Sidney Jones

International Crisis Group

DRAFT, CTITF Conference, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

24 January 2011

COUNTERING EXTREMISM ON INDONESIAN INTERNET SITES:

SUBSTANCE, STYLE AND TIMING

In looking to construct appeals to counter the message of extremist violence, one useful approach, as Omar Ashour points out, is to look at the arguments of former militants who have renounced violence. Another is to examine the content of internal critiques that are known to have been widely disseminated on the Internet and to have had an impact on extremist thought. What made these appeals particularly persuasive? What elements might be replicated in a broader counter-radicalisation strategy?

In this paper I look at two tracts that have been the subject of intensive discussion on radical websites in Indonesia. One is called “Reflections on the Aceh Jihad”; the second is a short section from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s criticism of his former pupil, Abu Mus’ab Zarqawi, that was translated into Indonesian as They are Mujahidin But They Made Mistakes (Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah).

There are some common elements to both:

  • Timing was critical to their impact. Both were released in the aftermath of incidents that had dealt major setbacks to the movement.
  • Both reinforce the legitimacy of the global jihad.
  • Neither renounces violence per se but both question the failure to focus on longer term objectives that will allow Islam to triumph.

Both arguably had more impact on the jihadi community in Indonesia than arguments against bombings made by former militants, in part because they were circulated on the Internet by people still involved in the movement, in part because they went beyond the usual point-counterpoint of general jihadi arguments. Their impact suggests that an effective Internet counter-strategy requires a thorough familiarity with ongoing debates, and that the efficacy of the message may last only as long as that debate stays current. If extremist movements are constantly evolving, presumably strategies aimed at an Internet audience will need the same flexibility and ability to adapt to changing events.

  1. REFLECTIONS ON THE ACEH JIHAD (REFLEKSI JIHAD ACEH)

This 6,000-word critique is one of the rare examples of Indonesian jihadi revisionism, as opposed to revisionist texts translated from the Arabic and made available on Indonesian websites. It appeared in three parts on a salafi jihadi blog, , with the first part posted on 22 March 2010. This was exactly one month after Indonesia’s counter-terrorism police, Detachment 88, had broken up a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, run by a group calling itself Tandzim al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah (Serambi Mekkah, or Mecca’s Verandah is a local term for Aceh).

By the time the first installment appeared, dozens of men linked to the camp had been arrested and seven had been killed. “Refleksi” was quickly picked up by other blogs and featured on several of Indonesia’s leading radical websites including It argued that by running off to the jungle with guns and losing so many of its members, the movement was depleting its own resources and undermining its prospects for victory.

“Refleksi” has several elements that boost its persuasiveness.

  1. The anonymous author establishes his radical credentials by siding with the mujahidin against two groups of detractors: the conspiracy theorists (read Hizb ut-Tahrir), who do not believe that Muslims are smart enough to pull off a spectacular feat like the World Trade Center attack themselves and see everything as a plot by the C.I.A. or Mossad; and the “neo-murji'ah” (read pure salafis), who castigate the mujahidin as heretics or khawarij.
  2. He identifies with those he is criticising, saying we all should be proud to be called terrorists in defence of Islam.
  3. The style is conversational, not didactic. The author knows his audience – not just the jihadis themselves but the broader hardline community that constitutes a potential recruiting base. He uses a touch of humor here and there to make the criticism more palatable and the content more appropriate for debate and discussion.[1] At one point he says that to blame the police for all the setbacks for jihad in Indonesia would be like blaming Brazil if there were an Indonesia-Brazil football match and Indonesia lost. The Indonesian team would become a laughing stock unless it recognised its own weaknesses, and we jihadis need to do just that.
  4. He is careful NOT to reject violence but makes the case for the need for more da’wa and development of human resources first. He points out that violent jihad in Aceh -- and Indonesia more broadly-- lacks popular support and cannot succeed without it.He contrasts Indonesia with Iraq, where Abu Mus’ab Zarqawi, a hero to those he is addressing, was able to build on a hated occupation by brutal kafir. Ordinary Indonesians do not understand the rationale for attacking foreigners, he says, and most of the police are Muslim, so we are encouraging Muslim on Muslim attacks. As far as the public is concerned, the police rationale for attacking terrorists may make more sense. This underscores the need for da’wa and education to educate the ummah about who the enemy is.
  5. He asks his colleagues to think about benchmarks for success. Is it simply the number of martyrs? Is it the increasing number of mujahidin in jail? Is it our ability to mimic al-Qaeda propaganda? Because on all these counts, we’ve succeeded, he says. But if we look at our ability to continue the jihad and weaken the enemy so that Islam will be victorious, we don’t have much to show. He cites Abu Mu’sab as-Sury, another iconic jihadi thinker, on the need for continuous evaluation about shortcomings and weaknesses.
  6. He uses gentle mockery, chiding those who just want to see photos of themselves holding AK47s and who neglect the “machine” behind any victorious jihad – schools and other religious institutions; individuals with professional skills like doctors, teachers and engineers; farmers and fisherman who can feed the movement and so on. He also urges his audience to differentiate between jihad as an end in itself and jihad as a means to a more important end – the “means mazhab” vis the “end mazhab”. The former, he says, are inclined to see simplify jihad as if they were advertising a product on television.
  7. He goes out of his way not to alienate those responsible for radical websites and says the jihadis should not be exhorting them to leave their posts and head for the hills because they are playing a more important public education function. The critique at one level can be understood as an appeal for more “jihad by the pen” but at another it is an argument to put down the guns and get back to books.
  8. He argues that the best people are not being drawn into jihad and therefore something is wrong with the way it is being conceived. It is different, he notes, in Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia where everyone wants to fight and everyone is needed. In a non-conflict situation like Indonesia, the cadres need to be chosen more carefully, and not everyone who is eager to fight makes a suitable mujahid. We need people who are as interested in strengthening Muslim banking, building Muslim enterprises, encouraging aMuslim lifestyle as they are in taking up arms. This is a long war, not just a battle or two, but Indonesian mujahidin have lost sight of the long term goal of taking political power. This, he hastens to add, does not justify taking part in Indonesia’s filthy party politics but instead is a rationale to put more effort into applying Islamic law.
  9. He repeatedly cites leading jihadi theoreticians in arguments against al-Qaeda style violence. One given particular prominence Hazim al-Madani whose book on jihad has been translated into Indonesia. He quotes al-Madani approvingly that the entire Muslim umat needs to be seen as a partner for the global jihad, but interprets this to end as he began the critique, that any jihad can only succeed with community support.

