Virginia Review of Asian Studies: 19 (2017): 91-97

Virginia Review of Asian Studies: 19 (2017): 91-97

Issn: 2169-6306

Curry: South China Sea

A NOTE ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, CHINA AND ASEAN

Robert L. Curry, Jr.[1] California State University Sacramento

The Setting

President Donald Trump, his key administrativeofficials and their staff personnel collectively facean array of domestic and international problemsthatwill tax their collective capacity to deal with them successfully.For example, In the East Asia region two problems stand out. The first is a belligerent North Korean government whose efforts to mature its nuclear and ballistic missile capacities puts the region on edge and the possibility that the government might actually use them is a frightening nightmare. Second, there’s a conflict involving China that’s escalating around the South China Sea’sParacel and Spratly Islands and it’s one that could develop intoa full military confrontation that would also involve the United States. Efforts to deal with the problemssuccessfully stands a chance of being impaired by the Trump administration’s recent fiscal decision to enhance military spending at the expense of a “softer” (or diplomatic) approach to dealing with international problems. Another troubling sign is that diplomacy might be devalued as a tool because during the early days of the administration there have been significant departures of career diplomats from the Department of State. Dealing with global problems generally, including those that are brewing within East Asia will require bothresources and skilled and experienced diplomats.

The conflict that’s been brewing in the South China Sea has at its core two persistent unresolved issues. The first is a set ofcompeting sovereign territorial claims and counter claims made bythe People’s Republic of China (PRC)andfour members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The second is China’sintrusioninto parts of the South China Sea in the form of recoveringland from the seaand then buildingmilitary instillations on the new surfaces.It’s a hard-headed conflict becauseeach contending partyis serious and unyieldingabout the legitimacyof its claims, aspirations and actions. Each is reluctant to takea backward stepand over time their shared stubbornness could ignite a latent potential for a dangerous clash. Continuingmilitary buildups by China and the United States have escalated the importance of finding diplomatic ways to resolvethe disputed claimsandto settle the matter of intrusion.Finding ways to do so amicably and successfully will not be easy,andthe United States will necessarilybe involved in the process. This means that the Trump administration will play a key role in determining whether the future of the South China Seawill reflect stability and securityin the form ofmaintaining commercial and navigational opennessor whether the regionwill dissolve into chaos and possibly a military confrontation. If it turns out to be the latter, more than the immediate region will be affected. The U.S. will play a crucial role in determining the outcome of the conflict and helping to shape that outcome in a positive willbe a test of whetherthenew administration is capable and competent.

The conflicted settingin which the test will take place resulted of a series ofterritorial disputes with, andnumerous incursions by China. They have been routinely resisted and challenged by ASEAN members. The disputes and confrontationshave been going on for decades and as long as they persist, there’s a danger that they could get “out of hand” and ignite what is a very real potential regional flashpoint. This potential challengesall diplomats and legal professionalsto find ways to achieving four desired outcomes: limiting China’s intrusion into the region’s islands; minimizinglikelihood that the instruments of intrusion will be used aggressively; eliminating or at least reducing the possibility thatthe conflict could actually ignitea military conflict; and settling the sovereign territorial disputes amicably and according to the rules of law.

Enter the Trump Administration

The role that the Trump administration will play will be within the contextof its global relations withChina. As it enters the picture, the new administration would be wise to formulate an approachthat starts by evaluatingthe validity of the opinion that the PRC isnecessarily auniversal adversary of the United Stateson virtually all issues. True, China and the U.S. are engaged in an array ofeconomic, financial and strategic contestsglobally. No oneof them is potentiallymore important, contentiousordangerous as is the conflict that’currently growingover China’sphysical and military expansion into the South China Sea.Yes, the PRC’S expansion unquestionablythreatensregional stability,but does this mean that China isabsolutely and immutablyan adversary of the U.S.? In effect, are negotiations with the PRC impossibleandtherefore are diplomatic resolutionswith it unreachable?

Before concludingthat the answer to each question is “yes”, it’s useful to note that at the multilateral diplomatic level the Chinese government agreed with the Obama administration to be part of the global effort to deal with climate change. At the bilateral level, following negotiations with wildlife preservation activiststhe PRC agreed to stop permanently the importation of ivory within a year. And most importantly, bilaterally both the U.S. and the PRC currently adhere to a “One China” policy.These and other actions by the government of China suggest that it would be shortsighted to reach the conclusion that it’s impossible for either the U.S. orany other government or non-governmental organization toengage the PRC diplomatically and successfully.

