CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION INSPECTION COMMITTEE

123rd General Assembly

INSPECTION REPORT

OHIO STATE PENITENTIARY

NOVEMBER 20, 1999

Prepared and submitted by:

Peter Davis

Executive Director

December 8, 1999

CIIC INSPECTION REPORT

OHIO STATE PENITENTIARY [OSP]

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1999

9:30 AM – 12:30 PM

ANNOUNCED

CIIC Members Present: Senator Robert Hagan

CIIC Staff Present: Peter Davis, Executive Director

OSP Staff Present: Dave Johnson, Warden
Dave Bobby, Deputy Warden, Administration
Odell Wood, Deputy Warden, Operations
Linda Taylor, Deputy Warden, Special Services
Condie Bright, Correctional Officer and Union
President

DRC Staff Present: Norm Hills, North Regional Director
Greg Trout, Chief Counsel

Interested Parties: Trooper Gerald Funelli, Ohio State Highway Patrol
Jamie Fellner, Associate Counsel,
Human Rights Watch
PURPOSE OF VISIT:

In October 1999, Senator Hagan was contacted by Ms. Jamie Fellner, Associate Counsel for Human Rights Watch. Numerous complaints and allegations from prisoners at Ohio State Penitentiary [OSP] had been relayed to Human Rights Watch from an attorney in Youngstown, Ohio. Senator Hagan consented to Ms. Fellner’s request to accompany him on a scheduled visit to OSP and to her request for background documents and information from DRC officials prior to the visit. On October 28, 1999 CIIC staff were requested to assist in obtaining the background documents and information. CIIC Staff Director Peter Davis met with DRC Director Reggie Wilkinson and several of his executive staff to discuss the wide-ranging list of "Background Information and Document Request" submitted by Ms. Fellner, much of which was not viewed by DRC officials as "public information". On November 16, 1999 DRC officials delivered to CIIC staff an extensive compilation of documents in response to Ms. Fellner’s request. DRC officials stated that Ms. Fellner would be viewed as an appropriate, authorized guest of Senator Hagan for purposes of touring the prison. However, DRC reserved its statutory right to deny Ms. Fellner access to inmate files, institution records and other "non-public" information.

OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTION:

Inmates placed at OSP are classified as "high maximum security", and are considered to present the "highest degree of threat to the security and order of the department and its institutions, in the professional judgment of the classifying official".[DRC Policy Statement 111.07] With a construction cost of $65 million dollars the OSP complex is designed to house 504 inmates [single celled] in a "state of the art" penitentiary building comprised of four (4) separate housing units, each comprised of 126 cells. Sixteen (16) of the cells are handicap accessible. A separate Correctional Camp building houses minimum security inmates in two (2) large dormitories with a combined capacity of 180 beds. The Correctional Camp accepted its first group of minimum security inmates in February 1998. The first high-maximum inmates arrived in May 1998. Within its first year of operation the facility received full accreditation from the American Correctional Association.

OSP has an annual operation budget of $22,071,269. As of November 20, 1999 OSP housed 460 high-max inmates [295 black, 160 white, 5 "other"]. Thirteen (13) Death Row inmates are housed at OSP. Approximately 460 staff are employed [including 310 security staff], with plans to hire three (3) additional Unit Managers and five (5) Correctional Supervisors (Lieutenants). Reportedly, communication with inmates will be increased with the addition of more Unit Managers and an Assistant Inspector.

Inmates are locked in their solid door-front cells 23 hours each day. Each solid-front cell door has a small, thick glass window and a key controlled "food slot" hatch". Each cell is approximately 89.7 square feet and allows for a small degree of natural light. Privileges are very restricted and limited. Tape recorders, cassette tapes, fans, typewriters [or access to typewriters], and smokeless tobacco, are not permitted. [Inmates on Level 3 are permitted a specific type of "Walkman" tape player.] OSP is a "smoke free" facility. Inmates are allowed to shower at least five (5) times per week. One (1) hour of recreation per day is allowed at least five (5) times per week. All meals are delivered to inmates at their cells.

Inmate movement to any area outside their cell is conducted by escort of at least two (2) Correctional Officers and while the inmate is in full restraints. Level 2 status inmates are permitted to have a television and two 10 minute phone calls per month. Level 3 inmates are permitted to have a television and one 10 minute phone call per week. [Consideration is being given to allow inmates on Level 3 to go to recreation and showers unescorted. Consideration is also being given to providing Level 3 inmates with "art" programming.]

