Nate Nieman Reading Twitter in Tehran 10/28/18
Reading Twitter in Tehran:
Iranian Women Emerging through Technology
I.INTRODUCTION...... …………….1
II. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRI)...... …………….4
A. POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IRI...... ……………...4
B. OPPRESSION OF IRANIAN WOMEN...... ……………...7
C. SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH IN THE IRANIAN MEDIA...... ………………9
III. THE INTERNET IN IRAN...... ………….....13
A. ADOPTION OF THE INTERNET IN IRAN...... ……………..13
B. IRI PULLS THE PLUG ON THE INTERNET...... …………….17
C. EMERGENCE OF PEER-TO-PEER SOCIAL NETWORKING...... …………….23
IV.THE TWITTER REVOLUTION...... ……………28
A. EVENTS OF JUNE 2009...... …………….28
B. TWITTER REVOLUTION’S EFFECT ON IRANIAN WOMEN...... ……………31
C. PEER-TO-PEER AS DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD...... …………….35
V.CONCLUSION...... ……………40
I. INTRODUCTION
Here and now in that other world that cropped up so many times in our discussions, I sit and reimagine myself and my students, my girls as I came to call them, reading Lolita in a deceptively sunny room in Tehran. But to steal the words from Humbert, the poet/criminal of Lolita, I need you, the reader, to imagine us, for we won’t really exist if you don’t. Against the tyranny of time and politics, imagine us the way we sometimes didn’t dare to imagine ourselves: in our most private and secret moments, in the most extraordinarily ordinary instances of life, listening to music, falling in love, walking down the shady streets or reading Lolita in Tehran. And then imagine us again with all this confiscated, driven underground, taken away from us.[1]
Reading, the central activity in Azar Nafisi’s memoir, Reading Lolita in Tehran, empowered the Iranian women featured in the book by allowing them to participate in the international dialogue of literature. By reading Western literature banned by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the women in the book were able to do in private what they were not able to do in public—that is, share their experiences as women in Iran with other Iranian women through the discussion of literary characters in novels such as Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita. The women in Reading Lolita in Tehran had to share these experiences in private because, when the book was written in 1995, Iranian women had no public forum for such discussions and therefore had no way of sharing their experiences with other women in Iran or abroad. The emerging popularity of the Internet in the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, irrevocably changed the way Iranian women communicated with each other. First through websites, then through blogs, and then through SMS text messaging and “tweets” on the social networking website, Twitter, previously silent and marginalized contingents of Iranian society—chief among them, women—began making themselves heard, despite the Iranian government’s efforts to suppress their speech at home and abroad. Iran, which has experienced one revolution after another for most of its modern history, underwent yet another revolution—the so-called “Twitter Revolution”—which, because of the pervasive changes it promises to bring now and in the future, has the potential to be the defining revolutionary moment in Iran’s history. The Twitter Revolution, unlike prior revolutions in Iran’s modern history, cannot be characterized as one regime eclipsing another, but rather as the speech, and therefore the power, of marginalized contingents of the Iranian populace eclipsing the ability of the Iranian government to silence its populace, including its women, into submission.
The Twitter Revolution can be defined as a short time period in June 2009, when, following the re-election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, individual Iranians used simple technology such as SMS text messaging and Twitter to communicate to the international community about Iranian activists’ protests and demonstrations and the Iranian government’s efforts to (at times, violently) dismantle the activists and silence their message. This article is concerned with the Twitter Revolution’s effect on Iranian politics and human rights in the past and the future, with particular attention given to the impact that the Twitter Revolution had and will continue to have on the rights of women and the political power of Iran’s female population.
Part II of this article provides a political and historical backdrop for the Twitter Revolution. The unique political structure of the Iranian government, in which the religious supervisory leaders are the most powerful, has shaped, through Islamic law (shari’a), the rights of women throughout Iran’s modern history and has greatly effected the way that women communicate, look, and act in public. Women’s rights under shari’a are greatly unequal to men’s, and have positioned women for decades as politically and legally inferior to men. Furthermore, many of the same tenants of shari’a that have led to the suppression of women vis-à-vis their male counterparts have also been used by the religious supervisory bodies of the government to censor ideas in Iranian media in order to maintain the status quo. Part III discusses the introduction of the Internet to Iran, and how new technologies have dramatically enabled the ability of Iranian citizens to communicate with each other and challenge the status quo. While new technological developments have been generally empowering for Iranians, these same developments have also invited an aggressive campaign of censorship led by the Iranian government, which itself has been challenged by the emergence of peer-to-peer online social networks. Part IV discusses the events of the Twitter Revolution of June 2009 and how, even despite their inherent drawbacks, the peer-to-peer technologies used during this revolution are capable of empowering women by allowing women to more effectively communicate with one another. The article concludes that the peer-to-peer communication technologies used so effectively during the Twitter Revolution are unique and powerful tools that Iranian women can use to elevate their social status and gain equal rights with men.
II. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
A. POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IRI
The Islamic Republic of Iran, the regime currently in place in Iran as of this writing, assumed power by way of revolution in 1979. [2] In January of 1978, demonstrations began against Iran’s monarchy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. [3] Between August and December of 1978, demonstrations and strikes escalated to a point where revolution seemed imminent. [4] In January of 1979, the Shah went into exile, and on February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran. [5] On February 11, 1979, shortly after Ayatollah Khomeini’s return, the Shah’s monarchy was toppled. [6] On April 1, 1979, the country voted to become the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter “IRI”), and a theocratic constitution was ratified naming Ayatollah Khomeini the nation’s “Supreme Leader.” [7]
Following the revolution of 1979, only the structure of the IRI, whose different branches, with their own, often opposing agendas, has prevented the government from becoming the type of totalitarian regime that was created by Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini during World War II. In contrast to Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, the IRI has no political parties and is instead fractured into three factions unified only by their relationship with each other, with each faction having different political ideas. [8] The first faction derives their legitimacy from shari’a, and is composed of religious supervisory bodies such as the “Council of the Guardian [Majles-eKhobregan], the Expediency Council [Majma’-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam], and the Assembly of Experts [Shora-ye Maslahat-e Nezam].” [9] This faction is joined by a secular faction, whose Parliament, President and judiciary are legitimized by Iran’s citizens. [10] Finally, the religious and secular factions work in tandem with semi-governmental religious foundations called bonyads. [11] The most powerful actor in Iran’s “Government of the Jurist” structure is the “Supreme Leader,” whom, as of this writing, is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. [12] The Supreme Leader is not elected but can overrule bills passed by the elected legislature. [13] The Supreme Leader’s power to do so, however, is subject to approval of the religious supervisory bodies, which, together with the Supreme Leader, oversee the secular faction comprised of the legislature, presidency, and judiciary. [14] The complex structure of the IRI has often pitted factions against one another, resulting in a government that is constantly in a delicate state of flux. However, the power of the religious supervisory faction has proved dominant. Since 2000, Iran’s hard-line, Islamist “conservatives” have defeated reformists by exploiting the unique structure of the IRI to achieve their political objectives. Iranian conservatives have been successful in repressing reformists through silencing the reformist press, using political leaders from the religious faction to veto legislation and prevent reformist political candidates from running for office, and even going to the extreme of imprisoning, torturing and killing reformist activists. [15] Among reformists, women have been particularly repressed by Iran’s conservatives. [16]
B. OPPRESSION OF IRANIAN WOMEN
Women played a critical role in the Iranian Revolution against the Shah. [17] Women were motivated to support the Iranian Revolution because they were being deprived economically, were suffering political oppression, and were increasingly identifying with Islam. [18] During the Iranian Revolution, supporters donned the traditional veil in a show of opposition to the Shah and to the West. [19] Soon after the current regime took power in 1979, shari’a became the primary source of law. [20] This had the effect of eradicating the gender equality principles that the Shah had enacted during his rule and making mandatory the veiling of women. [21] The women who had supported the new regime by donning the veil did not anticipate wearing the veil after the new regime came to power and were shocked when hejab (Islamic modest dress) was strictly enforced. [22] Hejab was temporarily rescinded, but in 1981, veiling once again became compulsory and enforcement was harsh. [23] Some women who defied hejab by wearing lipstick in public had their lipstick removed with a razor blade.[24]
Women’s rights under shari’a differ greatly from those of men, resulting in discrimination of women under shari’a. [25] During the first ten years of the Iranian Revolution, female singers were banned and polygamy and temporary marriage was allowed. [26] Even now, under shari’a, a woman, unlike a man, does not have the right to file for divorce or claim custody of her child or children; a man’s testimony in court is weighed more heavily than a woman’s; in wrongful death and negligence cases, a woman is eligible to receive only half the punitive damages that a man would receive. [27] Additionally, the age of legal responsibility is fifteen years old for males while just nine years old for females, effectively meaning that nine-year-old girls can be tried as adults and sentenced to death. [28] In adultery cases, both partners are eligible to be stoned to death, but a woman is stoned while buried to her neck while a man’s arms remain free. [29]
Under the Iranian Civil Code, women’s rights are also unequal to men’s. Under the Code, marriage, as long as it is authorized by a natural guardian, can occur as early as nine years old, and as the husband’s wife, the husband may legally have sex with the child. [30] Even if the natural guardian does not consent to the marriage, a civil court has the ability to grant permission for the girl to marry if the natural guardian fails to provide a valid reason for refusing to consent. [31] Though the minimum working age in Iran is fifteen, a girl as young as nine, if married, can circumvent labor laws by working within her husband’s household. [32] Women in Iran are also cannot be judges; a woman must ask for written permission from her husband before obtaining a passport; and a woman must ask permission from her husband or another male relative in order to work, and that husband or male relative has the ability to limit the type of work she can do. [33] Whether under shari’a or secular law, Islamist politics, as one commentator has noted, has “produced an extremely disadvantaged position for women. It ha[s] reinforced male domination, compromised women’s autonomy, and created a set of gender relations characterized by profound inequality.” [34]
C. SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH IN THE IRANIAN MEDIA
The IRI has also used principles of shari’a, codified in its laws, to suppress the speech of its citizens, thereby stifling criticism of the way women are treated in Iran. It is stated in the Preamble to Iran’s constitution, passed in April 1979, [35] that media must “‘strictly refrain’ from the ‘diffusion and propagation of destructive and anti-Islamic practices.’” [36] Article 24 states that “Publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. The details of this exception will be specified by law.” [37] Article 4 of the constitution requires that all laws be “based on Islamic criteria,” [38] which, in practice, requires Iran’s constitution and laws to be squared with shari’a. Because Iran’s laws cast a broad mandate against any criticism of Islamic law or the state of Iran, the government’s ability to regulate the speech of Iranian citizens pursuant to its constitution and laws is practically unfettered.
