Northwestern IllinoisState’s Attorneys
October 1, 2009
Wendy J. Muchman
ardc
Litigation Group Manager
Director outreach and mcle Chicago office
HYPOTHETICALS
Your Turn!
What’s a Prosecutor to Do?
Prosecutor is involved in a criminal proceeding regarding child-abduction of a minor child. The natural father had abducted his child and would not return the child until several conditions were met, one of which was that he wanted an appellate court order allowing him annual visitation with the child. There was no case pending in an appellate court. Prosecutor, being concerned about the safety of the child, prepares a court order that purports to be an order of the Illinois Appellate Court and signs the name of a retired Justice of the Court to the document. The prosecutor’s defense is “What’s a lawyer to do? I was worried abut the kid.”
What’s a Prosecutor to Do, Question Two?
Prosecutor is an AssistantState’s Attorney assigned regularly to the courtroom of the same judge, Judge Meanswell. Meanswell is longstanding friends with Judge Helpinghand. One day over coffee, Helpinghand tells Meanswell that his good friend and neighbor owns a trucking company and one of the drivers has an overweight citation pending in Meanswell’s courtroom. Helpinghand asks if Meanswell could have his State’s attorney “help” a friend. Later, Judge Meanswell calls the prosecutor in at lunch time and tells him that there is a hearing coming up on an overweight citation for a truck. The judge asks the prosecutor to “take a look at it” and see what he can do to “SOL it or whatever.” The case is called after lunch. The prosecutor stated: “I’m looking at the ticket and I don’t think I’m going to be able to meet my burden of proof on this matter. Motion State SOL.” Judge Meanswell granted the motion. The police officer who issued the citation was in Court that day and was surprised at the result. The Prosecutor had never talked to him before calling the case. After the case was SOL’d the officer whispered: “I guess money talks around here.” The prosecutor told the officer,” what’s a lawyer to do? I had to do it for the judge.” The police later complained of blatant “ticket fixing.”
Is There Something Wrong?
Prosecutor, Billy Bravo, is first assistant in a small town of Mayberry. His best friend is a judge and is also the sister of the wealthiest builder in town, Ernie Evil, who has a lot of influence in Mayberry. Ernie’s daughter is dating a guy from the wrong side of the tracks, Freddie Fearless. The felony criminal sexual assault statute requires that there be a five year age difference between the offender and the victim in order to charge the felony violation. Billy does the math and figures out that for one month out of the year, Freddie is five years older than Ernie’s minor daughter. He talks to the judge and explains he is slightly concerned about charging the felony violation. “Is there something wrong?” she asks him. “That scumbag Freddie will walk if you only charge a misdemeanor sex crime. You have to slap him with the felony charge.” Billy charges the felony crime.
Illinois Lawyer Disciplinary Case Summaries: The Criminal Prosecutor as a Lawyer-Respondent.
The following case summaries do not include disciplinary proceedings instituted against lawyers on the staff of the Illinois Attorney General, Special Illinois Assistant Attorney Generals, municipal lawyers, or other government employees and public officials. Many of the Board reports and Supreme Court orders for the following cases are available on-line at
In re Eugene Lee Armentrout,Charles E. Petersen, Jay Robert Grodner, Kim Edward Presbrey, William H. Weir, and William John Truemper, Jr., 99 Ill.2d 242, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983). The KaneCountyState's Attorney was suspended from the practice of law for two years after he organized a massive forgery of voter signatures on a referendum petition. The forgery, consisting of ‘round-tabling’ signatures at a table located in the CountyGrand Jury room. The Court imposed lesser sanctions on the attorneys who assisted him in forging voter signatures; his chief assistant was suspended for six months and a second assistant State's Attorney and two attorneys in private practice were censured.
In re James F. Baba,M.R. 22324, 07 SH 74 (Ill. May 19, 2008). Mr. Baba, who was licensed in 1995, was disbarred on consent. While employed as an AssistantColesCountyState’s Attorney, he withdrew three bags of cannabis from an evidence locker maintained by the Coles County Sheriff’s Department. He represented that he needed the items for court purposes. No court cases involving the items were, however, pending at the time and he never returned the items to the evidence custodian.