That the criticism hit home was evidenced by how quickly it was picked up by other sites, copied on Facebook pages, discussed in study groups and printed as a supplement to the monthly magazine run by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s organisation, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid. It probably had a greater impact than any single tract published in recent years in the electronic or print media aimed at the jihadi community.

A weak rebuttal, probably from Abdullah Sunata, one of the key promoters of the Aceh camp, appeared on an obscure blog, , on 9 June 2010 shortly before Sunata was arrested.[2] Called “Misperceptions of Refleksi Jihad Aceh” (Salah Kaprah Refleksi Jihad Aceh), it was not widely picked up at the time remains the only posting on that site. But it was brought to the attention of “Refleksi”’s author who then posted a rejoinder in which the full text of the rebuttal was printed with comments inserted. This again was widely reproduced and served to strengthen the original arguments.

Refleksi’s popularity suggests that at least some of the nine elements cited above should be used by anyone trying to construct counter-narratives for an Indonesian audience. But it is also worth examining another tract that had a major influence on Indonesian jihadi thought.

  1. THE AL-MAQDISI TRACT: AVOID MUSLIM DEATHS

Al-Maqdisi, often cited as a leader of jihadi revisionism for his criticism of Zarqawi’s tactics in Iraq, is one of the most widely read radical authors in Indonesia, thanks to translations of many of his writings by the influential Indonesian salafi jihadi scholar, Aman Abdurrahman alias Abu Sulaiman.[3]His arguments do not have the same immediate appeal that Refleksi’s do, but a few themes have resonated deeply with Indonesian extremists, which suggests that they should be included in any counter-narrative. One is how individuals can contribute to the eventual Islamic victory other than byblowing themselves up; the second is the unacceptability of tactics that produce Muslim casualties.

They Are Mujahidin But They Made Mistakes(Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah) was published in December 2007.[4] This was a year that saw major police operations in Poso, Central leading to the death of 14 mostly armed mujahidin, and the arrest several months later of several top JI leaders including its acting amir, Zuhroni alias Zarkasih and a top military commander, Abu Dujana. Noordin Top, leader of a terrorist splinter group that carried out a second Bali bombing in 2005, was still at large, calling himself the leader of al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago, and serious debates were underway within the jihadi movement about tactics and strategy.

The book’s arguments are similar in some ways to Refleksi’s, though obviously written from a very different context and in a less engaging style. Al-Maqdisi criticises the young people “whose only capital is enthusiasm”, whose only weapons are explosives, and whose indiscriminate attacks alienate ordinary Muslims who otherwise would support a jihad.[5] Attacks at the wrong time, in the wrong place and against the wrong targets, he argues, only give legitimacy to the enemy.

