rose-roth seminar
190 SEM E
Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
64th ROSE-ROTH SEMINAR
Moldova and the euro-atlantic institutions: bridging the gap
Secretariat Report
Chisinau, Moldova
19-21 October 2006
International Secretariat 28 November 2006
*This Secretariat Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly.
Assembly documents are available on its website,
1
190 SEM 06 E
1. Political divisions and socio-economic problems as much as the dispute with the breakaway region of Transdnistria are factors hampering Moldova's path towards further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This was the general conclusion of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Rose-Roth seminar held in Chisinau from 19-21 October, in cooperation with the parliament of Moldova, under the theme “Moldova and the Euro-Atlantic Institutions: Bridging the Gap”. Some 50participants - including legislators from NATO and partner countries, Moldovan cabinet members, and representatives from NATO, EU, OSCE and local NGOs - gathered to discuss the country's uncertain future on the eve of Romania's EU accession, which will bring Moldova to the Union's border on January 1st, 2007.
2. In his introductory remarks, Marian Lupu, Speaker of the Parliament of Moldova recalled that Euro-Atlantic integration is “a priority” and an “irreversible” choice for Moldova resulting from a consensus of all political parties. Current relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions are based mainly on an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and a Neighbourhood Action Plan with the EU, both of which were agreed in 2005. Mr Lupu insisted that Moldova should use every opportunity as part of these processes to modernise its state structures and promote domestic reform, noting however that integration does not necessarily mean accession. He also acknowledged that “the future of Moldova is inseparable from the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict” and called for an active engagement of the international community, particularly the EU, in settling the conflict.
3. Loïc Bouvard, former President of the NATO PA, presented the purpose and programme of the seminar. He recalled its first visit to Moldova with a delegation of the NATO PA in 1994 and underlined the tremendous changes that have taken place since then, which have confirmed that Moldova lies “at the heart of Europe”. Mr Bouvard also recalled the links and parallels between NATO’s programmes and the NATO PA’s activities, particularly through its Rose-Roth seminar and hoped that the seminar will allow all participants to better understand Moldova’s aspirations and challenges on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration.
4. In her keynote address, Catherine Durandin of the Paris Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, reviewed the long history of Moldova’s relations with its two neighbours, Romania and Russia, focusing on how this history has shaped the country’s identity. Still today, Moldova is subject to competing foreign interests, including from the United States and Russia. Ms Durandin explained that Moldova has recently redefined its foreign policy priorities, but the focus seems to be on the EU rather than on NATO. She warned that stopping EU enlargement at the borders of Moldova would have catastrophic consequences. Concluding that the future of Moldova lies at the crossroads between identity, security and prosperity, Ms Durandin called for innovative solutions, which would acknowledge the country’s specificity and plurality rather than present the issue of identity as a problem. “Only by transcending downright nationalism will Moldova be able to build a pacified and prosperous society”, she argued. Guidelines for the future can be found in the Moldovan Constitution, which recognises Moldova as a unitary and neutral state, where Moldovan is the official language.
5. The discussion following the keynote address set the tone for the rest of the seminar, underlining some of the main challenges which Moldova faces on its road to Euro-Atlantic integration: the country’s multiple identities; Moldova’s status of neutrality and its implications for Moldova’s aspirations to Euro-Atlantic integration; the balance between the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and the country’s relations with Russia, and the need to engage Russia in a dialogue based on common European values; the future of enlargement in a context of enlargement fatigue and discussions on the so-called absorption capacity; the Transdnistrian conflict and potential parallels with other frozen conflicts.
Session I: The Conflict in Transdnistria: Views from Moldova
6. Vasilii Sova, Minister for Re-integration of Moldova, presented an optimistic perspective on the conflict in Transdnistria, arguing that there were no deep reasons for this conflict to exist, but only artificial obstacles and divisions. He suggested a roadmap for the resolution of the conflict, based on a three-step process: democratisation – including the organisation of free elections; internationally-supervised demilitarisation; and determination of the final status, which could be protected through legal or security guarantees in the Constitution. He also insisted on the need to develop economic links with Transdnistria to break the isolation of the region and of its population.
7. Oazu Nantoi, Programme Director for Conflict Management at the Institute for Public Policy in Chisinau, presented a much less optimistic assessment of the situation.He pointed out that, for the past 16 years, negotiations over Transdnistria had relied on a number of assumptions, which have proven unable to foster conflict resolution. In particular, he challenged the assumption that this is a conflict between the two banks of the Dniestr river. In his view, Tiraspol should not be considered as a party in the conflict, but rather as a pseudo-state controlled from abroad. Moreover, Mr Nantoi argued that Transdnistria is not a unified block, but shows some signs of diversity and internal divisions. Therefore, efforts towards conflict resolution should focus on transforming Transdnistria from the inside. In particular, Chisinau should create opportunities for a direct dialogue with the population of Transdnistria and take measures to become more attractive for this population. A second priority should be curbing those interests, which benefit from and support the continuation of the conflict. These two initiatives could be part of a broader plan based on the three principles of "democratisation, demilitarisation, and decriminalisation".
