- intro
- hammontree v. jenner
- christenson v. Swenson
- Baptist memorial hospital
- ostensible agency requirements
- conduct by principal
- causes reasonable belief that agent was employee/agent
- justifiable reliance on agency
- plaintiff did not raise matter of fact on any elements
- negligence
- brown v. kendall
- ordinary care standard
- plaintiff has burden of proof in negligence action
- standard of proof is preponderance of evidence (50-50)
- DUTY
- policy
- fairness
- compensation
- deterrence
- fraud
- floodgates
- defendant wants to show nonfeasance, plaintiff wants to show misfeasance
- aid/rescue – no general duty to rescue
- harper – lakeMinnetonka diver
- social host did not have duty to warn guest about shallow diving
- affirmative duty to act only for special relationships
- common carriers, innkeepesr, landownders, family
- knowledge of danger ≠ duty to warn
- nonfeasance
- farwell – beaten up friend
- duty to avoid affirmative actsthat worsen situations (misfeasance)
- beginning assistance can lead to duty
- special relationships can bring about duty
- profit
- historical duty
- contractual relationship
- custodial (sometimes)
- obligations to control the conduct of others
- factors (tarasoff)
- foreseeability of harm
- closeness between defendant’s conduct and injury
- burden to defendant
- consequences to community
- preventing harm
- (insurance)
- tarasoff
- usually, there is no duty to 3rd parties
- unless there’s a special relationship (restatement 2nd)
- therapist and victim (doctor – patient)
- master – servant
- land owner
- parent - child
- professional inaccuracy doesn’t negate therapist duty to protect victim
- public interests (welfare) weigh more than private
- anti-duty argument
- therapists predictions unreliable
- therapy requires open communication (confidentiality problem)
- doctor/patient special relationship
- doctor had duty to s.o. of plaintiff to tell about HIV+
- 2 years btwn plaintiff’s infection and treatment of patient
- doctor had duty to inform child of patient about genetically transferable cancer
- doctor had no duty to husband of patient for false negative hep C test results
- doc had not known plaintiff at time of offense
- tenuto – doc has duty to warn parent of infant who contracted polio from immunization (special relationship expands to immediate family)
- reynolds v. hicks
- social hosts have no duty to third persons
- too wide an imposition, too difficult for hosts
- commercial hosts more prepared and get benefits, so they have duty
- pro-duty
- serving alcohol to a minor is criminal offense
- injury is foreseeable
- must stop causal chain
- landowners/occupiers
- carter v. Kinney
- trespasser: no duty
- licensee: duty to make safe dangers of known conditions
- invitee: reasonable care to make safe dangers revealed by inspection
- bible study attendee is a licensee
- dalai lama is not a trespasser until you tell him to beat it
- invitee
- business
- public
- heins – icy hospital – invitee/licensee classifications should be abandoned
- invitee/licensee classifications are predictable, stable, and historical
- but entrant’s status should not determine duty
- life less worthy of compensation because of permission?
- classifications no good for urban industrial society and arbitrary
- too harsh
- factors
- foreseeability
- purpose for entrance
- use (expected) of premises
- reasonableness of inspection/repair/warning
- burden
- posecai
- no duty to provide security in parking lot
- balancing test
- foreseeability of harm
- nature of land
- similar incident
- gravity of harm
- burden to landowner
- totality of circumstances test – nature of land and prior incidences
- specific harm test – is there knowledge of it
- judge determines duty here
- nonfeasant third party – problem requiring duty
- duty to acquiesce
- pro
- bright line rule avoided
- con
- legal obligation to give up money
- criminals are unpredicatable
- intrafamily
- liability intentional harm by parents against children
- negligently inflicted harm in question
- broadbent
- parental immunity usually doesn’t apply when
- parent is willful, wanton, reckless
- child is emancipated
- death
- parent acting outside parental role and within employment
- parental immunity (no good anymore)
- injury to child disrupts family more than lawsuits
- there are measures to protect against fraud in judicial system
- insurance can keep lawsuit from depleting family resources
- parent probably will not inherit money
- parents always owe parental duty to minor child
- standard is reasonably prudent parent in situation
- insurance
- may foster collusion
- emotional harm
- factors
- intentionally or recklessly inflicted
- results from physical injury negligently inflicted
- emotional harm leads to physical injury
- direct victims
- falzone – emotional damage without physical impact
- husband struck by car, wife sick from fright
- elements for recovery
- negligence causes emotional harm
- emotional harm leads to substantial physical injury
- impact not required (medical evidence advanced now)
- awards sometimes given for pre-impact fright
- decedent was aware of doom for an appreciable length of time
- gammon
- dead father’s leg was really not amputated
- damages for ordinarily sensitive person here (no eggshell plaintiff)
- reasonably foreseeable is the only requirement here (b/c family?)