Family visits are permitted by appointment only on Wednesdays and Thursdays from 8:00 AM to 2:30 PM in "no contact" booths. Weekend visits are not allowed, reportedly due to an insufficient number of staff to supervise both the main compound and the Camp. Honor Camp inmates have their visits on weekends.

INITIAL DISCUSSION IN WARDEN’S OFFICE:

Senator Hagan began by expressing his longstanding concerns for the safe and secure operation of the institution, for the protection of local residents, for the safety and security of prison staff, and for the constitutional protections of humane treatment for prisoners. He stated that he "doesn’t like super max" as a penological concept. He also stated that DRC’s response to the requested advance materials, while extensive, was not complete. DRC officials responded that considerable effort was expended to promptly assemble the requested materials for Ms. Fellner’s benefit. Although Ms. Fellner’s request was forwarded to DRC through Senator Hagan, thus making it Senator Hagan’s request, DRC officials drew a distinction between Senator Hagan’s right of access to "non-public" information as a member of the CIIC and Ms. Fellner’s limited access to similar information. DRC officials remained willing to afford Senator Hagan access to inmate files and to non-public institution records while on-site and out of the presence of Ms. Fellner.

Ms. Fellner stated that Human Rights Watch is "not against super max prisons per se". She emphasized that her organization’s primary concerns are two-fold: (1) "Are inmates here who don’t need to be here"; and (2) "Are the living conditions of super max only punitive in purpose, with no other legitimate penological considerations?".

The following "Key Considerations of Super-Maximum Security Confinement" are excerpted from a Human Rights Watch position paper and are illustrative of the organization’s focus and concern, as articulately expressed by Ms. Fellner during the two hour discussion.

Correctional authorities in the United States rely increasingly on super-maximum security units and facilities to house for extended periods of time inmates who are considered dangerous or disruptive, are reputed to be members of prison gangs, or who are serious escape risks --- the so-called "worst of the worst." Although conditions and policies vary somewhat, the basic characteristics of supermax confinement are extreme social isolation, reduced environmental stimulus, the absence of recreational, vocational and educational opportunities and extraordinary levels of surveillance and control. In most such facilities, inmates are locked in their cells twenty-three or more hours a day, eat and exercise alone, and are placed in heavy restraints and escorted every time they leave their cells. They can be held for years in this modern version of solitary confinement.

As with all prisons, the design and use of super-maximum security facilities is subject to international human rights standards. International human rights treaties signed by the United States, and binding on state and federal officials, require respect for the inherent dignity of each inmate and prohibit treatment of inmates that constitutes torture or that is cruel, inhuman or degrading. Conditions of confinement violate these standards if they produce suffering ---physical or mental ---that is unduly severe, unnecessary or disproportionate to the objective of ensuring a safe and orderly prison operation or if they are pointlessly degrading, humiliating or otherwise inconsistent with recognition that all prisoners ---including the most difficult --- are members of the human community.

Disciplinary or administrative segregation in super-maximum security confinement is not prohibited under international human rights standards. But solitary confinement, particularly for long periods and when combined with extreme deprivation of sources of stimulation and social interaction, may cause serious suffering. For mentally ill inmates, the conditions can aggravate their symptoms and exacerbate their illness; for them, supermax confinement can amount to torture. Many of the rules and conditions in supermax facilities exceed reasonable security requirements and reflect primarily punitive considerations. While holding inmates accountable for their conduct is a legitimate penal objective, the public is ill-served by practices that deny inmates’ humanity and conflict with the goal of promoting public safety by helping inmates develop resources needed to live responsible, nonviolent and productive lives.

Human rights principles and sound correctional management both mandate placing prisoners in the least restrictive environment consistent with operating safe, secure and humane prisons. Supermax facilities should be reserved for the relatively small portion of inmates in a correctional system who have proven themselves through their conduct behind bars to be too dangerous or disruptive to be confined in a less restrictive setting. When "tough on crime" politics dominate criminal justice decisions and when public scrutiny is impeded, however, correctional authorities are more likely to send prisoners unnecessarily or arbitrarily to super-maximum security facilities. This is particularly so if political forces have promoted construction of supermax capacity that exceeds a state’s genuine need for high security segregated beds. Given the importance of the decision to place someone in the extreme conditions of supermax confinement, it is critical that adequate safeguards exist to ensure that it is made carefully and fairly.

