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INTRODUCTION
Within the realist school of international relations, two primary power-equilibrium camps of explanatory theories for war exist: the “balance” camp hypothesizes that peace lasts in systems with equally strong powers or alliances that balance each other, whereas the “polarity” camp hypothesizes that the existence of hegemons or superpowers best maintains peace[1]. Scholars admit there has been a long debate between the two camps, and disagreement over which theory better predicts the outbreak of war[2]. Both theories rest on mutually exclusive assumptions about the international system, and both have numerous case- and large-N studies to back them up. While the overall debate is interesting, this paper will focus on the assumptions, models, debates, and research methods of the polarity camp, and specifically, Power Transition Theory.
Organski first proposed Power Transition Theory in 1958, in a book called World Politics[3]. Organski introduced a new set of assumptions about the international order: Organski proposed that the international system was not anarchy but instead an implicit order based on the rules imposed by great powers, challenging the predominant Balance of Power Theory. Some smaller powers under this rule are satisfied; others are not. When dissatisfied states rise to challenge the power of the dominant state, war is likely[4]. The mechanism of war is debated[5], but it is generally agreed upon by Power Transition theorists that the faster the rise of a challenger state within a dyad, and the closer to equal the power of the two states, the more likely war becomes[6].
Power Transition Theory’s importance lies in its ability to predict the likelihood of future wars, allowing policymakers to concentrate diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts more efficiently. If Power Transition Theory has more explanatory power than Balance of Power Theory, then a shift away from dependence on balance theories would improve American and worldwide foreign policy efforts. Furthermore, Power Transition Theory has the potential to strengthen its measurements of power and conflict to increase its predictive power over time, allowing policymakers to better identify critical moments in power dynamics among state dyads such that they can take action. In addition, if policymakers have at their disposal an identified group of particularly significant antecedent conditions to power transition conflicts, then they would be able to change some of these conditions to dampen the risk of war.
One particularly urgent rising power case is that of China. Since the Cold War, the United States has remained the overwhelmingly dominant hegemon in the world, but within the next century, China’s rapidly growing economy and military are likely to rival that of the United States. Are China and the US barreling towards war? An improved Power Transition Theory framework will help policymakers in predicting, and thus managing, hostility between these two powers. Nevertheless, Power Transition Theory needs work, and certainly stronger models and tests to improve its predictive capabilities and to show whether, as a theory, it has greater predictive power than the competing balance theories.
I will propose through my research design to test Power Transition Theory as the literature currently maintains it, to better develop measurements of power and conflict, and to expand the key antecedent conditions of the theory. In this next section, therefore, I will review the literature of Power Transition Theory. I will identify what is known (and with how much confidence), where the debates lie, what deficiencies remain in Power Transition literature, and how my research will develop the theory as a whole. I intend to show that the literature is conceptually strong and identifies working mechanisms both in case studies and large-N studies, but that the correlations that scholars produce are weak due to both insufficient antecedent conditions and narrow definitions of power and conflict. My research design will incorporate intuitively important antecedent conditions; provide wider, more detailed, and more accurate measurements of power and conflict; and observe a wide range of both the independent variable (IV) and dependent variable (DV) to strengthen the test of the theory’s predictions. Furthermore, my research will allow me to identify the most significant antecedent conditions, such that policymakers may identify important ways to retard the risk of war.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Assumptions of the International Order
To assess what is known in Power Transition Theory, we should first review the fundamental assumptions of the theory, and then the conclusions that have been drawn in the last fifty years of literature. The generally accepted assumptions of Power Transition Theory[7] are as follows.
1) States are the primary actors in international politics.
Power Transition models do not incorporate non-state actors. Rather, the theory assumes they are small forces in international politics. Recently, we have seen that this is a significant limit on the explanatory power of the theory (for example, terrorist cells have significant impact on international politics).
2) State leaders are rational actors in the international arena.
State leaders act in rational self-interest for their states. While this tendency does not mean that all state leaders are interested in power, it does mean that states that are dissatisfied with the international order will try to make themselves powerful enough to change it.
3) The international order is hierarchically organized under the leadership of the dominant power.
Unlike Balance of Power Theory, Power Transition does not assume that the international system is anarchy but that an organization and set of rules exists, created by the dominant power in the system.
4) The rules for interactions between entities in the international political system are similar to those for domestic systems.
Like within a domestic system (that is, a state), the ruling party rules largely by maintaining a monopoly of power and enforces its rules with force. Individual actors and coalitions lobby the ruling power to change policy.
5) Military and economic growth, especially industrialization, are the primary means of enhancing power.
Entities or polities increase their power, and thus their ability to reorder the system, by expanding their economic, industrial, and military might. This increase in power is a means for a dissatisfied country to achieve a more desirable international order.
6) Alliances are inflexible and thus are not the primary means of enhancing power.
While Balance of Power Theory assumes that alliances can be broken and re-formed to address a perturbation in the balance of power[8], Power Transition Theory assumes that reforming alliances is difficult, due to ideological constraints, domestic politics, and the convergence of interests of two states in an alliance. Because breaking and reforming alliances is difficult, alliances are not the primary means through which a state accumulates power.
What makes Power Transition Theory consistently relevant is a further observation that the decline of hegemons is inevitable, due to the high costs of dominance. A dominant power must pay a high cost to sustain its dominance, including patrolling the seas, stationing troops in foreign countries, investing in new technologies, and bearing the burden of enforcing the international order. Smaller states can free ride on these expenditures, allowing them to spend less to catch up[9]. As other states rise in relation to the hegemon, those that are not satisfied with the order consider unseating the old power using force[10]. Alternatively, the declining hegemon, unsure of the intentions and ambitions of the rising power, has the choice of either appeasing the rising power or fighting a preventative war to keep the rising power from achieving dominance[11].
