No. 02-2793
In the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SAINT TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL CORPORATION, et al.
Petitioners,
v.
Patrick and Melissa AMENDOLA, on behalf of their minor child, Danny
Respondents.
ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT
Brief for Petitioners
Team #3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………..……………………………………………………1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………………2
ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………………………..6
- THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT’S RULING THAT THE ST. PAUL HIGH SCHOOL BASEBALL TEAM’S HAIRCUT POLICY UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VIOLATED DANNY AMENDOLA’S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BECAUSE HAIR LENGTH CANNOT BE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT, THE HAIR POLICY SATISFIES RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW, AND A SINGLE DISTINCT REQUIREMENT BETWEEN GENDERS IN AN OTHERWISE EQUALLY BURDENING GROOMING CODE IS NOT SEX DISCRIMINATION…………………………………………………………………6
- This Court Should Rule That Hair Length Is Not A Fundamental Right, Apply Rational Basis Review To The Haircut Policy, And Find That The Policy Is Rationally Related To The Legitimate State Interest Of Team Image And Unity, Thereby Not Violating Danny Amendola’s Substantive Due Process Rights……………………………………………………………….8
- Hair length cannot be a fundamental right under this Court’s established precedent…………………………………………………..9
- Rational basis review should apply to the haircut policy…………..10
- Under rational basis review, the haircut policy is rationally related to the legitimate expressed interest of team image and unity……...10
- The Court Should Rule That The Haircut Policy Was Merely A Single Distinct Requirement In An Otherwise Comparable And Equally Burdensome List Of Grooming Requirements Upon Both Boy And Girl Athletes, Thereby Not Qualifying As Sex Discrimination Under The Equal Protection Clause……………………………………………………………….11
- A single distinct requirement between men and women where there is an otherwise comparable scheme does not qualify as sex discrimination………………………………………………………....13
- The haircut policy was a single distinction between genders in the context of an overall grooming policy that was equally burdensome to both genders………………………………………………………..14
- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADOPT THE BASEBALL RULE FOR TULANIA BECAUSE THE BASEBALL RULE BEST BALANCES THE NEEDS OF STADIUM OWNERS AND SPECTATORS….16
- Public Policy Demands The Adoption Of The Baseball Rule………………..17
- The baseball rule assures that spectators are protected while setting adequate, straightforward liability rules for stadium owners……..17
- Baseball fans typically accept the dangers of a foul ball and want to be involved in the game………………………………………………18
- The baseball rule should be adopted by state courts despite the development of comparative negligence and state legislation……...19
- The Baseball Rule Should Be Applies To This Case Even Though Respondent Was Hit With A Foul Ball When She Was Not In Her Seat…...20
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
United States Supreme Court
Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115 (1992)……………………………………………………………………….8
Kelley v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238 (1976)……………………………………………………………………….8
Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977)……………………………………………………………………….9
Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937)……………………………………………………………………….9
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
490 U.S. 228 (1989)……………………………………………………………………...12
Reed v. Reed.
