Refinement of Democracy: the Significance of Hume S Perfect Commonwealth

Refinement of Democracy: the significance of Hume’s Perfect Commonwealth

Refinement of Democracy: the significance of Hume’s Perfect Commonwealth

Abstract

The interpretations of Hume’s essay ‘An idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, as found at the end of hisPolitical Discourses, has spanned a multitude of various interpretationsThe aim of this paper is to trace the theoretical foundations of thesaid essay back to Hume’s consistent and persistent search for the best system of government. His plan should be interpreted as an attempt at preservation of authority in an increasingly commercialized society, rather than as a proposal for‘democratization’, or a proof of his commitment to civic tradition. Besides, in his plan Hume tries to utilize the opposition of interests, which he considers to be the source of vitality in the British constitution. Although he is deeply skeptical about the implementation of any radical reforms, and stands in opposition to the utopians, such attitude, as we shall see, need not be seen asincompatible with his seriousness about the search for the best system of government. (156 words)

Paper submitted for 32nd Annual International Hume Society Conference, Toronto, Canada

Refinement of Democracy: the significance of Hume’s Perfect Commonwealth

Introduction

David Hume’s essay ‘An idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, found at the end of his Political Discourses, has spanned a multitude of various interpretations.[1]Some picked up the opening paragraph of this essay, and merely emphasized itsopposition to radical political reforms.[2] Others claimed that the essay,in its entirety, was just a satire aimed at discreditingan armchair theory.[3] Recently, John Robertson asserted thatit proved Hume’s commitment to civic tradition.[4]The very fact of such a variety of interpretations poses a difficulty for anyone wanting to place the essay within the framework of Hume’s political thought.

The aim of this paper is to argue that the aforementioned essay is not a satire, but a product of many years of philosophical speculation. By that token, it should be interpreted as groundwork for Hume’s plan to attain an equilibrium between liberty and authority in a commercialized society, and not as a proposal for ‘democratization’, or the proof of his commitment to civic tradition.[5]

Firstly, in order to substantialize the point we shall trace thedevelopment of Hume’s idea from the Essays, Moral and Political up to the Political Discourses. In the following section, we shall considerHume’s attempt to‘refine the democracy’ (E 528), andwe shall discuss the idiosyncrasy of Hume’s plan, when compared with Montesquieu’s idea of the federation of republics. All in all our discussion should provide a sufficient ground for arguing that there is no contradiction between Hume’s theoretical search for the best system of government and his opposition to radical reforms.

Section 1: The formation of the idea of perfect Commonwealth

First of all, we have to trace the process of how the idea of a perfect commonwealth has been developed throughout Hume’s writings. Seemingly the idea appears to surfacealmost unannounced at the end of Political Discourses. However, a sketch for the idea is already inherent in a much earlier piece, namely Essays, Moral and Political, and, as we shall see, it is coextensive with the whole of Hume’s political philosophy.

In the essay ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, Hume claimed that in order to establish politics as a science, we have to explore each form of government as a system, and to analyze what kind of government could attain the higher predictability of political administration. According to him, the administration of any absolutist government necessarily depends on the personal character of the kings, and thus, should be considered precarious in itself. Conversely the republic can be managed even by ‘bad men’, if we set ‘the particular checks and controuls’ in the constitution (E 15).

Although in the essay in question he cites the British mixed constitution as a kind of ‘republican and free government’ (E15), Hume did not always considerit to be the most perfectly balanced one; the view proudly held by many of his contemporaries. In the history of political philosophy, beginning with Tacitus, understanding a well-balanced mixed government as the best constitution has a long tradition. In the essay ‘Of the independency of parliament’ Hume remarked that had‘such geniuses as Cicero and Tacitus’ saw the British government, they would have said that ‘[s]uch government […] will not be a mixed government’ (E 43), for the House of Commons has unbalanced gross power in the constitution, and can appropriate the rest of the power at any time. Nevertheless, such a constitution made stability possible in its own way. He explains ‘this paradox’ in terms of a system of self-restraint. The crown of those days had many offices at its disposal which it gave to the leading MPs. Although the House of Commons criticized this practice as ‘corruption’, many MPs would lose their posts, had they really broken this practice. ‘[T]he House of Commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation [on the crown] would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members’ (E 45). In this essay, he defends the influence which the Crownhas on the House of Commons, because it is an effective measure of self-restriction of the latter. However, according to him, the check of king’s legislative power is not enough to control the increasing power of the Commons (E 44). He goes on to say that only ‘pure republic’ can redress the balance in the mixed monarchy, and concludes the essay as follows;

In pure republics, (…) the checks and controuls are more regular in their operation; because the members of such numerous assemblies may be presumed to be always nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and it is only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into consideration. (E 46)

Thus, the fundamental disadvantage of a limited monarchy lies in being dependent on the personal character of the monarch, and the only solution is the well-regulated republic, free from the influence of any particular statesman or king (E 527).

