On Coup Attempt

On Coup Attempt

1. We condemn this coup unequivocally
2. Culpability must be determined through due process
3. This is likely to make Erdogan more authoritarian and ruthless

What happened?

On Friday, 15th July a group of middle-ranking Turkish soldiers attempted a coup

Their focus was on Ankara and Istanbul, taking control of the Istanbul’s bridges, airports, the Turkish parliament, and some police stations

Their attempted coup was ill-planned and badly executed

Their efforts were thwarted by the police and public

Killed > 160 civilians, 104 coup soldiers. Wounded > 1,500

The government has blamed the coup on its ‘default scapegoat’, FethullahGulen. Some govt ministers have also blamed the US administration

John Kerry has rebuked the Turkish Foreign Minister for these slurs, saying it harms bilateral relations.

Aftermath – As of 19 July evening

29,464 suspended from civil service

1,577 deans were asked to resign

21,000 teachers in private schools had their licences revoked

6,319 soldiers are in custody

950 civilians arrested

3 newspapers were denied printing facilities

20 news websites were blocked in Turkey

2,745 members of the judiciary were among the suspended civil service personnel

Who is behind this coup?

We really do not know. It is too early to say.

What we do know is that Erdogan is capitalising on this to purge state and society

The scale and speed of the purge proves he is it above and beyond the coup plotters.

Many suggest he is simply purging non-loyalists.

How did the government determine the culpability of 20,000 judges, prosecutors and civil servants in a coup overnight?

The govt says these people were already being investigated and it merely accelerated the process?

So the coup helped determine these peoples guilt somehow; how?

Furthermore, this does not sound realistic bec the govt has been for the past 3 yrs

Media reports suggest it purged 60,000 people since corruption invest in 2013

So theoretically, it has already purged those associated with other groups. So who are these people?

Furthermore, we are seeing the type of people being purged, people like a member of the Consititutional court who has been critical of the govt internet ban – basically non-loyalists.

Has Gulen condemned the coup?

Absolutely and unequivocally

In the early hours of the coup, the Alliance for Shared Values, an organisation that speaks on behalf of Gulen, condemned the coup attempt. This was followed by a personal statement by Gulen, and by leading Gulen inspired organsiations condemning the coup without if’s and but’s.

Gulen’s condemnation was picked up by the world press, including the FT.

So why has Erdogan blamed Gulen for this coup?

Gulen and Hizmet is Erdogan’s “default scapegoat”. Whenever something happens that he does not approve, he blames it on Gulen.

Be it a condemnatory report by the EU, a condemnatory letter from 75 US Senators or anything else. Gulen becomes a convenient pretext to purge state and society of anyone not entirely loyal.

In an interview on SundayGulen said the govt may have orchestrated this coup on itself to gain more power. Seriously?

Gulen has given three interviews since this coup. On whether this was a hoax coup staged by Erdogan Gulen says that cannot say this as he has no way of knowing but that this must be kept within the realm of possibility.

However, that Gulen says that this should be kept within the realm of possibility should not be miscontrued. When asked if any of his followers were involved he gives a similar response saying “I cannot know who all my followers are; how can I say no one that is inspired by me was involved, let it be investigated by an international body and I’ll accept their findings”. By saying so, he is being consistent in keeping that within the realm of possibility also.

So the Turkish people stood with President Erdogan against the military? I thought they hated that guy?

Erdogan’s support among the Turkish electorate was approximately 40-50 per cent before this coup. So he already had widespread support.

Even those staunchly critical of Erdogan and the government condemned the coup and stood by the government.

Crucially, the coup plotters failed to project the sense that their coup was succeeding which coup experts point out as crucial.

There was no support for a military takeover by the Turkish people

Why have the people opposed Erdogan in the past? What has he done that has made people so unhappy?

In his 1st and 2nd terms, Erdogan ran a reforming government.

However, from 2010 onwards, Erdogan became increasingly authoritarian as he began to pursue more populist Islamist policies. The summer 2013 Gezi park protests was in reaction to this authoritarianism which Erdogan labelled as a coup of the “interest rate lobby”, a euphemism for the Jewish lobby.

This authoritarian streak gained momentum when a series of corruption investigations implicating Erdogan’s inner circle went public in December 2013 onwards. To suppress the substantial evidence and judicial investigations, Erdogan fought back to control and colonise the judiciary, media and civil society to crush all forms of dissent.

Many people are unhappy with the resulting authoritarian regime.

What now?

Erdogan has already won. There won’t be any meaningful opposition to his witch-hunt against opposition groups from now on.