Trying to find a solutionnecessarily mustinclude ASEANgenerally and specifically to four of its member states that have sovereign territorial disputes with the PRCPresidentTrump would be wise to examinecritically whether the South China Sea issue is exclusively or even primarilya conflict between China and the U.S. or whether a third party is involved. Indeed one is involved and it’s ASEAN as a whole on some issues and four of its member states on matters strictly related to sovereign territorial disputes. Failure to recognize this fact would be in error because even a brief examination of the issue’s history reveals that over the past two-plus decades members of ASEAN have been involved ina series of competing claims thathave pittedthem against China. It’s also important for the trump administration to note that althoughsovereignty and incursion issues remain unresolved, the antagonists continue to meet diplomaticallyaiming for an amicable solution. Maintaining diplomatic engagement will be central to deliberations. This will be an asset to the Trump administration, one that it should neither ignore nor under-value.

The Complexities

The Trump administration enters asetting that is fraught with complexities and a key one has to do with ASEAN as an ally. It’s clear that historically previous U.S. administrations have consistently supported the claims of the ASEAN states and denounced China’s intrusions.Butthere’s a fundamental impediment to creating an evenmore solid U.S./ASEAN connection becauseASEAN is neither fully committed to, nor enthusiastic about any suchunlimited partnership. This is because ASEAN’sbasic operating principle is internal consensus which, in this case is not easily achieved. Theassociation’s ten membersdiffer in the severity of their concern over the PRC’s South China Sea intrusions and claims. In addition, only of them have territorial claims that would conflict with China’s ambitions. However, on the matter of military intrusions,it’s generally acknowledged that all ASEAN members are at least somewhat concerned about some of China’s assertiveness throughout the region. For example, they’re all concerned about China taking steps such as building amissile defense system in the Paracel Islands along with previous military installations that were constructed on both the Paracel and Spratly Islands. While some ASEAN members physically border the region, others do not. Most members are physically distant from the South China Sea, an area that measures 410,000 square kilometers and includes about 100 small and islands.

The Trump administration will need to navigate all of this. Unfortunately (but realistically) a legitimate concern has to do withthe degree to which the administration fully recognizesASEAN for what it is and what it is not; that is, what factors will shape the nature of the contemporary U.S./ASEAN connection One point is clear—ASEAN and its members are important. From apolitical-economy perspective, ASEAN is a major strategic, economic, security and political component to thecontemporary Asia-Pacific mosaic. On the economic side ASEANregion issubstantial and successful: its terrain is home to 622million people who collectively produce a regional economic productexceeding 2.6 trillion US dollars annually. The Association’s focusis on economic growth and developmentwithin member states via promoting openness in the form of tariff reductions, trade liberalization, continued expansion of foreign direct investment, anddispute settlement through the use of the ASEAN Dialogue Partnership System (ADPS).

ASEAN is lively and forward looking. Recently itsten members agreed to take a big step by forming a tightly knit ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) the goal of which is to grow the regional economy further by creating a set of production and financial centers throughout the region and linking them througha set of improved and expanded physical infrastructure facilities in transportation, energy, water and communications. Here’s where China enters the picture via its global investment institution that financed someof the AEC’s newerinfrastructure projects. This is only one aspect of China’s shared interests with ASEAN—there are others. Indeed, for an array of economic reasons it’s clear to serious policy analysts that both thePRC and the U.S. need to continue takingASEAN seriously: one key reason is that, on the economic sidethe AEC is the third largest economy in Asia and the seventh largest in the world. It’s an active and forward-looking entity with economic tiesboth toChina and the U.S. The result is a stable and dynamic South East Asian economy that is importantto the three parties because each draws substantial benefits from participating in the way it functions.

On the political and diplomatic side, association with ASEAN provides the United States with important benefitsprovided that they are generatedin ways that neither insult, anger nor provoke the Chinese into expanding furtherinto South China Sea islands.The keybenefit for the U.S. is that when it forms a working relationship withASEAN it not only gains anallybut more importantly,it gains onethat hasgenerally good relations with China. This produces abridge for the U.S. andASEANto use jointly as theynegotiate with China. Each partner has always known thattheir connection must not be seen as anti-Chinese. The government of the PRC must be a full party todiplomatic proceedings and must be satisfied with any agreement generated from such proceeding

Thebridgebegan to be created when the U.S. started to supportASEAN member countries in their territorial claims against China: four of the ten member countries have been negotiating diplomatically with the PRC over these rights and other mattersfor years. In the process the contending parties have come up with agreements that aim to protect free navigation, to assure shared resource extraction privileges and to pledge to continue negotiating over a range of issues.An over-riding issue is China’s recent movement ofmilitary resources into the islands. For the United States, how to deal with the PRC’s actions becomes a real problem. The U.S. is not alone in condemning China’s actions. ASEAN is also concerned and this sets the stage for a stronger U.S. and ASEAN connection (understanding that there’s a solid and positive relationship between ASEAN and China). The connection provides the U.S. with a bridge to deal with the PRC: by teaming with ASEAN the U.S. is not forced to “go it alone” in confronting China.Moreover there is aset of relationships among the three countries that are important to them and acknowledging this symbiotic phenomenon is likely to be an important constraint toboth China and the U.S.

