NightWatch

12 September 2007

Special Report:August inAfghanistan

Summary

The security situation deteriorated more noticeably in August than all summer. Clashes involving casualties rose, the Taliban had fewer losses and NATO lost its edge, based on analysis of press reports.

Level of violence

The number of violent clashes that resulted in casualties, as reported in the international press, jumped to 203in August, compared to 172 in July. The table below shows the data. The Taliban had the initiative for most attacks. Allied counter attacks seemed to be less effective.

Month / Clashes with casualties
April / 32
May / 51
June / 160
July / 172
August / 203

Area of the fighting

The number of provinces experiencing clahseswas 22 of 34, the same as in July. However, the intensity and locations were not the same.Fighting was less concentrated in the Pashtun heartland than had been the case earlier in the summer. Usually 80 % of the attacks are in ten southern and southeastern provinces. In August 11 provinces accounted for 80% of the attacks but the mix was different.

JowzjanProvince came under stress for the first time in the summer. Fighting in Kapisa worsened more than in any other province as a percentage of increase. In July, it had one clash with casualties, but in August it had seven. Small numbers, but big psychological impact because Kapisa is directly north of Kabul. Clashes in Lowgar also more than doubled. Lowgar is directly south of Kabul. This is part of the changed mix of provinces and a shift in violence in the direction of Kabul.

The Taliban ability to sustain fighting cells north and south of Kabul is an ominous development and a significant lapse in security.Last month was the first time in the summer that the provinces near Kabul came under stress. This month they worsened measurably.

The most concentrated fighting was in Kandahar. The data suggests the Taliban tried to seize the city and the province. They did not succeed, but they vowed this past week to renew the effort. Conditions in Helmand appear to have improved slightly and Uruzgan improved significantly, probably because the fight shifted south towards Kandahar.

A deterioration in security conditions in Ghazni and Zabol is important because the Kabul-to-Kandahar segment of the Ring Road runs through them. The fighting data of the past three months show that the government cannot maintain security in that north-south corridor and hold the district headquarters. This reinforces the report from Kabul that the road is no longer secure.This road is one of three lifelines to the capital.

Worst Provinces

Province / June Clashes / July Clashes / August Clashes / Total
Helmand / 20 / 32 / 26 / 78
Ghazni / 23 / 17 / 19 / 59
Kandahar / 10 / 12 / 28 / 50
Zabol / 18 / 16 / 12 / 46
Paktika / 22 / 11 / 12 / 45
Nangarhar / 10 / 6 / 19 / 35
Khost / 17 / 10 / 8 / 35
Konar / 7 / 7 / 13 / 27
Paktia / 3 / 14 / 9 / 26
Lowgar / 2 / 8 / 8 / 18
Kabul / 2 / 4 / 9 / 15
Total / 134 / 137 / 163 / 434

Sources: Pajhwok Afghan News Agency; the RSIS project in Singapore; NATO official press releases; various international news services.

These data account for 81% of all clashes reported in the public domain. They show that by maintaining moderate operational tempo, the Taliban and other government opponents sustained significant combat capabilities despite large monthly casualty rates. The provinces are all in the Pashtun belt.

Aggregating the summer data, 25of the 34 provinces have Taliban fighting groups operating in them at least some of the time. By comparison In April, prior to the summer offensive, Taliban were engaged in clashes in 11 provinces. This expansion appears to measure the dissipation of tribal support for the government which translates into support for the Taliban or other armed resistance groups.

Analysis by District

NightWatch again examined the districts in which clashes occurred to develop greater fidelity about the gravity of the security situation. The 34 provinces of Afghanistan contain 398 districts. Taliban tried to seize only two district headquarters in August and claimed success, but the attacks were repulsed or just did not take place. No district headquarters fell. Unlike past months, the Allies did not draw the Taliban into major battles.

In the chart below, the statistical data on fighting in the districts during August are highlighted in yellow and bold. As noted clashes that resulted in casualties occurred in 22provinces, which contain 253 districts. The fighting took place in 67 of the 253. Several of the worst provinces showed improvement but this appeared to be the result of Taliban avoiding engagements and moving into new areas.

