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Types of deliberation… Page
Ways of Talking, Types of Democratic Deliberation and the Limits of Citizen Participation
Shawn W. Rosenberg
UniversityCenter for Human Values
PrincetonUniversity
Graduate Program in Political Psychology
UC Irvine
Abstract
Following more than a decade of theorizing and widespread practical application, political scientists have begun empirical research on democratic deliberation. Typically, this research has focused on individual or collective outcomes of deliberation, paying relatively little attention to the deliberative processes themselves. Here these processes are studied directly. First, I offer a typology of the different ways people talk to one another. Three types of discourse are defined: (1) conventional, (2) cooperative, and (3) collaborative. The last two types are of the kind presumed by deliberative democratic theory, with more liberal versions assuming that deliberations are cooperative and more critical versions assuming that deliberations are collaborative. I then report research on two groups of parents who met seven times to consider the delivery of education in their area. Despite conditions highly favorable to deliberation, the analysis of their discussions indicates that they were overwhelmingly conventional. The participants rarely engaged one another in the way assumed by liberal democratic theory and never engaged one another in a more critical manner. To conclude, the political implications of this result are discussed.
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Types of deliberation… Page
Scholars and political commentators have increasingly voiced concerns about the state of democracy in the advanced industrial societies of the West. They point to evidence of declining citizen interest in politics, diminishing rates of political participation, increasing suspicion of politicians and governmental institutions, and the social fragmentation characteristic of large multicultural societies. In response to these concerns and with normative considerations in mind, a number of political theorists have advocated a more deliberative form of democratic practice to supplement conventional electoral democracy. Drawing onMill (1858/61), Dewey or Habermas (1984/7, 1996), most emphasize the importance of citizen participation in policy discussions and the critical role this plays in expressing and fostering the core democratic values of autonomy and equality (e.g.,Guttman and Thompson 1996, 2004; Cohen, 1996, 1997; Chambers, 1996; Benhabib, 1996, 2004; Bohman, 1997 and Dryzek, 2000). They claim that citizens brought together to deliberate public policy in a setting that emphasizes equal participation, mutual respect and reasoned argument are more likely to produce policy decisions that are perceived as more legitimate and are in fact more rational and fair.They are also more likely to bridge their differences and forge a common point of view. This turn to deliberation is also evident in political practice. Reliance on deliberative fora of various types is becoming an increasing reality in political life. Public policy analysts have reported numerous cases of deliberation in Europe, the United States and South America (e.g. Forester, 1999; Fung and Wright, 2001, Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Innes and Boohr, 2003, 2004; Fung, 2007, Weatherford and McDonnell, 2007). My own investigation of deliberative efforts in the US suggests that citizen deliberations have been central in major city, school board, county and regional decision-making in over 1000 localities over the last twenty years.
Despite this theoretical and practical interest in citizen deliberation, political scientists have only recently begun to go beyond the informal observation of particular cases to the conduct of more systematic studies of citizen’s tendencies to engage in political talk (e.g., Delli Carpini et al., 2007), their views of deliberation (e.g., Walsh, 2004) and the impact of deliberation on participants’ attitudes (e.g., Luskin, et al., 2002; for a review of the literature, see Mendelberg, 2002). However, little systematic research has focused on what both theorists and practitioners view as the most critical element of deliberation – the quality of the discussionthat actually occurs among citizen-deliberators. Although the criteria vary somewhat, only certain types of discussion qualify as deliberative and democratic. Only if that discussion involves the presentation of justifications for claims and a reasoned consideration of those justifications, can it be regarded as deliberative. Only if the discussion is conducted in a way that preserves the autonomy and equality of the participants,can it be considered be democratic. Insofar as it discussion fails to be deliberative or democratic, the deliberation is likely to be less effective in bridging significant differences and building a sense of community and the policy recommendations that follow are likely to be less rational, less fair and less legitimate.
In this article, I examine the quality of the deliberative exchange. First, I offer a theoretically grounded description of how individuals actually engage one another when they are asked to deliberate. I describe three different forms of discursive practices that may emerge in deliberative settings: conventional, co-operative and collaborative. Each form of discourse has a distinctive communication structure that enables some types of discussion and prohibits others. Defining the parameters of discussion, each form tends to foster the development of certain kinds of shared understandings or values and preclude others. The different forms of discursive exchange correspond to the empirical expectations and normative demands of different political theories. Conventional discourse is consistent with conservative (and most sociological) expectations of what deliberations may consist of and accomplish. Cooperative discourse is consistent with more classically liberal conceptions and that of the mainstream of deliberative democratic theory itself. Collaborative discourse meets the expectations of more radical and developmental democratic theory (e.g. Benhabib, 1996; Habermas, 1987, 1996). Here I use this typology to guide the analysis of two citizen deliberations thatwere convened under conditions highly favorable to deliberation. Having determined that most deliberation is “conventional,” I then consider how this most prevalent type of deliberation delimits the kind of citizen that the individual participants can be and the political values and understandings they can generate together in a way that contradicts the assumptions of deliberative democratic theory. In this light, I conclude by briefly consider the implications for the conception of deliberative democracy.
