Case: Losing Children

In Spring 2002, the national media had seized upon the story that the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) had “lost” five-year-old Rilya Wilson—that is, the agency could not account for the whereabouts of this foster child under the care of the state. Although she had not seen her daughter in some years, Rilya’s mother nonetheless appeared on CBS’s “The Early Show” to plead for the recovery of her daughter. Since this mother was drug-addicted at Rilya’s birth, DCF placed the infant with the woman assumed as Rilya’s grandmother but who was actually an unrelated family friend—willing to take the girl in and to accept state compensation for her care.[HU1]To this day, Rilya is yet to be found, but her caretaker has been charged in her disappearance.

The Rilya Wilson coverage triggered a barrage of related exposes’ in the Florida media concerning tragic fates of other children in the DCF foster care system. In some cases, children were victimized in a foster- or biological-family setting after DCF case workers had closed*[UoDC2] the case files on particular children. For example, after her case was closed (and agency supervision ended), stories surfaced about a malnourished ten-year-old girl (weighing twenty-nine pounds) imprisoned in a locked room by her state-appointed caregivers who refused food as punishment. [HU3]In other cases, the media reported on tragic circumstances of children under the watch of DCF caseworkers lagging behind in their supervisory and paperwork responsibilities or mishandling their case documentation. As a case in point, reports focused on a nine-year-old girl assaulted seven months after her caseworker’s last visit yet before that individual could file a safety assessment report based upon that visit. In still other cases, published accounts examined dire circumstances of children as outcomes of how caseworkers responded in particular cases. Although observing a violence-prone boyfriend enter a mother’s apartment, one caseworker decided against contacting police. That caseworker subsequently learned this man had stuffed an eleven-month-old in a freezer after killing the mother (the infant survived).[HU4]

The problem of children falling between the cracks of state agency foster care systems is by no means unique to Florida. The head of a national advocacy coalition on child protection reform drafted an op/ed. piece for Florida newspapers outlining how various states (such as Alabama and Illinois) confronted similar failings and initiated policy actions in response. [HU5]Still, the sheer numbers of children suffering abuse and even death within the Florida system before and after coverage of Rilya Wilson appear disproportionate and disturbing. Over eighteen hundred children had not been visited by a DCF caseworker in a given month. Twenty-three children under DCF supervision died in less than one year (during 2001-02). And over 400 children--such as Rilya Wilson--could not be accounted for, as the agency disclosed in the fall of 2002. [UoDC6]

Certainly, events such as these fuel media exposés that liberally heap blame on caseworkers and their immediate supervisors without calling attention to the stark administrative realities of under-staffing and under-funding. Reports hone in on such stories as that of a caseworker who allegedly disposed of bundles of active case files in a storage shed behind her residence [HU7]and of a supervisor who extended too many “second” chances to a poor-performing casework[HU8]er. Journalistic enterprise aside, it is natural to react to children suffering at the hands of their adult care givers as evil in our midst. Whether this evil is attributable to the agency becomes a vexing question given the complicated web of policy actions (or inactions) and administrative events in the years immediately preceding and following disclosure that the Florida DCF had lost Rilya Wilson in 2002.

The DCF Under Kathleen Kearney

Kathleen Kearney, a former judge, served as Secretary of the DCF at the time Rilya Wilson disappeared in February of 2001. Before her appointment to that post by Governor Jeb Bush in January of 1999—at which time seventy-two children were known missing,[UoDC9] Kearney sat on the Broward Circuit Court where she had acquired a reputation as a “child-protection-first” judge and influential advocate for children in abusive situations. And as a jurist, she assumed a policy making role in crafting state and federal legislation intended to assist children in troubled family environments.[UoDC10]Although widely regarded (even among political adversaries) as caring and compassionate, Kearney confronted criticism—especially after the Rilya Wilson story broke—related to her judicial background as it may have impacted upon her leadership of the DCF bureaucracy. One of the more caustic appraisals of her performance asserted that she in fact did not “put children first,” but instead “put them in foster care.” [UoDC11]This criticism parallels more analytical commentary that attributed her experience in the courts to values militating for the “stripping of parental rights” as the logical punitive outcome of a criminal justice system. Given the unceasing number of criminal proceedings involving “unfit” parents, it appeared to some that the DCF became the perpetual conveyor belt processing the children of parents so punished by the courts.

[UoDC12]This punitive conduit between the courts and the foster care system likely exacerbated the immediate working environments of child-protection caseworkers charged with making timely on-site visits, keeping records current, closing files of children “duly processed” into the foster system, and keeping those open that warranted continued scrutiny.One news report would later comment (after Kearney’s departure), “Caseworkers, who have been leaving DCF in droves, need to be reassured that whoever takes over appreciates their hard work and understands their difficult and even dangerous jobs.” In fact, Governor Bush’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Child Protection—created very soon after media revelations about the Rilya Wilson case—was quick to recommend increased state funding to be directed at street-level for the compensation and retention of case workers and for the case management function in general. [UoDC13]These recommendations, even if funded and implemented, might not have addressed what some observers recognized as the systemic nature of the DCF’s problems. For example, an editorial in the Tampa Tribune (appearing in late-May of 2002) caricatured the DCF as the “Dysfunction Containment Facilitator” and, in so doing, deflected some blame away from individuals—particularly Kathleen Kearney and Jeb Bush—to stress the larger dimensions of problem-ridden policy systems related to the courts and family services. In fact, the editorial quoted the governor, “These aren’t widgets we’re talking about. These are children with unique problems.”

[UoDC14]Prior to her late-August 2002 resignation, Kathleen Kearny was the frequent target of criticism for her policy stances—although much of this scrutiny was retrospective havingintensified after coverage of Rilya Wilson. Along with Governor Bush, Kearney was assailed for her opposition to a $7.5 million expansion of the state’s guardian ad litum program that provided advocate attorneys and/or lay guardians to represent the interests of foster care children in legal proceedings that affect them. Again Kearney’s legal background surfacedin her justification that deliberations about the welfare of children ought not digress to adversarial contests. On the other hand, Jeb Bush opposed the legislation because it would increase the “head-count” of state employees, contrary to his campaign commitment to cut the size of government. In response to Kearney’s objections to adversarial proceedings, legislators supporting expansion of this program (who happened to be Republicans) countered that, rather than representing children directly, lawyers in fact represent lay guardians of children in the courtroom. It turned out, however, that the Blue Ribbon Committee (mentioned above) backed expanding the program to $12.5 million amid speculation that Rilya Wilson would not be lost if she had a guardian. The governor supported this recommendation asserting that his earlier position had been misconstrued in the media.

[UoDC15]Kearney also attracted media controversy in disputing the findings of the Child Abuse Death Review Committee that investigated the deaths of sixty children placed under DCF care. In particular, Kearney took issue with that Committee’s finding that four-fifths of those fatalities were preventable. Reporters seized upon her contention that the agency should be permitted to “edit out” these findings viewed internally as inaccurate.

[UoDC16]Kathleen Kearney left the DCF in the late-summer of 2002, well after it had been reported that the governor was actively recruiting a successor in another state. Coverage of her departure acknowledged her virtues as a compassionate friend of children and an accomplished jurist.[UoDC17]Yet it appeared that these commendable traits do not necessarily translate into effective administrative leadership.

The DCF Under Jerry Regier

It was Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating who recommended that Jeb Bush appoint Jerry Regier to replace Kearney as Secretary of Florida’s DCF. After news of his nomination surfaced, Regier’s background fell under scrutiny when it was learned that he had backed faith-based initiatives as head of Oklahoma’s social service agency. On one hand, Regier’s religious leanings signaled a policy change in favor of family preservation, if at all possible. But on the other, they generated more stories relating to his past activities and statements reflecting dogmatic views on marriage, the family, and child-raising that might affect his leadership of DCF. For example, some speculated that Regier’s preference for family preservation could stem from a biblical conviction of a man’s* authority over the affairs of his household without interference from government. In fact, Regier had delivered a paper advancing such strident views at an international family conference in Malaysia a few years earlier.[UoDC18]Others pointed to Regier’s appointment as evidence of Jeb Bush’s agenda to reward his Christian conservative base.[UoDC19]Yet regardless of their factual merit, investigations of Regier’s religious background led the media back to Oklahoma to discover problems related to abuse in juvenile detention facilities under his charge and ethical breeches in the awarding of state contracts. Regarding the latter, it was disclosed that Regier paid nearly a half-million dollars to a consultant for a marriage initiative project (to reduce the divorce rate) without a competitive bid.[UoDC20]

Upon assuming his new post, Jerry Regier declared Florida’s child welfare system “in crisis” and in need of almost one-half billion dollars for viability. He appealed for about $90 million to hire more caseworkers—with the intent of reducing caseloads to twelve per worker—and another $50 million to raise salaries for these street-level professionals. Regier floated these numbers after having completed a “listening tour” with workers in the field, which prompted him to comment, “If I heard anything from our frontline staff in my travels, it’s that we are in a downward spiral with our staff.” The ambitious thrust of Regier’s proposal collided with a conflicted political reality that militated both for and against these requests. On one hand, the DCF and its problems commanded a high priority on the legislative agenda. Yet on the other, Regier’s numbers did not sit well with a governor committed to cutting the size of government and a fiscally conservative legislature facing a tough budget year.[UoDC21]Ultimately, Jeb Bush cut the request in half, and legislators approved even more modest DCF increases[UoDC22]. Six months after airing his initial plan, Jerry Regier reported in a letter to the press that “we requested and received $30 million from the Legislature for better pay for front-line caseworkers and funding for 376 new caseworkers beginning January 2004.”[UoDC23]

In securing additional funding for caseworkers, Regier laid the groundwork for DCF reforms directed toward reducing the staggering backlog of open cases and, more fundamentally, decentralizing much of DCF’s management infrastructure to locally-based community care organizations. In December of 2002, Regier ordered steps to bring his agency in compliance with state law requiring cases closed within sixty days. [UoDC24]In regard to decentralization, the Secretary responded to the Governor’s mandate to privatize child welfare by strengthening the role of DCF district administrators to interface with community organizations[UoDC25] and to contract with private (or nonprofit) child care providers. In essence, this mandate prompted DCF to shed considerable responsibility in foster care management to community-based providers and investigative services to local law enforcement.[UoDC26]Regarding the latter, the Tampa press covered the tribulations of contracting with a county sheriff, who cancelled out on a $9 million contract because “there wasn’t enough money in the budget to fund the endeavor.”[UoDC27]

The rationale for decentralizing and privatizing child welfare services was to redirect resources away from the DCF bureaucracy to local communities that could better allocate funds for critical children’s services and that could marshal local funding toward that end. Op/ed. pieces in the press indicated that Regier’s implementation of the privatization initiative was well-received by nongovernmental child care communities that were well-organized and established. Predictably, heads of such groups claimed that a locally-based, contracted approach to child welfare could deliver quality services with substantial reductions in state overhead costs.[UoDC28]Nonetheless, the conversion process was a challenge--even within established provider agencies--as one nonprofit executive stressed, “organizing a private operation under contract with the state nearly killed us. I can’t compare it to anything. We kind of lived through it.”[UoDC29] It is not clear how well this decentralization strategy fared in the rural areas of the state (outside the scrutiny of major media sources used here) where children’s advocacy might not have been well-organized.

As reported, some DCF employee reactions to Jerry Regier’s leadership focused upon his directives to reduce case backlogs. One account relates employee charges that the agency had resorted to “smoke and mirrors” tactics using more relaxed agency protocols to justify closing cases. These sources attributed sharp increases in open cases to heightened vigilance on the part of DCF administrators--after the beating death of a six-year-old girl--intent on taking every case to court as a fail-safe measure.[UoDC30]Other employee criticisms of Regier related to actions seemingly motivated by his religious convictions. Some objected to the character-building classes established under his leadership, regarding them as part of his religious agenda. Others were critical of his efforts championing a court battle to appoint a guardian for the fetus of a disabled rape victim.[UoDC31]

By the summer of 2004, attention turned away from Regier’s efforts to reform child welfare in Florida to mounting reports of DCF contracting improprieties that implicated the Secretary himself. Months earlier, the agency had been embarrassed by the faltering initial performance of the HomeSafeNet computer system (a statewide child-abuse hotline and case tracking system), particularly after it became known that the project was four years late and millions of dollars over budget. Subsequently[UoDC32], an unsuccessful bidder “blew the whistle” alleging that Regier had rigged the HomeSafeNet deal with American Management Services, whose lobbyist was Regier’s friend and former secretary of DCF’s predecessor agency. It was further disclosed that Frank Keating, who had recommended Regier for the DCF job, had served on the contractor’s board of directors until May of 200[UoDC33]4.[UoDC34]The whistle-blower’s report resulted in an investigation by the governor’s chief inspector general who issued findings of a wider pattern of improprieties involving DCF officials who accepted travel and other gratuities from contractors with close ties to Regier. [UoDC35]Beyond undermining agency credibility, the IG’s findings of cronyism in DCF under Regier cast a long symbolic shadow over privatization as a reform strategy for protecting children at risk in the Florida child welfare system. Later that summer, Jerry Regier resigned as Secretary of DCF claiming that “at some point, perception overtakes reality. Here we have seen tremendous progress, and yet we continue to have people talk about the beleaguered department and we can’t get it right.” [UoDC36]In September of 2004, the governor appointed Luci Hadi, a former DCF administrator who had been implicated in contracting improprietiesin 1993, as interim director of what one reporter described as “the worst pressure cooker in Florida government.”[UoDC37]

[HU1]1 “No Shortage of Blame…” Tampa Tribune, May 7, 2002, p. 10.

[UoDC2]Note: Open cases are those that need continued monitoring by case workers. If abuse or neglect is found, case workers formulate a safety plan prescribing various interventions (e.g., various types of counseling) that require monitoring. Closing a case certifies that monitoring is no longer needed—either because no neglect or abuse could be substantiated in the first place, or the specified interventions have been completed and monitoring is no longer required. Source: Michelle Norris, “Texas Sends a Team of Social Workers into Overburdened County.” [audio file] NPR: All Things Considered. December 10, 2004. Available at