In the essay ‘Of the first principle of government’, following the Harringtonean scheme, Hume explains the historical process of how the balance of political power in the constitution derives from the balance of property. Anewly-risen class gradually gets to acquire their political share, which they originally did not have. ‘This’, Hume said, ‘has been the case with the House of Commons in ENGLAND’ (E 35). Disagreeing with Harrington, Hume acknowledges that there still remains a gap between their economic and political power. This is because the political power does not rest directly upon the real balance of property, but upon the‘opinion’ about it. His emphasis on the notion of opinion implies that every government is susceptible to drastic changes in this respect. In this sense, his political theory includes both his keen awareness of the instability of reality and the pursuit of theoretical stability.

Considering the real state of affairs, it is unlikely that such an overbalance, i.e., the gap between the riches of the Commons and their undeserved political power, could be left as it has been for a long time. If there were ever an attempt at radically changing the constitution, the influence of the Crown would be too fragile to stop it.Once again, he concludes by predicting the advent of a ‘pure republic’ in Britain:

I must, therefore, be of opinion, that an alteration in this particular [i.e., the influence of crown] would introduce a total alteration in our government, and would soon reduce it to a pure republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form. For though the people, collected in a body like the ROMAN tribes, be quite unfit for government, yet when dispersed in small bodies, they are more susceptible both of reason and order; the force of popular currents and tides is, in a great measure, broken. (E 35)

It is here that we receive the first intimations of his basic idea of the ‘Perfect Commonwealth’, even though after the passage just quoted, Hume denies the possibility of the realization of such a republic, and recommends his readers to ‘cherish and improve our ancient government as much as possible’ (E 35). It is important to note that this pure republic is a theoretical ideal, and that Hume did not expect it to be ever established. A more extensive discussion of this point follows in section 4.

In the essay ‘An idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, Hume does not explain or even hint at its relation to his other ‘economic’ essays.Nevertheless, two of his essays, namely,‘Of the fist principle of government’ and ‘Of the independency of parliament’show the relation between his historical understanding of the newly-risen middle ranks, which produced the gap between their economic and political power, and the possibility of pure republic as its consequence (although he did not hope for it). As is well known, in his economic writings Hume thinks highly of the middle ranks as ‘the best and firmest basis of public liberty’ (E 277), and he shows the positive effects (including the increase of liberty and ‘Knowledge in the arts of government’ E 273) produced by their commercial activities. However, he does not think that the engagement in commerce or industry raises political ability of each person.[6]At least, we have no direct proof that he believes so. In the above sketch of his idea, it is clear that he does not take sides with the common people. Rather, he tries to break the popular tides into as small particles as possible in order to realize the ‘reason and order’. In the next section, we will see the mechanism he contrived in more detail.[7]

Section 2: the balance between liberty and authority

Apart from his scientific analysis of the constitution, Hume considers the republic to be fitted for commerce.[8] This is because there is ‘a great equality of fortune’ (E 401) in a republic, and if ‘attended with the spirit of peace, order, and industry’ (E 453)[9] it will be most desirable system for the happiness of mankind. He has to concede that such a situation would be favorable to the increase of populationeven in the ancient world. The ancient republics, however, were usually ‘ferocious, and torn (…) by bloody Factions’. Modern republics in Europe, by contrast, are less disadvantaged, because‘Modern Manners have corrected this Abuse’ (L 2:306). A similar remark can be found in the essay ‘An idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, where he observes that ‘[a]lmost all of [the modern republics] are well-tempered Aristocracies’ (E 417), and chooses to adopt the relevant institutional measures in his plan.

Hume is consistently critical of the direct democracy exemplified by the Athens republic (E16). It produced only confusion because of its lack of ‘any limitation of property’, ‘any distinction of rank’ and ‘controul from any magistracy or senate’ (E 368). That is to say that Hume believes that stable republics require limitation of property, distinction of rank, and control from the upper House.

In his perfect commonwealth, Hume gives the lower people the suffrage to elect theirrepresentatives;a concession based on a belief that they have enough judgment to discern the‘men of fortune and education’ (E 524) among the people close to them.[10] This has two meanings. Firstly, he does not give the lower sort of people the right to participate directly in political administration;he merely gives them the suffrage to elect their representatives. In other words he tries to absorb ‘the force of popular tides and currents’ (E 528). This is because he does not believe in the political ability of ‘the lower sort of people and small proprietors’ (E 522).

