FUTURE OF AIRPOWER
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1. INTRODUCTION3
2. AIRPOWER, WHERE ARE WE NOW?4
3. DOCTRINE8
4. TACTICAL MISSIONS10
- Air Superiority11
- Air Interdiction14
- Close Air Support16
5. THE FAR FUTURE18
6. CONCLUSION22
INTRODUCTION
What is the future of airpower? Can there be a topic more near and dear to the heart of the airmen? Airpower was born of the technological revolution at the beginning of the 20th century. Its entire (relatively short) history is so fundamentally tied to technology as to be inseparable. Airmen more than any other military service look to the future, for their basic tool, the aircraft is a product of forward thinking. Airpowers effect on the battlefield since its inception has been tremendous; perhaps it has been more significant than any other weapon in the history of warfare. Opening the third dimension to military operations changed the way wars were, and will be fought. Yet, while airmen have been champions of technology and weapons development, their track record in developing coherent doctrine is spotty. Additionally, the roles and responsibilities debate that airpower's rise sparked among the various military branches has at times inhibited its potential. Airpower has now been used for almost a century in warfare. What is its future at the threshold of the 21st century? In the last 100 years many prophets, proponents and theories about airpowers capability have emerged. However, it is only recently that airpower has truly matured as a weapon in war. Where to go now? Not all the doctrine and theories of the early years was off the mark. Airpower is a military weapon and the rules of war apply to its employment, just as they apply to the army or navy. In fact, the doctrinal lessons of the past are very much applicable today. Priorities of operations such as were developed in North Africa for example are as valid today as then. But will the very nature of airpower be changed by the security environment of the early 21st century? Airpower prophets such as Mitchell and Douhet wondered the same thing in the early years of airpower. And though some of their ideas were not correct, or perhaps a bit premature, it was their forward thinking that helped shape the direction of airpower. Attempting to look forward and assess airpowers role in the future is of vital importance. As Sun Tzu put it.
"The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable."[1]
What is airpower's current and future capability to ensure we are ready for the threats in the next century? This paper will address four areas in an attempt to look forward to airpower's potential future. First, where are we now? What is the world situation airpower is faced with, and are there fundamental changes in perceptions of airpowers uses? Second, how will airpower doctrine be affected by the early 21st century, will it change significantly or essentially remain per the status quo? Third, what are the specific future challenges and possibilities for the three tactical airpower missions, air superiority, Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support (CAS)? Lastly, if one attempts to look forward and auger the future, what of the longer term? What are some possible airpower challenges of the far future? Before the future of airpower can be discussed it serves to reference where we are now.
AIRPOWER, WHERE ARE WE NOW?
There is an elemental question to ask and answer if one is to asses what airpower's status is in the present time. It is one that must constantly be asked by military leaders and politicians. Does the present day geo-political situation fundamentally alter current airpower theory and doctrine? Every new generation of airmen from airpowers beginnings in warfare has asked and attempted to answer this question. Their accuracy has of course never been spot on. But that is not the point. The exercise is to limit as much as feasible any surprises, and to prepare as best as possible for the future. Col John Warden is a contemporary airpower theorist and has this to say of the current world situation and airpower.
"The world is currently experiencing what may be the most revolutionary period in all of human existence with major revolutions taking place simultaneously in geopolitics, production, technology, and military affairs. The pace of change is accelerating and shows no sign of letting up. If we are to succeed in protecting our interests in this environment, we must spend more time than ever in our past thinking about war and developing new employment concepts. Attrition warfare belongs to another age, and the days when wars could be won by sheer bravery and perseverance are gone. Victory will go to those who think through the problem and capitalize on every tool available—regardless of its source. Let us begin laying the intellectual framework for future air operations."[2]
The question then, where is airpower now? Many factors must be considered to answer this question, but several can be concentrated on for both their deep-seated and historical record of importance. At the very base of the issue, who are our likely adversaries? As best as we can determine, who are they, and what are their capabilities? Second, what are our capabilities? Specifically, what is our strategic position?[3] What can history teach us of the importance for these issues?