The part of the book that drew the most attention on radical websites, however, was al-Maqdisi’s distinction between qital nikaya, repeated hits at an oppressor, and qital tamkin, liberation of territory so that Muslims can better implement their religion. The first is what Refleksi’s author calls jihad for jihad’s sake, without broader strategic goals. Qital tamkin, by contrast, is aimed at the establishment of an Islamic polity. If Zarqawi was the embodiment of qital nikaya in the Middle East, Noordin Top was his counterpart in Indonesia, putting together teams for bombing operations that served no broader goal than “making Western nations tremble”.

We know from individuals directly involved in the Aceh training camp that the nikaya vs tamkin debate was a critical element in finding common ground among the disparate groups in the al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah alliance. All could agree on the need to avoid Muslim deaths, the need for a secure base from which to build the Islamic state, and the need for more focus on building bridges with the surrounding community through da’wa.

One question is how this one part of the al-Maqdisi tract reached the broader jihadi community. Radical websites in Indonesia fall into two broad categories, those aimed at ideological teaching, and those aimed at news of the global jihad, which is where Refleksi was circulated. One of the most important sources for teaching, however, has been al-Maqdisi’s own websites, and .[6]Materials are downloaded by an Arabic-speaking Indonesian, translated, and posted either in whole or in part on Indonesian blogs or websites such as or . From there they are downloaded, photocopied, printed as pamphlets and circulated, often becoming materials for radical religious discussion groups. The Internet thus becomes a way station, one node in a broader dissemination through print and word of mouth, and the nikaya vs tamkin tract probably reached as many people through print and discussion groups as it did through the Internet itself.

The importance of not killing Muslims was reinforced in a posting on the website of a new JI affiliate, Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI), where the author wrote:

You can learn from the bombings in Jakarta that caused Muslim deaths. Just imagine a da’i (preacher) having to support jihad in front of ordinary people. What Quranic verse or hadith can a preacher use to support you? Have we reached conditions here that are so dire that we don’t even have to take Muslim deaths into consideration? Are we in a situation where if Islamic forces don’t attack the enemy with the risk of Muslim casualties, the enemy will defeat the faithful with even worse consequences? In such conditions, shedding Muslim blood can be justified. But you must answer this question honestly: is there no way to oppose the US or the West in Indonesia other than by shedding Muslim blood?

If the answer is yes, then we have reached a state of emergency. But if there are other means, for example if you become a sniper who can guarantee that your victim will fall, or use poison or hitting a car or other such methods, then we have not reached such conditions. This means you are an egotist, you are not taking into consideration how difficult it is for scholars and preachers to defend you. You are happy living with your own logic, as if you’re on another planet. You feel resentful when we don’t come to your defence. When we say this isn’t jihad by law, you become angry.[7]

No one wishing to challenge jihadi narratives would be encouraged by the idea that poison or hit-and-run car attacks are better than suicide bombings, but pointing out the high Muslim casualties in indiscriminate attacks is a powerful argument against them.

Another argument to consider, not used by al-Maqdisi although he gets close to it in his comments on suicide bombers, is that those who rush toward martyrdom are essentially selfish, thinking more of themselves than of the ummah. The point is made in a response by an influential JI leader to the accusation that JI was just sitting around doing nothing these days while others risked their lives in jihad. Abu Rusdan’s response was entitled “Not Cowardice, But Strategy.”[8]

  1. AUTOBIOGRAPHIES OF EX-MILITANTS

In Indonesia, the two most important militants to reject extremist violenceare Nasir Abas, a former regional commander and strategist, and Ali Imron, a religious scholar, two of whose brothers were among those executed for the first Bali bombs.[9]Both published autobiographies that rely on religious arguments to make a case against indiscriminate violence, but crucially, without renouncing violence in principle. The arguments of Ali Imron, considered more of a scholar than Nasir, are particularly worth examining.

Like Refleksi’s author, Ali Imron underscores the legitmacy of jihad and the individual obligation to wage it when Muslims are under attack. But he challenges his former colleagues on several fronts. On the more practical side (but using religious arguments):

  • Muslims who are too weak to confront a much stronger enemy should focus on i’dad (preparation) and building up their strength. This argument is also used repeatedly by JI leader Abu Rusdan to argue against engaging in attacks in Indonesia.
  • Viewed from a cost-benefit analysis (manfaat and madharot), attacks are counter-productive
  • Attacks lack community support and have only served to weaken and divide the ummah

He goes on, but less effectively, to question the legitimacy of targets chosen; the assumption by the attackers that they are among the thaifah manshurah, the group that will be saved on Judgment Day; their failure to engage in da’wa before using attacks as a last resort; and other shortcomings. These more general arguments against terrorist attacks are precisely the ones that the extremists themselves have become past masters at refuting, so it is not clear how much weight they would carry if simply posted in an Internet message, no matter how credible the source.