404 U.S. 71 (1971)……………………………………………………………………….11
US v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996)……………………………………………………………………...12
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997)……………………………………………………………...7, 8, 9, 10
United States Courts of Appeals
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,
549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977)…………………………………………………………….13
Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist.,
401 F.3d 381 (2005)……………………………………………………………………...10
Breen v. Kahl,
419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969)…………………………………………………………….9
Crews v. Cloncs,
432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970)…………………………………………………………….9
Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc.,
488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973)………………………………………………………….13
Hayden v. Greensburg Community School Corp.,
743 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2014)………………………………………………………..passim
Holsapple v. Woods,
500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974)……………………………………………………………….9
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co.,
444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006)…………………………………………………………...12
Knott v. Mo. P. R. Co.,
527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975)……………………………………………………….13, 15
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co.,
507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975)……………………………………………………….13, 15
State Courts
Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist.,
424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1981)…………………………………………………16, 17, 18, 19
Alwin v. St. Paul Saints Baseball Club, Inc.,
672 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)……………………………………………..20, 21
Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club,
231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950)……………………………………………………………..16
Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids,
443 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989)……………………………………………………………16
Bellezzo v. State,
851 P.2d 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)………………………………………………….16, 18
Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc.,
635 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 2001)…………………………………………………...18, 19, 20
Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n,
240 N.W. 903 (Minn. 1932)……………………………………………………………...18
Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno,
147 N.E. 86 (Ohio 1925)…………………………………………………………………16
Friedman v. Houston Sports Ass'n,
731 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 1987)……………………………………………….17, 19, 20
Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.,
901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995)………………………………………………………………17
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.,
166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929)………………………………………………………………..18
Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n,
46 P.2d 144 (Cal. 1935)………………………………………………………………….16
Ritchie-Gamester v. City of Berkley,
597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999)…………………………………………………………...16
Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC,
296 P.3d 373 (Idaho 2013)…………………………………………………………...20, 23
Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters,
202 Cal. Rptr. 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)…………………………………………………19
Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc.,
796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1990)……………………………………………………………….16
Stephens v. Stearns,
678 P.2d 41 (Idaho 1984)………………………………………………………………...16
Swagger v. City of Crystal,
379 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)……………………………………………..16, 18
Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment, LLC,
180 P.3d 1172 (Nev. 2008)………………………………………………………16, 20, 23
Turpen v.Granieri,
985 P.2d 669 (Idaho1999)……………………………………………………………….16
Wade-Keszey v. Town of Niskayuna,
772 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)…………………………………………...20, 22
Winn v. Frasher,
777 P.2d 722 (Idaho 1989)……………………………………………………………….16
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1983…………………………………………………………………………………..6
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12–554 (1999)…………………………………………………………..20
745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 38/10 (1992)………………………………………………………….20
Constitutional Provisions
US Const. amend. XIV, § 1……………………………………………………………………….6
Other Sources
Jay M. Zitter, Liability to Spectator at Baseball Game Who Is Hit by Ball or Injured as Result of Other Hazards of Game—Failure to Provide or Maintain Sufficient Screening,
82 A.L.R.6th 417 (2013)……………………………………………………………..16, 17
ARGUMENT
- ThIS Court should reverse the Fourteenth Circuit’s ruling that the St. Paul High School baseball team’s haircut policy unconstitutionally violated Danny Amendola’s substantive due process and equal protection rights because hair length cannot be a fundamental right under the Court’s precedent, the hair policy satisfies rational basis review, and a single distinct requirement between genders in an otherwise equally burdening grooming code is not sex discrimination.
This Court should find that the Fourteenth Amendment protections of substantive due process and equal protection are not violated by a public high school boys baseball team policy restricting the length of a participant’s hair. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that no “[s]tate [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” US Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Among the protections described, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses have developed doctrines such as substantive due process and sex discrimination, respectively.
Respondents initially filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thereby allowing them to initiate a private cause of action against another for alleged constitutional violations. As the district court recognized, “[t]o prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered the violation of a federal constitutional right by one acting under color of state law. There is no dispute that the [Petitioners] were acting under color of state law at all relevant times.”
Here, those doctrines are being applied to a haircut policy implemented by Coach Belichick, the Head Coach of the St. Paul High School (St. Paul) boys’ varsity interscholastic baseball team. Coach Belichick was granted such authority by the St. Paul High School Athletic Code of Conduct, which was developed by the principal of St. Paul, Principal Kraft, and approved by the School Board of The Saint Tammany Parish School Corporation (School Corporation)—the school district in which St. Paul is located. The haircut policy requires boys wishing to participate on the baseball team to have their hair cut above their ears, eyebrows, and collar. The only other varsity coach, for boys or girls, to their team to implement a policy limiting hair length was the boy’s football team. When the issue was not resolved internally, Respondents filed suit on the grounds that requiring Danny to change his hair length to play a school sport was a violation of his fundamental right to wear his hair however he likes and that the policy was sex discrimination because the girls’ softball team did not demand adherence to an equivalent hair length policy to play softball. R. at 3.