Till now, the Chief of General Staff resisted Erdogan’s attempts of redesigning the military. The Chief of staff has now given into that.

Having attained complete loyalty from Turkish state and civil society structures, Erdogan next stop is likely to be the Turkish diaspora overseas.

We are already seeing coordinated attacks against Hizmet overseas and this is likely to continue.

For the past 6 years Erdogan has been creating formal and informal structures through which to mobilize the Turkish-speaking and increasingly wider Muslim communities.

On Gulen and Hizmet

Why is Gulen Erdogan’s “default scapegoat”?

1. Hizmetcriticises: As per all his critics, Erdogan wants to silence Hizmet.
2. Erdogan’s notion of political Islam is antithetical to Hizmet’s projection of civil Islam. Erdogan came closer to Hizmet on renouncing political Islam; he became openly hostile to Hizmet as he reverted back to his version of political Islam
3. Hizmet had widespread network. This gives illusion of “they are everywhere” allowing Erdogan to “mass purge” and go after seemingly unrelated sectors & people. He couldn’t sack judges following coup without claim of underlying link. Hizmet’s extensive network of schools and alumnis gives support to that illusion.
4. Ready made narrative: Easier to blame group already criminalised in hearts and minds of Erdogan supporters.

Has Hizmet created a parallel state in Turkey?

1. Between 2000 and 2006 Gulen was tried and acquitted by Turkey’s staunchly secular courts on charges of infiltrating the state. His acquittal was upheld by Turkey’s highest court of appeal in 2008. The case against him included every piece of ‘argument’ and ‘evidence’ flaunted in the media today. Had there been any truth to this claim, Gulen would have been found guilty then. Remember, Gulen’s acquittal was upheld in 2008, the same year the AKP party was found guilty by the same judiciary for being the centre of religious fundamentalism.
2. The movement focuses on education and upward social mobility through schools and social projects. It had approximately 400 of the best schools in the country. It is a statistical inevitability that graduates of these schools will take up positions in the state sector. That in itself is not proof of guilt.
3. A public official’s affinity to a particular philosophy, worldview, religion or even political party (as they vote) is not illegal or immoral. Their very presence cannot be considered suspect. The question must be whether such people contravene the law. The claim that they do needs to be proven in court; it has not.
4. It is not impossible to prove this allegation in the age of digital footprint and in a Turkey which has an intelligence service that is not accused of being controlled by the movement. So why has it not been proven?
5. If Hizmet wanted to control the state it could easily do so by forming a political party. Why waste time and resources with opening schools in obscure parts of the world when you can win elections in Turkey and ‘take over the state’ that way?

How would you describe FethullahGulen

1. A mainstream Sunni-Hanafi Islamic scholar and peace advocate that has inspired a transnational movement to engage in social, educational and dialogue activities for the welfare and wellbeing of society in general.

How would you describe the movement?

1. An Islamically-inspired social movement based on service and altruism
2. Aiming to reimagine what it means to be a Muslim in the 21st century
3. With a focus on education, dialogue and relief work
4. And values of empathy, care, compassion, social responsibility & dialogue

Is the movement a cult?

1. Gulen is not a cult leader, neither is the movement a cult because a cult by definition means and entails an unorthodox, extremist, or false religion or sect whose followers often live outside of conventional society under the direction of a leader who seeks blind allegiance and blind loyalty.

1. Gulen’s theological position on religion is not unorthodox, reformist, modernist or extremist. Rather he offers new perspectives on the basis of sacred text via authentic methods of interpretation.

1. The movement he inspires is not extremist and certainly does not live outside of conventional society. To the contrary, Gulen constantly encourages integration and is against all forms of ghettoisation.

1. Gulen seeks to avoid being the centre of attention or attracting allegiance to himself. He often complains and corrects terms such as ‘Gulen movement’, Gulen followers, Gulen schools.

Why are some people scared Hizmet?

1. Hizmet’s religious dimension irks some Kemalists who are very weary of religious manifestation owing to Turkey’s past and present.
2. Hizmet’s notion of civil Islam is antithetical to the governing party’s political Islam and authoritarian governance.
3. The size and scale of Hizmet has been a cause of concern for others who are sceptical of all things big.
4. The difficulty of classifying Hizmet has also caused some people to doubt its aims and work
5. Hizmet’s Turkey reflexes, not necessarily volunteering one’s point of inspiration owing to fear of persecution as per the current practice in Turkey, has also baffled some and caused some to doubt it.
6. Some see Hizmet as a threat to their status quo and are fearful of that.