WISSENSCHAFTLICHE WELTAUFFASSUNG:

DER WIENER KREIS

[The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle] 1

Dedicated to Moritz Schlick

PREFACE

At the beginning of 1929 Moritz Schlick received a very tempting call to

Bonn. After some vacillation he decided to remain in Vienna. On this

occasion, for the first time it became clear to him and us that there is

such a thing as the 'Vienna Circle' of the scientific conception of the

world, which goes on developing this mode of thought in a collaborative

effort. This circle has no rigid organization; it consists of people of an

equal and basic scientific attitude; each individual endeavours to fit in,

each puts common ties in the foreground, none wishes to disturb the

links through idiosyncrasies. In many cases one can deputise for another,

the work of one can be carried on by another.

The Vienna Circle aims at making contact with those similarly oriented

and ,at influencing those who stand further off. Collaboration in the Ernst

Mach Society is the expression of this endeavour; Sclick is the chairman

of this society and several members of Schlick's circle belong to the

committee.

On 15-16 September 1929, the Ernst Mach Society, with the Society

for Empirical Philosophy (Berlin), will hold a conference in Prague, on

the epistemology of the exact sciences, in conjunction with the conference

of the German Physical Society and the German Association of Mathematicians

which will take place there at the same time. Besides technical

questions, questions of principle are to be discussed. It was decided that

on the occasion of this conference the present pamplet on the Vienna

Circle of the scientific conception of the world was to be published. It is

to be handed to Schlick in October 1929when he returns from his visiting

professorship at Stanford University, California, as token of gratitude

and joy at his remaining in Vienna. The second part of the pamphlet

contains a bibliography compiled in collaboration with those concerned.

It is to give a survey of the area of problems in which those who belong

to, or are near to, the Vienna Circle are working.

Vienna, August 1929

For the Ernst Mach Society

Hans Hahn

Otto Neurath Rudolf Carnap

1. THE VIENNA CIRCLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF THE

WORLD

1.1. Historical Background

Many assert that metaphysical and theologising thought is again on the

increase today, not only in life but also in science. Is this a general phenomenon

or merely a change restricted to certain circles? The assertion

itself is easily confirmed if one looks at the topics of university courses

and at the titles of philosophic publications. But likewise the opposite

spirit of enlightenment and anti-metaphysical factual research is growing

stronger today, in that it is becoming conscious of its existence and task.

In some circles the mode of thought grounded in experience and averse

to speculation is stronger than ever, being strengthened precisely by the

new opposition that has arisen. .

In the research work of all branches of empirical science this spirit of

a scientific conception of the worldis alive. However only a very few leading

thinkers give it systematic thought or advocate its principles, and but

rarely are they in a position to assemble a circle of like-minded colleagues

around them. We find anti-metaphysical endeavours especially in England,

where the tradition of the great empiricists is still alive; the investigations

of Russell and Whitehead on logic and the analysis of reality have won

international significance. In the U.S.A. these endeavours take on the most

varied forms; in a certain sense James belongs to this group too. The

new Russia definitely is seeking for a scientific world conception, even

if partly leaning on older materialistic currents. On the continent of

Europe, a concentration of productive work in the direction of a scientific

world conception is to be found especially in Berlin (Reichenbach,

Petzoldt, Grelling, Dubislav and others) and in Vienna.

That Vienna was specially suitable ground for this development is

historically understandable. In the second half of the nineteenth century,

liberalism was long the dominant political current. Its world of ideas

stems from the enlightenment, from empiricism, utilitarianism and the

free trade movement of England. In Vienna's liberal movement, scholars

of world renown occupied leading positions. Here an anti-metaphysical

spirit was cultivated, for instance, by men like Theodor Gomperz who

translated the works of J. S. Mill,Suess, Jodl and others.

'Thanks to this spirit of enlightenment, Vienna has been leading in a

scientifically oriented people's education. With the collaboration of Victor

Adler and Friedrich Jodl, the society for popular education was founded

and carried forth; 'popular university courses' and the 'people's college'

were set up by the well-known historian Ludo Hartmann whose antimetaphysical

attitude and materialist conception of history expressed

itself in all his actions. The same spirit also.inspired the movement of the

'Free School' which was the forerunner of today's school reform.

