#5-437
Meetings with Chou Hsien-chung and Yu Ta-wei
May 10–11, 1946 Nanking, China
CHOU Hsien-chung, May 10, 2:30 P.M.
Professor Chou, a representative of the Chinese Youth Party and editor of a daily newspaper in Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan province, talked to Marshall about what could be done to break the political stalemate. The current “extremely tragic” situation was “largely due to the fear and mistrust of each side toward the other,” Marshall said; “the main obstacle to an agreement was the lack of appreciation on either side of the fears of the other party.” Marshall suggested that the minority groups “form one single independent and neutral political party” that would fully support his mediation efforts. (Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 829–30.)
Yu Ta-wei, May 11, 9:45 A.M.
Marshall handed General Yu his memorandum “Possible Basis for Agreement Regarding Manchurian Issues” (see Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #5-436 [5: 548–52]). Yu again raised the issue of government occupation of Changchun, followed by the stationing of symbolic forces along the Changchun-Harbin-Manchouli railroad. “Symbolism matters little if the area is dominated by the Communists,” Marshall replied. “It is a matter of weighing the symbolic gesture against the actual power.” Time was on the Communists’ side. The Nationalists might have to withdraw partially from Manchuria and face a civil war in North China. Radicals and militarists were in power within the Communist party, Marshall thought, and Chou En-lai “has lost a great deal of his power to negotiate thus making it problematical whether we can restore the balance we had on 1 March.” Nationalist-Communist maneuvering against one another had to be stopped at once or not at all, which would render Executive Headquarters ineffective.
Chiang Kai-shek had repeatedly stated his determination not to agree to anything that did not provide for the government’s occupation of Changchun, Marshall noted. “The Generalissimo’s feeling is shared by many other Chinese,” Yu said, and outlined the likely distribution of government armies in Manchuria after the Communists agreed to evacuate Changchun. The Communists would never accept this, Marshall insisted, adding that he “would not be a party to the negotiations as chairman, knowing that there was no basis for agreement.” The symbolic force dispositions would not demonstrate the government’s power and were certain to invite trouble. He was considering asking Chou En-lai to go to Yenan and Manchuria, where he could familiarize himself with the dangers of the situation, Marshall said. He hoped that this might “convince the Communists—who are too keenly aware of their favorable military situation in Manchuria—that their immediate gains may well lead to their eventual loss.” (Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 830–32.)
Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 552–553.