In re Michele Lynne Berkel, 97 SH 115 (ARDC Hg. Bd. Reprimand, Mar. 24, 1999)The respondent, a young assistant county prosecutor, improperly attempted to gather information for use in a friend’s contemplated divorce proceeding. Berkel sent a letter to the Secretary of State's office using the State's Attorney's letterhead and inquired whether the friend’s husband was publicly listed as an officer or agent for any registered business entities. In the letter, Berkel falsely represented that the State's Attorney's office was investigating the husband. She also telephoned the Madison County Recorder's office and requested a search of their records for any public information relating to the husband without disclosing that her request was unrelated to her official duties. The respondent was reprimanded.
In re Charles Luther Bretz, M.R. 12243, 96 CH 118 (Ill. Mar. 24, 1999). Bretz was suspended on an interim basis and until further order of the Court in 1996. The interim suspension was imposed after he was convicted of attempted official misconduct. While serving as a county prosecutor, he improperly charged a criminal defendant with felony aggravated criminal sexual abuse when he knew that a felony charge requirement of a five-year age difference between a victim and the defendant did not exist. Because there was no five-year age difference, the defendant's offense only warranted a misdemeanor charge. In addition, while serving as the FirstAssistantState's Attorney, he hid a file in his office during an ongoing criminal investigation of illegal storage of hazardous waste in order to impede further investigation or prosecution of a defendant. He was also disciplined for his role in a criminal trial where he failed to disclose on the record that he had a prior professional relationship with the judge. Finally, shortly after being appointed First Assistant, but while acting as a private attorney, he handled an “emergency” legal matter for a friend. In that matter, he failed to conduct a reasonable factual investigation before filing a petition for an emergency restraining order and failed to give notice to the opponent’s counsel when he presented the petition. He was suspended for three years retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.
In re John Hawthorne Campbell and In re Bradley W. Murphy, M.R. 21566, 06 SH 74 and 06 SH 75 (consolidated) (Ill. May 18, 2007). Murphy, who was licensed in 1973, and Campbell, who was licensed in 1978, were censured. Both are federal prosecutors. While co-prosecuting a cocaine and weapons case, they failed to disclose to the defense certain statements that one of their primary witnesses had made to government agents. Police officers had arrested a man named Childs for multiple deliveries of crack cocaine to three different cooperating individuals. The evidence against Childs included that, on four occasions, one of the three, Alan Logston, purchased crack cocaine from Childs in controlled transactions. The police supplied Logston with money to make the purchases. Respondents’ office filed an indictment against Childs and a codefendant in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division. Campbell was lead prosecutor and Murphy assisted him. On Friday, April 2, 2004, three days before trial began, Logston confided to a detective that he kept some of the crack cocaine that he had purchased from Childs in the controlled transactions. The detective immediately informed Campbell, who then informed Murphy, of Logston’s statement. Prior to that time, on at least two occasions, Logston had denied keeping any of the drugs. On April 6, 2004, upon entering the courtroom and immediately prior to testifying, Logston stated directly to Campbell that he had taken one-half of the crack cocaine that he had purchased in three of the transactions, and he apologized to Campbell for lying previously. Campbell told Murphy of Logston’s statements. At no time prior to or during the trial did Respondents disclose to the defense Logston’s statements that he kept some of the crack cocaine that he had purchased. However, under cross-examination, Logston testified that he had kept some of the crack cocaine, and he testified that he had previously advised the police and prosecutors of his conduct. Defense counsel moved for dismissal of the indictment on the basis that the failure to disclose Logston’s statements violated Childs’ constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland. The district court found that the prosecutors wrongly failed to disclose Logston’s statements, but denied the motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of prejudice. Subsequently, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts, which were affirmed on appeal.
