Opinion of Robert Szymczak
a doctor who consults the winter expedition on K2 regarding doubts regarding: the decision on dissent

The decision to end the rescue operation after Tomasz Mackiewicz and to continue the rescue operation only with Elisabeth Revol was taken on 27 January 2018 at 23.30 of Polish time (28/01/2018 at 3.30 am in the Pakistani time), about 2 hours after Denis Urubko and Adam Bielecki arrived Elisabeth Revol. The decision was made by the coordinator of the Polish rescue operation of doctor Robert Szymczak (doctor preparing medical expedition for K2 expedition and a doctor consulted winter expedition to K2), program manager of Polish Winter Hymnalism Janusz Majer and members of the rescue team on the site of Jaroslaw Botor - medical rescuer of the winter expedition to K2 , Piotr Tomala, Adam Bielecki.

The reasons for the decision were as follows:

  1. Failure to complete the original rescue plan, which gave the opportunity to rescue both climbers. This plan assumed the possibility of landing a helicopter on 27.01.2018 in the vicinity of camp III on Nanga Parbat at a height of about 6,500 m in order to directly evacuate Elisabeth Revol with this helicopter. Then transporting four of the climbers of the rescue team together with oxygen tanks for the same amount. The next stage of the campaign was to reach four of the climbers to Tomasz Mackiewicz using oxygen support (1-2 days of mountain action), giving him help and lifting the victim to the height of about 6500m (next 2 days of mountain action) for further evacuation by helicopter. The implementation of the plan from the very beginning was a very big question mark because the success of implementation depended on many factors:
  2. possibility of landing a helicopter in the vicinity of camp III under the current weather conditions (the pilot on the spot decided that there is no such possibility );
  3. the ability to quickly locate Elisabeth Revol, reach her and put her in a helicopter;
  4. the possibility of a safe and fast rescue by the rescue team of the route from camp III (around 6500m) to the place of residence of Tomasz Mackiewicz (7280m). "Safe" climbing at this height, in this terrain and season requires protection and use of ropes; the implementation of this plan was based on the assumption of the possibility of using, to a large extent, rail ropes left after the previous season, whose finding in these conditions was quite doubtful;
  5. Ability to efficiently carry out the drift of Tomasz Mackiewicz from the height of 7280m ​​to 6500m without creating a threat to the life and health of the rescue team of the climbers; It is worth noting that the members of the rescue team are primarily climbers, not qualified mountain rescuers. Lifting / bringing on a stretcher of an injured person in winter conditions at extreme altitudes is a task that they would not be able to cope with due to their qualifications.
  6. weather conditions enabling climbing, drifting and transport by helicopter (unfortunately, forecasts pointed to the approaching breakdown of weather and life threatening conditions, making it impossible to conduct mountain actions over 6500m )
  7. real chances of survival of Tomasz Mackiewicz until the rescue team reaches him (according to the accounts of Elisabeth Revol, Tomasz Mackiewicz at the time of the climbers' disconnection on 26/01/2018 at about 13.30 he already had consciousness disorders).
    The inability to land the helicopter at the height of 6,500 m on 27.01.2018 was the main reason for the inability to carry out the above original rescue plan giving the opportunity to rescue both climbers. However, if the helicopter landed at 6500m, transported Eisabeth Revol and left the rescue team of the climbers at 6500m, the implementation of the above plan would also not be possible due to the forecasted collapse of the weather. Being above 6500m in the forecasted weather conditions would directly threaten the life of the rescue team.
  8. Failure to implement any alternative plan that would give an opportunity to rescue the two climbers. Considering the fact that the helicopter did not land at the height of 6,500 m on 27/01/2018, and the forecasted weather conditions for the next days, it was not possible to plan an alternative action on 27/01/2018, the implementation of which would depend on the helicopter being able to land on 6500m.
  9. Waiting by the rescue team in camp I (about 5000m) from 27th to 28.01.2018 to implement the original plan the next day 2018.01.28 would minimize the chances of survival of Elisabeth Revol and was not rational with bad weather forecasts for the next day.
  10. Definitely, Adam Bilecki and Denis Urubko, after arriving at Elisabeth Revol, checked the night in camp II (about 6000m) in the hope of helicopter transport Elisabeth Revol on the next day 2018.01.28 would reduce the chance of safe her bringing in the next day if the helicopter he did not come. Planning that exhausted climbers together with the other two potentially transported helicopters will be able to continue the rescue operation from the height of 6000m in the forecasted weather conditions had no rational premises for the chance of implementation.

On 27/01/2018, after Adam Bielecki and Denis Urubko arrived in Elisabeth Revol, transport possibilities, forecasted weather conditions, human resources involved in the rescue operation and the anticipated threat to health and life of the rescue team from the climbers due to worsening weather conditions gave a chance to save one climber - Elisabeth Revol. However, it should be noted that bringing Elisabeth Revol from camp II by Adam Bilecki and Denis Urubko was still a very difficult and dangerous task. Continuing the action after Tomasz Mackiewicz would be a mistake, because it would require Elisabeth Revol to leave the mountain independently, would expose the rescue team to the immediate threat of life during the action in the breakdown of the weather and from the medical point of view would give a very low chance of reaching the living Tomasz Mackiewicz. The decision made was difficult and characteristic for actions in crisis situations, mass accidents or disasters, where the number of victims overwhelms the capabilities of emergency services. In such situations, the efforts are focused on providing help to people who are saved, while resigning from rescue actions against the injured, who in a given situation do not prognosticate survival. Then, on 27/01/2018 only Elisabeth Revol was saved, Tomasz Mackiewicz, unfortunately, did not prognosticate the experience. The weather breaks down on Nanga Parbat during the next days after 27.01.

Today (2018.02.02) is a week from the moment when Tomasz Mackiewicz was last seen by Elisabeth Revol. At that time, he was at an altitude of 7,280 m, he had a disturbing consciousness in the ice gap, he was unable to descend on his own. From the medical point of view, it is unlikely that he would still be alive. He probably died as a result of height deterioration - exhaustion with height, which mainly consists of altitude hypoxia, hypothermia and dehydration.

In view of the above, organizing a rescue operation again has no reason to exist and it would be unnecessary and unreasonable exposing the members of the rescue team to health and life risks related to staying at extreme altitudes during the winter season. Conducting a search campaign using the human resources at the top is also not justified at this moment.

02/02/2018

Robert Szymczak

Official Information