Didem Buhari, University of Edinburgh, Explaining Turkey's Failure to Comply with the European Union: a neoinstitutionalist perspective
INTRODUCTION
Turkey is an official European Union (EU) candidate since 1999. It started accession negotiations in 2005 and enacted substantial reforms in order to align with the EU acquis. However, negotiations were stalled by the EU in December 2006 due to Turkey’s failure to comply in several policy areas. This research intends primarily to study cases where there is significant domestic resistance to the EU reforms and understand why this resistance has occurred. Accordingly, the research investigates the policy domains in which there are pressures to comply with the EU requirements, Turkish domestic actors who resist these pressures and the mechanisms through which the latter receive, translate and reject the EU “messages”.
This research aims to investigate four recent instances, which constitute “hard cases” for Turkey’s membership to the EU. Those are Turkey’s restrictions against the EU citizens’ right to acquire land and work in Turkey, restrictions against Greek Cyprus and the Article 301 penalizing insult to “Turkishness” and Turkish institutions. In all of the proposed instances, the magnitude and the essence of domestic resistance vary as well as the involved actors. Although “national interest” argument is ubiquitous, its meaning is different in each case.
Following Neo-institutionalist literature, this paper introduces relevant concepts that might explain the selected cases. Briefly, apart from the involved actors and the domestic political organization, the domestic salience of norms and the clarity of the EU messages are advanced as explanatory variables. Hence, not only material but also ideational factors should be considered.
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES
Turkey is an official EU candidate since the EU Helsinki Council decision in 1999. It has started accession negotiations in 2005 and enacted substantial reforms in a wide range of policy domains in order to align with the EU. However, the negotiations have been stalled by the EU in December 2006 due to Turkey’s failure to comply in several policy areas. This research intends primarily to study cases where there has been significant domestic resistance to Europeanization and understand why this resistance has occurred. Accordingly, it is crucial to investigate the Turkish policy domains in which there are pressures to comply with the EU requirements, Turkish domestic actors who resist these pressures and the mechanisms through which the latter receive, translate and reject the EU “messages”. In this sense, the role of the institutions in Turkey’s Europeanization process should be taken into consideration.
Among a wide range of choices, this study proposes to study four recent instances, which constitute “critical cases” for –i.e. directly consequential upon- Turkey’s Europeanization process. Those cases are officially reported by the European Commission in its regular progress reports on Turkey (published annually since 1999). In all of the four proposed instances, the magnitude of domestic resistance related to the number and the nature of the involved actors vary.
The four cases of interest involve restrictions against foreigner’s right to land and to work in Turkey, limitations towards freedom of expression and ban against Greek Cypriot transport to Turkey. Due to time limitations, we have to limit ourselves by looking only at the foreigner’s right to own land (FLO) in Turkey.
Resisting Foreigners’ Land Ownership and Europeanization
Since the inception of the Turkish Republic, there have been several legal limitations towards foreigners’ land ownership in Turkey[1]. Briefly, according to Turkish legislation, foreign legal persons’ right to land is totally restricted; villages and military zones are forbidden to foreign acquisition; finally, the total surface of the land acquired by foreigners may not exceed 30 ha. In mid-1980s a pro-liberal Turkish government amended the legislation twice in order to ease the restrictions.[2] However, those amendments were quickly annulled by Turkish Constitutional Court, which announced that land ownership is not merely an economic matter, but a matter of national interest and sovereignty.[3] Hence, restrictions towards foreigners have been maintained. Up until the officialization of Turkey’s EU candidature, there has been no development in this domain.
However in 2003, the pro-EU Turkish government decided to accelerate its reform process in order to start accession negotiations with the EU and passed a law allowing both foreign real and legal persons to acquire land even from villages. This law aimed at harmonizing Turkish land market legislation with the EU principle of free movement of capital.[4] Yet, upon the request of the main opposition party, the Constitutional Court decided to annul the new law based on the same arguments it had declared in 1980s.[5]
In Turkish Constitution, there are at least four provisions -Articles 6,7,8,9- prohibiting delegation of sovereignty to an external entity[6]. Furthermore, the Preamble of Turkish Constitution stipulates that “…no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and …secularism…;” Moreover, Constitutional Court justified its restrictive stance by claiming that even the EU member states do not unanimously comply with the free movement of capital. The Court’s reference to the EU member states, which derogate from the EU is crucial in terms of demonstrating the impact of internal EU affairs on the Turkish domestic actors.