Explanatory Power
Many scholars have studied Power Transition Theory using large-N models of conflict and power to show an externally valid correlation between transitions in power and conflict[12]. Others have shown Power Transition mechanism at work using comparative case study and process-tracing methods[13]. Furthermore, scholars have tested Power Transition Theory using different measurements of power and have shown it to be a statistically significant predictor of war; indeed, some have shown it to have predicted the majority of wars since the 17th century[14]. Case studies of Europe and Asia have explored the mechanisms by which power transitions lead to war. Kumar shows that conflict between Pakistan, India, and China over the last half-century has been largely governed by individual countries’ critical points in capability[15], as well as power realignments, and suggests that joint mediating organizations be used to identify these points and to help these neighbors maintain peace during these tense periods[16]. Lemke shows that Power Transition theory can similarly be used to show when war will not happen—in the case of the Cold War, he uses Power Transition Theory to show why the Soviet Union and the US never resorted to full-scale warfare. He tracks US versus Soviet economic and industrial power and shows that Soviet power never came closer than being half that of US power and, further, that the gap between US and Soviet power consistently increased over time. Because the power differential was always large and
even growing, the Soviets and Americans never neared a power transition point and thus never went to war[17]. Nevertheless, while Power Transition Theory shows significant explanatory power, it contains “holes” and imperfections that have led to ongoing debates since it was introduced fifty years ago.
Debates on Theoretical Mechanisms
Debates in Power Transition Theory have sometimes focused on whether or not the theory has explanatory power[18], but they more commonly raise questions regarding accuracy of assumptions, proper measurements, and the workings of some intermediate mechanisms in the explanatory process. One of the most fundamental debates in the literature of the theory centers on whether or not the relative rate of decline of the larger power significantly changes the probability of war. As initially proposed by Organski, Power Transition Theory could be summarized by stating that the probability of war is directly proportional to the relative rate of decline of the larger power (that is, relative to the other state in the dyad) and inversely proportional to the difference in total power at that moment[19]. Authors like Geller agree and use the theory in this form to demonstrate significant predictive power[20]. But Kim, in two papers, challenges the notion, showing that Power Transition Theory has higher predictive power when rate of change is not taken into account, by running control (traditional theory) and experimental (no rate-of-change version) regressions on the same group of dyads[21].
Additional debate on the nature of transition focuses around critical points. Not surprisingly, critical points occur when a state’s power has either peaked or bottomed and is turning around. There is debate both in how to measure critical points and whether they are significant. Scholars like Chiu have measured critical points with respect to percent share of total world power[22], where others have measured them with respect to absolute power[23]. Both methods have shown to be effective, and some scholars believe that critical points are not only sufficient but also necessary concepts in Power Transition Theory[24]. While few other scholars have openly criticized or attacked this model, many have still simply failed to incorporate critical points into their models[25]. Other debates have shown similar one-sidedness.
Further debate centers on alliances. Organski and Kugler wrote that alliances, because of the difficulty with which one changes them, are not a primary means for a state to build power, and therefore do not play a significant role in the advent of war[26]. Some scholars saw this lack of attention to alliances as one of Power Transition’s primary weaknesses[27], but scholars like Kim have tried to tackle this issue and incorporate alliances into the Power Transition framework. Kim saw alliance transitions, similar to industrial or economic transitions, as strong motivators for war. If a small alliance neared power parity with a larger alliance, the risk of war increased. Especially important in alliance transitions, he said, was the fact that they could happen at a much higher rate of speed than industrial or economic transitions, increasing the crisis that both the growing and declining camp would face[28]. In these papers, Kim challenges the notion that alliances should be stricken from the model—while they may not be entirely flexible, alliance shifts do happen, and certainly affect the decisions of state leaders in power transition moments.
Debates on Measurement
The final large debate in Power Transition Theory focuses around measurements. In essence, tests of Power Transition center around a comparison between the power shifts between two nations in a dyad and the conflict that arises between them as a result. However, proper measurement of these two concepts has proven a contentious question in the literature. Many papers that test the theory use the binary measurement of whether or not war occurred as their sole conflict measure[29]. However, scholars have begun to use conflict codes to create an ordinal measurement to achieve a finer, more precise measurement of conflict; Geller seems to have led the way in developing this method[30]. While it is clear that a more precise measurement would lead to a tighter regression, it is not clear what the most proper measurement of conflict is. Similarly, many scholars debate what measure of power is best. Scholars have used GDP, military spending, industrialization, military strength, or some combination of these to encode for power. It may remain difficult to agree on a fundamental measure of power that indisputably captures the concept, but many scholars have tried novel means of power measurement both to better represent the concept and to better match the concept’s meaning to the mechanism in Power Transition Theory to which it corresponds. Houweling and Siccama use their own power code that they derive from military and industrial power[31]; Soysa, Oneal, and Park use a combination of GNP and the “Correlates of War Composite[32],” and claim that the strength of a Power Transition Theory test depends largely on the strength of the measurement of power used. Kumar uses only GNP[33], and Kim uses a specifically non-industrial economic and military power code to try to expand Power Transition Theory’s explanatory power beyond the Industrial Age[34]. While Power Transition’s explanatory power has grown, its central debates have remained largely unsettled, leaving a series of holes in the theory as a whole. I will attempt to remedy some of these issues in my own research.