Saferworld submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human rights report 2005
November 2005
Introduction
This submission highlights key issues relating to UK arms sales and countries identified by the Foreign Office Human Rights Reports 2005 as countries of concern. It is divided into three sections:
· key recommendations
· arms licences and equipment that have been granted to countries of concern
· background information on the issues relating to each recommendation
In 1998, the Government introduced two reports: the Foreign Office Human Rights Annual Report; and the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls. In 2004, Quarterly Reports on Strategic Export Controls were also introduced.
Since their inception, Saferworld has been comparing these two reports in with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria against which arms licences are assessed. The Criteria states that the Government will not issue an export licence “which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts” or “if there is a clear risk that the proposed equipment might be used for internal repression.”
The implementation of criteria relating to human rights is often seen as one of the most politically sensitive issues in the field of arms export control. The Foreign Affairs Committee and the Joint Quadripartite Select Committee on Strategic Export Controls (QSC) have consistently urged the Government to fully apply human rights criteria when granting export licences.
This submission assesses the Government 2005 Annual Report on Human Rights[1] against the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls 2004[2] and the UK Quarterly Reports Jan- March and April-June 2005.
Saferworld is concerned that the Government’s policy on arms exports continues to undermine its commitments on human rights. In 2004, the Government authorised arms sales to 19 of the 20[3] states identified in the Human Rights Report as “major countries of concern”. The submission makes key recommendations[4] and highlights the most worrying licences granted and trends.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
§ The Government should introduce a 'presumption of denial' for arms exports towards an agreed list of 'countries of concern', where there are human rights concerns. The list should be agreed with the Quadripartite Select Committee.
§ Licensed production agreements and overseas subsidiaries should be subject to much stronger regulation, including specific re-export clauses in export licences to prevent UK companies from undermining UK and EU export controls
§ Additional measures should be taken to ensure appropriate controls that British companies wanting to license the production of weapons overseas should first have to apply to the UK Government for a licence.
§ The Government should implement a system to allow clear and effective monitoring of the end-use of UK arms exports
§ The arms embargo on China should be retained
Arms exports and human rights countries of concern
Afghanistan
The Human Rights Report states:
"We continue to receive reports of widespread human rights abuses"
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
2004: components for assault rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols
Jan- June 2005: 45 assault rifles and small arms ammunition
Colombia
The Human Rights Report states:
"The human rights situation remains critical"
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
2004: heavy machine guns, components for combat helicopters.
Jan- June 2005: small arms ammunition
Indonesia
The Human Rights Report states:
"We continue to have concerns about Papua … some NGOs and activists have reported attacks on villagers in the Papuan highlands, we have expressed our concerns to the Indonesian Government about these reports"
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
2004: components for combat helicopters
Jan-June 2005: components for air-to-air missile launching equipment
In 2004, the QSC raised serious concerns about the level of instability within Indonesia and the apparent use of UK equipment in violation of human rights and in breach of the end-use assurances the Indonesian Government had given the UK. The QSC recommended that ‘the Government must be prepared to monitor the end use of the equipment concerned effectively and actively where the suggestion of misuse arises.’[5]
Israel
The Human Rights Report states
"The UK opposes the Israeli policy of targeted killings, which are illegal under international law"
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
2004: armoured all wheel drive vehicles, military aero-engines.
Jan-June 2005: components for combat helicopters
Nepal
The Human Rights Report states:
"The human rights situation has been steadily deteriorating in Nepal for several years, with serious abuses being carried out by both Maoist insurgents and the security forces"
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
Jan- June 2005: components for assault rifles
Russia
The Human Rights Report states:
"The human rights situation in Chechnya remains arguably the most serious in the broader European continent"
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
2004: shotguns, components for combat aircraft
Jan-June 2005: air rifles, gun silencers, shotguns, air guns
Saudi Arabia
The Human Rights Report states:
"The Saudi Government has continued to violate human rights"
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
2004: heavy machine guns, assault rifles
Jan-June 2005: general purpose machine guns, armoured all wheel drive vehicles, gun silencers, assault rifles
Pakistan
In addition, the Government authorised the export of large quantities of arms to Pakistan, which despite serious human rights problems did not make it on to the Government's "top 20".
Export licences were granted for inter alia:
2004: components for large calibre artillery; shotguns, harpoon guns, heavy machine guns;
Jan-June 2005: components for large calibre artillery, components for large calibre artillery; shotguns, combat helicopters
Background information on Key Issues
Arms embargo on China
Despite the fact that there is an EU embargo on arms sales to China, in 2004 the Government authorised strategic exports, predominantly dual-use goods which could be used for military purposes, to China to the value of £100 million, as well as 13 additional licences of indeterminate value. During 2005 the EU has been debating whether to lift the arms embargo; following US pressure the UK has recently argued to continue the embargo, however the Government's record on licences granted to China makes a mockery of this position.
In its most recent report, the Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that ‘the raising of the EU arms embargo on China would send the wrong signal at this time.’ In 2005, the QSC reached a similar conclusion as the Foreign Affairs Committee over the embargo on China: that despite reassurances of ‘no qualitative or quantitative increases,’ ‘this pledge is in itself imperfect.’
Diversion and misuse
In the case of several of the countries identified in the human rights section above, it is concerning that licences for exports have been granted where there is a risk of diversion. As the UK Government does little to check what happens to arms exports once they leave the country, there is little way of knowing whether the arms find their way to other users, such as criminal gangs, pariah states, terrorists, paramilitaries or warlords or other rebel forces. A number of these states have reputations as conduits of arms to other irresponsible parties. For example, concerns have long been held over the links between the Colombian Government and right-wing paramilitary forces within the country, while China, Israel and Pakistan have all been identified as serial proliferators of military equipment or technologies. There have also been examples of misuse by recipient states. Israel has in the past failed to honour explicit end-use undertakings while in 2004 the Quadripartite Committee criticised the UK Government for failing to monitor UK equipment that was allegedly misused by the Indonesian Government.[6]
Incorporation
Also of concern has been the willingness of the Government to issue export licences for equipment for 'incorporation' (i.e. components that will be incorporated into weapons systems in the recipient country for onward export) to countries with dubious export control practices. In 2004, these incorporating countries included China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, South Africa and Turkey, none of which would be regarded as having export control standards equivalent to that of the UK. Thirty incorporation licences were issued for Israel in 2004, including components for electronic warfare equipment, for airborne radars, for weapon day and night sights, and for unmanned air vehicles.
Licensed Production Overseas and Uzbekistan
Turkish-made Land Rover Defender 110 military vehicles were used by Uzbek troops during the Andijan massacre in May 2005. The vehicles were a gift from the Turkish government to the Uzbek Government, and it is extremely likely they were produced under licence from the UK by the Turkish company Otokar. Although 70 percent of the components are exported from the UK in kit form for assembly in Turkey, it seems this production takes place completely outside the UK licensing regime – this is a serious loophole. It is highly unlikely that the UK Government would have licensed the direct export of these Land Rovers to the Uzbek security forces – it is therefore of concern that the intention of the Government can be so easily undermined by the un-regulated use of licensed production arrangements.
1
[1] UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human Rights Report Annual Report 2005, July 2005. Cm 6606.
[2] UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2004, July 2005 Cm 6646
[3] Only North Korea did not receive arms.
[4] Background information on each of the recommendations is provided on p3.
[5] QSC, Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny.’ House of Commons HC 390, 5 May 2004. Ch.4, p29, point 102.
[6] See export licences to Indonesia above. QSC, Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002.’ Ch.4, pp 26-29.