Colombia: Paradox, Intervention and Survival

Week 5:

Colombia: Paradox, Intervention and Survival

Topics: -

1. The Paradox of Colombia

2. The Legacies of Conflict: Violencia, Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

3. The Drug Trade as an International Problem: Looking Beyond the Cartels

4. From Plan Colombia to 'Democratic Security'

5. Colombia in Its Regional Setting

6. Colombia: A Surviving Culture in the 21st Century

1. The Paradox of Colombia

Colombia is one of the most paradoxical countries in South America. From 1932 down to the mid-1990s it had a strong and growing economy based on diversified resources, including a strong agricultural base (tobacco, coffee, tropical fruits, beef, hides), sizeable reserves of petroleum, gas, coal, gold, emeralds, silver, platinum, nickel and iron ore, and a modest industrial sector including steel and chemical production projects, machinery and electrical goods, and processed foods (Safford & Palacios 2002, p314; Johnson 2003). Major exports include oil, coffee and coal in that order (Jonhson 2003). In particular, from 1953 through 1996, 'the Colombian economy and per capita income grew at stable but moderate rates' (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p6). During the last 25 years the average growth in GDP was 4.5% and even over the 1995-1999 was still growing at around 1.6%. However, economic stagnation began to affect the country through 1999 with increasing unemployment rates, with some slight recovery in 2000-2001, and around GDP real growth of 1.8% in 2002 and 3.7% for 2003, and 4.5% for 2005 (Johnson 2003; DFAT 2003). Through 2002-2004, unemployment was estimated at 13.8%-15% with inflation at 6-7% (Johnson 2003; DFAT 2004a). Foreign debt is also relatively high, around 46.2% of GDP in 2002 (Johnson 2003).

Strategically located at the top of South America, abutting Panama, the Caribbean Coast, and the top Andes, it is also a democracy with regular elections, and has a long history of constitutional and political reform (though often contested or violent). With a population of approx. 44 million, it has a well-educated upper and middle class, as well as an active civil society that has sought to publicise and moderate social and justice problems. Its military was often less directly involved in politics than in other countries, such as Argentina and Chile in past decades, but this trend was complicated by the fierce conflict with guerrilla groups over the last two decades. Over the last ten years the Colombian army has become more professional and less involved in human rights crimes, though some abuses continued through the mid-1990s (Avilés 2001, p33) and there have been ongoing claims of ongoing subvert cooperation with right-wing paramilitaries. On this basis, Colombia, after a slow phase of development in the 19th century, should now be one of the thriving success stories of Latin America. These benefits, however, have not been translated into a stable society or strong state (for further aspects of this paradox, see Foreign Policy 2002), largely due to the nexus of political violence among paramilitaries, left-wing guerrilla activity, and the drug trade.

The country has suffered extreme social violence over several decades, and through late 1990s and early 21st century was still subject to social crisis, insurgency, problems linked to organised crime and the international narcotics industry, as well as subject to indirect international intervention and tensions over the control of its borders. This in part goes back to earlier strong regional differentiation within the country, as well as a fierce debate between centralised verses federal views of political authority, and to civil wars between Conservative and Liberal forces through the 19th century (Safford & Palacios 2002).

Colombia Map (Courtesy PCL Map Library)

In recent years, from one million (official figures) up to three million people (NGO based figures) have been internally displaced within Colombia (the second highest after Sudan, Alford 2004; Farfan 2004), out of a population of 44.6 million. Poverty remained at a high rate: through the mid-1990s 52% lived in relative poverty and unemployment reached 20%, and both guerrillas and paramilitary forces control large sections of the country (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p7). In the 1994-1998 period some 15,000 Colombians died as a result of a counterinsurgency war or as a result of political killings (Avilés 2001, p31). In 1999 the cycle of violence among these groups led to 2,000-3,000 deaths, and around 4,000 in 2001, while conflict in rural areas displaced 300,000 civilians during 1998 alone (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p5; Sweig 2002, p123). Through 2001-2004, the Colombian state remained relatively embattled. Ironically, 'Democracy, liberalization, and stability in economic management have been combined with inequality, repression, and widespread corruption' (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p7).

Nonetheless, the government of former President Andrés Pastrana remained functional through 1998-early 2002, and was able to engage strong foreign actors such as the European Union and the United States in its future development, as well as trying to strike some kind of balance of force with revolutionary guerrilla, paramilitary groups, and with the fragmented drug cartels. At the same time, with large sections of the territory of Colombia effectively 'colonised' by groups that exercise control of resources and use armed force. Thus an oligopoly of sovereignty has been established, in which counter-state powers (guerrilla groups), para-state powers (self-defence and paramilitary forces) and organised crime (Melguizo 2001, p111) have established complex alliances and parasitic relations with the state and civil society. In spite of sustained peace-talks, plus efforts to strengthen the armed forces, peace talks eventually collapsed in 2002 (Johnson 2003). Through 2002-2005 the government of President Alvaro UribeVélez broke of peace-talks with rebels forces (FARC), and sought to use military means to control them, under the rubric of 'democratic security', since the peace process of earlier years had not resulted in national stability (see further below).