In re John Matthew Chancey, M.R. 10266, 91 CH 348 (Ill. Sept. 23, 1994). While serving as the FirstAssistantLakeCountyState’s Attorney, Chancey prepared a false document that purported to be an order of the Illinois Appellate Court and signed the name of a retired appellate justice to the document. At the time, Chancey was involved in a criminal proceeding regarding an alleged child-abduction. A natural father had purportedly abducted his child and would not return the child until several conditions were met. One of the conditions was that he wanted an appellate court order allowing annual visitation with the child. Chancey knew it would be impossible to obtain a legitimate court order because no case was pending in the appellate court. He was, however, concerned about the safety of the child. The Review Board found that, although he may have had a good motive, he still engaged in dishonesty and deceit, and recommended that he be reprimanded. The Supreme Court permitted the Review Board reprimand to stand.
In re Brent Allen Cain, 02 SH 19 (Hg. Bd. Reprimand, September 26, 2002). While an assistant state’s attorney for MacoupinCounty, Cain left a bar after drinking about 6 beers on a Friday night and drove off in his SUV on South Plum Street in Carlinville, Illinois. He hit an 18-year-old woman who was walking on the road and left the scene without providing assistance. As a result of the collision, the woman was knocked from her feet, fell down and struck her face on the curb. He pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eighteen months of conditional discharge conditioned on his paying court costs, his submission to a substance abuse evaluation, and his completion of any recommended treatment within six months.
In re Randolph G. Cook, M.R. 4712, 88 CH 11 (Ill. March 28, 1988). Cook was disbarred on consent, with the sanction effective as of February 1, 1987. He pled guilty to four counts of official misconduct and four counts of theft and was sentenced to a two-year prison term. The disbarment was ordered, in part, due to his conduct while he was serving as the FirstAssistantState’s Attorney for DeKalbCounty. A man named Rogers was charged with multiple traffic offenses and DUI while driving through the town of Roscoe in WinnebagoCounty. Rogers contacted Cook regarding the charges. Cook told Rogers that he, Cook, would “take care of it” and that it would cost $2,000. Later, Cook contacted the Roscoe City Prosecutor, identified himself as the FirstAssistantState’s Attorney for DeKalbCounty and falsely informed the man that Rogers was an informant working for the Department of Criminal Investigations and the DeKalbCountyState’s Attorneys Office. Cook requested that the city prosecutor give consideration to Rogers given his “informant” status. Thereafter, Rogers met with Cook and gave him $2,000 in cash. Cook falsely related that he was not going to keep the money but instead give it to a TASC fund.
In re Thomas Gerard Cosgrove, M.R. 19629, 01 CH 76 (Ill. Sept. 27, 2004). Cosgrove, who was licensed in 1991, was censured. He served as an assistant state’s attorney assigned to Courtroom 204 in the Markham courthouse and was the only assistant state’s attorney assigned to that courtroom when Judge Paul Sheridan presided there. Each day in Courtroom 204, there were approximately two hundred cases on the court call. Cosgrove described Sheridan as a judge who wanted to move the court calls along. Judge Sheridan had never indicated to Cosgrove that he had a particular interest in any case. Sheridan and another judge, Harry R. Buoscio, had known each other for more than twenty years and were friends. Buoscio had neighbors and long-time family friends who owned a trucking company, Cress, Inc. One of the truck drivers for Cress Inc. received a citation for driving an overweight truck. The citation was scheduled for hearing in Courtroom 204. At some point, Buoscio learned that Sheridan was assigned to Courtroom 204. Buoscio told his colleague about the overweight citation for Cress Inc. and asked whether Sheridan could have the assistant state’s attorney assigned to the courtroom “help” a friend. On the date of hearing on the overweight citation, Sheridan and Cosgrove had a conversation in Sheridan’s chambers. Sheridan told Cosgrove that there was an overweight citation coming up and that Cosgrove should “take a look at it” and see what he could do, to “SOL it or whatever.” When the case was called, Cosgrove stated: “I’m looking at the ticket and I don’t think I’m going to be able to meet my burden of proof on this matter. Motion State SOL.” Sheridan then granted the motion. The police officer who issued the citation was in Court that day and was surprised at the result, as Cosgrove had never talked to him before calling the case. After the case was SOL’d, the officer whispered: “I guess money talks around here.” Cosgrove then told the officer that he “had to do this for the judge, or because of the judge.” Later, the officer’s commander wrote a memorandum to Sheridan’s presiding judge and complained of what he described as a case of “blatant ‘ticket fixing’”. At the time of the events in question, Cosgrove had been a lawyer for two years. At the disciplinary hearing, he testified that he should immediately reported the Sheridanex parte conversation to his supervisor. He said that he did not call his supervisor because of the pressure to keep moving cases in the courtroom.