Ms. Fellner pressed hard and repeatedly (but respectfully and politely), to gain access to specific inmate files, use of force reports and other "non-public" records. DRC officials repeatedly, politely refused. DRC Chief Counsel Greg Trout reiterated the department’s view that Ms. Fellner, as a "guest" of Senator Hagan, did not enjoy the same right of access to non-public information. At all times during the two hour discussion all parties remained calm, cordial and respectful.

Senator Hagan and Ms. Fellner posed questions regarding the following issues and areas of concern:

  • criteria for supermax placement,
  • criteria for inmate progression through the three (3) levels of confinement,
  • criteria for release from supermax classification,
  • level and frequency of mental health monitoring and treatment,
  • lack of outdoor recreation,
  • use of force incidents and monitoring,
  • lack of congregate activities,
  • inmates "maxing-out" from OSP directly to their home communities,

It should be noted that CIIC staff has been engaged in extensive discussions with DRC officials on these and other issues during the past year. A descriptive and explanative summary of these issues (including references to the DRC response documents) are described below:

SUPERMAX PLACEMENT CRITERIA:

CIIC have longstanding concerns regarding who is being sent to super max, for what reason(s), and based on what objective / subjective behavioral criteria. "High Maximum" classification is a security status and not a "special management" status, as distinguished from Administrative Control, Local Control, or Protective Control. Pursuant to DRC Policy Statement 111.07, inmates are assigned to high maximum security when all of the following factors are present:

  • The inmate is or is about to be classified as maximum security;
  • The inmate has demonstrated behavior which meets high maximum security criteria, and/or
  • The inmate presents the highest level of threat to the security and order of the department, in the professional judgement of the classifying official.

Criteria for classification to high maximum security status includes the following behavior:

  • The inmate’s conduct or continued presence at the sending institution poses a serious threat to the physical safety of any person, or the security of the prison;
  • The nature of the inmate’s criminal offense indicates that the inmate poses a serious threat to the physical safety of any person, or the security of the prison;
  • The need to contain, prevent or quell a disturbance or riot;
  • A conspiracy to introduce contraband which may pose a serious threat to the security of the prison;
  • The inmate functions as a leader or enforcer of a security threat group;
  • The inmate poses a serious threat of escape; or
  • The inmate has demonstrated an ability to compromise the integrity of staff.

Among the advance materials provided by DRC officials was a December 1998 QualityReviewTeamReport on OSP prepared by a select group of DRC officials. Ms. Fellner characterized the Team Report as a "solid document" which offered a sound, meaningful and critical analysis of the early implementation phases of the supermax facility. The Quality Review Team surveyed DRC Central Office staff, Wardens, other institutional staff and inmates. The Team Report identified several critical issues and offered recommendations for improvement to basic operations and processes. Although some improvements have been implemented, CIIC staff regard many of the same issues referenced in the Team Report still to be ripe and relevant for continued review, study, clarification and resolution.. Most notable are the following findings and recommendations cited in the Team Report:

"When asked about the inmate population for which OSP is intended, most all respondents cite "the worst of the worst." This concept has proven difficult to operationalize, particularly when we go beyond the 200 or so inmates who are clearly OSP material. Identifying those inmates who represent the "lighter " end of high maximum had become clouded by the overlap and similarity in characteristics among high, close, maximum A.C. [Administrative Control] , and high maximum inmates."

"While the criteria are adequate as written to describe inmates who present the highest level of threat to the security of the Department’s institutions and the safety of persons living and working there, many stakeholders interviewed indicated that they would like to have a clearer, more precise understanding of the working distinctions among the several most restrictive security/management assignments [high close, SOCF/GP, SOCF/A.C. and high maximum]."

Many inmate’s at OSP have complained to CIIC staff that they "don’t know why" they have been assigned to supermax and many have complained that they "don’t need to be at OSP", especially when their reported conduct is compared to other inmates who remain at lesser security institutions. DRC Central Office [Office of Prisons] approves all transfers to OSP. Reportedly, the institutional classification committee meets with the inmate and provides written notice of the pending transfer. DRC officials acknowledge that, "Initially some inmates who were transferred were not provided with written notices prior to transfers; however, this problem has since been rectified."

