Great Northern Railway Company V Swaffield

Great Northern Railway Company v Swaffield

(1874) LR 9 Exch 132

Chapter 5 (page 244)

Relevant facts

On 5 July 1872, Swaffield sent a horse on a Great Northern Railway Company (‘GMRC’) railway line to himself at Sandy Station.The fare was prepaid.When the horse arrived at Sandy Station at 10pm there was no one to receive it.The station master directed that the horse be taken to a nearby stable for the night.

Soon after the horse had been sent to the stable, one of Swaffield’s servants arrived at the station to collect the horse.The station master told the servant that the horse was at the stable and he could have it on payment of the cost of the stabling.The servant refused to pay and the horse remained at the stable for the night.

The following day Swaffield arrived at the station and complained to the station master.The station master offered to pay the cost of stabling the horse and let Swaffield take it away. Swaffield refused.GNRC later offered to deliver the horse to Swaffield without payment of any charges but he refused to receive it without payment of a sum for his expenses and loss of time.Finally on 18 November 1872, the station master paid the stabling costs and sent the horse with a porter to Swaffield’s residence.

GNRC brought an action to recover the cost of the stabling from Swaffield.A jury in the County Court decided in favour of Swaffield.GNRC appealed.

Legal issue

Did the emergency circumstances give GNRC the authority to act on behalf of Swaffield and engage the services of the stable?

Decision

On 22 April 1874, the Court of Exchequer unanimously reversed the County Court’s decision.The court decided that GNRC had acted reasonably in putting the horse in the stable and that Swaffield was liable for the charges which they had paid.

According to Baron Pollock:

Now, in my opinion it was the duty of the plaintiffs, as carriers, although the transit of the horse was at an end, to take such reasonable care of the horse as a reasonable owner would take of his own goods; and if they had turned him out on the highway, or allowed himto go loose, they would have been in default. Therefore they did what it was their duty to do. Then comes the question, can they recover any expenses thus incurred against the owner of the horse? As far as I am aware, there is no decided case in English law in which an ordinary carrier of goods by land has been held entitled to recover this sort of charge against the consignee or consignor of goods. But in my opinion he is so entitled. It had been long debated whether a shipowner has such a right, and gradually, partly by custom and partly by some opinions of authority in this country, the right has come to be established ... It was there said (after referring to the observations of Sir James Mansfield CJ in Christy v. Row), ‘The precise point does not seem to have been subsequently decided, but several cases have since arisen in which the nature and scope of the duty of the master, as agent of the merchant, have been examined and defined.’ Then, after citing the cases, the judgment proceeds: ‘It results from them, that not merely is a power given, but a duty is cast on the master, in many cases of accident and emergency, to act for the safety of the cargo in such manner as may be best under the circumstances in which it may be placed; and that, as a correlative right, he is entitled to charge its owner with the expenses properly incurred in so doing.’ That seems to me to be a sound rule of law. That the duty is imposed upon the carrier, I do not think anyone has doubted; but if there were that duty without the correlative right, it would be a manifest injustice. Therefore, upon the whole of the circumstances, I come to the conclusion that the claim of the company was a proper one, and that the judgment of the learned judge of the county court must be reversed.

Significance

This decision extended the doctrine of agency of necessity to cases concerning the carriage of goods by land.Previously it had been limited to cases of carriage of goods by sea.It confirms that in cases of accident and emergency, where it is impossible to get the principal’s instructions, an agent is automatically authorised to act to make a contract with a third party on behalf of a principal.