Nick Watts, Deputy Director-General, U K Defence Forum

GR176

The Challenges facing the British Army

by

Nick Watts, Deputy Director-General, U K Defence Forum

January 2015

Executive summary

The main challenge facing the British Army in the early years of the 21st century is change. Change in the way warfare is conducted; change in the technology of weapons and sensors, change in the way personnel are recruited and incentivised to remain in service.

The financial constraint under which the British Army operates poses a significant challenge. How this particular challenge is addressed will determine how, and to what extent, the UK continues to play a significant role on the world stage.

After the drawdown from Afghanistan, the British Army is being prepared for ‘contingent’ operations. Against what threat will it train? How will it prepare itself? How will personnel be prepared? Will Army 2020 be a credible force?

This paper begins by setting out the current situation and then examines some of these challenges.

Context

The British Army has been on operations continually since 1945. The demand for military intervention or support has been continuous. With the advent of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) the army, along with the other services, has been called upon to bear its share of cost cutting measures. This comes with the drawdown from operations in Afghanistan. 2015 will see the army on operations in Sierra Leone (Op Gritrock) and on the continuing UNFICYP operation in Cyprus.

Events have led to changes in the structure of the army from the abolition of conscription in the early 1960s, which gave rise to ‘the professionals’ and the ending of the Cold War, which saw a rapid reduction in the overall size of the army and its presence in Germany. The onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 – 08 and Britain’s exposure to it as a globalised economy called for reductions in government spending.

The 2010 SDSR resulted in a further study into the structure of the armed forces under the rubric of Future Force 2020. Army 2020 was officially unveiled by the Secretary of State for Defence on 5th July 2012. Part of this exercise was a separate review of the Reserve forces, Future Reserves 2020. The implication for the army in these exercises was first and foremost the question of numbers. Whilst the Navy and RAF man equipment, the Army equips the man (and woman). Army 2020 is planned to comprise of around 112,000 personnel; 82,617 regulars and 30,000 reservists.

Related to the headline numbers is an equally pressing question of what roles will the army be expected to undertake once it has finished operations in Afghanistan. How will it train and how will it be structured? The answer is to prepare for ‘contingent’ operations. The drawdown from Afghanistan has been conducted alongside the relocation of forces in Germany which is due to be completed by 2020. Recruiting and retention will also become more of a challenge as the economy recovers. The army will need to be seen as an inclusive employer; partly in response to gender and ethnicity guidelines imposed by government, but also to tap into as wide a pool of talent as possible.

The primary challenge that the army will face is change. The way wars are conducted has changed from the Cold War era; terrorism has changed from the shooting matches of 1970s Northern Ireland to the insurgency of Afghanistan. A new kind of warfare has been added to the lexicon: after ‘war among the people’ and ‘hybrid warfare’, which characterises the operations the army undertook in Iraq and Afghanistan, comes the ‘ambiguous’ warfare seen in Eastern Ukraine. The tools with which the army fights these new campaigns will also need to change. The Challenger tank will be joined by the cyber warrior.

Part one: From Cold War to Hybrid war

The Secretary of State for Defence, Rt. Hon. Tom King MP, made a statement to the House of Commons on 25th July 1990 outlining the MOD’s ‘Options for Change’. In the context of the end of the Cold War and anticipated reductions in force levels in central Europe, the MOD planned to reduce the size of the armed forces by ‘around 18%’. King went on to say:

“Our proposals will bring savings and a reduction in the share of GDP taken by defence. We need force levels which we can afford and which can realistically be manned, given demographic pressures in the 1990s. The aim is smaller forces, better equipped, properly trained and housed, and well motivated. They will need to be flexible and mobile and able to contribute both in NATO and, if necessary, elsewhere.” [1].

In tandem with this announcement General Sir John Chapple, the Chief of the General Staff, issued a letter to the army outlining the implications of ‘Options for change’:

“The statement gives the strength of the Army of the future as ‘around 120,000.’ …. This entails a reduction in our overall authorized strength of about 25% and in our presently manned strength of about 22%. In this model the trained strength of the Regular Army would be around 109,000 men and women. This figure is broadly in line with the estimated sustainable recruitable strengths which our demographic studies have disclosed.” [2].

In both cases the Territorial Army (TA) was mentioned only for completeness. The TA was perhaps given a lower priority because a premium was to be placed on ‘ready’ forces. At that time the TA needed a complicated call out procedure, which would have been part of Britain’s mobilisation plans for a general European war.

Frontline first; the Defence Costs study 1994

The immediate background to the Defence Costs Study (DCS) of 1994 was strictly financial. The changes begun under ‘Options for change’ were still underway and were due for completion in 1995. The MOD was not immune from public expenditure cuts, but Malcolm Rifkind the Secretary of State was adamant that cuts could be minimized by examining efficiencies in supporting areas. One result of this exercise was the decision to establish a Joint Force HQ. Service personnel reductions were planned to be in the order of 18,700 by 2000. The army lost 2,200 personnel; the largest component (900) in the area of recruiting and medical support.

The 1998 Strategic Defence Review

The new Labour government of 1997 undertook a Strategic Defence Review. It was able to draw upon the experience of the post-Cold War world, which had increased the tempo of operations in the Gulf (1990 – 91) and the Balkans from 1993 onwards. As a result of this review there was an increase in ‘jointery’ which had begun under the 1994 DCS. It was also announced by George Robertson the Secretary of State that: “I am proposing an increase in the size of the Regular Army of 3,300 – a change which will go a long way to restoring vital parts of our armed forces which have been hollowed out.”[3].

