Human Rights Internet
Operationalising SCRes 1325
South Sudan
This report is intended to provide interested international parties with recommendations for promoting and enhancing the roles of women in peace processes, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), or SCR 1325. We have taken as our focus the participation pillar of SCR 1325, following on the work in a 2010 publication of the Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy, SCR 1325 and Women’s Participation: Operational Guidelines for Conflict Resolution and Peace Processes (or 1325 Guidelines).
Although our starting point is the application of the 1325 Guidelines, given the context outlined below it may be more feasible to view the question at hand as how to promote and enhance the roles of women in public life in South Sudan more generally. When the exercise began (Spring 2012), the Government of the Republic of South Sudan was in negotiations with the Government of the Sudan over various issues (the talks have since concluded; see Background, below); no women were at the table. This was not merely an oversight or a reflection of a lack of a mechanism. One of SCR 1325's limitations – aside from being non-binding – is that it does not fully and explicitly address the obstacles to women's participation in peace processes. Some of these obstacles can be practical, such as women's often limited access to resources or a comparatively low level of formally recognised training. There can also be more socially-constructed obstacles, such as little effective access to power and decision making, bringing about a self-fulfilling situation of there being few or no women in peace processes because there are few or no women in a position to bring about the participation of women (and men historically have a poor record of doing this). The lack of women at the recent talks is a reflection of this.
As well, in the specific case of South Sudan there are dire, myriad needs and never, it seems, enough resources. The effects of years of both neglect and civil war are being exacerbated by continuing, if low-level, conflict and rampant corruption. Although the international community has been and remains generous in supporting South Sudan, the needs – and the dearth of internally-generated funds – dwarf available resources. Ultimately, one of South Sudan's greatest resources will be its people and aiding in the promotion of women's roles in developing the country - broadly speaking, the effective implementation of SCR 1325 - could be the most important contribution the international community can make to this young state.
In taking a broad reading of the participation pillar and the 1325 Guidelines, we aim to identify ways in which the international community may contribute to the development of an environment in which women will play more appropriate – i.e., more active, more prominent – roles in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. This can and should include involvement in the processes which will need to follow the talks mentioned above. In concert with this, however, it will be important to help to develop the underpinnings of this ability to participate in public life, for this is a prerequisite for the effective implementation of SCR 1325.
Background:
Less than two years into its independence, South Sudan is in a precarious and complex situation. Many of the gaps in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) – reached between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), now the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoRSS) - remain unaddressed. Partly as a result of this South Sudan is still in conflict with the Sudan, over both disputed borders and the division of oil revenues (most of the oil is found in South Sudan but it is exported through a pipeline to Port Sudan in “the North”). The conflict over borders has resulted in overt hostilities between the two states, though through a sort of triangulation as one of the parties is the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N), widely seen as allied with the GoRSS though resident in the disputed areas.
The conflict over sharing of oil revenues resulted in South Sudan stopping oil production in January, 2012 which, in turn, meant a loss of almost all of its self-generated revenue (i.e., not including international aid). In September, a series of agreements on oil revenues, security, and other matters (the “Addis Agreements”) was reached between the two governments, though even if the arrangement concerning oil revenues is fully implemented (not a sure thing[1]) it will be months before oil – and, consequently, revenues - begin to flow again. In the meanwhile, the almost exclusive source of domestically-generated GoRSS revenues has been interrupted.[2] As well, the agreement includes a payment to the GoS of approximately $3B over a period of three and a half years to help compensate for the GoS's loss of oil revenues as a result of South Sudan’s secession; when compared with GoRSS's projected expenditures in its 2012/2013 budget of approximately $1.5B, this represents a very large draw upon GoRSS resources. It may also add to political divisions within South Sudan.
Although the September agreements do cover a range of security and border issues, it must be noted that any resolution to the disputes over Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan remains to be achieved.
Additionally, inter-communal violence – long a feature on the landscape of South Sudan – continues to flare up. On the surface at least much of this has to do with traditional cattle-raiding (generally for bride payments) and the abduction of women. As bad as these conflicts have been, they are aggravated by the increased presence of automatic weapons, mounting pressure on resources thanks in part to the needs of returning refugees and IDPs, ecological pressures, inflation (if this can be how one describes an increase in the “price” of brides), and a general erosion of traditional means of limiting and resolving such conflicts. As well, it can be assumed that the Government in Khartoum may be encouraging the violence; certainly, there is precedent for such involvement during the civil war.
