Stopping War Before It Starts: Testing Preventive Diplomacy in the Self-Determination Case

Stopping War Before It Starts: Testing Preventive Diplomacy in the Self-Determination Case of Southern Cameroons ( aka Ambazonia)*

By

Tatah Mentan, Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Political Science (2005-06),

Laurentian University, Sudbury, Ontario, Canada.

Introduction

La République du Camerounis “a sleeping volcano.” This description has its meaning rooted in the history of what has come to be called the “Anglophone problem” in Cameroun. This “problem” can be traced back as far as the partitioning after the First World War of the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate (1884-1916) between the French and English victors, first as mandates under the League of Nations and later as trusts under the United Nations. The French-and English-speaking Cameroons formed an illegal “federal union” in 1961 which is now exploding.

Why preventive diplomacy? Anglophone-Francophone animosities in Cameroun have been raging intermittently since 1961, the year La République du Cameroun (French-speaking) simply annexed the Southern Cameroons (English-speaking). These animosities, as they run riot, threaten the peace of Cameroun frequently. The essence of preventive diplomacy is therefore early warning and timely intervention where this peace is menaced by a typical problem of paternalism.The frequent slaughter of protesting Southern Cameroons students and protesters by La République du Cameroun forces of annexation is eloquent testimony.

Preventive diplomacy in this case, to be successful, compels some diplomatic intercession. This intercession requires understanding the sources of an impending conflict and addressing them in time to prevent violent confrontation. Once a conflict has broken out, the immediate need is to address its humanitarian consequences, while seeking an end to the hostilities by addressing the issues that led to the conflict in the first place. Success means restoring peace and creating conditions that are capable of sustaining the achieved peace. The process is therefore circular in that ensuring a lasting solution becomes a preventive measure that should ideally address the sources or causes of the conflict. In Cameroon, preventive diplomacy entails the resolution of the conflict created by the annexation of the British Southern Cameroons by La République du Cameroun.

The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights

At the 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, held in Banjul (Gambia) from April 27 to May 11, 2005, the Commission heard oral presentation made by the complainant (Southern Cameroons) and the response of RespondentState (La République du Cameroun). The Complainants reiterated that their submissions at the Admissibility and Merit stages of this case establish conclusively the elements of ‘people’, ‘domination’, ‘colonialism’ and ‘oppression’: the people of the Southern Cameroons are without any shadow of a doubt a people, a people under the domination of the people of Respondent State, a people under the colonial rule of Respondent State, and a people oppressed by Respondent State. Complainants repeated the following facts:

1)that the Southern Cameroons and République du Cameroun were two separate Class B UN Trust Territories under two separate colonial Authorities with well-defined international boundaries (see 1958 Map showing the Southern Cameroons as a UN Trust Territory under UK Administration; Nigeria is to the west and the Trust Territory of French Cameroun is to the east) ;

2)that the Plebiscite Questions as framed by the UN invited the people of the Southern Cameroons to pronounce themselves on the achievement of independence by ‘joining’ either Nigeria or République du Cameroun;

3)that the pre-plebiscite Agreements between the Southern Cameroons and Respondent State and the voting at the UN in April 1961 leading to the adoption of Resolution 1608 clearly envisaged three concomitant events to happen on 1 October 1961, namely, achievement of independence by the Southern Cameroons, entry into a federal association with République du Cameroun and the consequential termination of the trusteeship over the Southern Cameroons;

4)that operative paragraph 5 of Resolution 1608 called on the Government of the Southern Cameroons, the UK and République du Cameroun to finalize before 1 October 1961 the arrangements by which the agreed and published policies on a federal association would be implemented;

5)that said paragraph 5 was not and has never been implemented;

6)that on 1 September 1961 RespondentState passed an annexation law asserting sovereignty over the Southern Cameroons; and

7)that on 1 October 1961 RespondentState sent its troops into the Southern Cameroons, grabbed it as part of its territory, and has since been exercising a colonial sovereignty over it, the fierce protest of the people notwithstanding

8)The Complainants concluded their presentation as follows: “the self-determination process of the people of the Southern Cameroons is irreversible. Widespread bloodshed in Ambazonia may be only a few months away as the struggle for self-determination gathers its momentum.”

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights

The clash between the Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun continued on March 31, 2005, on the floor of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UN CHR). In the exercise of its right to reply, La République’s Ambassador lashed out at the NGO through which the Southern Cameroons delegation was accredited to the 61st Session of the UN CHR. He accused the Human Rights Commission of giving the Southern Cameroons (SCNC) the platform to “discredit his government.” He stated that the SCNC are “terrorists who have killed military officers and destroyed government property.”He claimed that the Southern Cameroons was attached to La République du Cameroun by the UN referendum of 1961 and was split into two of the 10 provinces that make up the country.

