VI. Political Change: Taiwan and South Korea

VI. Political Change: Taiwan and South Korea

The main purpose of this class meeting is to take a close look at the driving forces of democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea. The comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea do offer some important explanations for the driving factors of democratic transition.

Taiwan

1. Structure-oriented perspective

The first explanation is the structure-oriented or structuralist perspective that emphasizes the level of socioeconomic development and its association with democracy. The main finding of this perspective is that all the socioeconomic prerequisites for democracy have generally been met in Taiwan and therefore it is on the path to a fully democratic system. One of the most important indicators: a consistent average annual growth rate of about 7 percent and a per capita GNP of US$10,202 for 1992 and US$ 10,566 for 1993 have ranked Taiwan among the world’s fastest growing economies. Taiwan has surpassed the basic level of economic development required for the development of democracy and has allowed the general population to access to education, mass communications, transportation, and resources for political participation.

2. Process-oriented perspective

The second explanation is the process-oriented or elitist perspective that emphasizes the ruling elite calculation of repression versus toleration and the crucial role of individual decision-makers and leaders of main political groups in deciding the course of political change. A decision by the ruling elite either to repress or tolerate opposition and that by the opposition elite to rebel or cooperate can determine the process and the outcome of political transition. In order to gauge the attitudes of elite groups towards the building of a democratic political system, an understanding of their political views is needed and mapped. Therefore, surveys or interviews of political leaders on key political issues should be the main source for evaluating the relationship between political transition and elite settlement. The literature suggests that Chiang Ching-kuo’s decision to liberalize the Taiwanese politics played a crucial role in the transition toward democracy.

In short, Taiwan serves a strong case for modernization theory or structuralist perspective that emphasizes the macro socioeconomic conditions as well as a strong case for process-oriented perspective which emphasizes the role of individual elite in initiating transition process.

South Korea

1. Structure-oriented perspective

To put it in a comparative context, South Korea is similar to Taiwan in a sense that both pro-capitalist dictatorships achieved export-led industrialization, thereby creating favorable conditions for a “smooth” transition to democracy. As in Taiwan, all the socioeconomic prerequisites for democracy have generally been met in South Korea. South Korea had a consistent average annual growth rate of about 7 percent. A per capita GNP of US$10,202 for 1992 and US$ 10,566 for 1993 have ranked South Korea among the world’s fastest growing economies. S. Korea’s economic has allowed the general population to access to education, mass communications, transportation, and resources for political participation.

2. Process-oriented perspective

S. Korea’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy is not top-down, regime-initiated process, but a process characterized by a cyclical pattern of direct, violent conflict between the popular revolts in civil society and the authoritarian regime in S. Korea. Despite the fact that the military regime used its coercive might to suppress student uprisings or popular revolts, no military governments were able to eliminate a strong network of opposition forces including dissident movements, grass-roots labor protests, and student demonstrations. Therefore, the mode of transition is one based on negotiated pacts between ruling elite and opposition, which is different to Taiwan’s transition. What is notably different about S. Korea’s transition is the forces “from below” played a greater role than its counterparts in Taiwan.

Comparison of Taiwan and South Korea

South Korea serves an excellent case for comparison with Taiwan. These are two countries that have so much in common that gives us a common ground for comparison.

Similarities:

1. Both are under the influence of the Confucian culture in people’s daily, social value system, and leadership style.

2. Both South Korea and Taiwan are governments of divided nations, claiming sovereignty over their territories and having an effective control over their population within their territories.

3. Both are locked into the bitter struggle with their rival communist regimes, with a powerful support from the United States. Both became highly dependent upon the U.S. foreign aid and military support. In fact, without the U.S. military intervention and support in the cold war, both were unlikely to survive and exist today.

4. In the 1960s, both turned to outward-looking economic policies, adopting ELI strategies in their economic development, and enjoyed exceptional economic boom for several decades.

5. In the late 1980s, both embarked upon political transformations from military and one-party dictatorships to some forms of constitutional democracy.

Differences:

1. The pre-transition regimes are different.

From Chiang Kai-shek to Chiang Ching-kuo (1949-1988), Taiwan was ruled by a political regime established and maintained by one single powerful and institutionalized political party, the KMT (the Nationalist party), with all the political, administrative, and military apparatus under its direct control. The KMT was constructed in the Leninist organizational line from the “cell” up to the “Standing Committee,” subject to strict party discipline.