As an overlapping phenomenon, there remain active rebel movements in South Sudan, with violence in Jonglei involving a militia led by David Yau Yau being at the centre of recent incidents. As well,the Sudan People's Liberation Movement for Democratic Change party of Lam Akol is suspected of having links to armed groups.[3] While these also have ethnic dimensions, they are centred on access to economic and political power, though with cattle raiding and abduction of women being a recurring manifestation of at least the violence associated with Yau Yau. Finally, there is the continuing threat of violence from the Lord's Resistance Army, a group which has enjoyed the support and indulgence of the GoS in the past.
These security threats must all be understood in the context of the uneven capacity of South Sudanese security services. Both the SPLA and the South Sudan Police Services have limited training as modern, disciplined security forces bound by civilian oversight and human rights norms. Additionally, they have each had to absorb members of various militias with even less training.
Finally, good governance is a major problem in South Sudan. Corruption is generally seen as having been rife in the years between the signing of the CPA and independence, with the standard explanation being that senior SPLM/A officials were preparing for what they assumed would be a return to all-out conflict with Khartoum. As well, while the GoRSS, quite understandably, lacks general capacity it also appears to be already suffering what could be the beginnings of a crisis of political confidence in its leadership. There is an impression that President Salva Kiir is not nearly effective enough (though that may be more a measure of the tasks and his resources than a measure of the man) and there have been rumblings of internal dissatisfaction with his performance. The inter-ethnic tensions referred above also come into play, with jealousies of Dinka dominance of the GoRSS and SPLM/A never far from the surface. The Government's success – or lack thereof – in selling the terms of the recent Addis Agreements with the GoS and their successful implementation will likely be a key indicator of Kiir's political future and stability within South Sudan.
Against this backdrop, South Sudan is still in the throes of early post-conflict nation building. A staggering array of needs must be met and one cannot blame the many constituencies for finding that their patience is being tested by an apparent lack of progress on any number of fronts. With an economy which has yet to find its feet and further hobbled by both a lack of infrastructure and the above-mentioned throttling of oil revenues, these needs are even more difficult to address.
Women and Gender Issues:
In terms of women’s participation, the situation is at best a mixed bag. On the one hand, there have been strong political statements made in favour of the equality of women and men. The ruling SPLM has made gender equality an explicit part of its politics for almost 20 years, women’s rights were recognised in the Machakos Protocol which led to the CPA, women played key roles in the peace movement over the years, and women’s equality is recognised in both the Interim and Transitional Constitutions of South Sudan. The Transitional Constitution stipulates that at least 25% of representatives at all levels of government and in governmental institutions and commissions should be female. As well, as a result of deaths and displacements from the civil war, women head a large minority of households and many have engaged in non-traditional livelihoods in recent decades. Finally, there is a great deal of international attention paid to gender questions in South Sudan; indeed, one could say that the Sudan peace process emerged in the age of SCR 1325, really beginning to gain traction in 2002.
On the other hand, traditional views and practises remain strong among many South Sudanese and these tend to favour men and male-dominated institutions. For all that women have been key to civil society and the peace movements they were largely excluded from the CPA negotiations and from the negotiations leading to the recent Addis Agreements. The systemic disadvantages women have experienced have also resulted in them having a much lower level of literacy than men (16% compared to 40%, according to the World Bank[4]), making it even more difficult for them to take on formal roles of responsibility. South Sudan is not yet a party to the CEDAW and has not ratified the African Union's Maputo Protocol. The Transitional Constitution's 25% quota has been met in only a few areas of Government. Many of the pressing needs of South Sudan – including the conflicts mentioned above and the pressures of returnees – have made it difficult for the GoRSS to bring adequate attention and resources to bear upon the fundamental questions of establishing, enforcing, and reinforcing the equality of the sexes.
