School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations

School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations

Reviving Hedonism about Well-Being:

Refuting the Argument from False Pleasures andRestricting the Relevance of Intuitive ‘Evidence’

Daniel Michael Turton

A thesis submitted to Victoria University of Wellington

in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in Philosophy

2008

Acknowledgements

Heartfelt thanks first and foremost to Associate Professor Nick Agar for his invaluable guidance and genuine encouragement.

Thanks also to Professor Kim Sterelny for insightful comments on Chapter 2 and to Dr Ramon Das for some useful discussions very early on. Much gratitude to Alan, Alice, Dennis, Frieder, Matt, Nick, and especially Tony for being my thought experiment guinea pigs (and occasionally co-experimenters). Much appreciation also to the numerous graduate and postgraduate students around Australasia and especially Victoria University of Wellington for enduring, and providing useful feedback on, too many of my hedonistic seminars. Indeed, many thanks to the whole Philosophy Department at Victoria University of Wellington for your friendship, support, and for the office on the sunny side.

A million ‘thank you’s to Dad and Joe for the many tedious hours you both spent providing incredibly useful and amusing editorial feedback.

And, finally, a hefty debt of gratitude to Mum and Linda for your specialist emotional support and encouragement.

Abstract

Throughout the vast majority of its history,hedonism about well-being has been perennially unpopular (Feldman 2004). The arguments in this essay take steps towards reviving the plausibility of hedonism about well-being. The main argument currently used to refute hedonism about well-being, the Argument from False Pleasures, is shown to lack sufficient evidence to be compelling. The main evidence provided for the Argument from False Pleasures comes in the form of two thought experiments, the Experience Machine (Nozick 1974) and the Deceived Businessman (Kagan 1998). These thought experiments typically produce strong intuitive responses,which are used to directly support the Argument from False Pleasures.

This essay investigates how theories of well-being are currently evaluated by moral philosophers, with a specific focus on the place our intuitions have in the process. Indeed, the major role that moral intuitions play in evaluating theories of well-being, despite their sometimes dubious epistemic credentials, leads to an in-depth enquiry into their inner workings and potential for containing normatively significant information. The investigation, which draws on the work of Woodward and Allman (2007), concludes that intuitions about unrealistic thought experiments should not play an important role in evaluating theories of well-being. Rather, they should only act as a warning sign,highlighting moral propositions for further analysis. Based on these findings, a new method for assessing theories of well-being is suggested and applied to a specific internalist account of hedonism about well-being to show how the Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine thought experiments lack normative significance, leaving the Argument from False Pleasures without sufficient evidence to be compelling. Indeed, this essay concludes that the Argument from False Pleasures should no longer be thought to provide any good reason to believe that hedonism about well-being is implausible. This result is only one step on the road to reviving hedonism about well-being, but it is a very important one.

Contents Page

Introduction...... 1

Argument Summary...... 1

Chapter Outline...... 3

Chapter 1: What Hedonism about Well-Being is and Why it Needs Reviving.8

Introduction...... 8

Defining Hedonism about Well-Being...... 9

The Argument from False Pleasures...... 23

The Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being...... 28

Conclusion...... 41

Chapter 2: Towards a Better Understanding of Intuitions and the Role They Should Play in Evaluating Theories of Well-Being 42

Introduction...... 42

How Moral Intuitions Really Work...... 43

Recommendations for the Use of Intuitions in Evaluating Theories of Well-Being57

The New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being...... 71

Conclusion...... 77

Chapter 3: Refuting the Argument from False Pleasures...... 78

Introduction...... 78

Evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being...... 79

Deflating the Deceived Businessman...... 86

Extinguishing the Experience Machine...... 104

Conclusion...... 124

Conclusion...... 127

Argument Summary...... 127

Chapter Outline and Implications...... 128

References...... 134

- 1 -