- wrong diagnoses sometimes permit emotional distress
- restatement does not require physical damage but requires permanence
- indirect victims
- portee v. jaffee
- mom watches son die in elevator shaft
- dillon test for foreseeability of emotional injury
- physical proximity to victim
- direct witness of harm
- close relationship to victim (court says this is most crucial)
- additional factors
- severity of injury causing emotional distress (not all courts use)
- sensory impact (related to physical proximity)
- zone of danger, immediate family, severe physical injury
- time between negligence and emotional distress can limit recovery
- unmarried cohabitatants s/t can’t recover where married couples can
- Johnson v. Jamaica hospital
- baby abducted from hospital for 4.5 months
- no direct duty to parents for care to child
- emotional injury to infant does not trickle down to parents
- dissent says it’s a “pitiful confession of incompetence”
- BREACH
- foreseeability
- defendant wants event to be specific (less foreseeable)
- plaintiff wants to make event bigger (boys playing)
- cases
- adams (boy swinging wire)
- duty to take reasonable precaution
- foreseeability (wire not reachable, no prediction possible)
- cost of prevention – insulation impossible
- effectiveness – guards have little value
- value of activity
- custom
- us v. carroll towing (barges)
- learned hand b < pl is negligence
- find factors to apply to b, p, l
- p – harbor activity, weather, crowd, light/dark
- b – customs, hiring attendant, cooped up bargee
- l – cost of bargee, cargo
- bolton v. stone (cricket)
- cricket ball strikes woman off field
- how probable is it someone will be struck
- remedial measures are irrelevant
- there should not be activity that creates substantial risk
- reasonable person
- bethel (wheelchair on bus)
- common carriers do not owe passengers highest degree of care anymore
- historically b/c railroad accident injuries high
- buses similar in that passengers are at mercy of bus
- reasonable person standard accounts for circumstances
- public conveyances are now as safe as private modes of travel
- what ordinarily ought to be done (not what is done)
- some jurisdictions (kansas) still can apply highest degree of care standard
- awkward or hasty must rise to reasonable standard
- exceptions
- blind
- children (no capacity)
- usu. held to standard of conduct reasonable for age
- no ability to foresee possibilities
- when children engage in adult activities adult standards (driving boat/car)
- mentalability
- should stupid be an exception
- emergency (some states)
- levey, defendant confronted with emergency not of his/her own making
- judge and jury
- pro-judge
- consistency, clarity of rules
- repeated fact patterns
- policy (efficiency)
- experience
- pro-jury
- peer/common person more fair
- emotions are relevant
- no politics
- b&o v. Goodman
- defendant had no duty to display sign warning of oncoming train
- plaintiff did not stop, get out, look - negligent
- when standard of conduct is clear, judge decides on negligence
- pokora
- boxcars blocking view of oncoming train (no whistle)
- plaintiff did not have duty to stop and look, no negligence
- Goodman breached duty and was negligent
- jury where there is no standard evolved for customary conduct
- akins (foul ball in the eye)
- reasonable care under the circumstances is ordinarily, but not always, question for jury
- andrews v. united airlines (overhead bin)
- common carrier owes utmost care toward passengers
- complaints received but injuries low
- jury should decide whether airline had duty to do more than warn
- ordinary flight circumstances
- custom
- courts, not custom, define standard of care except in malpractice
- well-defined
- same business
- actor either charged with knowledge or negligent ignorance
- jury charged with reasonableness and custom
- trimarco (bathtub door)
- custom can show some evidence that defendant is sub-par (unreasonable)
- reasonable person
- lavallee
- defendant motel had no duty to provide flashlights etc.
