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Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO
AY 2006-2007
AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE:
THEJOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
RESEARCH PAPER
DR. JOHN BOKEL
WILLIAM G. ADAMSON, COL, USA
SEMINAR 7
(DR. GREG FOSTER, PRIMARY FACULTY ADVISOR)
The IndustrialCollege of the Armed Forces
NationalDefenseUniversity
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.20319-5062
AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE:
THEJOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
Abstract
This study evaluatesthe effect of an asymmetric threat, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), onstrategic leader initiative during the “Long War”. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established by the Department of Defense (DOD) to “defeat (IED) as weapons of strategic influence”. DOD’s military response, by itself, lacks sufficiency and JIEDDO’s success remains elusive.The hostile use of IEDs worldwide persists, and will likely continue, without a national mandate dictating greater interagency (IA) involvement. This paper suggests a more committed IA constituency will lead to better collective performance, potentially resulting in success. The observations of the former operations officer of JIEDDO offers a portfolio of lessons toenable organizational effectivenesswhen responding to anomalous conditions.
COL W. G. Adamson, USA
IndustrialCollege of the Armed Forces
NationalDefenseUniversity
Dr. John Bokel
2007
An Asymmetric, Strategic Form of Fires
“Explosives are the safest weapon for the Mujahideen. Using explosives allows us to escape enemy personnel and to avoid being arrested. In addition, explosives strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.”
- (Al Qaeda statement quoted from “Encyclopedia Jihad, Version 4”)
The United States (US) currently engages an adversary cloaked in an ancient ideology in a war it failed to fully envision. The prevalent global threat comes from autonomously networked, non-state actors, like Al Qaeda, motivated by ideology, mistrust of the West, and disapproval of international governance. The strategy of hostile forces presents evolving asymmetries confronting the will of the American public as the “center of gravity” to democratic ideology. Assassinations, kidnappings, beheadings, suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) represent the tactics employed in a “global insurgency”.(Barno, 2006) This paper relates a chronological account of the DOD response to one of these tactics, the IED,by recounting the formation of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).
DOD’s military response to the IED threat, by itself,is inadequate, and JIEDDO’s mission “to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence”remains elusive because of insufficient interagency (IA) support. National tunnel-vision with the war in Iraq restricts JIEDDO’s capacity to broaden the national effort on the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs worldwide persists, and will likely continue, absent a national mandate dictating greater IA involvement.
A more committed IA constituency will greatly benefit the IED effort. Greater IA contributions toa national IED effort, particularly among the intelligence community (IC) and law enforcement agenciescould result in better collective performance, potentially achieving success. Current IA participation in the IED effort is a testimony to the entrepreneurial leadership at JIEDDO. Organizational theory addresses the difficulties of synchronizing complex organizational endeavors when functions are not viewed as essential.
Organizational theory suggests that organizations are created in order to accomplish certain missions….Organizations favor policies that will increase the importance of their organization, fight for capabilities that they view as essential to their essence, seek to protect those capabilities viewed as essential, and demonstrate comparative indifference to functions not viewed as essential. (Nagl, 2002, pp. 4-5)
Because DOD’s preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan centralizes JIEDDO support properly on the Combatant Commander the IED effort reflects an imbalanced military-centric approach. As a result of counterinsurgency experience, military commanders learned and the DOD adapted its institutional response to the hostile use of the IED. The military’s learning curve outpaces other government agencies in regards to the IED response. Meanwhile,the hierarchical, ad hoc IA process lacks a comprehensive strategy for defeatingthe global IED threat because it is not viewed as essential to theircollective or unilateral missions. Lieutenant Colonel Tucker Mansager’s experience in Afghanistanled him to state of the IA,“…coordination has been haphazard and ad hoc, particularly at lower levels. Action is required; the system will not improve by itself.” (Mansager, p. 80)
A modest prototype effort expanding the scope of IA involvement on the IED problem could validate integration concepts and processes for a subsequent broader IA reform effort. Divergent IA authority, tribal-like organizational cultures, and bureaucratic reluctance inhibitsfull or comprehensive participation in the IED effort. The same could be said of the four military Services during the formative stages of DOD’s IED response. However, existing law, the Goldwater-Nichols Act,dictatinga Joint Service organizational structure and joint warfare concept enabled the military to overcome inadvertent friction and Service biases. The release of the Iraq Study Group reportNovember 2006, recommended a Goldwater-Nichols model for training and conducting joint operations across IA boundaries. (Iraq Study Group [ISG], 2006) The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended government reform of the IA process along the line of Goldwater-Nichols. The notion of building operational capacity within the IA that approaches the capability of DOD’s joint organizational concept underpins the recommendations in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study by CSIS. (Murdock, C & Flournoy, M, 2005, p. 8)
The IED threat required a rapid response,invoking initiativeon the part of strategic leaders and organizational adaptation. An account of the strategic adjustments, organizational initiatives,and processes enacted during the creation of JIEDDO illustrates senior leader initiative. Highlighting organizational “best practices” allowsdevelopment ofa portfolio of lessons observed. A review of the scope of the IED problem provides operational context for the subsequent development of lessons observed.