8. The discussion highlighted significant differences in perception among participants as to the current situation in Transdnistria. Whereas some participants argued that there were already links between the population of Transdnistria and that of the rest of Moldova, others insisted that Transdnistria was a closed society, relying on external support and illegal trafficking. Participants agreed that fighting against illegal trafficking should be a priority, and that current efforts undertaken by the governments of Ukraine and Moldova, with the support of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), are quite successful. However, they were more divided on the objective and means of promoting democracy in Transdnistria.
Session II:
The Conflict in Transdnistria: The Role of the International Community
9. Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, EU Special Representative to Moldova, briefed participants on the outcome of the recent meeting of mediators on the settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict. He noted that the three mediators and two observers (the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the United States) reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing the peaceful re-integration of Moldova and finding an acceptable status for Transdnistria within Moldova. However, he insisted that the international community has only a supportive role to play to foster those principles, but initiatives must come from both sides. Main tasks for the 5 international partners should include promoting the democratisation of Transdnistria; promoting confidence-building measures, including demilitarisation; establishing an inspection mission to investigate the issue of weapons production in Transdnistria; and assisting with the transformation of current peacekeeping arrangements into a multinational stabilisation mission, excluding the two sides, and placed under the auspices of the OSCE.
10. Joachim Haack, Deputy Head of Operations for EUBAM, presented the objectives and activities of the EU mission, which assists the governments of Moldova and Ukraine in their efforts to enhance border management and curb illegal trafficking through their common border. The mission is supported by a staff of 158, including 101 international staff from 16 EU Member States and 3 CIS countries and 57 local staff. One of the main achievements of the mission is the establishment of a new customs regime between the two countries. 235 companies out of 300involved in import/export have registered with the Moldovan authorities according to the new rules. Mr Haack explained that EUBAM observations at the border have also revealed that goods can now flow freely into Transdnistria, and are blocked only by Transdnistrian authorities.
11. Petro Chalyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to Moldova, assured participants that the new Ukrainian government is unambiguously committed to conflict resolution in Transdnistria. In his view, the peace plan proposed by President Yushchenko for Transdnistria could serve as a model for other frozen conflicts. Mr Chalyi expressed satisfaction at the resumption of negotiations, though noting that recent developments, including the recent referendum on independence, did not help these negotiations. He also insisted that additional confidence-building measures are needed to facilitate the resumption of talks between both sides. Finally, he saluted the work of EUBAM in creating a new model for border management in the region.
12. The discussion further underlined the difficulties of promoting conflict resolution in a particularly complex environment, where both sides seem to be plagued by internal divisions. The situation in Transdnistria is particularly contrasted, as the regime allows some contacts with the rest of Moldova, while promoting a culture of difference, e.g. through the recent referendum. Participants also addressed the role of Russia, with several Moldovan participants arguing that negotiations on Transdnistria should take place between Chisinau and Moscow, not Chinau and Tiraspol. Finally, the discussion highlighted that the issue of illegal weapons production in Transdnistria is still a major source of tension and mistrust, which should be solved through effective international verification.
Session III: Moldova and its Regional Context
13. Alexandru Cujba, Head of the Bilateral Affairs Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova, described the different levels of Moldova’s policy in the region, insisting that regional cooperation and European integration were parallel and mutually reinforcing processes. Moldova recently joined the South Eastern European Cooperation Process as a full member. It also participates actively in various cooperation frameworks in the Black Sea region, including the new Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development created out of the GUAM grouping. Mr Cujba argued that regional cooperation had transformed relations between countries in the region and contributed in bringing them closer to European standards.
14. Nicu Popescu, OSI Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, argued that Moldova belonged geographically in several regional ensembles, yet did not really fit in any of them. In a narrow regional perspective, Moldova lies between Ukraine and Romania. However, current relations and links between the three countries do not allow them to take full advantage of their interdependency. In a broader perspective, Moldova belongs to other ensembles such as South-Eastern Europe, the Black Sea or Greater Black Sea regions. However cooperation within these regional groupings was also constrained by a number of deficiencies and by the proliferation of initiatives. Nevertheless, Mr Popescu argued that Moldova should follow the example set by other countries – in particular the new EU member states - which managed to overcome their pre-determined geographical position and created new links with the region of their choice, i.e. Europe.
