Lobbying Across Arenas. Interest Group Involvement in the Legislative Process in Denmark

LOBBYING ACROSS ARENAS. INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN DENMARK

Abstract

Interest groups may approach political decision makers in two phases of the legislative process: the pre-parliamentary, administrative phase, in which billsare prepared by bureaucrats; and the parliamentary phase, in which billsare discussed and possibly revised by parliamentary committees. The article investigates the factors that lead groups to engage in these phases based on group proceedings for 225 bills presented to the Danish parliament in the 2009/2010 session. We conclude that resourceful groups are clearly more active in both arenas, but the parliamentary arena is also a venuefor voicing discontent and defending gains achieved in the administrative arena.

Introduction

It has always been important for interest groups to approach and put pressure on key decision makers to gain political influence. A major objective forinterest groups is to affect legislation with possible consequences for the group or cause they represent. The interaction between organized interests and decision makers is beneficial to democracy as interest groups provide decision makers with information about the citizens’ views and preferences. Interest group involvement may therefore strengthen concordance between legislative decisions and the citizens’ wishes. However, group involvement may also distort the political process, so that well-organized interests are promoted to the detriment of less well-organized and potentially the public good. Consequently it is of great interest to political scientists to determine which groups are heard, and when and why they are heard in the legislative process.

These questions have been investigated with different approaches. The US literature has primarily been concerned with lobbying of Congress (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Yackee 2005), and European – especially Scandinavian scholars – have focused on corporative arrangements arguing that parliaments are of minor importance since deals and compromises are struck before legislation even reaches parliament. Contacts to civil servants and cabinet members are regarded as more important than contacts to parliaments (Rokkan 1966; Binderkrantz 2003; Rommetvedt 2005). The cross-Atlantic differences have diminished, however, as recent studies conclude that corporatism has been in decline in the last couple of decades, while parliament has gained prominence (Christiansen et al. 2010; Öberg et al. 2011; Rommetvedt et al. 2013). This means that European countries may evolve in a pluralist direction and become more similar to the US system (Binderkrantz 2013; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008).

Interest groups may be seen as venue shoppers who approach relevant decision makers in bureaucracy and parliament, conduct media campaigns and mobilize members to affect decision making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Beyers 2004; Eising 2007; Kriesi, Tresch, and Jochum 2007). To expand our still limited knowledge of how groups combine different strategies in specific cases (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 147-167), the article poses the following research question: which interest groups are involved in administrative preparation and parliamentary reading of a bill, and when do groups use both venues rather than just one? The answers are important for our understanding and evaluation of the involvement of organized interests in the legislative process.

We investigate these questions using data on all bills (225) introduced in the 2009/10 session of the Danish parliament. Responses to administrative consultations are used as an indicator of administrative involvement in the legislative process, and contacts to parliamentary committees (letters and meetings) are used as an indicator of parliamentary involvement. We combine this documentary data with survey data in order to test the effect of group characteristics (resources, scope of interests, and position in the political system).

Danish parliamentary committees are comparatively strong; they control their own agendas and enjoy considerable power to suggest and write substantial amendments to government bills (Martin and Vanberg 2011; Mattson and Strøm 2004; Damgaard and Jensen 2006). In the relevant session (2009/10) the right-wing Danish People’s Party (DPP) was permanent support partyfor the Liberal-Conservative minority government.DPP did not support all government bills,[1]but the government was in reality an informal majority government, since important decisions were cleared with DPP. Even though Denmark is a unique case and group involvement is likely to be affected by country and institutional factors (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008), the lessons from Denmark are likely to be relevant for other multi-party systems with legislative bodies organized by parliamentary committees.

The next section places our research question in the broader literature on interest group involvement in the legislative process. Based on this, we develop our hypotheses and proceed to a detailed discussion of the Danish case and the research design. Finally we conduct our analysis, discuss the results and draw our conclusions.

Venue shopping in the legislative process

Our premise is that interest groups are rational strategic players in pursuit of influenceon public policy who operate under severe information restrictions and in difficult institutional settings (Richardson 2000; Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999). Groups have limited resources which they try to deploy in the most efficient way even if efficiency is often difficult to assess. Groups are per definition collective actors, but we assume that they are relatively capable of acting as unitary actors and of making deliberate choices about political strategies (cf. Scharpf 1991: 282ff.). For interest groups it is key to influence possible legislation concerning their members or their cause.

The legislative process provides interest groups with several access points. Typical accounts of policy making distinguish between agenda setting, preparation, decision making, and implementation (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008; John 2012). Here, we focus on the process from a draft bill is prepared in the administration until the final bill is adopted by parliament. In Denmark as in most Western European countries, the government is in control of the legislative agenda (Mattson 1995). The government proposes the large majority of bills and most of these are adopted by parliament (Döring 1995). This does not mean that parliament has no influence on the legislative process. Parliamentary majorities are needed and in parliamentary committees MPs can discuss, criticize and suggest amendments to government bills.