In this lecture there will not be time to go through the entire history of this fascinating country (see Safford & Palacios 2002). Colombia was at first part of the large state of New Granada where from the early 19th century Simón Bolívar Palacio began the revolution that would overthrow the control of Spain and also establish the early framework for South American states. By 1830 Venezuela and Ecuador had split off, while by 1903 the region of Panama (with U.S. support) secured its independence, leaving Colombia with its present borders. The possibility of Panama's independence had worried Colombia as early as 1831, with tensions escalating after 1849, with thousands of people crossing the isthmus on the way to the goldfields in California (Safford & Palacios 2002, p132, pp217-218).

The modern social and political life of the nation has been partly shaped by its geography: 15% of its territory is above 1000 metres, and three major mountain ranges (cordilleras) divide different parts of the country from each other, with distinct differences between the north (on the Caribbean), the eastern lowland plains fronting onto the Amazon region), and the Pacific coast (Safford & Palacios 2002, p3). This made early transport and trade extremely difficult, with even rivers such as Magdalena only partly making up for the shortage of road and railways during the 19th century (Safford & Palacios 2002, p6). These factors also changed the ethnic composition of the emerging Colombia state: on the north coast a large number of African slaves were brought into to act as a labour force, leading to a more 'Caribbean' culture and Afro-Caribbean style in the 20th century (for the influence on music culture, and the emergence of revitalised Afro-Colombian communities, see Floyd 1999; Gamboa 2001, p98), while in the eastern highlands more indigenous peoples survived, leaving traces of the pre-Columbian Muiscas culture (Safford & Palacios 2002, p7). At first a rural country, by the end of the 20th century 70% of Colombians lived in cities, with a number of major cities in different regions, e.g. Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp301-302). Correlated with this was an increase in rural poverty, with up to 76% of rural, non-town residents living in poverty in 1995 (Safford & Palacios 2002, p307).

Some historical legacies have fed into the challenges that face Colombia today. In brief, they include the following issues: -

Before European contact, Mesoamericans from Central America arrived circa 1200 B.C., followed by later waves of settlers, forming distinct cultures, including the arrival of Chibchas, Arawaks and Caribs (Hanratty & Meditz 1988). From the 1500s, the Muisca and Tairona tribes developed advanced settled cultures based on the cultivation of the potatoes and corn (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). The Tairona constructed temples, stone roads, bridges, and extensive irrigations works (Safford & Palacios 2002, p20). The Inca empire only expanded to include tribes in the region of the southern border of Colombia with Ecuador (Safford & Palacios 2002, p21). Rapid depopulation of the indigenous tribes occurred shortly after Spanish settlement, and in the 17th century the Spanish administration sought to concentrate indigenous people in larger local towns, so that they could be more easily Christianised, controlled, and their labour used (Safford & Palacios 2002, p41). From the 18th century onwards, a sizeable minority of mixed (mestizo) background emerged in the cities of Colombia, e.g. up to 34%, though many Indians simply redefined themselves as mestizo for political reasons (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp42-43). In 1810 the Congress which set up the state of New Granada declared Indians to be citizens and henceforth, at least in theory, to be able to hold office (Safford & Palacios 2002, p109). Trends of political and social equality, as well as the trend to free slaves, were at first resisted by some land-owners and by Colombian elites (Safford & Palacios 2002, p180). Current estimates suggest that mestizo's are 57% of the population (Johnson 2003), but this is not strongly reflected in national-identity politics. There was a strong trends towards Hispanicisation of these mixed groups.

Except for small groups, most Indians were absorbed culturally and linguistically into Colombian society, with only 1% retaining definite indigenous status (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). Nonetheless, the treatment of indigenous people has remained an important issue, with a strong division between those in the 19th century who were willing to see an upwardly mobile indigenous and mestizo group, and those who sought a 'white' Hispanic heritage for the Colombian state (Safford & Palacios 2002, p26). However, by the "latter part of the eighteenth century people largely of mixed race, but completely Hispanic in culture, had become more numerous in most regions than any of the other socioracial groups - whites, Indians, or black slaves" (Safford & Palacios 2002, p51). Although at first there was an effort to keep coloured groups out of universities or positions of authority, in time a mestizo with wealth or a public office might 'claim to be effectively white and eligible for positions of honor' (Safford & Palacios 2002, p53).