15. The discussion raised the question of whether Moldova’s position at the crossroads between several regions is a challenge or an opportunity for the country. Some participants argued that Moldova could use its position to become a new bridge between Europe and Russia or another Switzerland in Europe. Others underlined the difficulty for Moldova of choosing freely between competing influences, particularly in a context where domestic priorities have to be balanced against external constraints, including Moldova’s dependency towards some of its neighbours. However, not all participants agreed that Moldova faced a choice between two models – East and West, Europe and Russia, arguing instead that these really represent one single set of common values.
16. Ambassador Louis O’Neill, Head of the OSCE Mission in Moldova, underlined that regional cooperation can play an important role in promoting reform and conflict resolution in Moldova. Regional issues, such as the protection of the environment in the Black Sea region, need regional solutions, which can provide a framework for building new links between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Transdnistria should not be excluded from regional projects, because the links these projects create will provide a good basis for post-conflict reconstruction. Mr O’Neill also called on regional and European organisations to support regional projects, following the model set by EUBAM in promoting border cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine. He argued that Russia should not be excluded from this process, as its influence (on the economy, on energy, or on conflict resolution) is “based on realities”. Ignoring these realities would only encourage the creation of new dividing lines in Europe.
17. The discussion highlighted that a resolution of the Transdnistrian will require efforts from all interested parties Chisinau needs to promote consensus within Moldova and present an attractive model for the population of Transdnistria. Russia, which participants agreed plays a crucial role in negotiations over the conflict, also needs to play an even more constructive role. Finally, European partners need to engage more with Russia on these issues. Finally, following an intervention by an Azerbaijani delegate on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, participants discussed the issue of whether various frozen conflicts can be compared or not.
18. Filip Teodorescu, Ambassador of Romania to Moldova, emphasised the impact that NATO and the EU’s enlargement to the East has had in drawing both organisations’ attention towards regional cooperation in the Black Sea region. Romania in particular has played an active role in promoting links between regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic institutions, and will continue to play this role in the future. A major challenge for the region remains the frozen conflicts, which MrTeodorescu argued represent a threat as such and in that they provide a favourable environment for other security threats in the region. Each conflict requires a different and adapted solution, which should be supported through a common NATO-EU vision.
19. Oleksandr Sushko, Deputy Director of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, analysed the current state of relations between Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. Moldova was in a good position to be a link and a promoter of closer cooperation between the three countries. In particular, relations between Moldova and Ukraine are insufficiently developed, although Moldova is a unique partner for Ukraine in the region. The three countries should also strive to coordinate their positions in broader contexts, such as in their relations with the EU. Finally, Mr Sushko warned against separating European and Euro-Atlantic integration, arguing that “they are two wings of the same plane” and are both necessary to assist partner countries in their transformation.
Session IV: Defence Reform in Moldova
20. Guy Gerbeau, from the Defence Policy and Planning Division at NATO, presented the principles and the main steps of defence reform, from the development of key documents and processes - National Security Concept, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Strategic Defence Review – to their implementation. Some of the main conditions of a successful defence reform include: building consensus at all levels; developing an information strategy to sell the reforms; and involving the whole security apparatus.
21. Viorel Cibotaru, Director of the European Institute for Political Studies in Moldova, assessed the current state of security sector reform (SSR) in Moldova as largely insufficient. Current initiatives are based on the 2002 Concept for Military Reform, which has proved unable to promote real reform. Obstacles to SSR in Moldova include: the ongoing conflict in Transdnistria; the persistence of a mindset inherited from the Soviet era; the challenge of defining the country’s identity in the new security environment while taking into account the status of neutrality. MrCibotaru saluted the role of NATO in promoting SSR in Moldova, noting that the IPAP now provides a comprehensive programme and clear guidelines for further reform. Nevertheless, he called on European partners to pay greater attention to the countries that are now part of the EU and NATO’s ‘near abroad’. Those countries need comprehensive and coordinated assistance to help them promote prosperity, democracy and stability. At the same time, opinion polls demonstrate that Moldovan authorities also need to inform their citizens better on NATO’s contribution to reform in Moldova and the role of NATO in general.
22. Valeriu Plesca, Minister of Defence of Moldova, presented the future objectives of defence reform in Moldova. He explained that Moldova needs to adapt to a changing security environment and become a contributor, rather than just a recipient, of security. The 2002 plan for military reform initiated a three stage process: 2002-2004: adaptation of the legislation; 2005-2008: reorganisation of the national army and of military structures; 2009-2014: modernisation of the military. This process has been supported by international assistance, particularly from NATO. The conclusion of an IPAP with NATO represented a qualitative leap for Moldova, which should foster defence reform and promote better interoperability of Moldovan troops with NATO.