- no witness knew of motel that provided emergency lighting in question
- Levine
- custom showed dumbwaiters used smooth ropes to avoid injury
- statutes
- violation of criminal statutes can cause tort harm
- majority examine statute for intent, but some don’t
- usually some evidence standard
- martin – standard of care statute
- trial judge leaves jury to decide importance of plaintiff’s lights
- appeals says no duty to plaintiff who disobeys s.o.c. statute
- tedla – rule of the road statute
- rules of the road do not require strict observance
- excuse – agree that violated standard of care, excuse as defense
- justification – want new standard
- approaches to violation of statutes
- some evidence (jury)
- prima facie evidence of plaintiff’s negligence (jury if rebutted)
- negligence per se
- factors
- was there excuse?
- was it the wrong type of harm intended to be avoided by statute
- usually not liable (public order v. safety)
- was the plaintiff the one meant to be protected?
- if it was a standard of care statute, was there a choice?
- proof
- circumstantial evidence
- negri – spilled baby food
- prima facie negligence, slippery baby food jars in aisle
- baby food does not move around left spilled for hours (?)
- gordon – wax paper
- constructive notice (none)
- visible defect
- temporal existence of paper on steps
- res ipsa loquitor – sed quid in infernos dicet?
- elements
- exclusive control of defendant
- sometimes right of control is enough
- no proof of negligence possible
- accident would not have occurred ordinarily without negligence
- not due to voluntary action by plaintiff (sometimes)
- explanation more accessible to defendant (sometimes)
- byrne – barrel of flour falls out of sky
- presumption of negligence from warehouse
- barrel in control of defendant – prima facie negligece
- Nicollet hotel
- national junior chamber of commerce throwing stuff out window
- hotel management knew and turned other cheek so infer negligence
- McDougald – tractor-trailer tire
- a spare tire coming loose and airborne and crashing is not an accident which would occur but for failure of reasonable care of controller of tire
- preponderance of evidence that there was negligence is requirement
- Ybarra
- right arm and shoulder injury after appendectomy
- several defendants
- res ipsa can’t be invoked against any individual defendant
- if no RIL, plaintiff can’t recover knowing someone was negligent
- like pedestrian struck bybarrel or passenger sitting awake in train
- number of defendants or their relationships determine applicability of RIL
- plaintiff, unconscious, does not have to identify negligent defendant
- if no RIL, patients injured while unconscious willo never recover
- fireman’s fund – no RIL where fire broke out but 1 of 4 smoking defendants started it
- medical malpractice
- standard of care
- expert requirements
- knowledge, experience, training, education
- board certification “presumptively qualified”
- no single factor is determinative
- sheeley – episiotomy
- expert testimony determines standard of care in malpractice case
- unless lack of care is obvious within layman’s common knowledge
- sometimes, court requires expert of similar education, skill, experience
- same or similar locality rule thrown out
- encourages disparity in standards among communities
- was procedure executed in conformity with recognized standard of care? (no, liable)
- accreditation, proliferation of literature, national standards
- informed consent
- matthies – nonconsent for NONSURGERY
- informed consent
- doctor must explain medically reasonable alternatives and outcomes
- doc must give non-recommended alternative treatment info
- policy: self-determination (historically, battery), patient must make informed decision