Petitioners subsequently argue that hair length cannot be considered a fundamental right given the requirements for such status developed in the wake of the Court’s holding in Washington v. Glucksberg, which provided a specific list of rights recognized as fundamental and set forth the requirements for adding to that exclusive list. 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1997). Additionally, Petitioners assert that, under the well-developed line of cases addressing sex discrimination in the workplace, different grooming standards are not discrimination if comparable.
Here, applying rational basis review since hair length is not a fundamental right, the legitimate state interests asserted by Petitioners are to develop a clean-cut image of the team and uniformity to promote unity amongst the team, and these interests are rationally related to the haircut policy. Additionally, analyzing the overall grooming standard enforced at St. Paul, all athletes—boy and girl alike—were subject to the Athletic Code of Conduct, which included more generalized grooming restrictions, particularly addressing hair.
As such, it is requested that this Court reverse the Fourteenth Circuit’s ruling and hold that the Haircut Policy for the boys’ varsity baseball team was constitutional on both substantive due process and equal protection grounds.
A.This Court Should Rule That Hair Length Is Not A Fundamental Right, Apply Rational Basis Review To The Haircut Policy, And Find That The Policy Is Rationally Related To The Legitimate State Interest Of Team Image And Unity, Thereby Not Violating Danny Amendola’s Substantive Due Process Rights.
Due process, as articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment above, “affords not only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of ‘liberty,’ but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restrictions by the State.” Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976). The Due Process Clause additionally “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. In addition to the enumerated freedoms in the Bill of Rights, this Court has held that the Due Process Clause specially protects the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, to abortion, and to refuse lifesaving treatment. Id.
In finding these specific freedoms to be fundamental rights, this Court has also expressly been “reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). This Court expressed the root of that concern as being that “[b]y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
1.Hair length cannot be a fundamental right under this Court’s established precedent.
When determining whether a freedom should be considered a fundamental right, this Court has held that the Due Process Clause only specially protects rights as fundamental when they are “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, . . . [such that] neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right] were sacrificed." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).
The Fourteenth Circuit primarily relied on three cases from the Seventh Circuit to come to its determination that hair length is a fundamental right. SeeCrews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1035 (7th Cir. 1969). Unfortunately, the Fourteenth Circuit failed to consider the Seventh Circuit’s post-Glucksberg opinion in Hayden v. Greensburg Community School Corp., which acquiesced that “[t]he notion that one's hair length is an aspect of personal liberty so important that it constitutes a fundamental right is hard to square with the Supreme Court's later opinion in Glucksberg, which describes fundamental rights” as defined above. 743 F.3d at 575. The Seventh Circuit in Hayden went on to note that “The [Supreme] Court [in Glucksberg] called for the ‘utmost care’ in adding to [the] short list of fundamental rights” and “[its] post-Glucksberg cases have repeatedly taken note of, and heeded, this advice.” Id.
In analyzing whether one’s hair length passes muster as a fundamental right, the necessary historical aspects are murky, at best. Unfettered control of one’s hair length does not appear to be deeply rooted in the nation’s history as would one’s ability to marry, reproduce, or bodily integrity. Even more telling though on whether hair length should be a fundamental right is the second aspect—whether a lack of this right would prevent liberty and justice from existing. It is hard to imagine a scenario where the inability to control the length of one’s hair, in and of itself, would prevent our ordered system of liberty from being able to exist. As such, the Seventh Circuit in Hayden appears to have been correct, and hair length cannot be considered a fundamental right after this Court’s opinion in Glucksberg.
2.Rational basis review should apply to the haircut policy.