Theworst 11 provinces contain 139 districts. Clashes occurred in 48 of them. These outline the main battle space, but further refinement is possible.

In the southwest, Sangin, Musa Qala and Gereshk Districts in HelmandProvince are the least safe places in Afghanistan. They are the heart of the drug culture.

In the south, Zarai District in KandaharProvince had 11 clashes in August, making it the most violent district.

In the southeast, inGhazniProvince, Qarabagh and AndarDistricts were the most violent,

In the east near Pakistan, in NangarharProvince, bin Laden’s old hideout region of Tora Bora plus nearby Khogiani district were the most violent. Much of this fighting was instigated by Allied operations, though the Taliban want to recapture bin Laden’s lair.

These 8 districts accounted for a quarter of all the clashes in August. They represent the geographic core of the insurgency.

The most interesting development is the differentiation between Taliban, tribal and criminal groups. The kidnapping of the South Korean missionaries indicated that Taliban groups operating in the east must resort to exceptional methods to obtain funds. A spokesman suggested that in a public statement. One of the reports received from the field noted the Taliban in the Kandahar to Kabul axis are often short of ammunition.

That is not the case for the mix of drug and tribal fighters in Helmand in the south. Not all armed opposition groups apparently are enjoying the benefits of the huge increase in drug production and trafficking.

Dutch Context Analysis (August 2006)

A careful and balanced analysis by the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kabulto support its Provincial Reconstruction Team explains the influence of historic tribal rivalries between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtun tribal federations for control of the region around Kandahar as well as influence over resources in Kabul. Both federations supported the Taliban, who tried to avoid entanglement in local feuds. Taliban leader Mohammed Omar is a Hatak Ghilzai. Afghan blog sites assert that the Ghilzai were the backbone of the Taliban.

Afghan President Karzai, who is ex-Taliban, is a Popalzai Durrani. Durranis dominate the Karzai government and usually exclude the Ghilzais. The struggle between these federations began in the 1770s! and has ebbed and flowed for control of Kabuland trade/smuggling ever since.

The Dutch analysis is that the struggle for dominance in the Pashtun south that began with the ouster of the Taliban is tribal more than religious. As during the Soviet occupation, the anti-government fighting often overlays the settling of local scores and the continuation of historic tribal feuds. Pacification in these areas will always be just a ceasefire, not a permanent peace. The Western forces are in the middle, but are viewed as propping up the tribal federation that dominates in Kabul. Many probably are not aware that this would make them targets even if there were no Taliban.

Province / Number of Districts / Districts with Clashes -July / Districts with Clashes -August / Number of Clashes -July / Number of Clashes –August / Comments
Kabul / 14 / 2 / 1 / 4 / 9
Kandahar / 13 / 6 / 6 / 12 / 28 / Pashtun south
Parwan / 11 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0
Helmand / 13 / 7 / 6 / 32 / 26 / Pashtun south
Herat / 16 / 2 / 1 / 4 / 5
Ghazni / 16 / 10 / 8 / 17 / 19 / Pashtun east
Zabol / 9 / 6 / 5 / 18 / 12 / Pashtun east
Laghman / 5 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1
Lowgar / 5 / 4 / 2 / 8 / 8 / South of Kabul
Oruzgan / 6 / 4 / 1 / 10 / 4 / Pashtun center
Paktia / 12 / 6 / 2 / 14 / 9 / Pashtun east
Paktika / 15 / 4 / 4 / 11 / 12 / Pashtun east
Farah / 11 / 2 / 1 / 5 / 5
Faryab / 12 / 0 / 1 / 0 / 1
Nurestan / 6 / 1 / unk / 2 / 3
Konduz / 7 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0
Konar / 12 / 4 / 3 / 7 / 13 / Pashtun east
Nangarhar / 20 / 5 / 5 / 6 / 19 / Tora Bora area; Pashtun East
Khost / 12 / 4 / 6 / 10 / 8 / Pashtun east
Badakhshan / 28 / 1 / 3 / 1 / 4
Balkh / 14 / 2 / 0 / 3 / 0
Badghis / 7 / 0 / unk / 0 / 4
Kapisa / 6 / 1 / 3 / 1 / 7 / North of Kabul
Nimruz / 5 / 2 / 0 / 2 / 0
Wardak / 8 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 5
Jowzjan / 9 / 0 / 1 / 0 / 1