However, the KMT was not the same as the CCP. In theory, the KMT was non-communist and not at the service of a universal and utopian goal of communism, while in practice the KMT’s agenda of control on the island was limited, not totalitarian, with its goals for a prosperous economy, a strong army, and a monopoly of power.

South Korea was ruled by military dictatorships for most of the history, lacking fully institutionalized political parties. Political parties did exist but were neither the elitist party as in Taiwan nor mass political parties as in Western Europe. Those major functions of political parties in modern politics such as coalition building, constituency maintenance, and support mobilization were poorly performed. Until 1986, no party had survived the political lifespan of its founding persons. The changing of the guard in Korean politics was characterized by the leadership of a strong man with groupings or parties built around him.

2. The state-society relationships are different.

In Taiwan, the KMT enjoyed the high autonomy in governmental decision making and the capacity of implementing its policies freely, because no interest group was powerful enough to propose its agenda into the national policy making. Civil society was disorganized before the transition.

In South Korea, state policy had the “corporatist” feature. As a rule, whenever we see the functional organization of society in whole or in part, not on an individualistic basis, government control, structuring, organizing, and licensing of interest groups, and their incorporation into the process of the modern state, we are most likely to find corporatism present. In South Korea, in order to achieve the national goal of industrialization, the government worked together with big business interests and subsidized giant conglomerates (jaebol) at the expense of small business and the building of heavy and chemistry industries at the expense of the consumer and farm sectors.

3. The modes of transition are different.

Modes of transition are usually distinguished according to the process through which incumbents are replaced by opposition forces. Roughly, one can distinguish between transitions from above, transitions from below, and transitions where regime and opposition play a roughly equal role in regime change. Three ideal types of transition can be distinguished: Transformation occurred when the elites in power took the lead in bringing about democratic transition. Replacement occurred when opposition groups took the lead in bringing about democratic transition, and the old regime collapsed or was overthrown. Transplacement or pacted transition occurred when democratic transition resulted largely from joint action by elites in power and opposition elites (Huntington, p. 114).

Taiwan is the typical case of transformation. The transition to a more open, democratic regime was a KMT decision and the implementation of this policy was carefully managed by the KMT, although the “outside-party activists” and opposition forces did play an important role. “Regime-led reform,” “regime-initiated liberalization,” or “change from above” are all the terms to describe the central feature of this mode of transition. In Taiwan’s political transformations, (1) the government was stronger than opposition and had the power and capacity to move their countries toward democracy; (2) the relative power of reformers (Lee Teng Hui and his allies) was stronger than that of standpatters that resisted the transformation; and (3) those in power (Chiang Ching Kuo) were willing to take the lead and play the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic system (the assigned article, pp.83-85).

South Korea is the typical case of transplacement. “Pact,” “negotiated transition” or “compromise” are often the terms to describe the central feature of this mode of transition. Democratic transition is produced by the combined actions of government and opposition. In South Korea’s transplacement, two features can be clearly identified.

(1) Within the government, the balance of power between standpatters and reformers was such that the government was willing to negotiate a change of regime – it was usually pushed and pulled into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition. Under extreme pressure from the streets, the opposition parties, and the world, the leader of moderate faction, Roh, made compromise to the opposition’s demands on June 29, 1987 and his compromise forced President Chun to reopen negotiations with the opposition and eventually concede to the opposition all its major demands.

(2) The opposition was not strong enough to overthrow the government, while the government recognized that the costs of constant suppression, nontolerance, and nonnegotiation were too high and increased repression would lead to further alienation of social groups from the government and significant losses in international legitimacy. The political process leading to transplacement in South Korea was therefore marked by a hauling back and forth of strikes, protests, and demonstrations, on the one hand, and repression, police violence, martial laws, on the other. (The assigned article, pp. 85-87) Therefore, process-oriented approaches find their excellent case in South Korea’s transition toward democracy.

Cycles of protests and repression that eventually led to negotiated agreements between government and opposition can also be found in other cases such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, and South Africa.