In August 1979, the IRI closed dozens of non-Islamist newspapers after a new law was passed banning “counter-revolutionary policies and acts.” [39] The Press Law of 1986 was later enacted, which has served as the primary legal instrument for restricting free speech in the Iranian press. The Press Law echoes the spirit of the Iranian constitution, prohibiting the press from “‘promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic...offending the Leader of the Revolution…or quoting articles from the deviant press, parties or groups that oppose Islam (inside and outside the country) in such a manner as to propagate such ideas...or encouraging and instigating individuals and groups to act against the security, dignity, and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran.’” [40] The Press Supervisory Board of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with identifying violations of the Press Law, banning publications that violate the Press Law, and referring violators of the Press Law to the Press Court and the Revolutionary Court when violations are made. [41] Iran’s Penal Code “provides for mandatory imprisonment terms for many of the violations of the Press Law, including insult of State or religious officials, engaging in propaganda activities, or publishing of libel, false information or satirical material.” [42]
Following the election of reformist President Mohammed Khatami in 1997, a burgeoning independent press enjoyed an ability to publish critical material and investigative journalism. [43] This ability was short-lived, however, as Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei fought back by shuttering over one hundred newspapers and imprisoning reporters and editors. Several of the newspapers that were closed by the IRI were owned by women and targeted a female audience. In closing these newspapers, women in Iran were kept from communicating with one another through them. In April 2000, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei proclaimed that the reformist press were “‘bases of the enemy.’” [44] In an amendment to the Press Law in April of 2000, prescriptive mandates were added to the restrictions in the Press Law of 1986. The 2000 amendment listed a set of objectives to be followed by the press, including “‘propagat[ing] genuine Islamic culture and sound ethical principles,’” [45] providing only “constructive criticism,” and publishing content devoid of “insult, humiliation, and detrimental effects.” [46] Additionally restrictions on the freedom of the press were also added in Article 6, [47] which, because these are so vague, grant the IRI’s bureaus even broader power to regulate speech that the IRI finds threatening. [48]
On August 8, 2002, Journalist’s Day in Iran, the IRI Press Court shut down a newspaper called Ruz-e Now simply because it had a name similar to a reformist paper that had been banned the month prior. [49] A week later, the IRI closed a Tehran daily called Ayinjeh-e Jonub for allegedly “publishing articles contrary to the law and spreading propaganda against the Islamic revolution.” [50] Between April 2000 and the closing of the Ayinneh-e Jonub in August 2002, the IRI closed over sixty publications and dozens of liberal activists were jailed. [51] In 2007, Reporters Without Borders ranked Iran 166 out of 169 countries in the World Press Freedom Index. Iran ranked lower than Cuba and Burma and only ranked higher than Turkmenistan, North Korea, and Eritrea. [52]
III. THE INTERNET IN IRAN
A. ADOPTION OF THE INTERNET IN IRAN
Technical advances such as the Internet, email, and cell phones—brought to Iran, by way of globalization—forever changed the nature of publication in Iran and the dissent against the government voiced therein. In 2008, Iran was estimated to have a population of roughly 70 million people, nearly 56% of whom were under the age of 25. [53] Of these approximately 70 million people, 23 million are Internet users.[54] The number of Internet users in Iran is especially remarkable considering that the number of Internet users in the country has climbed 48% annually, from under one million users in 2000 to 32 million just eight years later. [55] Cell phone use is also pervasive, with Iranians sending 80 million text messages per day. [56] The IRI-authored Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan announces goals of a 50% penetration rate for cell phones and 30 million Internet users by 2010. [57]