Ways of Talking /Types of Political Discourse
While briefly stipulating what a deliberative exchange should be like, most deliberative democratic theory focuses on the institutional context or social setting of the deliberation. Critical attention is paid to the ways in which institutional arrangements and social statusoperate to exclude people from the deliberation and then to distort the discussion of those involved by highlighting the concerns of the more powerful participants and by silencing the less powerful participants or forcing their conformity. The assumption here is that insofar as power can be neutralized and constraints on participation can be removed, individuals will engage one another in a more truly democratic and deliberative fashion. Allowing for some variation among theorists, most argue that the result will be a collaborative consideration of a problem or issue through the assertions of fact or value (as personal narratives or explicit claims) that are actually or potentially backed by reasons or clarified by elaborations which may then be subject to challenge, defense and revision. The assumption is that this presentation and interrogation of claims will involve the free and equal expression of personal views and a respectful consideration of others’ perspectives, fairness and the common good.
While instructive, this way of characterizing deliberative discourses is inadequate. To begin, theorists make little reference to evidence on how people actually deliberate. This may be justified insofar as ideal deliberation is realized or at least closely approximated in real deliberations. However, in her seminal study of town hall meetings, Mansbridge (1980) observed that deliberation was in fact far from ideal. Ifthis is generally the case, an analysis of how people actually engage one another in deliberative settings becomes necessary. The need for careful empirical analysis is underscored by Mendelberg’s review (2002) which suggests that the wrong kind of deliberation can generate quite negative political outcomes. However, with its focus on a single kind of exchange, the kind assumed and prescribed by deliberative theory, this approach offers little direction for empirical research. If people engage one another in a non-normative fashion, the theory can only offer a framework for negative description; it can only provide a way of describing what people are not doing. What people are doing is thus obscured.
Here I adopt a structural pragmatic view of cognition and communication. In this view,meaning-making is understood to be a purposive, constructive activity that has both subjective and inter-subjective dimensions(Mead, 1932; Habermas, 1987; Rosenberg, 2002, 2003). This view yields a distinctive understanding of communication, one that suggests that communication may take qualitatively different forms thereby producing (a) structurally different ways of coordinating the interaction between participants and (b) different possibilities for the kinds of meanings they can inter-subjectively construct.Building on the insights of this tradition and on Mead’s and Habermas’ theoretical writings on forms of communicative exchange, I describe three types of communicationbelow: (1) concretely anchored, conventional discourse, (2) co-operative discourse and (3) collaborative, reconstructive discourse. In the movement from conventional to cooperative to collaborative discourse, the exchange between participants becomes increasingly complex, reflexive and attentive to personal and cultural differences. As noted earlier, each type corresponds to the expectations of a different political tradition: the first is consistent with a conservative vision of citizen discourse, the second with a liberal democratic tradition and the third with a more critical, developmental democratic tradition. For expository purposes, I begin with cooperative discourse, the type assumed in most liberal democratic and deliberative democratic theory, and then discuss the conventional and collaborative alternatives.
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I. Co-operative discourse
Aim of the discourse. Cooperative discourse is guided by two aims. The first is problem oriented. The aim here is to construct a correctunderstanding of the problem.Most importantly, this means that a critical approachis adopted toward participants’ initial perceptions and specific cultural claims. The assumption is that these perceptionsare likely to reflect a narrow and superficial focus. Consequently in the deliberation an attempt is made to understand the problem better by considering both the relationship among its aspects and the larger context in which it emerges. Similarly in the discussionof cultural conventions, an attempt is made to insure that the invocation of any particular cultural definition or prescription is consistent with a broader understanding of the practical or social problem in question andwith other possibly relevant cultural claims that might be made.
A second goal of co-operative discourse is more social. The aim here is to construct a shared understanding of the problem and how it is being addressed. The presumption is thatdifferent individuals may be exposed to different experiences or different aspects of the broader culture and therefore may have different frames of reference for the claims they make. As a resultthey may not understand a particular claim in the same way. The result will not be so much disagreement as misunderstanding. Recognizing this, a co-operative discourse involves a good deal of mutual interpretation in an effort to generate a shared understanding of the matter at hand. The discursive exchange is thus strongly oriented toward building consensus.
