Niccolò Petrelli
Post-Doctoral Fellow
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
Counterinsurgency:
A Conceptual and Operational Reassessment
Introduction
The last 11 years have marked a ‘revolution’ in the Western thinking and practice of counterinsurgency.[1] From being relatively neglected in military studies and almost forgotten in the academia, ‘Counterinsurgency’ rose to prominence again, becoming one of the most researched issues in strategic and security studies.[2] The renewed interest in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, alimented by the ascendancy of asymmetric warfare over ‘conventional’ or ‘symmetric warfare’ and the declaration of a Global War on Terror (GWOT) by the Bush Administration,[3] has generated a scholarly revival of the so-called ‘classics’[4] produced in the period of decolonization wars, the exegesis and re-elaboration of the prescriptions and lessons contained in those works and later on, especially following the first difficulties in the successful application of those lessons ‘in the field’, various forms of reappraisal of this rapidly consolidated new conventional wisdom.[5]
Such an intellectual debate, often epitomized in the much employed theoretical dichotomy of Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism (or ‘enemy-centric’ and ‘population-centric’ approaches)[6] has taken place in a rather tumultuous way, impacting adversely on a disciplined and rigorous accumulation of knowledge on the topic of counterinsurgency. In fact, both the processes of reception of the classic wisdom and its following questioning have taken place quite hastily, often over-conditioned by looming failures on the battlefield or reappraisals of foreign policy goals in the cadre of the GWOT.[7] Consequently, an examination of the evolution of the scholarly and professional works on counterinsurgency ultimately leaves with a confused and contradictory understanding of counterinsurgency.[8]
From this premise emerges the main question which this paper intends to address: how to reassess the theory and practice of counterinsurgency in light of the debates and experiences of the last ten years?
This general question addresses relevant unresolved issues in the literature on counterinsurgency. In fact, among the fallacies which affect the scholarly knowledge on the topic distinctly stand: the semantic confusion concerning the very nature of counterinsurgency (what is counterinsurgency?) and its proper field of application (what kind of conflicts does it suit?);[9] the too broad generalizations concerning sets of ‘best practices’ and operational templates supposedly applicable to all cases beyond contextual variations;[10] the construction of narratives of success of ‘population-centric’ approaches often based on biases and selectivity in historical accounts.[11]
In order to analyze these issues the paper distinguishes between counterinsurgency theory (COIN) and practice. This paper frames the analysis within a ‘systems perspective’, envisioning the theory and practice of counterinsurgency as affecting each other through complex feedback relationships. The 60s theory, mainly a by-product of theorist-practitioners, significantly contributed to influence and shape material goals and expectations for policy-makers and practitioners, as well as to set the foundations of the scholarly and professional debates and our very understanding of the practice of counterinsurgency. On the other hand, constraints and difficulties in adapting theory-informed practice to battlefield conditions produced in turn (albeit to a limited extent) adjustments and reassessments in COIN theory and in the understanding of practice. Such a deep functional interdependence between theory and practice makes sure that the effect determined by each element can be understood only in the context of the system as a whole.[12] Thus, although a distinction between theory and practice may appear somewhat artificial, given their strong degree of overlap and interaction, the subsequent analysis will show that it constitutes a useful heuristic device.