Scope of the IED Problem
The havoc caused by the use of IEDs began in the first few months following the end of major combat in Iraq. Initially, IEDs did not concernmilitary forces. Following the end of major combat, loosely coordinated direct fire engagements constitutedthe major form of enemy attack in Iraq. The overwhelming firepower and accuracy of US and Coalition military forces in direct fire engagements caused rapid adjustment of enemy tactics. Indirect fire attacks, primarily from mortars and rockets, quickly became the enemy’s desired form of contact, targeting forward operating bases (FOBs) and Iraqi government facilities. As US counter-battery fires became more effective, a new tactic emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED. The term, IED, entered the popular lexicon of the US military during what was originally planned as the stabilization and reconstruction phase of the Iraq War.
Numerous definitions exist for the IED. Simply stated, a bomb-maker modifies the characteristics of munitions, explosives, or substances with explosive propertiesin a homemade fashion,creating an IED. (Global Security.Org/military/intro/ied.html) IEDs can be constructed and delivered to their targets in many different ways. Used for hundreds of years,recent examples of IED attacks range from the truck bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, to the ship-borne attack against the USS Cole in 1999. The successful aerial IED attacks on September 11, 2001 produced a Presidential response with an intense focus on homeland security resulting in the reorganization of 22 federal agencies under the Department of Homeland Security. However, as the USopted to expand the GWOT into Iraq the most pervasive form of IED became the roadside bomb and car bomb.
Few experiences compare with the helplessness felt by those involved in an IED attack. The experience is searing. An IED attack has many of the attributes of a sniper ambush. There’s no emotional build-up prior to an attack, such as: the anxietyprior to an assault, the sound of preparatory artillery fire, or the rumble of a tank formation en route to a meeting engagement with enemy armor. IEDs are weapons of surprise. An IED victim vaults from relative calm to chaos in the blink of an eye. The IEDstrikes unexpectedly like the piercing crack of a sniper rifle. The blast from an IED has indiscriminate, constituent effect. No attacker is readily apparent. This relative anonymity offers advantage to hostile forces. The combination of these ingredients: helplessness, surprise, calm before chaos, indiscriminate effect, collateral damage, and anonymity of the attacker contribute to tactical anxiety. Personal involvement with IED attacks begins with the response to a scene of a suspected IED and often moves onto casualty evacuation. Later, personal involvement extends to discussions with victims, patients convalescing and coping with daily rehabilitation from wounds. The sense of urgency felt on the battlefield or in the amputee wards enters living rooms via nightly news coverage. Images of IED attacks invoke strategic influence over the public, a public otherwise physically dislocated from combat. The strategic power of the IED comes froma non-kineticsource, information.
America’s adversaries operate in and exploit the information environment. Blast effects from IEDs are sensational on film, indiscriminate in the collateral damage they cause, create a climate of fear in the public, and have a psychological impact on military forces. IEDs present a new and asymmetric form of fires with a tactical effect much like artillery; however, the kinetic effect producespsychological anxiety as well as strategic influence. IEDs become “weapons of strategic influence” because images of IED attacks impact the psyche of the American public through daily news broadcasts. Hostile forces count on “sound bite”deep analysis from the media and the American electorate,seeking to overcomethe US technological and military advantage with this asymmetric form of fires. The resultant draining effect exhausts national will and commitment. Oscar Wilde once said, “In America the President reigns for four years, and journalism governs for ever and ever. (Wilde 1881/Torricelli 2001, p. 177) The adversaries of the US in the GWOT exploit this reality well. Curtailing the informational power exploited by global insurgents through images of IED attacks calls for a wider application of all elements of national power, not exclusively military force.
In operational terms, IEDs presents an asymmetric threat to Coalition Forces for two reasons: first,they represent a new method of attack that conventional capabilities were unprepared to address,and second, the IED was something not fully understood. (Skelton, 2004) Hostile forces do not develop innovative technologies through conventional research and development (R&D) programs. Attackers employ decades old insurgent techniques with available Industrial Age weapons. In short, terrorist and insurgents modify commercially available equipment and adapt tactics at a rate that bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations cannot keep pace with. Are IEDs, as some suggest, just a symptom of the general problem of insurgency and or terrorism? One cannot consider terrorism and insurgency without considering the IED. The following quote from an Al-Qaeda document highlights this terrorist organization’s reliance on the IED.