- professional standard
- expertise
- better notice
- more efficient (settlements)
- decrease unnecessary treatments
- patient standard (matthies)
- true to patient expectations and desires
- unbiased
- self-determination
- subjective standard
- not standard
- CAUSATION
- actual cause
- where but-for cause is problematic use
- more likely than not (stubbs hemlock and holly typhoid case)
- in medical suits, loss of chance - doesn’t need 50% (alberts ambutation)
- elements
- material loss of chance
- causal link to a reasonable degree of medical probability 50%+
- closed window of chance (temporal)
- anti-lost chance approach
- playing role of lotteries and insurance policies
- statistics unreliable and misleading
- substantial factor
- where deterrence is the object
- joint and several liability
- joint and several
- plaintiff recovers 100%
- each defendant liable for full damanges
- where there is a single, indivisible injury
- when damage cannot be allocated
- concert in action (drag races)
- uniform act – each defendant pays no more than pro rata share
- equity principles – solvent tortfeasors divide full amount among them
- summers v. tice
- quail huntin
- where both defendants are negligent, one caused harm
- shift burden of proof to defendants (access to evidence)
- each defendant joint and severally liable for all damages
- no requirement for acting in concert
- if one defendant is not negligent, CA court dismissed case
- hymowitz v. eli lilly - DES
- ~300 defendants, all negligent, direct causation problem
- national market share approach
- innocent plaintiff
- deterrence
- apportioned liability
- several liability only to avoid overdeterrence
- not liable if defendant did not market drug for specific use in question
- liable even if defendant proves no actual specific causation (no exculpation)
- liable if plaintiff proves causation traditionally (inculpation)
- asbestos, lead paint, vaccines
hymowitz v. eli lilly
Several Liability / Joint and Several Liability
exculpation (no actual causation) / No / Yes
exculpation (no market share) / Yes / Yes
inculpation (traditional causation) / Yes / Yes
primary concern / optimal deterrence / optimal compensation
- proximate cause
- factors
- foreseeability
- type of harm
- extent of harm
- manner
- plaintiff’s conduct
- directness
- intervening causes
- judge v. jury
- unexpected harm
- direct harm
- cause followed naturally from original negligence
- risk is foreseeable
- not too large time/space
- not too many intervening causes (some can be okay)
- eggshell plaintiff (benn)
- physical injury - extent doesn’t need to be foreseeable, only injury
- emotional distress – courts split, usually no
- in re polemis
- benzine drops onto wooden board and ship burns up
- rule
- direct harm
- some harm foreseeable
- liable for all damages
- wagon mound
- molten metal falls into water igniting rag soaked in bunkering oil spread from spill
- rule
- type of harm must be unforeseeable
- extent?
- intervening causes
- mclaughlin - unwrapped heating blocks
- egregiousness of intervening act augments unforeseeability of it
- not clear about foreseeable egregious act?
- intervening causes approaches
- liable
- reasonably likely egregious ic liability (extension of mclaughlin)
- substantial factor liability (restatement 2nd)
- not liable
- egregious ic no liability (mclaughlin)
- highly extraordinary no liability (restatement 2nd)
- defendant pushes specifics, plaintiff pushes generality
- unexpected victims
- palsgraf - scales fall on woman’s head in train
- cardozo – no duty because no foreseeable harm to this plaintiff
- dissent, j. andrews
- physical link
- remoteness in time and space
- natural progression
- intervening causes
- FOS
- egregious?
- highly extraordinary?