The Theory of COIN
Theories about how to counter insurgency and rebellion date well before the age of Imperialism, Social Darwinism, and Racism. However, this ‘classical’ literature has been often forgotten with most authors today assuming that contemporary literature on counterinsurgency has its roots in the 19th century.[13]
Consequently, though the subject itself is quite fluid,[14] what is today commonly referred to as the theory of counterinsurgency or COIN is the semi-formal body of theories and precepts for countering insurgencies which were elaborated mainly in the US government-research ‘think-thank’ community of the late 50s. It seems in fact that the very term COIN developed sometime between 1958 and 1962, in response to the problems of Cold War low-intensity conflict in underdeveloped countries once part of the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa.[15]
In 1958, following the outbreak of communist-inspired nationalist insurgencies in the wake of decolonization process, the RAND corporation, a nonprofit policy think tank founded in 1948 by Douglas Aircraft Company to provide research and analysis to the United States armed forces, carried out a series of war games for the US Air Force called SIERRA.[16] SIERRA focused on the problems of limited war in South Asia, the Far and the Middle East.[17] One of the key outcome of project SIERRA was to generate a brand new interest in the topic of rebellion and insurgency and the techniques to counter them, as confirmed by a book on Viet Minh insurgent strategy and tactics written by George Tanham.[18]
As part of an expanded research program on counterinsurgency, 1962 witnessed the organization of a Symposium by RAND to study contemporary wars of national liberation.[19] Purpose of the 1962 symposium was generating a corpus of knowledge relevant for the conduct of contemporary and future counterinsurgency operations. Through a methodological approach based on extrapolating lessons by analogy from case studies (developed by Harvard Business School and the Operations Research Community) RAND researchers attempted to advance knowledge on COIN, synthesizing best practices and field methods developed by practitioners with theoretical insights from RAND’s scientists and nuclear strategists.[20]
Despite the fact that, prior to the 60s, the US defense community had already maturated a certain experience of insurgent warfare, and that it had been partially codified in the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual,[21] the US renewed interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency at the beginning of the 60s testifies of a strong influence of European colonial counter-insurgency practitioners/theorists. Particularly prominent among them were Lt. Col. David Galula, in 1962 research associate at Harvard and veteran of Algeria, Col. Frank Kitson, veteran of the Mau Mau revolt (both present at the RAND 1962 symposium) but also Robert Thompson, from 1961 head of the British International Advisory Mission to Vietnam (BRIAM).[22]
Although not comprehensive theories, the works of Galula, Thompson and, later on, Kitson enclosed field experiences within a loose theoretical framework built on post-event rationalizations in the attempt to distil general lessons supposedly applicable to any context. Several of the precepts and principles theorized by these authors, such as the understanding of counterinsurgency as 90% political and 10% military, the inapplicability of purely military solutions, the need to provide security to the civilian population and/or to win its ‘hearts and minds’, to use minimum force and to respect the rule of law would become central tenets of the conventional wisdom in COIN.[23]
Some of these principles merged in the first theorizations of COIN elaborated by RAND in the first half of the 60s. Often moving from a similar ‘counter-Maoist’ perspective which animated Galula and Thompson writings, RAND researchers focused on the issue the insurgents’ need for popular support and the problems of modernization. In such a perspective, counterinsurgency would consist in providing the people security from predations by government and insurgent forces and reducing the negative consequences of development while enhancing the positive aspects. Increasing political rights of the people, improving standards of living, and reducing corruption and abuse of government power were key prescriptions of this COIN theory, which, tellingly, came to be known as ‘hearts and minds’, a term originally coined by Sir Gerald Templer during the Malayan Emergency.[24]
In the following years, practitioners and theoreticians in Great Britain, France[25] and the US moved away from the relatively benign perspective of COIN approaches of the early 60s,[26] in favor of more forceful approaches focused on the role of coercion (variously understood) in countering insurgencies. Nevertheless, the ideas of Galula, Thompson and the tenets of the so-called ‘hearts and minds’ paradigm variously re-elaborated by RAND scholars remained extremely influential among scholars and experts.[27]
In fact, after resonating in the context of the Vietnam War,[28] ‘WHAM’ (Winning Hearts & Minds) neo-classic theorizations of COIN resurfaced in the intellectual discourse of the early 2000s, rising to a consensual creed in expert debates about COIN in the mid-2000s. The popularity of such an understanding of COIN was later enshrined in the famous US Field Manual 3–24 of December 2006.[29]
Fostered by lack of historical framing and cultural isolation from other relevant contiguous fields of studies, this new wave of ‘neo-classical’ COIN theory however has developed in a rather tumultuous way and has not managed to overcome the limits of the previous neo-classical COIN literature. This has in turn led to the incorporation of many of its shortcomings and has generated redundancy and reinvention of the wheel.