In this liberal atmosphere lived Ernst Mach (born 1838) who was in

Vienna as student and as privatdozent (1861-64). He returned to Vienna

only at an advanced age when a special chair of the philosophy of the

inductive sciences was created for him (1895). He was especially intent on

cleansing empirical science, and in the first place, physics, of metaphysical

notions. We recall his critique of absolute space which made him a forerunner

of Einstein, his struggle against the metaphysics of the thing-in itself

and of the concept of substance, and his investigations of the construction

of scientific concepts from ultimate elements, namely sense data.

In some points the development of science has not vindicated his views,

for instance in his opposition to atomic theory and in his expectation

that physics would be advanced through the physiology of the senses.

The essential points of his conception however were of positive use in

the further development of science. Mach's chair was later occupied by

Ludwig Boltzmann (1902-06) who held decidedly empiricist views.

The activity of the physicists Mach and Boltzmann in a philosophical

professorship makes it conceivable that there was a lively dominant

interest in the epistemological and logical problems that are linked with

the foundations of physics. These problems concerning foundations also

led toward a renewal of logic. The path towards these objectives had also

been cleared in Vienni from quite a different quarter by Franz Brentano

(during 1874-80 professor of philosophy in the theological faculty, and

later lecturer in the philosophical faculty). As a Catholic priest Brentano

understood scholasticism; he started directly from the scholastic logic and

from Leibniz's endeavours to reform logic, while leaving aside Kant and

the idealist system-builders. Brentano and his students time and again

showed their understanding of men like Bolzano (Wissenschaftslehre,

1837) and others who were working toward a rigorous new foundation

of logic. In particular Alois HofIer (1853-1922) put this side of Brentano's

philosophy in the foreground before a forum in which, through Mach's

and Boltzmann's influence, the adherents of the scientific world conception

were strongly represented. In the Philosophical Society at the University

of Vienna numerous discussions took place under Hofler's direction,

concerning questions of the foundation of physics and allied!

epistemological and logical problems. The Philosophical Society published

Prefaces and Introductions to Classical Works on Mechanics (1899), as

well as the individual papers of Bolzano (edited by Hofler and Hahn,

1914 and 1921). In Brentano's Viennese circle there was the young

Alexius von Meinong (1870-82, later professor in Graz), whose theory

of objects (1907) has certainly some affinity to modern theories of concepts

and whose pupil Ernst Mally (Graz) also worked in the field of logistics.

The early writings of Hans Pichler (1909) also belong to these circles.

Roughly at the same time as Mach, his contemporary and friend Jose

Popper-Lynkeus worked in Vienna. Beside his physical and technical

achievements we mention his large-scale, if unsystematic philosophical

reflections (1899) and his rational economic plan (A General Peacetime

Labour Draft, 1878). He consciously served the spirit of enlightenment,

as is also evident from his book on Voltaire. His rejection of metaphysics

was shared by many other Viennese sociologists, for example Rudolf

Goldscheid. It is remarkable that in the field of political economy, too,

there was in Vienna a strictly scientific method, used by the marginal

utility school (Carl Menger, 1871); this method took root in England,

France and Scandinavia, but not in Germany. Marxist theory likewise

was cultivated and extended with special emphasis in Vienna (Otto

Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, Max Adler and others).

These influences from various sides had the result, especially since 1900,

that there was in Vienna a sizeable number of people who frequently and

assiduously discussed more general problems in close connection with

empirical sciences. Above all these were epistemological and methodological

problems of physics, for instance Poincare's conventionalism,

Duhem's conception of the aim and structure of physical theories (his

translator was the Viennese Friedrich Adler, a follower of Mach, at that

time privatdozent in Zurich); also questions about the foundations of

mathematics, problems of axiomatics, logistic and the like. The following

were the main strands from the history of science and philosophy that

came together here, marked by those of their representatives whose

works were mainly read and discussed:

(1) Positivism and empiricism: Hume, Enlightenment, Comte, J. S.

Mill, Richard Avenarius, Mach.