- foreseeability
- courts have found duty to rescuer of victim of negligence (trains)
- kidney donors don’t recover for malpractice (deliberate and reflective, no emergency situation pressure)
- time between act and injury can bar recovery
- Defenses
- contributory negligence
- plaintiff gets no recovery if contributorily negligent in a contributory negligence state
- comparative negligence
- plaintiff gets reduced damages if contributorily negligent in a comparative negligence state
- assumption of risk (only good for negligence, not intentional torts)
- express agreements
- dalury – ski resort was found to be void, but many juris. will uphold
- tunkl factors – waiver invalid if
- business type suitable to regulation
- service is important to public
- open to public
- defendant has excessive bargaining strength
- availability of reimbursement for burden
- person is under control of seller
- CO factors
- duty to the public
- nature of service
- clear language
- totality of circumstances
- service is private vs. public interest
- landowners have control and duty to make safe
- waivers remove incentive to manage risk
- societal expectations
- implied
- davenport approach
- primary
- implied waiver of liability
- no duty to plaintiff
- for policy reasons (sports)
- secondary assumption of risk (primary + negligent defendant)
- plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily confronts risks
- plaintiff must have been reasonable to recover
- adjust damages accordingly
- Murphy – the flopper
- elements
- foreseeability of harm
- voluntary assumption
- no obscure or very dangerous risks here
- limits
- obscure/hidden risks
- very dangerous risks
- amateur sports theories
- duty changes: only intentional or reckless negligence is recoverable
- negligence varies according to activity
- duty not to increase risk
- policy
- don’t chill vigorous participation
- specatators
- availability of choices (in seating at baseball stadium)
- some protection probably enough (b > pl)
- davenport – unlit staircase
- elements
- knowledge of facts constituting dangerous condition
- knowledge of extent of danger
- voluntary exposure (no lack of choice)
- Intentional Torts – the best place for punitive damages
- garret v. dailey (kid pulls chair from under aunt)
- defendant must foresee injury
- no contact necessary between plaintiff and defendant
- intent
- legal – substantial certainty of injury
- actual – know of harmful or offensive contact
- assault and battery – nominal damages okay here
- assault
- elements
- reasonable apprehension
- requires actual apprehension AND reasonable apprehension
- imminent physical harm
- intent (legal or actual)
- legal intent = substantial certainty that harm would occur
- conditional threat is often assault
- phone threat not assault (not imminent)
- contributory negligence is NOT a defense
- battery
- elements
- harmful offensive contact
- to person of extension of person (picard photographer)
- intent
- eggshell plaintiff
- specially sensitive plaintiff sometimes can’t recover (homophobe hug)
- unless defendant knows of special sensitivity (wishnatsky)
- subjective standard v. objective one
- physical eggshell plaintiff can recover
- intending assault battery or vice versa transfers
- wishnatksy v. huey – guy gets shoved out the door
- offensive
- to ordinary person
- not liable to unduly eggshell plaintiff (unless know of sensitivity)
- courts more sympathetic to eggshell plaintiff in battery
- false imprisonment
- lopez v. winchell’s donut house
- elements
- actual restraint or intent to restrain
- restraint (restatement)
- physical barriers
- overpowering physical force
- threats of physical force (sometimes can be implied)
- legal authority
- duress
- awareness of imprisonment (courts divided)
- against plaintiff’s will (moral pressure is not restraint)
- lopez said she was not afraid no recovery
- intentional infliction of emotional distress
- elements
- intent or recklessness
- outrageous or intolerable conduct
- continuous
- type plaintiff (kid, elderly, pregnant women)
- causation
- emotional distress (Womack says severe)
- (no bodily harm required)
- (fraud makes defendant’s case worse)
- Womack
- photographer takes photos of plaintiff at skateland
- racial and verbal harassment sometimes
- sc rejected reasonable woman (for sexual harassment)
- defenses and privileges
- consent
- hart v. geysel
- prize fighter dies after fight
- minority says if conduct is unlawful, no recovery unless malicious
- majority - mutual combat in anger means no consent defense
- professional sports
- recognized risk?
- can recover if tort is outside code and customs if sport
- self defense
- Courvoisier
- guy shoots police officer thinking he’s part of rowdy mob
- elements
- reasonable fear
- of imminent danger
- reasonable means
- honest belief
- third party may intervene only when necessary
- katko
- spring-loaded gun at empty house
- reasonable force means no taking life above property
- family was not in house
- posner suggests location, value, existence of legal remedy, warning, deadliness, cost of avoidance…
- must not be hidden
- strict liability
- ultrahazardous activities – context matters
- Indiana harbor belt railroad v.