Overall, the legislative process tends to follow a predictable procedure. The government machinery usually prepares the bills with a view to the stands of the enacting political coalition and relevant societal interests. After preparation, bills are presented to parliament, which discusses the bill in committees and in plenary sessions and finally votes on it. In the case of lawmaking it is meaningful to say that one venue precedes the other – administrative consultations are conducted before billsare discussed in parliament – although there may be reiterations between the two venues. The lawmaking process implies that options and choices are reduced over time. Before the pen has touched the paper, 100% is in principle open to the decision makers. As the bill is being prepared, deals between parties, parliamentarians,and stakeholders are struck. After parliament’s final vote the shop is closed. Rational interest groups should therefore enter the decision making process at the earliest possible time (Christiansen, Nørgaard, and Sidenius 2004). Ceteris paribus administrative engagement should be more attractive than parliamentary engagement.

Characterizing the First Legislative Venue: the Bureaucracy

The genesis of public policy may involve many actors and venues in complex interplay. However, the bureaucracy always plays a key role. The bureaucracy is professional, it is permanent, it is part of and a main gatekeeper of the policy making machine, and it is capable of entering credible commitments. Interest groups may make long-term deals with the bureaucracy where interest group influence on public policy is exchanged for technical and political support (Bouwen 2004; Öberget al. 2011).

Corporatist structures are based on this kind of political exchange and ties between interest groups and the bureaucracy are multifarious: informal and formal contacts; different types of network; participation in committees for policy formation; policy advice; or policy implementation; participation in consultations etc. (Schmitter 1974; Beyers 2008; Binderkrantz 2005; Blom-Hansen 2001). In short, the bureaucracy is an actor with which interest groups may establish lasting relations for mutual benefit. Mutually beneficial exchangescome at a price, however:it is demanding; it takes resources; and it presupposes some group control over group members to deliver a credible interplay.

The Scandinavian countries are traditionally singled out as being among the most corporative (Siaroff 1999). If corporatism is defined as the institutionalized integration of privileged organized interests into policy formation and implementation (cf. Christiansen et al. 2010), the strongest materialization of corporatism has been interest group representation in boards and committees with policy preparation and implementation tasks. Measured this way corporatism has been in decline in Denmark – and the other Scandinavian countries as well – during the last couple of decades, especially in relation to policy preparation in corporatist committees (Rommetvedt et al. 2013; Öberg et al. 2011).

In the Danish case, de-corporatization implies that interest groups are still involved in policy formulation, but in a less institutionalized manner: the government machinery decides if groups should be involved in policy preparation, who should be involved, in which phases, and about what. Only one thing is beyond the control of the minister and bureaucracy: it is mandatory to carry through an administrative consultation before a bill is presented to parliament, and to report to parliament the stance of different stakeholders and the ministry’s response to those comments. Participation in administrative consultation may for some – probably most – interest groups turn out to be the only involvement with bureaucracy in relation to a bill, while others may have had preceding contacts.

Characterizing the Second Legislative Venue: Parliament

Interest groups have two motives to approach parliament. First, parliament enacts legislation. This gives parliamentarians a say in the lawmaking process. Even if parliamentarians are primarily active late in the birth of a bill, the final decision and possible adjustments are still left to parliamentarians (Norton 1999).

Second, parliamentarians are also agendasetters, and groups may be interested in lobbying to make parties address an issue in order to lift it to the decision making agenda (Blondel 1973; Norton 1999, 2002; Pedersen 2011; AndewegandNijzink 1995). Thus, interest groups may lobby parliaments in the lawmaking process because of a long-term project to raise an issue before parliament.

In relation to the lawmaking process the parliamentary committee system is the most important institution (Mattson and Strøm 2004, 91). In parliamentary committees information is gathered, questions are asked, and amendments are suggested (Mattson andStrøm2004; Martin and Vanberg 2011, 35). The extent to which information is actually gathered and discussed in committees and the extent to which committees are able to amend bills vary across political systems, but overall committees are important parliamentary arenas for interest groups to approach in relation to bills already presented to parliament.

Groups may gain direct influence on bills by successfully making parliamentary committees suggest amendments that are finally accepted in parliament. Further, groups may give opponents of the bill information they need to criticize the bill or give MPs in favor of the bill information that is useful for a defense. Hence, groups may offer information and political legitimacy in exchange for influence on the bill.

In the parliamentary sessions studied in this article, the government was, as mentioned, close to being an informal majority government because of the DPP’s support to 98 % of its bills (see note 1). If a government and its supporting party strike deals on bills before they are presented, the impetus to invest resources in parliamentary contacts is weakened, but not killed. Almost all bills are changed throughout the legislative phase, and groups may still have a chance to affect part of the bill.

The Interplay between the Bureaucratic and the Parliamentary Arena

Interest groups use a wide variety of influence strategies,and generally combine different tactics and strategies also when they seek influence on specific issues (Beyers 2004;BinderkrantzandKrøyer 2012;Kriesi, Tresch, and Jochum 2007). However, since we know very little about the interplay between interest groups’ strategies and behavior in the bureaucratic and the parliamentary arena, we have to base our hypotheses on assumptions about the groups as well as the legislative process.

First, based on the argument that early involvement is preferable to late involvement, we expect more groups to engage in administrative preparation than in parliamentary reading.