Rather than following the Clausewitzian preference for explanatory theory early neo-classic theoretical works on COIN situated themselves in a tradition of rationalist prescriptive military guides well established in Western military thought since Henri Antoine De Jomini. In fact Galula’s, Kitson’s and Thompson’s works basically offered a simplistic, ‘how to’ guide to the successful conduct of COIN over-conditioned by normative assumptions. These theoretical books sought to break war down into simple steps exhorting the reader to follow a specific set of tactics and adopt well-identified best-practices permeated with sage operational advice, to achieve the perfect counter-insurgency.[30]
This rationalist and prescriptive approach further reinforced as the US increased its intellectual interest in COIN. The ‘engineering positivism’ traditionally manifested by the US think-tank community in its approach to security problems favored a natural inclination for attempting to simplify complex strategic problems and break them up into discreet technical puzzles manageable through technique and calculus.[31] Ideas and theories which were fashionable in social sciences at the time were therefore incorporated in works about COIN. Neo-classic COIN theory’s social-scientific component is in fact based on a rather materialistic conception of development, governance and legitimacy, as well as on a sometimes biased and narrow understanding of the nature of colonial and post-colonial societies in the Third World.[32] Historians Michael E. Latham and Jefferson Marquis, as well as political scientist D. Michael Shafer have clearly demonstrated the influence of modernization theories and of several other cultural/political approaches in the US reception of the first theoretical works on COIN by European scholars/practitioners as well as in the elaboration of the first theorizations on COIN by the Kennedy administration and the associated think-tanks.[33]
Appealing to the authority of neo-classical COIN theory, the new wave of theoretical works on COIN of the 2000s fully embraced the 60s approach, its research methodology and its intellectual foundations. Most of the theoretical researches on COIN were policy-oriented single case studies employed to find generalizable principles and/or to derive knowledge usable by certain international actors, most often the UK and the US.[34] Moreover, the incorporation of Western patterns of political thought within COIN theory perpetuated an understanding of COIN as a competition of governance between insurgents and counterinsurgents based on outdated views of social welfare, development and legitimate authority that were hardly held outside the western world.[35]
The adoption of a rationalist-prescriptive framework generated an almost exclusive preoccupation with method and technique. This led to advocate technocratic managerialist approaches based upon privileging particular types of knowledge and experiences as relevant and implying all insurgencies could be resolved through the application of such technocratic prescriptions.[36] Both the 60s neo-classic COIN theory and new wave crafted in the 2000s called for winning the hearts and minds of insurgents by delivering material benefits to the local population through the improvement of education, health and economic prosperity. At the same time both were underpinned by over-generalized rationalist and materialist assumptions which suggest that insurgencies are amenable to technocratic solutions and accompanied by ‘modernization’ or (more recently) by theories of globalization which assume that the world is moving inexorably in stages towards capitalistic democracy.[37] Though mentioning the importance of context, theoretical works on counterinsurgency often made generalizations about insurgents that could not adequately describe the complexity and diversity of counterinsurgency operations nor could they adequately explain diverse approaches over ethnic and religious identity, conceptions of legitimate authority and strength of political goals.[38]
Last but not least, though evolving into one of the most discussed and studied issue in strategic studies methodological and meta-methodological issues in COIN theory remained underdeveloped. In fact, the 2000’s neo-classical COIN remained afflicted by a broad sample size problem, as the case studies used to formulate the theory were drawn from a very small subset of examples of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and from a very specific historical period (that of communist wars of national liberation in the immediate post-1945 period).[39] Only in the last years the methodology of case studies started to be increasingly employed for the first large-N studies[40]. Moreover, despite their obsolescence in the philosophy of science, COIN theory mostly imported an empiricist epistemology, realist ontology and formal modes of explanation from political science and International Relations (IR). Epistemologically neo-classical COIN theory relied on knowledge justified inductively by reference to accumulated facts based on experience; ontologically real existence and causal properties to formal objects such as structures and systems is ascribed and finally, in terms of explanation, formal approaches such as classifications and correlations are adopted whereby history is treated as a source of data rather than a way of explaining data.[41]
All these shortcomings leave with a confused and contradictory understanding of how exactly we should think about COIN theory. In fact, rather than analytical investigations employed to analyze the constituent elements of a specific kind of war through critical enquiry[42] COIN theories consistently showed doctrinal features, resembling what Stephen Rosen and Barry Posen defined as ‘theories of victory’, namely notions of the combination of human and material resources and tactics believed to most likely produce success on the battlefield.[43]