“Al-Qaeda doctrine acknowledges ‘that the production of different types of bombs and explosives must be mastered,’ but adds this is not difficult because ‘the ways to do this are available and explained in many places…people with experience…[are] many in number in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere’."(
Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as leaders in the Pentagon, confronted by the rising insurgency which challenged security and stability in the region adjusted operational tactics. GEN Richard Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, recognized “the IED is the poor man’s cruise missile.” (Lovelace & Votel, 2005, p. 34) IED components are readily available, inexpensive, have relatively simple construction, and offer easy delivery to a target area. Proliferation in the use of IEDs by hostile forcescontinue. Given the widespread, de-centralized nature, and asymmetry of the IED problem, US forces have had difficulty progressing from a reactive operational mode. Moreover, the malignancy carried by the IED spans all levels of war.
The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs resulted in a response from the tactical to strategic level of war. The initial response in theaterfollowed a technically oriented approach rather than a holistic strategy. Initially, commanders categorized the IEDs as a problem foreither an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team,or Engineers, vice a new form of fires for ground commanders to address.(Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006)
360 Degree Warfare and the IED Phenomenon
Gaining an appreciation of the early tactical and operational impact of the IED provides greater awareness of the scope of change required by the IED. Terms common to maneuver warfare such as: meeting engagement, screen, delay, and movement-to-contact, pale in significance to a new lexicon associated with “360 Degree Warfare”. The concept of a front, or line of battle, vanished.
Currently, the primary offensive component of terrorism and insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan manifests itself through the use of the IED. IED attacks target convoys just as frequently as“front line”units. These logistics convoys become combat formations known as Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs). Aprevalent tactic once known as the “presence patrol”from the US experience in Bosnia and Kosovo become Combat Reconnaissance Patrols (CRP). Reconnaissance missionsincreasingly focused on route clearance. Assessing routes for out-of-place garbage bags, animal carcasses, piles of rocks, and broken concrete curbing indicative of IED camouflagetechniques becomes daily routine. Soldiers and Marines developed skilled vehicle-mounted scanning techniquesas they looked for the tell-tale lone wire crossing a street linked to an IED initiator. The appearance of new graffiti in a neighborhood becomes an important indicator of potential IED activity. The dominant form of maneuver for US forces operating outside of FOBs become CLPs, CRPs, and route clearance patrols.
Primarily for force protection, US forces implemented a policy of living and operating out of FOBs. Initially viewed as liberators and then occupiers by the Iraqi people,US forces adopted an “unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practice”by moving into FOBs. As noted in the final draft of a jointly issued Marine Corps and Army manual, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,separation and isolationfrom thepopulation involved in an insurgency historically leads to poor rapport and ineffective results. (FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, 2006) US forces looked more like foreign occupiers than liberators. The shared terrain linking the populace, insurgents, and US forces became the roads and access points to US facilities. By choosing the time and place for employing IEDs against troop movements, insurgents seized the initiative on these common routes. The vast majority of IED attacks occurred within a short distance of the FOBs. Regaining the initiative became the logical next step for US forces. Regaining the initiative optimally comes from precise, preemptive targeting of the human activities that enable IED manufacture.However, identification of an enemy capable of blending into the environment, one that can hide in plain sight, complicated the problem. Doctrine,training,and a lack of counterinsurgency experience set the conditions for a misconception of how to best approach the IED phenomenon.
Doctrinally in maneuver warfare, ground commanders own battle-space called an area of operations (AO). Ground commanders initially viewed IEDs as obstacles on supply routes or as a means of attacking patrols in their AOs. The preferred option for commanders remains obstacle avoidance, but if that is not possible,they pursue obstacle reduction or elimination. Decades of training taught commanders that eliminating obstacles quickly preserves freedom of maneuver and decreases the likelihood of preplanned attack by the enemy. When the option to avoid the obstacle eluded maneuver commanders, they typically used their assigned combat engineers. The comfort level and trust developed through years of doctrinally based training between maneuver forces and combat engineers expedited decisions to clear routes rather than secure and hold suspected IED sites for detailed exploitation and neutralization of IEDs. But a route, once cleared,without constant surveillance and subsequent interdiction becomes easily reseeded with IEDs. The required surveillance and interdiction rarely occurred rendering many route clearance missions ineffective. Rapid removal of the IED threat by ballistic or explosive techniques common to engineers did nothing for forensics or technical exploitation of the device thereby negating options to capture the emplacer or bomb-maker.
Ascertaining those responsible for IEDs becomes a primary concern andthe IED threat varied greatly from region to region. Sunni and Shii’a conflict, foreign terrorists, anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), former regime elements (FRE), organized criminal gangs, or the Taliban in Afghanistan, all these groups employed IEDs for their own purposes, with varying degrees of sophistication, and with different tactics. Deciphering this confusing array of threat groups at times presented a complex and haphazard picture of the IED threat for Coalition Forces. Technical analysis from EOD forces coupled with a spirit for law enforcement investigation supportive of Host Nationjudiciary and criminal law became vital components to the IED effort. Few maneuver commanders had experience operating with EOD forces to engender the critical cohesion and interoperability essential for success. Due to limited availability of EOD forces in peacetime, maneuver and EOD forces had not trained together and were forced to learn in combat.