In effect, what the ambassador did was to confirm the fact of the annexation of the Southern Cameroons by La République du Cameroun. This annexation by La République du Cameroun and the resultant self-determination of the Southern Cameroons is the substance of this paper to explore how preventive diplomacy can defuse the time bomb. Indeed, Cameroun has staggered into the twenty-first century with a smoldering time-bomb in the pocket. And, only very careful preventive diplomacy can defuse it. The most desirable and efficient employment of this type of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in violent conflict. Or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes.

In October 2001, following demonstrations in English-speaking provinces for greater political rights three people were killed, nine injured and over 100 arrested and tortured.According to Amnesty International “Over the last decades feelings of political marginalisation and discrimination have grown stronger in the English speaking provinces, leading to the foundation of the various political movements including the SCNC [Southern Cameroon National Council] and the affiliated SCYL [Southern Cameroon Youth League] in the early 1990s. Government response to pro-secessionist political movements and those demanding greater regional autonomy has increasingly toughened” (AI 4 Oct 2001).

A news report on demonstrations in the English-speaking provinces on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the 1972 referendum creating a unified Cameroon stated, “official celebrations held … [in Buea] were dwarfed by secessionist banners and posters observed all over” (Afrol News 21 May 2002). Referring to the groups calling for secession from Cameroon, the report continued:

“These groups at first sight may give the impression of hopeless dreamers, but anti-Yaoundé resentments are strong among Anglophone Cameroonians. The Anglophone population might be split on the issue of wanting a separate state, but mostly agree that they have become marginalized within the unified state”

(Afrol News May 21, 2002).

The absence of any significant move on the part of the Cameroun government to address the concerns of the Anglophone population has strengthened the position of separatists (including the SCNC and the SCYL) within the Anglophone community at the expense of the more mainstream Social Democratic Front (SDF). The SCNC has significant backing in the Anglophone population and has picked up support particularly among young people impatient with the lack of results produced by the SDF. At this time, the increased support for more radical solutions is not manifested in the streets or in armed actions, except in March 1997. But there is growing resentment in the Anglophone community at their continued treatment within Cameroon as second class citizens. Today, the Southern Cameroons has been admitted into the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization (UNPO). And, they are demanding their sovereignty. The Cameroon government of President Paul Biya has responded with indifference, outright repression or human rights violations to any attempts by Anglophone political parties and other groups to ameliorate the situation of Anglophones within Cameroon.

In a broader context, Africa is striving for the attainment of full democracy, the material and spiritual empowerment of her people. However, as striving differs in the conscious realisation of these ideals, many nations are still caught in the tragic dance of hypocrisy and deceit. Such nations, Cameroon being a ready example, risk the danger of total violence and the pains of collective immolation. Africa has suffered that kind of fate of which many states are unworthy examples, which litter the pages of human civilisation.

The post cold war security scenario we live in currently will determine the future of conflict and peace in the world. As this scenario develops, we are gradually able to recognize its characteristics. In some cases the security scenario will be drastically different; in many cases it will bear only slight changes. Gradually, influence and power will shift to other centers and thus change the course of policy and thus events.

In the cold war model, two world powers fought each other. They did it sometimes directly, but mostly indirectly, through proxies all over the world. Because of the many proxy wars and the global game of “playing for position,” no country was too small, no constituency too insignificant or population too scant to be courted by the superpowers. The superpowers used a series of common responses in this scenario. One, they attempted to gain direct influence in constituencies or populations around the world. Two, they tried to influence the divestiture process so that its proxies kept smaller, otherwise secession-minded cultures tightly bound to themselves. Thus often conflicts between cultures were decided by external actors, through the rationale of global superpower strategy instead of the relative merits of the situation. Often the process of divestiture and independence was postponed due to cold war rationale.

So what is different about today? Since the Soviet Union has ceased to be the global strategic player it once was, the United States has essentially dropped interest in many regional or local conflicts. This means that each constituent in those players has either looked for other sponsors, or sought to bring to open conflict that for so many years had been contained by the resources of superpowers seeking self gain.

In some cases the conflicts have erupted and been decided according to new rationale and guidelines brought about by the world community. In others, the conflicts have been sponsored by other powerful countries, still seeking self-gain or economic interest, but not necessarily towards a bi-polar political strategy. In many countries, the world community, through the UN or other bodies, actually discourages this process, calling it secessionist, and labeling it an additional threat to the stability of the region. To some small countries, this is the ultimate irony that world organizations once thought to be their champions are now blocking the independence they so long dreamt of.

