THE OIL WEAPON AND THE FOURTH ARAB-ISRAEL WAR (YOM KIPPUR), 1973
12B-13A
Background:
The two issues central to the formulation of U.S. policy towards the Middle East have been oil security and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1973, the fourth Arab-Israeli War erupted. For the first time, the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia with whom the U.S. had a special relationship, used the oil weapon—the embargo—to force the United States to change its policy towards Israel. Behind all of this, of course, loomed the Soviet Union which hoped to capitalize on this crisis to further its own interests in the region.
I. THE “NEW ORDER” IN THE GULF:
A. THE POSTWAR SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD BEEN
DEVELOPED AND SUSTAINED BY BRITISH AND AMERICAN POWER
1. However, by the late 1960’s the power of both nations was waning, and that meant
that the political basis of the petroleum order was also weakening. This weakening of
Britain and America was the result of two factors:
a. The U.S. was bogged down in an increasingly costly and unpopular war in
Vietnam.
b. Britain’s financial crisis was deepening.
2. Significance of Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez: ______
B. THE U.S. WANTED THE SHAH OF IRAN TO FILL THATVACUUM
1. The overall aim of the Shah’s policy: ______
2. Two reasons the U.S. supported the Shah’s expanded role as neighborhood policeman
a. Coincided with the Nixon Doctrine that attempted to deal with the new political and
economic restraints on American power (caused by Vietnam) by depending on
strong, friendly, local powers to act as regional policemen.
b. ______
II. THE END OF THE TWENTY-YEAR PETROLEUM SURPLUS
A. THE WORLD’S INCREASINGY DEPENDENCY ON ME OIL
B.FACTORS ACCELERATING AMERICAN RELIANCE ON POLITICALLY
UNSTABLE ME OIL
1. ______
2. ______
Major implications of this: the “security margin” upon which the Western world had
depended, was gone.
3. ______
C. THE QUEST FOR POLITICALLY RELIABLE OIL: ALASKA AND THE
NORTHSEA
D. THE LIBYAN FIND & QUADDAFI’S PLAN
The two-fold significance of the Libyan agreement of 1970:
a. ______
b. ______
III. SADAT GOES TO WAR AND FAISAL UNSHEATH’S THE OIL WEAPON (THE YOM KIPPUR WAR), 1973
A. BACKDROP TO WAR: THE U.S. ENERGY CRISIS:
1. The number one concern of the Nixon administration when it came to power in
1969 was ______
2. Warning: That same month James Akins, the State department’s chief oil expert, had
been detailed to the White House to draft a report. He published an article in Foreign
Affairs whose title captured the new economic reality: “The Oil Crisis: This Time the
Wolf Is Here.” He said the U.S. should do three things to avert a crisis:
a. ______
b. ______
c. ______
3. By the summer of 1973, U.S. imports were 6.2mb/d compared to 3.2mb/d in 1970 and
4.5mb/d in 1972. Between 1970 and 1973, the market price for crude oil doubled.
B. SADAT’S GAMBLE
1. Political objective: ______
2. Sadat made three bold moves to get the attention of the U.S.:
a. Purged the pro-Soviet Egyptians.
b. In July1972, he threw out the arrogant Soviet military advisers, all 20,000 of them.
c. In late 1972 and early 1973, Sadat came to his fateful decision. He would go to war.
3. Central to Sadat’s calculation for war was ______
C. FAISAL’S DECISION TO USE THE OIL WEAPON
1. Faisal had always rejected the use of the oil weapon for two reasons:
a. ______
b. ______
2. Yet, now, Faisal changed his mind about using the oil weapon. Two reasons:
a. ______
b. ______
D. ISRAEL ALMOST LOOSES
1. Our top priority was ______
2. Concerning Israel, U.S. policy was ______
Best outcome: ______
3. Israel made two almost fatal miscalculations:
a. ______
b. ______
3. The American dilemma: ______
4. Two letters to Nixon:
a. From the Chairman of ARAMCO: ______
b. From Golda Meir: ______
Cornerstone of U.S. policy: the U.S. could not allow an American ally to be
defeated by Soviet arms.
5. Nixon’s decision: ______
E. FAISAL UNSHEATHS THE OIL WEAPON
1. Meanwhile, OPEC announced their decision to raise the posted price of oil by 70
percent—to $5.11/b The significance of their action was twofold:
a. ______
b. ______
2. For the U.S. and the Nixon administration this raised the question, if OPEC could
unilaterally raise the price oil, then what next?
3. Faisal’s threat: ______
4. Nixon-Kissinger’s response: ______
5. Faisal’s response: ______
6. Iraq’s call: ______
7. OPEC’s embargo against the U.S. and their overall strategy: ______
______
8. Nixon’s response to Saudi oil blackmail was as follows:
a. On October 17, the U.S. informed the Arab foreign ministers and Sadat that the U.S.
favored a cease fire and resolution based on UN RESOLUTION 242.
b. On Oct 19, Nixon publicly proposed a $2b military aid package for Israel. That
same day, Libya announced that it was embargoing all oil shipments to the U.S.
c. In the early morning hours of October 20, while enroute to Moscow, Kissinger
learned that in retaliation for the Israeli aid proposal, SA had gone beyond the
rolling cutbacks; it would now cut off all oil shipments of oil, every barrel, to the
U.S. The other Arab states had done or were doing the same. The oil weapon was
now fully in battle—a weapon, in Kissinger’s words, “of political blackmail.”
Significance: The three-decade-old postwar petroleum order had died its final death.
F. RUSSIA THREATENS TO INTERVENE
IV. AFTERMATH
A. KISSINGER INAUGURATES “SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY”
B. THE U.S. GUARANTEED “ONE THOUSAND PERCENT” SECURITY FOR
ISRAEL.
C. THE U.S. MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD RISK
WWIII OVER THE ME AND ITS OIL
@5/26/03: AFR