Robertson went on to address the question of the reserves:

“I am determined that the TA should become more relevant, usable and integrated with the rest of our forces. Those who wish to see it languish in an outdated Cold War role do the TA no service at all.” [4].

Robertson’s announcement that the 1998 SDR was ‘foreign policy led and not Treasury driven’ is worth noting, given what subsequently transpired when British military forces found themselves committed to enduring operations in Iraq, and later Afghanistan. The defence budget paid for the maintenance and upkeep of the military, but the Treasury was reluctant to fund operations from the contingency reserve. This despite the fact that the main theme of the 1998 SDR was the need for ‘expeditionary operations’.

The Jackson reforms of regimental structure.

In 2004 a reform was undertaken of the regimental structure of the Army. This was initiated by Geoff Hoon the Secretary of State and the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mike Jackson. The headline effect was to reduce the number of infantry battalions from 40 to 36. In its way it was as controversial as the Cardwell reforms of 1868, when infantry regiments were ascribed county names rather than numbers. This was to encourage local recruitment. Thus the 68th Foot became the Durham Light Infantry.

Under this new reform the county designation was to be merged into a larger regional identity. Thus the Cheshire regiment (22nd Foot) became part of the newly formed Mercian regiment. In part this was a recognition of something which was already happening. For career progression officers and NCOs were often posted between regiments within the same regional family. Thus a major in the Staffords would be posted to command a Company of the Worcester and Sherwood Foresters.

Additionally there was an inefficiency in the re-roling of battalions that took place every two years or so. A regiment would be based in Germany equipped for the armoured infantry role, and would be posted to Cyprus to undertake light infantry duties. This required a wholesale re-training of the battalion and the consequent loss of the skills it had previously developed. This new reform would leave a battalion in a particular role and allow personnel to be trickle posted to it (as is the practice in the navy) as their careers required.

Emerging from this reform was the formation of a new Special Reconnaissance Regiment and Special Forces Support Group both of which would assist the army in its central role in the war against a new kind of terrorist threat. The SFSG was based on a Parachute regiment battalion, which enabled the Parachute regiment to emerge with an enhanced capability; in effect retaining its 3 battalions.

The most controversial result of this reform was the formation of a single large Scottish regiment. The tribal nature of the British Army has long been held by many to be one of its strengths. This was particularly so in Scotland where many regiments remained un-amalgamated or re-named. The Royal Scots were proud to be directly descended from the 1st of foot raised in 1633. Losing their identity into the Royal Regiment of Scotland was something mourned by old soldiers, if not by the jocks themselves.

The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review: Future Force 2020

Changes in the economic and strategic worlds meant that a Strategic Defence Review was long overdue by 2010. Since 1998 both NATO and the EU had enlarged to accept new members. The world had embraced ‘globalisation’. Technology had enhanced global connectivity, but this brought with it a discrete cyber security threat.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 ushered in a new era of war fighting, which saw the UK become involved in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as home grown jihadist attacks in London in July 2005. Like the economy, warfare had globalised. Suddenly the world was full of potential instability which could spill over into internal upheaval, or cause states to fail. By 2010 what was needed was both a defence review and a security review.

The UK Economic and budgetary position

The economic situation of the UK in 2010 was not propitious for any areas of government spending. The incoming government, the first coalition since the Second World War, undertook to reduce the UK’s deficit and restore public finances. Thus a Comprehensive Spending Review, a National Security Strategy and a Strategic Defence and Security Review were all conducted at the same time. [5]. The consequent decisions about reductions in levels of personnel and equipment were criticised both in parliament and the media.

Defence spending

The Coalition governments spending review of October 2010 reduced defence expenditure by 7.5% over the 4 year planning period of the spending review cycle. From a baseline expenditure of £ 32.9 bn in 2010 / 11, 2.7% of GDP, defence spending would be reduced to 2.2% of GDP by 2013 / 14. It is also worth noting that an unfunded £ 38 bn spend on the Equipment Programme over a 10 year period was removed.

The politics of this was played out in public when a letter from the then Secretary of State Liam Fox was ‘leaked’ to the national press. The Coalition had pledged to protect spending on Health, Education and International Development; thus reducing the amount of cash available for other departments. In his letter to the Prime Minister, Fox warned of the dangers of cutting defence expenditure at a time of international uncertainty.

Defence Reform

The Levene review into defence reform was launched following the SDSR and reported in June 2011 [6]. This review was part of the Coalition government’s effort to increase the efficiency of public services; the MOD being seen as a particular example of a department out of control. The principal outcome affecting the army was the recommendation that service chiefs became Top Level Budget holders.

This means that the CGS will be responsible for funding the manning, equipping and training of the army. Previously this responsibility was divided between various differing budget holders. It will also require army staff to undertake balance of investment assessments, project manage large scale capability programmes and ensure such things as safety cases are managed. The army will need to grow these competencies in short order. Officers on 2-3 year rotations may result in the loss of a ‘corporate memory’ in this field.

In addition a 4 star Joint Force Command headquarters will own and manage all joint force enablers. Under the new ‘Levene’ model the Service Chiefs are responsible for generating and developing their service in line with strategic direction from the centre within the budget framework allocated to them. Front Line Commanders (FLCs) will not only need to develop their own services, but will need to work with Joint Force HQ to ensure that there is a balance of availability from the ‘enablers’ such as transport and communications.