Second, we argue that lobbying requires resources and that groups base their lobbying decisions on cost-benefit calculations. It costs to use more venues – that is, proceed to parliament after responding to the administrative consultation. Groups therefore need to believe that it is possible to gain more influence in parliament than they did in the bureaucratic arena, or find it necessary to invest resources in protecting already won concessions.

Relationships between Group Characteristics and Lobbying Behavior

As argued above, lobbying is costly, and an almost trivial hypothesis is that resourceful interest groups are generally more active in lobbying the legislative process through both venues, because they are simply better equipped. It is costly to produce thorough consultation responses or professional letters to bureaucrats and/or parliamentary committees, and to acquire expertise (Bukstiand Johansen 1979; Leyden 1995; Christiansen and Nørgaard 2003). Hence, we propose the following hypothesis 1:

H1There is a positive relation between resources and activities in the administrative as well as in the parliamentary arena.

Money is not everything, however. Since groups must know the political agenda and be affected by it in order to mobilize, we argue that 1) groups with a privileged position and 2) groups with a broad policy scope are more active as lobbyists. Privileged position refers to existing, close and institutionalized relationships with political decision makers. Privileged groups are likely to be better informed about the legislative process, and generally there is much variation between insiders with good access to policy making and groupsthat do not occupy similar positions (Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin 1994). Policy scope refers to the broadness of interests of a group and it differs tremendously. Some groups have a narrow relation to the political decision making machinery because their cause or members are only affected by few political regulations. Other groups have a much broader policy scope because they and their members are interested in many policy areas and are affected by many policy regulations (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 157-59; Browne 1990; HalpinandBinderkrantz 2011; Olson 1982, 47ff.). A peak-level business association may have interests in policies on tax, environmental protection, trade, education, and research etc. In contrast, an animal welfare group may have a much narrower political agenda. A larger number of proposed bills are likely to affect and hence mobilize the business association compared to the animal welfare organization.

In sum, we argue that privileged groups are better informed and enjoy closer contacts to political decision makers and that groups with broad political interests are more likely to be affected and thus mobilized by the political agenda than groups with narrow interests. This leads us to expect as follows:

H2Privileged groups are more active in administrative consultations as well as in parliament.

H3Groups with broad policy interests are more active in administrative consultations as well as in parliament.

General resources such as money, staff, privileged position and policy scope are all expected to have a positive impact on group activity across both arenas. However, other types of resources may have different values across arenas. Since resource exchanges between interest groups and decision makers depend on the arena (Halpin, Baxter, and MacLeod 2012; Salisbury 1984; Binderkrantz et al. 2012), decision makers in different arenas may prioritize different assets differently. Whereas bureaucrats especially need expertise when revising draft bills, members of parliament ask for political support, legitimacy and possibly stories of news value they can use to put pressure on the government (Binderkrantz et al. 2012; Bouwen 2004). Groups possess these assets to varying extents and as rational actors they exploit them most efficiently. Groups with control over important societal functions have a long history of enrollment into corporatist structures (Rokkan 1966).Some groups, such as business groups, unions, and organizations of public institutions, are particularly interesting for bureaucrats because their area of operation is related to society’s productive system. Lindblom (1977) talks about the “privileged” position of business, because business controls society’s material production.These groups can control insider resources, which are especially relevant for the administrative arena where bureaucrats ask for expertise. In contrast, citizen groups such as public interest organizations or groups of citizens with shared characteristics such as patients, elderly or students (we call these groups identity groups) do not possess these insider resources. Instead they possess outsider resources by representing a popular cause or personal misfortune, e.g., citizens with disabilities. It may be difficult for such groups to influence bureaucrats, but they may have more success approaching politicians who are looking for stories of news value. It may therefore be more rational to approach the parliament rather than the administration, which leads us to hypothesize that the following:

H4 Groups with insider resources (business groups, trade unions and organizations of public institutions) are more likely to approach the administration than the parliament in the legislative process.

H5 Groups with outsider resources (identity and public interest groups) are more likely to approach the parliament than the administration.

The five hypotheses all relate to the level of activity in administrative preparation and parliamentary committees respectively. But what makes groups use both venues rather than just one of them in the legislative process?

It is fair to assume that resourceful groups are active in both arenas in connection with a specific bill. However, even rich interest groups need to consider the return of their investments. Specific circumstances related to the individual bill are more likely to influence groups’ decisions to spend even more resources using a dual-venue strategy – that is contacting parliamentary committees after engaging in administrative consultations on the same bill – than general group characteristics. We argue that 1) a negative stance towards the bill and 2) lack of success in the administrative phase are the most important factors in explaining dual-venue lobbying. First, if a group supports a bill or only has minor objections to it, it is not rational for the group to invest more resources in going to parliament – except, perhaps, to monitor the legislative process. This group can invest its resources better on other issues. Second, even groups with major objections may stop lobbying if all their objections are met in the administrative arena, because there is little to gain from further costly engagement in the parliamentary arena – except defending their gains. Groups in a loser’s domain at the first venue have an incentive to take their chances again at the next venue – especially if they begin to see a chance of actually gaining influence in parliament. We hypothesize as follows: