Question 1
Greenacre Ownership
In interpreting the ownership of Greenacre from Grace's will, Alice has a life estate subject to divestment upon her discontinuation of the daycare and Grace's estate has a reversion in fee simple by operation of law. Although it appears that Grace's daughters' heirs also have a contingent remainder subject to open for later-born children, this clause is void as it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. This is because the class of Grace's daughters' heirs cannot be ascertained until both Alice and Brenda die. Since some heirs may be people who are not yet alive, there is no validating life and the non-vested contingent interest is not certain to vest or fail within 21 years of Alice's death. As Grace's will did not include a provision for this scenario, the reversion interest in Greenacre would be divided according to the state's rules of intestate succession, presumably leaving Brenda and Alice with equal shares.
In 1998, Greenacre reverted to Grace's estate when Alice closed her daycare. Heather may attempt to assert that Alice then acquired sole title of Greenacre through adverse possession during her continued residence. However, adverse possession requires "actual possession which is uninterrupted, open and notorious, hostile and exclusive, and under a claim of right made in good faith for the statutory period." Butler v. Anderson. In this case, Alice's possession of Greenacre was not hositle against the true owner until the property reverted to Grace's estate in 1998. Thus, Alice only adversely possessed Greenacre for 9 years before moving to New York and does not satisfy the statutory period. Based on this analysis, in spring 2009, Heather and Brenda each have an equal interest in Greenacre.
Since Grace's estate was the true owner of Greenacre when Alice sold the property to Frank in 2007, Heather and Brenda can file a quiet title action against Frank to obtain a final determination on the claims. However, Heather and Brenda will probably be unsuccessful since a subsequent bona fide purchaser is protected against prior unrecorded interests. Willard v. FirstChurch of Christ. On the other hand, if Grace's will was recorded and discoverable upon a proper title search in 2007, there is a chance that their action will succeed. If this action is unsuccessful, Heather and Brenda should still receive equal portions of the proceeds from Greenacre's sale through Grace and Alice's estates.
Oliver Twist Magazine Ownership
Brenda can sue Eveready for the magazines based on her inheritance of an equal share of her mother's personal property. Eveready will claim that it was a bona fide purchaser and should retain title under either the European market overt rule, as the magazines were sold on open market, or the discovery rule, as their ownership of the magazines was discoverable (with tacking) since Christies purchased them 9 years ago, in excess of the statute of limitations. O'Keefe v. Snyder. However, New York has adopted the Guggenheim rule, which states that the statute of limitations does not start until the true owner makes a demand for return and the good-faith purchaser refuses. Guggenheim v. Lubell. Since Brenda wrote her first letter to Eveready in 2005, she still has two years to file a claim and will probably be successful if she can prove that she was a "true owner" when Alice sold the magazines to Christies.
However, Eveready can argue that Alice owned the magazines under the law of finders, which states that a finder has good title against the whole world but the true owner. Armory v. Delamirie. As in Hannah v. Peel, Brenda never occupied the house and neither Grace, Alice, nor Brenda appears to have been aware of the magazines' existance prior to 1998. Therefore, Eveready will probably be successful in prooving that the magazines where "lost" property found by Alice and validly transfered to Eveready.
Lake Green Rezoning
Frank can file suit against the town claiming that the rezoning of the Lake Green area was a regulatory taking and seek just compensation. Frank will argue that this situation is analogous to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council., where SCOTUS found that the enactment of a Beachfront Management Act was a regulatory taking where it rendered $1 million of recently-purchased beachfront property "valueless." However, the Town can distinguish Lucas in that the rezoning in this case does not prohibit all economic use, specifically reserving the right to build single-family homes.
The Town can further argue that under the Dolan analysis land-use planning is not a taking if it (1) has an essential nexus with a state interest and (2) is reasonably necessary to effectuate a substantial government purpose. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. Although the exact reason for the rezoning in this case is unclear, there is likely a legitimate government purpose in preserving the beachfront despite some diminision in value without compensation. Pennsylavnia Coal Co. v. Mahon. However, Frank has a good argument that the prohibition of subdivision irrespective of size is not "roughly propotional." (Dolan) and that he had an investment-backed expectations in purchasing the property. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. Although courts often take a deferential view of taking, Frank has a good chance at receiving partial compensation for the loss of value in the property due to the rezoning. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.
Beachfront Property
Frank can also sue the Town residents for trespass in their access of the lakefront. However, the Town can counterclaim for a right to access the lakefront under several theories: (1) prescriptive easement, (2) implied dedication, and (3) public trust. Public prescriptive easement can be gained by long continuous use under a claim of title, but must be adverse to the owner. In this case, there is no prescriptive easement since the property was used with the owners' permission until 2007. City of Daytona v. Tona-Rama, Inc. Similarly, the residents have a poor case for implied dedication, unless they can determine that Grace and/or Alice intended to dedicate the land to the Town.
On the other hand, the residents will probably suceed on a claim of public trust. Under the public trust doctrine, the usage of beaches by the public has been a protected customary right since the beginning of legal memory. City of Daytona. The residents thus have and implied right to access the lakefront and to use any private land as a public easement for access. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association. The Town can argue that this is not a taking of private property, since Greenacre was subject to public's right of access since before the time of Frank's purchase.
Question 3
Option 3C
The Fair Housing Act ("FHA") prohibits landowners from discriminating on the basis of race, gender, color, religion, handicap, familial status, or national origin in selecting tenants. However, Section 3603(b)(2) (the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption) excuses from his prohibition owner-occupiers of dwellings containing no more than four families.
The strongest arguments in favor of repealing the Mrs. Murphy are equality, legislative purpose, and freedom from discrimination. First, since all laws can be seen as expressions of morality, the Mrs. Murphy suggests that discrimination in your own backyard is both legal and moral. Human equality is an inherent good and the Mrs. Murphy is morally repugnant as it is in direct opposition to these goals. State resources should not be expended to support such immoral practices. Second, the exemption appears to contravene the legislative purpose of the act, which is to "provide fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601. In fact, the FHA was enacted in 1968 during the civil rights era to combat pervasive systematic discrimination and racial segregation in the domestic housing market. The Mrs. Murphy creates a sizable loophole in the FHA with the practical effect of allowing continued housing discrimination albeit on a smaller scale. In addition, the Mrs. Murphy infringes on the freedoms of potential tenants. Freedom from discrimination is a basic human right and the Mrs. Murphy can be used as legal justification to violating that right.
On the other hand, personal autonomy, judicial economy, and libertarian free market values all support retention of the Mrs. Murphy. The primary purpose of the Mrs. Murphy is arguably to protect the individual decisions of landlords who have a direct close personal relationship with their tenants and fear interference with their right of association and privacy. Judicial decisions such as Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas have advocated for the protections of the fundamental rights of association and privacy at issue here. After all, there are many other acts that one might consider to be immoral, but are nonetheless legal on private property. As in State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, there are also concerns regarding the ability to efficiently administer claims. The Mrs. Murphy improves judicial economy by barring small scale claims where it would be difficult to determine whether discrimination has taken place and where individual decisions are unlikely to have a material effect on the market. Finally, libertarian principles suggest that individual rights are inextricably linked with property rights and that the full right to control without interference is necessary for the full enjoyment of such rights. The Mrs. Murphy thus provides some freedom from authoritarian power within the FHA's overarching scheme.
Supporters of retention would also refute claims that such exclusion is immoral, contravenes the legislative purpose of the FHA, and infringes on tenants rights. First, the inclusion of the Mrs. Murphy is an indication of the will of the people and it is a misnomer to say that the exemption goes against the legislative purpose of the Act. After all, the need for the FHA evidences a natural market demand for discriminatory housing. If the Mrs. Murphy is repealed, those who do not want to live in the same building as those with a different race, color, or creed will likely employ other means to achieve similar practical effects, such as public interest communities or homeowners associations. For example in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, SCOTUS upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance limiting housing in a small residential area to no more than two unrelated adults per household. People have a natural psychological attachment to their homes and should be allowed generous freedom from state intrusion into the most private spheres of their lives. It can be argued that the Mrs. Murphy provides such freedom and is of greater importance than imposition of moral claims.
In my opinion, arguments in favor of retaining the Mrs. Murphy are insufficient to justify its retention. First, although personal autonomy is certainly a laudable value, property rights are inherently coercive as they are relational amongst people, not between people and things. Since property is an affirmative right to state enforcement against others, personal autonomy of landlords must be balanced with the rights of potential tenants. This tension between constraining individuals and accepting the individual practice of prejudice is clear in the Mrs. Murphy's inclusion in the FHA. In addition, the Constitution already protects freedom of association and privacy, so the Mrs. Murphy is over-inclusive in protecting certain acts of overt discrimination under the guise of personal freedom. As to concerns about judicial economy, it seems rather arbitrary to delineate the exclusion at owner-occupied buildings with less than four units by claiming that such claims have less merit. In geographic areas where small privately-owned structures comprise a large portion of the market, incidence of discrimination can have macro effects making the Mrs. Murphy more like exclusionary zoning than small scale protection of autonomy. Further, the Mrs. Murphy does not differentiate between intentional malicious discrimination and personal preferences within one's own home. Although there are valid concerns about judicial economy, the Mrs. Murphy serves to exclude potentially meritous claims from the judicial system. Finally, free market ideals ignore the reality that state enforcement is always involved in private property transactions. Values of freedom aside, public funds should not be used to support discriminatory behavior.
If I were to recommend a modification to the Mrs. Murphy rather than an outright repeal, I would suggest limiting discrimination to the occupied unit. That would protect people's freedom of association within the most private sphere. In addition, to alleviate judicial economy concerns, I would raise the standard of proof to intentional discrimination for owner-occupiers formally covered by the Mrs. Murphy. In this way, small claims with little proof could be dismissed pretrial, while tenants would retain their right to bring suit against overtly bigoted landlords regardless of the size of the building.
Although these modifications would greatly reduce the scope of the Mrs. Murphy, anything short of repeal would be a second class attempt to appease xenophobic political constituencies. Within the area specified under the new modification, Mrs. Murphy could still express her racist tastes and bigoted ideals with full societal support of her freedom to discriminate. In addition, property rights are always in relation to other people, so by permitting Mrs. Murphy to discriminate, the exemption infringes on a potential tenant's right to be free from such discrimination. While the Mrs. Murphy arguably has limited practical significance and would be further weakened with the proposed modifications, the exemption would continue to have great symbolic force. A full repeal of the Mrs. Murphy would send the message that the law of the United States does not condone overt housing discrimination.
Question 2
Option 2B
Since it is unclear whether Randy signed a contract concerning the community obligations upon purchasing his beachfront property, I will first discuss the claims of the Raritania Beach residents assuming that he is party to the agreement and then analyze the claims assuming that he had no actual notice of the agreement.
If Randy signed an agreement concerning community obligations upon purchasing his property, he will almost certainly be liable for breach of contract and subject to damages and injunctions. Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, a purchaser of land can be held to a community's rules if disclosed to him before purchase and the standard for rules is highly deferential. For example, in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn., a rule prohibiting pets was upheld against a woman who owned several cats as such rules are presumed to be valid unless the violating party can show that the burdens substantially outweigh the benefits. The reasonableness of such restriction is determined by reference to facts specific to the common interest development as a whole, not to the objecting homeowner. In this case, it appears that the other owners are all content with the community rules, so the rules would clearly be enforceable under this deferential standard.
Even if Randy was not aware of the obligations before purchasing the property, the covenants can be enforced as reciprocal negative servitudes. An equitable servitude can be enforced against a successor if (1) the contracting parties intended it to be enforceable, (2) the assignee has notice of the restriction, and (3) the covenant "touches and concerns" the land. I will assume that the person who sold property to Randy intended the community restrictions to be enforceable against him, as the facts state that the community has been extremely stable, with few sales and no breaches of obligations. As for notice, Randy may claim that it is not fair to bind him to the community rules if he did not have actual notice and relied on the unrestricted character in purchasing the property. However, several judicial opinions have held that there is constructive notice where the restriction is easily discoverable. As in Sanborn v. McLean, Randy could have easily observed the uniform residential quality of the area and discovered that his land was subject to similar restrictions with a slight inquiry. As such, a court could find that Randy had constructive notice.
Thus, the primary question is whether the obligations "touch and concern" the land. This requirement arose to prevent opportunistic behavior, externalities, and ward off economic inefficiencies. In this case, the other Ruritanians' have paid for benefits in the community with reciprocal burdens on their property and association fees. Randy plans to free-ride off of the picturesque view and clean beach to line his own pockets with income from his guesthouse - truly rent-seeking behavior! Enforcement of as many of the obligations as possible will best efficiently allocate the benefits and burdens between all Ruritania residents. Any unfairness to Randy is outweighed by the externalities that he would force on the entire community. In addition the new Restatement has replaces "touch and concern" with an objectionability standard that these covenants clearly meet.