Constraint isimportant during thecontemporary phase of the conflictmilitary expansion is taking place as the Chinese governmentcontinuesexpandingits presence in the region by increasing local island surfaces and then constructingairstrips on recoveredland masses. Not only do the airstripshave military uses but in additionto them, the PRC continues installing anti-aircraft weaponry, ballistic launch platforms and sending fighter jets to the region.Their recent actions “heated up” the region becausein response to China’s continuing expansions the U.S.“upped the ante” by building up both its naval and air force capacities--and at the same time so has China! There are two dangers in how the twocould further “heat up”the conflict: first, bybad policy-makingon the part of both the U.S. and China; or second, byan unintended andaccidentalmilitary encounter in an area crowded with military assets. If an accidental encounter were to take place, military leaders and policy-makers might respond byescalating an unintended and isolated incidentinto a full-fledged military conflict. Granted,the probability ofsomething of the sort happening is slim,but it isn’t zero!Bringing it to zero obviously will require skillful political, diplomatic and military maneuvering by all parties, including President Trump!

The Challenge

Performing successfully within the complex nature of the South China Sea issue requires thatthe Trump administration accept four fundamental facts: first, ASEAN and some of its member countries are significantparties in the struggle; second, the individual countries as well as ASEAN as a wholehave generally excellent relations with both the United Statesand China; third, the government of the PRC also desires a solution to the issue that satisfies its interests; and fourth, all parties to the conflict have an interest in an amicable solution to this issue because they have other things to do—some of them jointly. For example, one over-riding goal that they share is to maintain a healthy and dynamic Asia-Pacific economy with the ASEAN region being a core component. The ASEAN region is a destination for both Chinese and United States exports and it’s a sourceof some key imports for both. In addition, the region attractsdirect foreign investments as well as short and long term capital flows from both the U.S. and the PRC. As a result, two-way trade, foreign direct investmentpatterns and portfolio capital flows tie together the three economies in ways that revealsymbiotic complementaritiesthatmatch their economic strengths and needs.

In addition to private sector financial and market connections, the three share institutional affiliations in regional economic organizations includingthe Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). These institutional affiliations are complimented by their shared interests in seeing to it that there’s a successful outcome in the South China Sea. On bilateral bases, the three are linked via a set of long-standing and successful agreements that promote cross border labor migration, foster cultural and artistic exchange programs and operate educational exchanges, particularly at the university level.

Clearly the three parties recognize that they share interests in a stable, open and growing regional economy and recognizing this obvious factprovides them with a firm foundation for serious although often contentious negotiations and open discussions. Maintaining a system of stable, peaceful and mutually advantageous market linkages between China and ASEAN is a significant part of that foundation. There’s an interesting example of direct and deepmarket exchanges that link five ASEAN economies with China. It’sthe Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) created in 1992 by the Asian Development Bank. The GMS brings them together in what has been called “a natural economic territory” built along the Upper Mekong that involves Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam withthe Yunnan Province of the People’s Republic of China. During the past quarter of a century the current regional economy graduallybegan to take shape as it replaced the old wild drug centered “Golden Triangle.” The area’s 300 million people have benefited from growth in the region’s industrial, commercial, agricultural and financial sectors. Private sector economic activities have been supported by an ever-improving transportation, energy and communication infrastructure. However, problems remain: for example, environmental issues have emerged along the great river as damns and electricity generation facilities constructed and operated by the Chinese have changed the course of water flows in its tributaries and his has affected local commercial and subsistence agriculture.

The GMS economy has other problems. For example, income and wealth inequalities are generated by the way that the GMS markets perform. The people of Yunnan Province and the government of the PRC have been the more prominent beneficiaries fromhow the economy performs. Distribution inequalities persist so do instances of poverty mainly among low productivity workers who live and work in the ASEAN side of the Mekong River. This is a significant and only failure and only the Chinese are in the best position to create the type of labor and goods market exchanges that would even-out the distribution ofincome and wealth.