(2) Foundations, aims and methods of empirical science (hypotheses in

physics, geometry, etc.): Helmholtz, Riemann, Mach, Poincare, Enriques,

Duhem, BoItzmann, Einstein.

(3) Logistic and its application to reality:. Leibniz,.: Peano, Frege,

Schroder, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein.' ,

(4) Axiomatics: Pasch, Peano, Vailati, Pieri, Hilbert.

(5) Hedonism and positivist sociology: Epicurus, Hume, Bentham,

J. S. Mill, Comte, Feuerbach, Marx, Spencer, Mtiller-Lyer, Popper-

Lynkeus, Carl Menger (the elder).

1.2. The Circle around Schlick .

In 1922 Moritz Schlick was called from Kiel to Vienna. His activities

fitted well into the historical development of the Viennese scientific, atmosphere.

Himself originally a physicist, he awakened to new life the

tradition that had been started by Mach and BoItzann and, in a certain

sense, carried on by the anti-metaphysically inclined Adolf Stohr. (In

Vienna successively: Mach, Boltzmann, Stehr, Schlick; in Prague: Mach,

Einstein, Philipp Frank.) .

Around Schlick, there gathered in the course of time a circle whose

members united various endeavours in the direction of a scientific conception

of the world. This concentration produced a fruitful mutual inspiration.

Not one of the members is a so-called 'pure' philosopher; all

of them have done work in a special field of science. Moreover they come

from different branches of science and originally from different philosophic

attitudes. But over the years growing uniformity appeared; this

too was a result of the specifically scientific attitude: "What can be said

at all, can be said clearly" (Wittgenstein); if there are differences of

opinion, it is in the end possible to agree, and therefore agreement is

demanded. It became increasingly clearer that a position not only free

from metaphysics, but opposed to metaphysics was the common goal of all.

The attitudes toward questions of life also showed a noteworthy

agreement, although these questions were not in the foreground of themes

discussed within the Circle. For these attitudes are more closely related

to the scientific world-conception than it might at first glance appear

from a purely theoretical point of view.:For instance, endeavours toward

a new organization of economic and social relations, toward the unification

of mankind, toward a reform of school and education, all show an inner

link with the scientific world-conception; it appears that these endeavours

are welcomed and regarded with sympathy by the members of the Circle,

some of whom indeed actively further them.

The Vienna Circle does not confine itself to collective work as a closed

group. It is also trying to make contact with the living movements of the

present, so far as they are well disposed toward the scientific world-conception

and turn away from metaphysics and theology. The Ernst Mach

Society is today the place from which the Circle speaks to a wider public.

This society, as stated in its program, wishes to "further and disseminate

the scientific world-conception. It will organize lectures and publications

about the present position of the scientific world-conception, in order to

demonstrate the significance of exact research for the social sciences and

the natural sciences. In this way intellectual tools should be formed for

modern empiricism, tools that are also needed in forming public and private

life." By the choice of its name, the society wishes to describe its basic

orientation: science free of metaphysics. This, however, does not mean

that the society declares itself in programmatic agreement with the individual

doctrines of Mach. The Vienna Circle believes that in collaborating

with the Ernst Mach Society it fulfils a demand of the day: we have to

fashion intellectual tools for everyday life, for the daily life of the scholar

but also for the daily life of all those who in some way join in working at

the conscious re-shaping of life. The vitality that shows itself in the efforts

for a rational transformation of the social and economic order, permeates

the movement for a scientific world-conception too. It is typical of the

present situation in Vienna that when the Ernst Mach Society was founded

in November 1928, Schlick was chosen chairman; round him the

common work In the field of the scientific world-conception had concentrated

most strongly.

Schlick and Philipp Frank jointIy edit the collection of Monographs on

the Scientific World-Conception [Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung)

in which members of the Vienna Circle preponderate.

2. THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD CONCEPTION

The scientific world conception is characterised not so much by theses of

its own, but rather by its basic attitude, its points of view and direction

of research. The goal ahead is unified science. The endeavour is to link

and harmonise the achievements of individual investigators in their various

fields of science. From this aim follows the emphasis on collective efforts,