Original Spanish exploration was conducted by explorers such as Alonso de Ojeda (1499), Rodrigo de Bastidas (1500) and Pedro de Heredia (1533). As a result coastal towns such as Acandí and Cartagena were founded (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). The present-day capital of Bogotá was founded in 1538 during an exploration of a land route to Peru (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). However, the rough terrain and the division of Colombia into different coastal, riverine, and mountainous regions left a difficult legacy for the early modern Colombian state (Safford & Palacios 2002).

The Catholic Church had a strong influence on modern Colombian culture. The Franciscan and Dominican orders arrived first, followed by the Jesuits. In 1580 a University of General Studies was set up in the territory, followed by other universities in 1622 and 1653 (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). One early bone of contention between Liberals and Conservatives from the early 19th century was over the role of the Church: Conservatives were willing to concede the Church a strong role in education and the Universities, Liberals were not and wanted to regulate Church rights and to limit the Vatican's ability to appoint Colombian bishops and priests unless nominated by the Colombian government (a first agreement was reached in 1827, and over Church lands (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp112-114). From 1939 Pope Pius XII was concerned to 're-evangelise' Latin America, leading to more religious orders moving into Colombia after 1946 (Safford & Palacios 2002, p285). However, in the twentieth century some radical priests were willing to support social revolution, inspired by socialist ideals and liberation theology.

Discontent with Spanish rule evolved from several sources: high taxes and restrictions on trade, excessive influence of those who came out from Spain (peninsulares) verses those born in the colony, the general influence of the Enlightenment, an the need to establish some level of independent government once the French invaded Spain and Napoleon tried for a time to control Spanish politics. Local self-governing councils or military juntas began to form from 1810 in Bogotá, Caracas, Cartagena, Pamplona and Socorro (Safford & Palacios 2002, p87). Fierce conflict with Spanish forces emerged through 1813-1816, with Spain for a time re-establishing complete control of the most populated areas, though subject to guerrilla warfare elsewhere, with the abortive attempt at independence in 1810-1816 being remembered as the Patria Boba, or Foolish Fatherland (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp94-95). Only through 1819-1820 would an independent state be refounded (Johnson 2003), following Simón Bolívar's decisive defeat of Spanish forces at the Battle of Boyacá. In 1822 the United States would move to recognize the newly independence states of the region, including Colombia (Safford & Palacios 2002, p98).

The military during the late 18th and 19th century was also a major career path for creoles, along with roles in the professions such as lawyers. Such groups would form key elements in the impulse toward independence, and provide leadership for the new state. One of the early problems would be the degree of control exercised by the civilian government over the military, and the need to cut back to size of the army which absorbed large amounts of a fairly small budget during the 19th century. From 1832 the officers corps was reduced in size, and taken as a whole the military had less direct 'corporate' influence on political life in Colombia than was the case in such states such as Mexico, Peru or Venezuela (Safford & Palacios 2002, p131). The armed forces modernised at first on European traditions (Prussian and French), but after World War II on U.S. models (Safford & Palacios 2002, p284). A government law in 2001 reduced some of the restrictions on the army, based on the ongoing conflict with the guerrillas, but this may once again open the door to increased human rights abuses. More generally, the army at times has indirectly supported paramilitary groups, while increased military budgets through Plan Colombia may tend to emphasise military solutions (see below). Rules within Plan Colombia also insisted that human rights vetting occur for those trained for new U.S.-backed battalions, and that the military break links with paramilitary groups (Sweig 2002, p130), but this has been difficult to enforce. Through 2002, the Colombia army had 117,000 soldiers, of which 52,000 were full-time soldiers, but only 35,000 could be effectively deployed into aggressive (verses defensive roles) operations (Sweig 2002, p135). Through 2004, total armed forces personnel were around 178,000 included some 74,700 conscripts, and 9 special mobile counter guerrilla forces (Chipman 2004). US Special Forces have also been sent into the country to train special Colombian army units, including those guarding major pipelines (Johnson 2003, see further below).

Colombian elites were influenced by the reformist ideas of the French and U.S. revolutions, and by the general ideas of the Enlightenment, while some would also be influenced by 19th century Freemasonry, a movement which would influence many of those who would later on form the Liberal Party (Safford & Palacios 2002, p115).

Although Spanish control would be excluded during 1819-1822, this would not end conflict in the new state: -

Colombia succeeded in its military task of ending Spanish control of Andean South America. But once this strategic aim was achieved, the union of Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador began to fail as a polity. In 1826 the union entered in a prolonged political crisis - involving concurrent, and often interconnected conflicts between clergy and university-educated liberal politicians, between the central government in Bogotá and elites in Venezuela and Ecuador, ultimately between <political leaders> Bolívar and Santander and their respective adherents. The crisis continued to 1831, by which time the Republic of Colombia had fragmented into its original parts - Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador' (Safford & Palacios 2002, p104).