The opposition parties have successfully sought to mobilize segments of Turkish society against the liberalization of Turkish land market. Arguments are mainly based on socio-economic problems, protracted sovereignty disputes with Greece, historical memories on Turkish national independence war against European forces and, anti-zionist and xenophobic sentiments. What is interesting is to observe that the opinions of leftist and rightist segments of Turkish society converge around the same arguments regarding this issue. For example, a prominent leading member of a leftist party (and wife of the former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit) opposed the new land law because she believes this would lead to the mass purchases of land by Israelis.[7] The pro-Islamists attack the law on the same ground.[8]
A prominent journalist published a map of Turkey showing the current numbers related to foreign acquisition of land and entitled it “invasion map”.[9] A former high-rank civil servant from Turkish Land Registry argued in his book that lifting restrictions towards foreigners was equal to treachery to the nation.[10] The same argument was endorsed in a written public report by a non-governmental organization, namely the Turkish Chamber of Survey and Cadastre Engineers.[11]
Finally, the main suspicion gaining ground in Turkish society is that the Europeanization process might undermine the territorial integrity of Turkish Republic. Some scholars call this suspicion “Sevres Syndrome”, i.e. historical paranoia named after the aborted Treaty of Sevres in 1920 intending to dismember the Ottoman Empire.[12] However, even the Turkish President of the time stated its concerns over the issue and aligned with the opposition.[13]
Accordingly, regarding public opinion, a large pro-status quo bloc has emerged embracing even an unholy alliance among the most extreme ideological opponents. Resonating arguments are mainly:
· (Economic disparity)- Due to the difference between purchasing powers, the majority of Turkish land might be bought by foreigners and Turkish farmers might remain landless (See the report of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects - Chamber of Survey and Cadastre Engineers, 2006).
· Emotional link to “motherland” could also contribute to the opposition.
· (National security)- Thinking retrospectively, there is a fear that Europeans (particularly Greek nationals) are willing to invade Turkey as they did in 1920s. This time not militarily but in a peaceful way, by buying Turkish land (Dundar in Milliyet 10 July 2006).
The popular reaction was such that Turkish Presidency and several Turkish universities launched researches on the current status of foreigner’s acquisition of land in Turkey. The Turkish General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre has even introduced a new chapter in its official website in order to answer public questions on FLO. Yet, in contrast to the high sensitivity in public opinion, official statistics report that foreigners’ land ownership in Turkey is negligible.[14]
Concerning the stance of the governing party over the issue, it is hard to draw a comprehensive analysis. This is partly because the party won a landslide victory in 2002 elections right after its foundation. Moreover, the top officials of the party have been previously known for their strong opposition to the EU membership. Yet, currently it is plausible to claim that the main agenda of the government has been based on the harmonization of Turkish law with the acquis communautaire. However, the attempted reform in the foreigner’s land ownership issue has been interpreted as revolutionary and faced institutional resistance from Presidency, several political parties and Turkish Constitutional Court. Thus, in order to avoid a backlash from the society, the government decided to follow the established restrictive attitude. Accordingly, the current law maintains the limitations towards foreigners.[15] Nevertheless, the government claims that the FLO issue is exploited by the opposition and adopts two types of arguments bolstering the FLO. First, the party officials claim that liberalization would be in the interest of Turkish society by attracting foreign investment and secondly, relying on the official statistics, they reject the concern that there will be massive amount of FLO.[16] However, they fail to appease those who believe that reciprocity is impossible between Turkish citizens and the EU citizens in land ownership issue, the gap between Turkish citizens’ purchasing power and the EU average is very high. Hence it would be uneven for Turkish people to let Europeans buy land in Turkey. Moreover, the EU policy of issuing limitations on the free movement of Turkish people in the EU even after Turkey becomes a member might create another obstacle for Turkish citizens to buy land in other EU countries.