A review of Inmate Admissionsfrom May 1, 1999 to November 8, 1999 revealed the following examples of conduct contributing to those inmates’ eventual placement at OSP:

  • stabbed inmates in head and jaw with shank;
  • stabbed inmate several times with 10" shank;
  • while in segregation threatened cellmate and choked him with a sheet;
  • conspired with 2 inmates to escape; made 2 shanks to be used on staff;
  • 2 on 1 assault with lookout; victim had jaw broken;
  • established relationship with female C/O; she smuggled 1 ounce of marijuana to him; he gave her $100 bill;
  • killed another inmate during SOCF riot; was previously referred, but denied because believed "seriously mentally ill"; determined by mental health staff to not be "seriously mentally ill"; placement approved by Bureau of Mental Health Services;
  • established relationship with female C/O; she admitted having oral sex and phone sex with inmate; also was going to bring marijuana into institution at inmate’s request;
  • cut inmate on wrist; weapon not found;
  • threats to inmate for sex;
  • had tire iron in Local Control and digging hole in cell wall;
  • threats to kill "blacks", manufacturing weapons, & threats to prosecutor;
  • fighting with shank and stabbed inmate in dining hall;
  • assaulted inmate with pens, prior attempts at grabbing staff and assault on inmate;
  • identified leader of Aryan Brotherhood, involved in extortion;
  • stalked visitors, possession of 2 bags of marijuana; struck C/O with elbow;
  • stabbed inmate with homemade knife; puncture wounds to heart & chest;
  • conspired to smuggle ¼ lb. of marijuana into institution;
  • unprovoked assault on C/O; victim required 11 stitches over eye;
  • cut throat (superficial wound) of inmate w/ small shank; threatened to finish job later;
  • struck C/O several times with fist; kicked C/O; threatened to assault staff;
  • out of state prisoner from high max; gang leader and organizer; numerous assaults and involved in drug activity;
  • pulled female C/O’s face into cell bars and punched her in the face;
  • attacked Captain, resulting in laceration requiring 3 staples to close; victim also suffered a concussion;
  • was released from OSP on expiration of sentence; sent to Mahoning County jail; was facing and convicted of vandalism and assault on 2 staff for his behavior at OSP;
  • threw urine on C/O; entered inmate’s cell & struck him in face and eye; also in past year arson;
  • cut inmate on stomach over debt; victim required outside hospital placement; 23 stitches to close wound;
  • entered DR&C from out of state where he was convicted under RICO statute for crimes of murder, robbery, theft and bombing of local government building; involved in shoot out with Ohio police; while facing RICO charges weapon found in inmate’s cell;
  • fight with shank; other inmate had cut above eye and puncture wound above chest;
  • conspired with C/O to smuggle marijuana into institution;
  • 2nd assault on inmates in 2 months; Aryan Brotherhood activity;
  • attempted to rape cellmate in Local Control;
  • stabbed inmate 3 times in dining hall;
  • tattoo gun & other tattooing material found in cell; admitted AB member and involved in disruptive activity including assaults;
  • assaulted inmate in front of group of inmates; punched victim in the face then while victim on ground stomped him in the face;
  • attempted to convey approx. 1.5 ounces of marijuana into institution; hidden in candy bars;
  • punched C/O several times, one in eye;
  • punched C/O in mouth;
  • caught in sex act with another inmate; spit on and threw waste water on staff and other inmates;
  • choked to death another inmate during physical altercation;
  • assaulted officer with his fists; victim received hemotoma to forehead and broken nose;
  • stabbed another inmate; admitted his intent to kill;

Such dangerous and deplorable conduct is, unfortunately, not new to Ohio’s prison system. Prior to the opening of OSP, inmates who exhibited the foregoing serious behaviors were, for the most part, sent to SOCF [maximum security], or, if already at SOCF, placed in Administrative Control or Local Control. Even within SOCF, some inmates were periodically placed in a 20 bed cellblock reserved for "the worst of the worst" and known as "J-1 Supermax". It should be noted, however, that between 1993 and 1998 [after the SOCF riot and before the opening of OSP] the 20 cells in J-1 Supermax itself did not remain full of inmates. Indeed, there were long periods of time since 1994 when J-1 Supermax was not even half-full.