We Already Talked a Little About Metaethics, As One of the Main Divisions of Ethics

METAETHICS

We already talked a little about metaethics, as one of the main divisions of ethics.

At one point, maybe from the turn of the previous century to about 1950, many, probably most, Anglo-American philosophers thought that we cold not really do ethics, in the sense of making substantive ethical proposals, of any sort. Instead, they thought that philosophers should clarify what is going on ethics. This move in ethics was consistent with a general shift in philosophy, in America and Great Britain, toward language analysis and logical positivism.

Logical positivism was aggressive in holding that meaning was intimately related to observation, and that there are no valid observations involving what is right or wrong. There are observations about what people think are right and wrong, but that is different from what is right and wrong.

Philosophers who took positivism and the linguistic turn in philosophy seriously, moved to metaethics in a way that often involved a rejection, at least in large measure, of substantive ethics.

Let’s define ‘metaethics’. (This isn’t the only way to define it, but it will do.)

Metaethics is the study of moral theory: what it attempts to do; how it is properly established; the meaning of basic moral terms, such as 'obligation' and 'goodness'; and an examination of the objectivity of moral inquiry.

Many philosophers believe that moral inquiry should begin with metaethical investigation, and some believe that a philosopher's only proper job is to make metaethical observations; such philosophers object to substantive ethics the branch of moral theory that provides guidance about what we ought do. For example, if we ask whether moral rules are proper or whether all moral judgments should be made in reaction to particular circumstances without using rules, we are engaged in a metaethical inquiry. The question is posed without addressing any particular moral values. However, if it is proper to use moral rules, then what the moral rules are gets us into substantive ethics. As we previously mentioned, the distinction between ethics and metaethics is not always completely clear.

Much of what we accomplished in moral theory is definitional. What does freedom mean? How is equality defined? What constitutes harm? Definitions are part of metaethics. However, as conceptions take shape, moral claims about whether actions are morally right or morally wrong typically intrude. So an attempt to define basic moral values tends to lead into substantive ethics.

Lots of people, I think, find metaethics boring. But boring doesn’t matter in philosophy. (Do you agree with that?) What matters is that we get things right, get them straight. Metaethics can, to a degree, help us to do that. Metaethics is a refined aspect of moral theory because it is pursued abstractly and technically. When one gets a taste for it, it becomes pretty interesting.

Further, it is about moral theory, also an abstract approach to morality. Though refined in the philosophical literature, our metaethical views, even if implicit, will influence the substantive positions we accept. So perhaps it is correct to say that metaethics should come first in moral inquiry.

If you find this information less than fully exciting, and how wouldn’t you, then I ask you to take it seriously as an important foundation, or something like that, for doing substantive ethics. At least much of what we will soon cover fits that description.