The United States potential adversaries in conflict are perhaps the single most important factor in determining where our airpower capabilities are now. The dawn of the 21st century has brought yet another 'new' type of conflict to the United States. Having fought two large general wars in the first half of the century, and many smaller 'Limited' wars in the latter half, an entirely new type of conflict has emerged. The 'War on Terrorism' has provided a serious challenge for the use of airpower. It is a war without borders, without armies, even less so than previous guerilla conflicts such as Vietnam. However, this is not the only threat as there are other likely adversaries with very conventional capabilities. China comes to mind, as does North Korea, Iraq until recently, and several countries in the Gulf Region pose a quite conventional threat as well. The answer to who is the likely threat in the early 21st century perhaps then runs the entire gamut of 'terrorists' to rogue states with both conventional and non-conventional forces to large nations with traditional strategic power bases and large conventional forces. Indeed, the current threat environment may just about cover every conceivable military type threat for airpower to employ against with the possible exception of a domestic insurgency. The implications for airpower are enormous. There is much uncertainty, and airpower must be flexible enough to answer all threats. Current capabilities versus these myriad threats bear some investigation.
First the most remote threat, which is a large-scale conventional war against a nation like China. America's airpower position in respect to such a threat is good. Airpower's development up to this point has largely been geared toward this kind of foe. The large military establishment created to counter the Soviet Union, though drawn down considerably, is doctrinally, organizationally and technologically aimed to counter such a threat.[4] Arguments over our strategic positioning in such an event not withstanding, the airpower capability, with specific doctrine, required to fight such a conflict exists.[5] Though, perhaps not in the numbers that might be required to fight a decisively quick war.
Likewise, America's current airpower positioning to effectively fight smaller 'rogue' nations or regional powers with airpower is also sufficient. The recent history (10-15 years) of U.S. airpower development has both been geared toward this type of adversary, and has benefited from the direct transfer of the focus on larger scale wars. Iraq was defeated, twice, largely with forces designed and prepared to fight the Soviet Union. Two limited wars in Korea and Vietnam laid foundations for the 'limited' aspects and lessons learned positively shaped the doctrinal issues. The two Gulf Wars marked a transition to airpowers concentration on the regional rogue power. We have, for all intents and purposes been fighting this type of conflict non-stop for 12 years. The efforts of Northern and Southern Watch, and the Balkans air war were all of this type. All helped shape airpowers capability and use versus the 'rogue nation' or regional power. Though one must wonder if these wars are significant to airpowers use in the new century, or are they a parallel to airpower lessons in Spanish Civil War? Interesting but not of significant importance to the newest threat.
The newest threat, terrorists such as Al Quaeda, and the myriad other trans-national terrorist organizations poses a serious challenge to airpowers use in the next century. One could even ask if airpower has a primary role at all in such a conflict, or is it more of a supporting force. There are no borders for the enemy, no infrastructure that can be attacked by air. On the limited occasions such infrastructure can be identified, can airpower react in time, or even have the effect desired? The war in Afghanistan provided an arena for airpowers use, and it continues to be of use there. However, the war on terrorism provides a severely limited target set, and especially in tactical aviation's situation severely limits its usefulness.
So, where are we now? Airpower in the latter half of the 20th century was built largely on the nation state threat. It was technologically and doctrinally designed to fight foes such as the Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and later the Soviet Union. However, while the two former were actually fought and defeated, the Soviet Union was never directly engaged and it was the preparation for the war that actually defeated them. The wars fought during the Cold War were not large conventional types; they were limited wars, wars between the super powers by proxy. Airpower had to flex, and did so admirably, to fight wars for which it was not specifically designed. Now, America is faced with the nebulous enemy of terrorism, further challenging traditional thoughts of airpower employment. In North Africa, airmen were faced with an enemy that lacked strategic targets, negating a large precept of their doctrine and forcing a doctrinal shift to interdiction and close air support. In the war against terrorists, another doctrinal shift may be needed. Tactical airpower must become increasingly timely, precise, and integrated with real time intelligence. Strategically and doctrinally then, we are at a crossroads, with the question being how to apply airpower to the new threat while maintaining the capability to counter the more traditional threats. Never in the history of airpower has one nation possessed such an overwhelming superiority in airpower capability. How the U.S. employs that advantage will determine, to a large extent, her success in the wars of the 21st century.
DOCTRINE
Few new weapons in history have sparked the intense doctrinal debate over employment airpower has. From the beginning airpower proponents considered it something 'different' in war, a 'revolutionary' military force, forever changing the face of conflict. This basic notion has colored the debate from the beginning. In the main this prophecy proved true with some qualifications. While the 'battlespace' changed dramatically (war fighting changed from two a dimensional arena to three). The airplane and airpower remains a weapon of war. A tool used in whichever manner military leaders decide, dependant on their imagination and flexibility, traits that are not exactly synonymous with military doctrine. A lack of imagination and flexibility combined with little to no precedent hamstrung airpower's doctrinal evolution.