Types of attacks

Most attacks were small conventional attacks, usually ambushes. The most deadly, as in July, were from mines,/roadside bombs and suicide attacks, but the numbers dropped off. The number of IED/mine attacks was 15, down from 26 in July. There were 12 suicide attacks, compared to 14 in July.

Casualties. Losses in the 203 clashes in Aug were reported as follows:

Killed (July)Wounded (July)

Taliban 561(875) 119 (60) (an additional 55 were captured)

NATO 31(28) 37 (45) (KIA: 16 US; 5 Canada; 4UK; 1 Netherlands; 1Poland; 1 France; 3 German)

Afghan Army 38 (11) 45 (32)

Afghan Police 34 (89) 41 (60)

Civilians 130(168) 74 (93)

Note about the casualty data. No numbers are authoritative for Taliban and civilian losses, but the public data reports have proven useful for making relative comparisons and track with the clashes. The NATO casualties are official.

Three of the British losses were from friendly fire. The Germans were policemen assisting the Afghan police and were victims of a roadside bomb. The Poles suffered their first casualty of the fighting.

This is the first month that the Afghan National Army losses exceeded those of the police all year. The reporting shows the Army executed more operations than in prior months. For example, in BadakhshanProvince in the northeast, the Army cleared three districts with limited Allied support. They did the same in the east. Usually the police take the most casualties.

The ratios

The loss ratios are again instructive. In August the total losses (killed and wounded) ratio declined to 3 : 1. In June and July it was 4 : 1. This matches the fighting reports that showed the Allies did less well. The NATO Allies cannot sustain this rate of casualties without losing support in Europe.

The kill ratios show an even larger change, for the first time. All summer the allies killed Taliban at the rate of 7 : 1. Last month the rate dropped to 5 : 1. The reports contain no clear explanation beyond the obvious fact the Allies did worse. There was no significant difference in the style, types, frequency or intensity of Taliban attacks, but Allied attacks seemed less frequent and less effective.

At the end of the month, the Taliban offensive made gains in and around Kabul and along the Ring Road.

The Taliban still have significant support among Pashtuns and improved their situation over July in that they held the psychological initiative. They still lack the ability to threaten the government, but moved closer to achieving it than they have in six years. The pressure on Kandahar, the loss of control of the Ring Road and the sustained pressure in provinces near Kabul are the three most serious developments. The drug problem in Helmand is chronic and probably severable. Major firefights in Kandahar and Kabul would represent significant setbacks in the psychology of the fight. The Taliban appear capable of executing such attacks for the first time.

Last month, NightWatch concluded the July wrapup with the prediction, “That condition will continue provided the level of effort by the forces of order remains undiminished. “ The level of effort diminished and the threat to the government increased.

The Taliban have hemorrhaged manpower but seem able to replace the losses. The increase in clashes suggests Taliban strength is growing, depending on the frequency that groups fight, which rather seldom. The NATO/International Security Assistance Force commands have released no updated Allied force information since July.

The force ratio in the table below is a best case comparison. The ratio is too low for achieving a permanent and favorable shift in the insurgency. For the Allies to make lasting improvements in the security situation, even with the advantages of modern technology, they need to have 50 : 1, or double the present force strength. Without more government manpower, the Taliban will make gains in September, especially because it is Ramadan.

Country / Forces of Order / Opposition / Forces of Order : Taliban / Status
Afghanistan / 150,500 total
- 17,000 Coalition (includes 8,000 US)
-41,000 ISAF/NATO (includes 15,000 US)
-31,000 Afghan Army
-61,500 Afghan Police / 6,000 -8,000 Taliban fighters (unknown number of part time fighters) / 18-25:1 / Taliban cannot hold terrain; Allies cannot prevent Taliban attacks

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