In re J. Earl Crisel, 101 Ill.2d 332, 461 N.E.2d 994 (1984). Crisel served as the EdwardsCountyState's Attorney. The conduct at issue took place in 1980, when he was seeking reelection to the State's Attorney position. He was reelected in 1980. Late in the evening of May 24, 1980, Crisel got into his car and drove to a remote spot near the Little Wabash River, intending to commit suicide. Unable to carry out this plan, he fired his shotgun twice into his automobile.Early the following morning, he contacted the EdwardsCounty sheriff's department, relaying a fabricated report that he had been shot at by unknown persons. Soon thereafter, he left town for approximately a week without telling anyone that he was leaving or where he could be found. Law-enforcement officials in the area initiated a search. At the disciplinary hearing, Crisel indicated that the disappearance was prompted when he learned that the local media was going to release a story containing the "true facts" involved in the attack on his automobile. He further testified that it was during this period that he decided to seek psychiatric care. The Supreme Court held his fabricating a report suggesting that he was a crime victim warranted a three year suspension, with stay of suspension and imposition of probation, in light of a finding that his actions were the result of a depressive neurosis. The Court held:
Respondent's intentional misrepresentations were closely related to, and in complete contravention of, his responsibility as a State's Attorney, to enforce the law. These acts were evidence of his lack of professional and personal honesty, threatening the integrity of the legal profession and the administration of justice. We would not hesitate in imposing a substantial period of suspension if the evidence of psychological impairment had not been introduced…
In re John Joseph Edwards,M.R. 22619, 07 CH 129 (Ill. Nov. 18, 2008). Mr. Edwards, who was licensed in 1998, was suspended for a period of two years and until further order of the Court, with the suspension stayed after one year by probation with conditions. He was convicted for possessing methamphetamine while he was employed as an AssistantState’s Attorney in CookCounty. The suspension is effective on December 9, 2008.
In re Jerry Finney, M.R. 20365, 04 SH 6 (Ill. November 22, 2005). Finney, who was licensed in 1974, was suspended for one year and until further order of the Court. Finney was an AssistantMaconCountyState’s Attorney. One day, two employees of A-1 Recovery Services were directed to repossess his 1999 Buick Century because he had failed to make payments on an installment loan. The two repomen, Messrs. Alderson and Starbody, identified Finney’s car, which was parked in a parking lot west of the Macon County Courthouse in Decatur, Illinois. From the courthouse window, Finney spotted the men preparing to tow the car. He ran out of the courthouse, approached the car, and told Alderson and Starbody that they were not going to take his vehicle. Finney proceeded to get into the car and Alderson stood behind the vehicle to stop him from leaving the parking space. Finney then put the car into reverse and accelerated into Alderson. After Finney hit Alderson with his car, Alderson ended up on the back of the Buick. Finney then accelerated and stopped the car with a jolt. When Alderson remained on the back of the car, Finney accelerated rapidly and Alderson eventually fell from the car. Finney left the area without stopping. Alderson suffered minor injures as a result of the incident. Following a bench trial, Finney was found guilty of two counts of reckless conduct and two counts of reckless driving and was sentenced to a twelve-month term of probation. He violated almost every term of the probation and it was subsequently revoked by the sentencing judge. Finney was previously disciplined for unrelated misconduct. He now resides in Indiana.