From the beginning of the independence movement, several key issues tended to divide colonial elites: whether the state should have a centralist or federal structure, and differences over how much influence the Church should have on the state (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). In order to avoid civil war between these groups, a Congress was called in 1811 to form a draft constitution which was based on a federal union with autonomous provinces (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). This trend towards federalism was also due to transport and technological limitations experienced by Colombia through much of the 19th century (Safford & Palacios 2002, p13). However, constitutional arrangements could never really balance the different interests of diverse regions within Colombia, nor the interest of conservative landholders verses artisans verses traders verses poor peasants. As a result of these diverse interests, Colombia was racked by crisis and civil war, e.g. during 1826-1831, and 1899-1903. Today, local departments and municipal city governments remain important, while the strong executive powers of the president are balanced by 'strict separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary' (DFAT 2004b).

Like much of Latin America, the division of political and economic interests into the Liberal and Conservative parties was more a collision of factional interests, rather than the creation of genuine political parties which respected the political process and recognised opponents as a 'loyal opposition'. From 1850 onwards, two parties tended to dominate political life: the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal - PL) and the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador - PC). During the early period, the Liberals were anticolonial and wanted to create a modern state, while the Conservatives wanted to preserve the influence of the Church and a more centralised, authoritarian state (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). The political process was influenced by violence, cooption, and unstable periods of power sharing. Conflict and class war occurred after the Liberal revolution of 1849-1854, while the Liberals tended to dominate the period of 1845-1876 (Safford & Palacios 2002, p188). From 1885, control of the political system moved towards the Conservative parties, with a new constitution in 1886, and a more centralised state system. It was in this context that a Concordat between the State and Church was signed in 1887, restoring the privileges of the Church and compensating it for lost properties (Safford & Palacios 2002, p246). The War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902) indicated that Colombia was far from nationally integrated and also resulted in the loss of Panama in 1903. During the 1920s and 1930s strong labor unions also developed, sometimes supported by Catholic social doctrine, at other times by the Liberal party (Safford & Palacios 2002, p292). From 1929 the Conservative dominance of government ended, with an alternation of moderate and 'radical' presidents in the 1930-1946 period (Safford & Palacios 2002, p288).

Gold was one of the main exports of New Granada and then Colombia, but ironically this may have inhibited the development of agricultural exports in the colonial period (Safford & Palacios 2002, p14). Though of less total value than the silver bullion mined in Peru and Mexico, it was the mainstay of Spanish elites in Colombian regions such as Antioquia, Popayán and Chocó (Safford & Palacios 2002, p47). During the early 19th century, both exports and foreign investments (at first mainly from Great Britain) were very limited, and fiscal crisis through the 1820s and 1830s fed into political instability (Safford & Palacios 2002, p112, p163). In this period, Colombia's exports were not enough to supply needed imports, stirring debates among those who supported free trade, and those who were protectionists (Safford & Palacios 2002, p167).

Historically, coffee was one of the mainstays of the Colombian economy, with Colombia tending to be the second largest producer after Brazil. Although still a strong export earner, problems in the coffee industry have increased pockets of rural poverty and pushed some of the poor into other crops (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p7). Coffee, though one of the main sources of income for modernisation of the Colombia economy (during the 1903-1946 period) and for the development of railways (Safford & Palacios 2002, p15), was also dependent on the level of production of major exporters such as Brazil, as well as on the international price which tended to fluctuate due to both market and political forces. Associations of coffee growers formed within Colombia (the Federation of Coffee-growers, the FNC), while internationally the market was at times controlled, e.g. by the Brazilian government (1906-1937), the U.S. government (during 1940-48), and by international agreements among major coffee grows during the 1962-1983 period (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp269-270). Thereafter, coffee sales and prices have been partly set by a small number of transnational companies (as the main buyers) and patterns of global over-production, particularly as newer exporters such as Vietnam come on stream (Perez 2002). As a result, coffee was a good, but unreliable export earner. Coffee exports were strong in the 1910-1940 period, stagnated from 1940-1975, grew against from 1974-1994, but became less important thereafter (Safford & Palacios 2002, p273). In the modern period the share of GDP earned by coffee exports has dropped to a low level, around 2% for the 1991-1998 period, compared to 16% during 1925-1935 (Safford & Palacios 2002, p272). Thus in February 2002, Andean coffee producers asked Brazil to cut their coffee crop production by at least a quarter in order to boost low international prices, while high Vietnamese exports also led to oversupply in that period (Reuters 2002a; Johnson 2003). Coffee prices dropped to a 30-year low in 2002, indicating the difficulty in relying on this crop, though there was some upward rebound in prices through 2003-2004 (NotiCen 2004). Today, some 500,000 are still part of the FNC (Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers), and try to improve the life of their many small growers: -

Founded in 1927, the FNC acts as a commercial enterprise, buying