The formal qualities of the discourse. The basic element of a co-operative discourse is the presentation of a perspective. This involves making a propositional claim of the relationship between concrete actions and then relating that claim to other propositional claims with which the first is linked. For example, a speaker discussing educational policy may make the claim that, “Students are only motivated by punishment because there is no attempt to make schooling relevant to their perception of their own needs. This is part of a more general problem of appealing to traditional values and authority in a way that no longer works.” In this way, a speaker begins to present the system of meaning in which her claims are embedded and related to one another. The co-operative exchange of these elemental perspectives is coordinated on three bases. The first basis is a setof rules of argumentation. These rules regulate how claims may be related to each other and to the objective reality (physical, social or personal) they are intended to represent. Included here is demand that claims be elaborated, explained, justified and challenged by presenting related claims(reasons) and evidence in a manner that follows the rules of logic and reliable observation. The second basis is a set of fundamental assumptions regarding the general qualities of the world. These assumptions provide individuals with a common general ground to which they can refer when making specific arguments based on their different perspectives. Included here are assumptions regarding the basic organizational structure and dynamic qualities of the natural world of objects, the social world of human beings and the subjective world of the self. The third basis for the coordination of discourse rests on the foundations of the second. It involves a shared understanding of the social conditions required to maintain a co-operative exchange among individuals with potentially differing perspectives. This then suggests guidelines for determining who should be included in any particular discussion and how they should interact with one another. These guidelines may be drawn upon in the collective determination of how to organize a particular co-operative discussion.
Structured in this way, co-operative discourse is organized around a general subject rather than a particular concrete topic. The subject of the discourse is the systemic quality of the problem and the context in which the problem is understood. To be relevant, propositional claims must be related to the problem’s objective, social or subjective context. At any point in the discourse, only one of these contexts is likely to be emphasized, while the other two are bracketed out. In this way dimensions of the discourse subject may be differentiated from one another and the discourse organized accordingly. For example, discussion may be structured so that the objective nature of the problem and the feasibility of different solutions are considered first and the social value of different solutions is deferred until later. A dimension of the problem may itself be organized by differentiating its constitutive aspects and then ordering them for discussion. For example, aspects of the objective problem of education (e.g., administration and teaching) may be differentiated and an agenda set for subsequent discussion. In this context, different conversational turns are related to one another as co-operative efforts to inform, to critique and to revise the different perspectives voiced with the aim of establishing a better, shared understanding of the problem. This requires attention both to the subject ofdiscussion and to the views of the individual speakers.
The dynamics of the discourse. Cooperative discourse may emerge in response to the failure of conventional discourse. When participants in a conventional exchange do not refer to the same experiences, authorities or social conventions, irresolvable disagreement may follow. At this point, conventional discourse may be suspended and a co-operative discourse may be initiated. This may include a preliminary discussion of the bases of the initial disagreement and the dimensions or aspects of the problem addressed. This may in turn lead to initial (and revisable) agreement as to how to organize the ensuing discussion.
In the discussion, any speaker may begin to present her perspective on the subject by making a propositional claim. She recognizes that her understanding of the meaning and value of her claim is relative to her own subjective perspective and that the listeners’ perspectives may differ from her own. Consequently the speaker will anticipate possible misunderstanding and this may lead to unprompted attempts (1) to clarify the meaning of her claim by placing it in perspective, that is relative to other claims she regards to be true or right, (2) to explore possible specific differences of experience, knowledge and preference that exist between her and the listeners, (3) to explicate her claims with reference to the listener’s perspective, and (4) to validate her claims with reference to the fundamental assumptions that she and her audience share about the objective world, social relations and persons. This attempt to express an understanding may be taken up and developed by others either by further elaborating a weave of connections or by introducing new considerations which require that the initial framework be reworked. In this way, participants may cooperatively build a common point of view.
When disagreement arises, discussion will focus on the justifications for the claims made. This may involve critical commentary on whether a justification violates commonly accepted rules of logic, coherence and reliable observation. Alternatively the focus may be on the incompatibility of ajustification with commonly accepted fundamental assumptions about the quality or dynamic of objective reality, society or personality. In either case, an attempt is made to argue the incorrectness of another’s claim in terms that she is likely to accept as binding. A disagreement may also be resolved by incorporating the differing positions under a common umbrella. Here reference is made to common rules and assumptions to demonstrate that the two positions are either complementary (perhaps illuminating different aspects of the same phenomena) or equally valid. In the latter instance, the two positions are defined as different results of drawing upon the same common basic assumptionsand applying the same rules of logic and observation. The result is acceptable disagreement in which the validity of each position is acknowledged.
Two kinds of circumstancesundermine or prevent co-operative discourse. In the first case, one or more participants do not recognize or are incapable of using the basic rules of argument. In this case their contributions to the discourse will be devalued as substandard. Communication toward them may assume a pedagogical or care-taking character. In this case, they are taught correct usage and assumptions or decisions are simply made for them. Alternatively these “incompetent” participants may be excluded from the discourse or their contributions maybe ignored. In the second case, one or more of the participants do not share the basic underlying assumptions of the others. This is likely when participants come from very different cultural backgrounds. Where discourse rules or foundational assumptions are not shared, the requisitecommon ground for co-operative discourse is lost and it reverts to a more conventional form. Opposed participants come to view each other not as incompetent, but as wrong-minded and harmful. This may in turn lead to physical struggle to determine both the response to the present problem and the conditions of future discourse.