On the other hand, the EU urges for Turkish compliance in FLO. The EU Commission Reports on Turkey states that Turkish legislation restricting EU citizens’ land ownership has to be abrogated for the functioning of the internal market. However, the EU is also aware of the sensitivity of the issue. The same problem has been experienced very intensely during the negotiations with the new member states.[17] Particularly, in Poland the harmonization process has been controversial due to Poland’s historical land ownership problems with Germany.[18]
Based on economic needs, several new members have been entitled the right to derogate for a limited time period regarding second homes, forestry and agricultural land. However, the EU does not accept arguments based on national security because this would reverse the character of the Union.[19] Hence, the Commission and the ECJ forced Greece to halt its security-related restrictions against EU citizens’ right to own land from border zones, islands and coastal regions.[20]
Finally, during the campaigns for the Turkish general elections held in July 2007, several political parties put the FLO issue on their campaign agenda and defended arguments against harmonization with the EU law. However, the pro-EU government won another landslide victory and established itself as a single government again. The FLO issue has not yet been dealt with. In order to analyze the case of interest, we propose to use a theoretical framework mainly derived from neo-institutionalist literature.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Neo-institutionalism is a promising theoretical framework for its analytical openness and its place bridging highly abstract general theories with the theoretical approaches limited to explaining stable causal mechanisms. According to George&Bennett, Neo-institutionalism is beneficial for researchers investigating a process because it also suggests considering intervening variables such as institutions rather than merely focusing on the initial and final stages of a phenomenon[21].
In summary, neo-institutionalism criticizes the mainstream decision-theoretic approaches on the grounds that “Political phenomena could not be reduced to the aggregate consequences of intentional individual behaviour. The organization of political life makes a difference”[22]. Similarly, Peter Hall in his book entitled “Governing the Economy” concludes that “The range of customary policy instruments at hand and the kind of societal resistance to be expected in the face of a given policy vary according to organizational differences that affect the perceived costs and benefits of policy in many issue areas”[23]. Briefly, according to neo-institutionalism, institutions, defined generally as formal and informal rules and regulations, have an effect on political preferences[24]. However, the main variants of neo institutionalisms -Rational choice and sociological institutionalisms- disagree on the extent of this institutional effect. This is mainly an ontological dispute over state interests and identity. According to rational choice institutionalism, states have pre-conceived interests that are exogenous to any international interaction. Hence a policy might be accepted by a state when it is perceived as beneficial to its established interests. However, sociological institutionalists reject such an instrumental review of state interests. Including sociological factors such as culture and identity to the debate, they defend that state interests are socially constructed and might be altered not necessarily out of strategic cost-benefit calculations. In other words, policies might be adopted not only for their benefits but also for their appropriateness concerning the identity of the state[25].
In Turkey’s relations with the EU, neo-institutionalism might thus explain two different developments. First, the rational choice approach suggests to investigate the number and relative power of the political actors involved in the case of interest. In his book “Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work”, George Tsebelis gives an explicit example of rational institutionalist work[26]. In our case, veto players, defined as political actors whose assent is necessary for a change in the status quo, include Turkish Constitutional Court, Presidency, and opposition parties. Studying the powers ascribed to them might help us to explain change and continuities regarding EU reforms in Turkey. However, this approach might also be criticized of excluding socialization and the impact of external actors such as transnational advocacy networks and epistemic communities in persuading and teaching domestic agents to adopt new policies[27].
In their works, Finnemore, Sikkink and Keck are claim that transnational actors influence the domestic perceptions and lead to policy changes not only because they are beneficial but also because they are appropriate[28]. Besides them, Checkel develops sociological institutionalist literature with his researches on the domestic agency in receiving and interpreting these messages transmitted by external actors[29]. In this sense, it is crucial to scrutinize the interaction process between external “messages” and the domestic arena that receives and translates them. This is particularly necessary when there is a significant “misfit” between the external norms and domestic normative structure. Similarly, Finnemore&Sikkink emphasize the role of mediators in this process, called “norm entrepreneurs” or “meaning managers”[30]. Those mediators should render the external “messages” more meaningful in the domestic context in order to persuade the domestic actors to adopt them.