Before further analysis, it must be determined what level of scrutiny Respondents will be required to overcome. As stated by this Court in Glucksberg, “a challenged state action [must] implicate a fundamental right [ ] before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action.” 521 U.S. at 722. With hair length eliminated as the potential fundamental right that would raise the bar for the state’s rationale for infringing upon that right, rational basis scrutiny shall apply.
However, before moving on to the rational basis review, the formally mentioned fundamental right of a parent to “to direct the education and upbringing of one's children” merits consideration. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. The Sixth Circuit put this fundamental right into perspective when it said that “[w]hile parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child.” Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (2005). As such, the fundamental right of Danny Amendola’s parents, Patrick and Melissa Amendola, to direct Danny’s education and upbringing does not extend to controlling the length of Danny’s hair in conflict with a school regulation.
3.Under rational basis review, the haircut policy is rationally related to the legitimate expressed interest of team image and unity.
Rational basis review requires that the state have a legitimate interest in fringing upon a freedom and that that interest be rationally related to the means through which it tries to effectuate that interest.[1] The burden to prove that the haircut policy is not rationally related with a legitimate state interest is on Respondents.[2] Petitioners offered during the district court proceedings, via Coach Belichick’s testimony, that the purpose behind the haircut policy was “promoting team unity, by having team members wear their hair in a uniform length, and projecting a ‘clean-cut’ image.” R. at 23. It was the duty of Respondents to show that the haircut policy was not rationally related to this reasoning, or in the alternative, that this was not a legitimate interest for the school to try and achieve. Neither was done.
Under these facts, this Court must find that the interests of team unity and image are legitimate and that they are rationally related to the haircut policy. As such, the Court must rule in favor of Petitioners on this issue by finding that the haircut policy did not violate Danny Amendola’s right to substantive due process.
B.The Court Should Rule That The Haircut Policy Was Merely A Single Distinct Requirement In An Otherwise Comparable And Equally Burdensome List Of Grooming Requirements Upon Both Boy And Girl Athletes, Thereby Not Qualifying As Sex Discrimination Under The Equal Protection Clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment additionally requires the equal protection of laws. In so doing, it “protects individuals against intentional, arbitrary discrimination by government officials.” Hayden, 743 F.3 at 577. This Court expanded that protection to include discrimination based on gender in Reed v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71, 73 (1971). “[I]n post-Reed decisions, [this Court] has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men).” US v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996). “Gender is a quasi-suspect class that triggers intermediate scrutiny in the equal protection context; the justification for a gender-based classification thus must be exceedingly persuasive.” Hayden, 743 F.3 at 577.
This Court brought into question the continued validity of much of the developed case law on “when the adoption of differential grooming standards for males and females amounts to sex discrimination,” Id., in its case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (plurality) (holding that an employer may not demand that employee's appearance and deportment match sex stereotype associated with her gender). The Ninth Circuit held, in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., that sex-differentiated grooming standards can still be valid post-Price Waterhouse. 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (sustaining make-up requirement for female employees in absence of objective evidence that such requirement imposed unequal burden on women) ("We have long recognized that companies may differentiate between men and women in appearance and grooming policies, and so have other circuits. The material issue under our settled law is not whether the policies are different, but whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff creates an 'unequal burden' for the plaintiff's gender.").
1.A single distinct requirement between men and women where there is an otherwise comparable scheme does not qualify as sex discrimination.
Judge Manion, in his dissent of Hayden, expounded on the line of cases addressing differing grooming standards for men and women by noting that “differing grooming standards are not discrimination if they are comparable; for the standards to be comparable, they must find some justification in commonly accepted social norms or generally accepted community standards, be reasonably related to a legitimate interest, and be applied evenhandedly, not imposing an unequal burden.” 743 F.3d at 584 (Manion, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Judge Manion goes on to point out that “courts have routinely upheld generally applicable grooming policies containing hair-length requirements for men but not for women.” Id. at 585 (citing Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Knott v. Mo. P. R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973).