Essence of Decision: Competing Rationalities
By Barry Nazar
Sometime around seventh grade, most of us were introduced to the “Scientific Method.” This was further reinforced with problem solving skills, more science, deductive and inductive logic, and we came to expect a certain kind of rationality to explain things and to drive successful ventures in the real world. But, most of the time, that’s not what happens. The real world, especially in public affairs, seems almost chaotic, even stupid sometimes.
In a now classic work, Graham Allison (1971; and republished in 1999 with Zelikow) published a book which goes a long way to explaining the disparities. It’s really two tracks in one book. One track is about the Cuban missile crisis, and the other is about how decisions get made in the area of public affairs. The case study of the Cuban missile crisis is merely a source of examples for examining the decision models Allison describes.
Allison lays out three distinct kinds of rationality that operate simultaneously. The first, he calls the “Rational Actor” model. This is the one we were taught in junior high school and have come to expect as the proper mode of operation. It presumes a “substance rationality” where there is a single goal to be value-optimized by all choices and actions. The paradigm requires that the whole system (the proverbial “they”) act as though it were a single rational actor. The benefits for achieving optimum outcomes are obvious and appealing in this approach.
In reality, however, things are usually carried out by organizations. And so, there is a second model, called the “Organizational Output” model that operates by “process rationality.” Successful organizations devote a great deal of attention to establishing standard operating procedures to insure reliable outputs. They also tend to avoid risk, create negotiated environments, and look after their own survival as the preeminent objective. As Herbert Simon (1997) notes, they do not optimize, they rather “satisfice” at levels that are considered good enough. It’s actually smart return on investment. They identify problems in light of their existing routines and they develop solutions that also deploy within existing routines. This gives rise to: new problem, same solution. When organizations confront completing goals, they resort to “sequencing.” That is, they look at goals one at a time with a kind of selective blindness that allows them to move on even though their outputs may be inconsistent with each other.
Organizations are basically seesaws balancing inevitable dilemmas about individual vs. group, purpose vs. process, centralize vs. decentralize, and stability vs. change. So, any given problem, when handled by an organization, becomes subject to “process rationality” as deemed necessary for the organization to hold itself together. The end output, therefore, is something far less optimal than what the “Rational Actor” model would dictate.
Another basic reality is that decisions are made by persons. These are players in positions, with unequal power. Often, they are not even in the same organization, but several or many organizations. They are linked together by “action channels;” that is, channels of influence by virtue of their positions and the actual and perceived power that accompanies their position. Thus, there is the third, “Political Resultant” model, where “plural rationality” operates.
To demonstrate, suppose there is a crisis event, like a school shooting. This will trigger an action channel that might involve: law enforcement, school administrators, the mental health professionals, primary health professionals, Homeland Security, local politicians, and any number of parent and community groups. The resulting decisions about responding to the crisis will be shaped by the interactions among these players on the action channel. And, this interaction among players occurs as a kind of “bargaining” based on actual and perceived power of each player and their position.
The dynamics are well described by “game theory” and so the action can be viewed as a game (not in the trivial sense of recreational games). Further, there are rules of the game, although it is rare that they would be written anywhere. One must earn a place on an action channel by promoting their position or doing favors for others with access to action channels. Once on an action channel, one must play, or lose their place in future games. Winning and losing shapes one’s influence in future games. The players are usually very busy, usually have an agenda of priorities, and their interest in a given game is determined by that pre-existing agenda. So, for each, there are high priority games and low priority games. In lower priority games, it is important at the very least to be on the winning side. Most players, therefore, try to hold back as long as they can on low priority games to size up where the winning side is. On high priority games the players who are most prepared, confident, assertive, and willing to use their power generally have the advantage. Even still, everyone thinks they spoke louder than they did, and believes they were heard more attentively than they were. Every player is busy and their attention is limited.
The political resultant model also has dynamics between “Chiefs and Indians. “ It is the Chiefs who sit on the action channels. It is their Indians (subordinates) who often try to push the Chiefs into action. The Chiefs often stall as much as they can for further clarification about where the game is heading. There is also the expectation among Chiefs that if I help you in your game, you will help me with my problem. A lot of unexpected dynamics emerge from these expectations. Players may align in very unexpected ways on a given issue because of past interactions having nothing to do with the current issue at hand.
The point of all this is that there are multiple rationalities at work. If we are cognizant only of the Rational Actor, substance rationality, we are destined to be surprised and disappointed over and over. There are process rationalities and plural rationalities also operating in affairs of any consequence. They are essential to understanding and shaping outcomes.
You could have the most solid, scientifically proven , best ever, evidenced-based practice for saving the world (a Rational Actor dream). When it gets handed to an organization to deliver, however, it will become subject to the process rationalities of that organization. And, further, whether it sees the light of day will be subject to the plural rationalities of players in positions with pre-existing agendas who will bargain away what organization gets to implement it and whether it gets to implementation intact, or as a mere fragment of its original design.
As troublesome as these other rationalities are, trying to subvert them is a worse medicine than the ailment. History is full of experiments aimed at circumventing matters to a pure Rational Actor model. Benito Mussolini made the trains run on time, but the final destination was not so happy. Better is to understand and appreciate that there are multiple kinds of rationality. What may look chaotic or even stupid, actually has rational antecedents. Without process rationality organizations could not exist. Without plural rationality, free societies could not exist. The trick is to understand that the way things are, currently, is not an endpoint. Things are always in dynamic flux and today is merely an approximation in an endless evolution of conditions. Understanding all three rationalities can give one a special advantage in shaping the direction of the ongoing evolution of conditions.
Allision, G.T. & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. (2 Ed.). London: Longman Publishers.
Simon, H.A. (1997). Administrative Behavior. (4th Ed.). New York: The Free Press.