This problem permeates the landscape of South Sudan. There is a Ministry of Gender, Child, and Social Welfare (for the purposes of this report, the Ministry of Gender, MoG) which is tasked with, i.a., promoting the roles of women, including mainstreaming a gender perspective throughout the Government. (There are State level counterparts.) It has an exceeding small budget as an overall percentage of Government spending, approximately 0.2% in 2011/2012, reportedly the smallest allocation of any line ministry. As well, it lacks capacity, as evidenced by the fact that is spent less than half of its budget in 2011/2012. It should also be noted that the Gender Directorate is only one part of the Ministry; the Social Welfare Directorate concerns itself with, among other things, rehabilitation of injured war veterans, surely a costly undertaking. Thus, even 0.2% of Government spending overstates the resources dedicated to the Gender Directorate’s work.
The MoG is widely seen as having an important role to play in the implementation of SCR 1325 but also as being not at all up to the task. Interlocutors do not criticise the MoG too harshly, understanding that it is typical of the GoRSS in terms of its need to develop capacity and secure resources.
Complementing the MoG is civil society. Civil society organisations (CSOs) have been very active in working on both peace and gender issues in South Sudan but, like the MoG, suffer from a lack of both capacity and resources in almost every conceivable way. Typically, the problems are most critical outside of the capital but even in Juba training, language, literacy, and material resources (including core funding for staff) are wanting. What CSOs do tend to have, however, is determination and a strong sense of the population's needs (which, indeed, often mirror their own). For both the MoG and CSOs, it would be unfair to say that they have no capacity, only that what capacity does exist does not match the many calls upon it.
Female parliamentarians are another group which needs support. The 25% quota, while a useful tool, has resulted in the sadly common situation of parliamentarians who are not always qualified for their positions, lacking the skills – including sometimes language skills – one would expect in an effective parliamentarian. This is not exclusively – nor universally – a problem faced by female parliamentarians but for women the difficulties and obstacles faced are both more common and more profound. Cultural norms still do not fully accept female politicians, and even travelling to constituencies (already complicated by lack of funds, distance, and sometimes effectively complete inaccessibility) can be perilous due to both a general lack of security and specific violence directed against women.
Support for SCR 1325 appears quite strong among many who are in fact aware of its existence, but this is an important qualifier. The population in general and even some legislators remain largely unaware of SCR 1325, let alone its implications. As well, there appears to be an acceptance on the part of some in Government that, whatever the merits of implementing SCR 1325, it is a secondary matter, of lesser importance than the many other challenges facing the new nation. (One might point to the fact that no women were members of the committee which was established to help draw up the recent austerity budget, for example. The presence or lack of women on such a committee does not guarantee that gender issues will or will not be taken into consideration; it does, however, seem less likely that an all-male committee would include gender concerns in their deliberations.) Building broad support for the resolution will require, at base, an awareness campaign which will be complicated by the various languages of South Sudan and the low literacy rate, particularly among women.
There have, however, been steps taken to develop a National Action Plan (NAP) to support the implementation of SCR 1325. A group of CSOs have both undertaken monitoring of South Sudan's current adherence to the resolution and begun a process of developing input into the NAP. The development of the NAP naturally falls to the MoG and preliminary work on this has begun in that a consultant has begun to look at the draft National Gender Policy and has begun consulting with CSOs regarding the NAP. A meeting between the Ministry, CSOs, and international supporters is expected to take place in early 2013 to formally kick off the process[5]. The above-mentioned problems of lack of capacity and resources which plague both the Ministry and CSOs can be expected to slow progress on this front and also implementation of an eventual NAP. As well, questions remain as to the priority that gender issues have in the GoRSS.
Insecurity remains a major preoccupation for South Sudanese women. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) appears to be widespread, though this is in large part based on anecdotal evidence as there is a scarcity of data regarding violations. Some of this lack of hard data is a reflection of the vacuum left during the civil war and its aftermath; some can also be put down to a reluctance among women and their families to report SGBV because of stigma, traditional views of women's rights (or lack thereof) in cases of domestic violence, and a lack of faith in the possibility of prosecution of perpetrators. This last aspect is reinforced in some cases by the role of the security services and others in positions of authority in committing the violence.[6] The security services and the judiciary are also in great need of gender sensitivity training.
It must be noted that while SGBV certainly includes, for instance, rape and domestic violence, other forms of SGBV include the abduction of women and forced – and often early – marriage. These phenomena are culturally sanctioned and can be both causes and consequences of conflict and even forms of conflict resolution. Addressing these forms of SGBV will be difficult and long-term endeavours.