Secondly, he tries to exclude the lower people from the political administration, while giving them the suffrage. Indeed, Hume raisedthe requirements for qualifyingfor suffrage every time he revisedhis Political Discourses.[11]This fact proves his intention to exclude from participating in electoral systemthe people he called ‘an undistinguishing rabble, like the ENGLISH electors’ (E 524). In the History of England, Hume admires the electoral system, which Oliver Cromwell implemented, because he, consciously or not, ‘deprived of their right of election all the small burroughs (…) The lower populace too, so easily guided or deceived, were excluded from the elections’ (H 4:69, see also E 526).[12]

Throughout his discourses Hume is always concerned about keeping the balance between liberty and authority, and expounds this view in a letter:‘Our Government (…) is too perfect in point of Liberty’ (L 2:216). In the essay ‘Of the Public Credit’, he is afraid of the disappearing of the nobility and gentry who are‘a kind of independent magistracy in a state’ (E 358). Here, we should notice that he really says in a letter to his nephew that ‘[One] great Advantage of a Commonwealth over our mixt Monarchy is that it [would] considerably abridge our Liberty’ (L 2:306, italics mine). On the whole, his proposal is neither democratic, nor an appeal to the ancient liberty (E 497). Rather, he tries to preserve authority, and to prevent the upsurge of political influence of the lower people, by imposing the property limitation onto the electoral system, and by giving the people not the right to participate in political administration but merely the suffrage to elect their representatives. (Needless to say, this does not mean that Hume tries to oppress liberty.)[13] Such measures are backed by his recognition of the increasing power of the common people and his distrust of the political ability of the lower sort of people.

Section 3: Montesquieu and Hume

In the previous section, we saw that Hume intended to exclude the direct participation of the lower people from the constitution, and to preserve the authority of men of fortune and education. But this does not necessarily mean that he unconditionally believes in the political ability of the latter. Ever since the Essays, Moral and Political, he regards ‘every man ought to be supposed a knave’ in politics (E 42) as a true maxim.[14]This means that he does not expect the advent of a patriot King as Bolingbroke did. He retains this basic point of view up until the essay ‘An idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’. In the opening of this essay, he declares that ‘one form of government must be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of particular men’ (E 513, italics mine).

Hume’s main aim in this essay is to bring stability into republic and/or democracy, which areotherwise ‘turbulent’ (E 527). As we have seen, one of the measures to rectify this defect was to exclude the lower people from the constitutional participation. The second measure is to tame and utilize theturbulence in questionwithin the constitution.[15]As quoted above, in the essay ‘Of the first principle of government’, he proposes to disperse the popular tide into small parts. The bigger the number of the denominator, the more effective can this measure be. This is the reason, why Hume suggested the enlargementof the number of representatives to 10,000, since‘[t]he 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide’ (E 525). Here, as with other proposals, he does not try to democratize his republic by increasing the number of representatives. One should bear in mind that he thinks that the factions in the British constitution are vital to it, and says that ‘the opposition of interests’ is the ‘chief support of the BRITISH government’ (E 525). In the History of England, he remarks that the parties of Court and Country ‘are the real causes of its permanent life and vigour’ (H 5:556). The opposition of parties can be dangerous only when it is concerned with the problem of the nature of constitution and religion. He finds that these critical problems produced many disturbances in British history, and that the mixed government could not eradicate the arguments over the nature of the constitution or of the proper limit of political power. In his plan, he carefully tries to remove such oppositions before they come to full bloom (E 493).[16]

To illuminate the above points we shall now compare Hume’s perfect commonwealth and the federation of republics, which Montesquieu proposed in the Spirit of Laws. According to Montesquieu, the republic is the happiest government, but it usually occupiessuch small territories that they are susceptible to invasion from the large absolute monarchies (Hume’s assessment, up to this point, is coextensive with that of Montesquieu). For Montesquieu, to address this weakness is to unite several republics into one federation.

It is likely that Hume was familiar with Montesquieu’s idea, which is all the more prominent as the two philosophers use the same state (the Netherlands) to show the feasibility of their proposals (E 526). It seems that Hume’s idea is very similar to that of Montesquieu. However, there are several important differences to be noted. Firstly, according to Montesquieu, each republic can dissolve the federation of republics, if it is inconvenient for that republic to stay within (Montesquieu 1989, 124, 132). Hume, by contrast, divides a country into 100 counties, one of which is further divided into 100 parishes. This is because Hume’s basic concern lies not in the international security, but in the settlement of domestic disorder, which republics tend to suffer from. Secondly, although it is desirable for Montesquieu that each republic should generally be of the same size, it is by no meansa necessary condition. For Hume, such lack of balance between various parts of a country could never happen, because the whole country is pre-divided into parts of the same size before it comes to be established (E 516). In short, the two philosophers’ ways of thinking are incompatible. Whilst Montesquieu tries to combine parts into one whole, Hume divides the whole into parts (‘Separate this great body’ E 523). The unification of small republics into one, which is at the heart of Montesquieu’s proposal, cannot stop internal turbulences. Hume’s idea, thus, was certainly an innovation at the time when many people (including Hume himself) believed that republic should be formed, principally, only within small territories.