"It has often been said that there was little realistic conception of how air power might be used-what air forces like to call doctrine. This is true, but also understandable. The air weapon was after all distinctive, indeed unique. Of all the “new” weapons of the Great War, it alone had no predecessor and no precedent."[6]
Humble beginnings notwithstanding, what began as a supporting unit quickly flexed its muscles and struggled for an independent status. An independent status that early air leaders felt would best use its inherent abilities. And so, the doctrinal debate has raged. Old school army and navy men argued airpower was a supporting unit to the true, traditional, military branches. Conversely, early airmen struggled to put together a doctrine that considered the airplanes potential, if not its actual capability. The argument being, airpower could save lives, and was a war winner itself. Even more controversially, the army and navy might be supporting units to airpower.
"What self interest and strategy made compelling, the nation’s mood made politic. America’s response to the bloodletting and disillusionment of World War I ruled out dispatch of another great army to fight abroad. In the 1920s it had been neither prudent nor especially compelling for airmen to offer their bombers as a substitute for the expeditionary armies of the past. In the 1930s, as crises abroad imperiled American interests, airmen guardedly advanced the case for a bomber force that could strike across the seas."[7]
A quick synopsis of airpower doctrine serves to establish the current situation.
As noted, airpower started as a supporting force to the army and navy in World War I. During the interwar years airmen proponed the strategic power of air forces. Airpower, they argued is inherently offensive and should be a separate (independent at least) force. During World War II, this crusade to gain independence gained momentum, as airmen, under the overall strategic direction of FDR sought to use airpower to win the war. Several important doctrinal achievements came from World War II. Strategic airpower gained dominance within the Army Air Corps. And on the strength of its reported strategic contribution to the victory, the Air Corps gained independence shortly after. Tactical airpower established three doctrinal ‘priorities’. These priorities were in order, air superiority, air interdiction and close air support. Airpower doctrine as established in World War II changed again as airmen applied it to the limited engagements born of the Cold War. Additionally, the advent of nuclear weapons brought further significance to the strategic side of airpower, solidifying in the minds of airmen the U.S. Air Force’s lead in defending the United States. However, airpower’s limitations in the small wars, and the lack of attention paid to tactical aviation eventually came home to roost, as the experience in Vietnam highlighted shortcomings in U.S. tactical airpower doctrine. Currently, U.S. forces enjoy something of a renaissance in tactical airpower doctrine brought on by the lessons learned in Vietnam, and employed, upgraded and proven in two Gulf Wars. But this ‘proof’ is against the local regional power and employed against conventional forces. Yet, the tactical airpower priorities arrived at during World War II appears as valid today as then. Will they remain valid in the future? A look at the three missions will serve to answer this question.
TACTICAL MISSIONS
The three missions of tactical aviation, as spelled out during World War II remain largely unchanged. Definitions have changed somewhat through the years but the basic doctrine is solid. Establish air superiority first, for this will allow air forces to operate without undue enemy interference. Once air superiority is established, interdiction of the enemy's military strength and supplies becomes the priority. Lastly, if both air superiority and significant interdiction are achieved, carefully considered close air support may be employed. Through airpower’s history these three priorities, or missions, for tactical airpower have flexed in different situations. For example, if an operation is deemed important enough or if a contingency arises, CAS can quickly become the priority mission. Such is the flexibility of airpower. Past performance aside, where are we currently with the tactical airpower priorities and “How will air superiority, interdiction and close air support manifest themselves in the 21st century?”[8]
AIR SUPERIORITY
Air superiority is probably the least controversial role/mission and priority for tactical airpower. It is readily apparent, and backed by every experience in aerial warfare, that air superiority[9] is required to facilitate all other aerial missions. It is the first tactical mission priority. Indeed, if resources are limited, it may be the only mission flown. For example, Germany, limited in resources for a variety of reasons in World War II was reduced to an almost purely defensive air superiority war over the Reich. With this mission obviously being of such importance militaries have allotted considerable resources to attain it. What is the state of air superiority for the United States and what are the possibilities for the future?