Today the preponderance of potential violence, or threats to regional security, originates in these long fettered cultural or ethnic problem spots. To the extent that these spots are found close to other interests of the USA or major European countries, they may find major power sponsorship. If not, countries in the region with their own economic strategies will fill that vacuum of influence in conflict spots such as those of self-determination.

Understanding Self-Determination: A Theoretical Framework

Self-determination is an often and perhaps increasingly frequently invoked notion or claim by the disenfranchised in many and varying ways and often with confusing specific demands. The orthodox view since the beginning of the contemporary era under the Charter of the United Nations is that peoples of a whole territory have a right to determine their political status, in particular against colonial, racist or occupying regimes. That notion contra colonial, racist or occupying regime has a specific historical context, which was that of the process of decolonisation. This was a kind of remedial idea, which is to say to remedy past or specific injustices of colonialism, racism and foreign occupation.

There is a second notion of self-determination - which is expressed for example in the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and also in the Charter of the United Nations in general - and that is the notion of the right of the whole population of a defined territory to determine its political status as a primordial entitlement, not as a remedial entitlement. But that means the entire population of a recognised state at international law. Some people contemporarily have interpreted that to mean a kind of right of revolt against an oppressive regime within an entire state. Still, it is about the whole population of a recognised state.

The right to self-determination, a fundamental principle of human rights law,1 is an individual and collective right to “freely determine . . . political status and [to] freely pursue . . . economic, social and cultural development.”2 The principle of self-determination is generally linked to the de-colonization process that took place after the promulgation of the United Nations Charter of 1945.3 Of course, the obligation to respect the principle of self-determination is a prominent feature of the Charter, appearing, inter alia, in both Preamble to the Charter and in Article 1.

The International Court of Justice refers to the right to self-determination as a right held by people rather than a right held by governments alone.4 The two important United Nations studies on the right to self-determination set out factors of a people that give rise to possession of right to self-determination: a history of independence or self-rule in an identifiable territory, a distinct culture, and a will and capability to regain self-governance.5

The right to self-determination is indisputably a norm of jus cogens.6Jus cogens norms are the highest rules of international law and they must be strictly obeyed at all times. Both the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States have ruled on cases in a way that supports the view that the principle of self-determination also has the legal status of erga omnes.7 The term “erga omnes” means “flowing to all.” Accordingly, ergas omnes obligations of a State are owed to the international community as a whole: when a principle achieves the status of erga omnes the rest of the international community is under a mandatory duty to respect it in all circumstances in their relations with each other.

Unfortunately, when we review situations invoking the principle of self-determination, we encounter what we must call the politics of avoidance: the principle of self-determination has been reduced to a weapon of political rhetoric. The international community, therefore, has abandoned people who have the claim to the principle of self-determination. We must insist that the international community address those situations invoking the right to self-determination in the proper, legal way.

International Community and Self-Determination

Self-determination is one of the most important and most obscure principles of contemporary international law and practice. The principle is important as the justification of the most far-reaching political realignments in recent international history, those associated with the collapse of imperialism and the post-World War II movement toward colonial independence. As a result, the principle has rapidly been accepted as a main principle of international law. The concept is twice mentioned in the United Nations Charter (articles 2(4) and 55) and is cited as authority for the General Assembly’s call for “the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples” in Resolution 1,514 (XX) of 14 December 1960 (UNGA:61:67). In the last quarter century, the General Assembly has reaffirmed this call almost annually, each time citing the principle of self-determination as if it were a self-evident first principle (Annex to UN Resolution 2,625(XXV), 24 October 1970).

The International community has taken significant steps towards leading this type of conflict towards peaceful, legal settlement through the UN, NATO, and other treaty organizations or NGOs. However, what has not changed in world politics is that economic gain is still the motivating factor for intervention. Small countries experiencing ethnic conflict, no matter how just their cause will face an uphill battle to secure their rights if the economic interests of larger countries dictate otherwise.

Typical progressions for this type of trouble spots begin with colonial origins, divestiture by colonial masters followed by political and economic instability. Ethnic tensions exacerbated by years of colonial mismanagement hasten this instability as the re-organization of powers within the state attempts to fill the vacuum left by the colonial masters. Finally, the sponsorship by one superpower or the other, may be serving to artificially impose stability on the region until that sponsor too divests and departs.

A good example of this post cold war loosening of proxies and the ethnic tension it releases is East Timor. The Indonesian annexation of Timor was accepted and perhaps encouraged by the Americans because the Indonesians were accomplishing for the Americans a proxy role: ridding the resource rich archipelago of potential conflict sites (weak, hostile governments in transition after colonial divestiture) where Soviet or Chinese influence could rapidly extend. This was simply a continuation of the consolidation of power that the Americans had quietly observed take place in Indonesia itself some 10 years earlier.