Prof. Amie Kreppel POS 6933 Spring 2017
Introduction to Formal Theory
This course is designed as an introduction to formal theory including game theory and spatial modeling. The course assumes no previous knowledge of these methods or calculus (although either is useful). What the course does require is an open mind and a willingness to try to think in new ways about old problems and subjects. The course is designed for all students not just those who think they want to use some aspects of formal modeling in their own work.
The application of a formal or game theoretic approach to political science can help us see our research in a new light, think of new questions to ask and forces us to be explicit about our assumptions about preferences (individual & group) as well as the political environment in which they act (institutional, cultural, social etc.). This course will allow students to approach their existing topics of research and interest from a new perspective. It will also allow those who ultimately decide not to use these methods in their work to understand anticipate and respond to potential criticisms from supporters of the formal approach.
Although this is not a math, statistics or language course several of the same rules apply. Students must complete all assignments, both readings and written (problems sets). You cannot learn formal modeling, game theory, spatial modeling or rational choice by passively listening to class lectures and discussion. You must practice applying what you learn. As a result, attendance and completion of assignments is mandatory.
The course will be structured around a number of key topics in formal theory, as well as some further development of these basic concepts. There will be two kinds of exercises, actual problem sets (for practice) and short writing assignments in which you apply what you have learned to your own topics (make up and solve your own games). These will be progressively more demanding and serve as the basis for the bulk of your grade (75%) together with attendance, participation and in class effort (25%). There is no large final paper in this course. We will be discussing home work and presenting papers in class so that we can discuss how to solve problems and think about how models can be applied to create and improve various models in diverse “real world” settings.
On weeks with paper assignments due all students will be asked to briefly present their papers to the class for group discussion. On days when problems sets are due we will go over them as a group (I will ask for ‘volunteers’ to assist). Each week there will also be two students assigned to help lead discussion on assigned readings.
We will be using four primary books as well as several articles (listed in readings). You will find that for most weeks the reading is not particularly heavy; however, you must read carefully and work through the examples within the text. You cannot skim this material and hope to be able to understand or apply it. Do not be fooled by the small number of pages.
· Morton, Rebecca (1999). Methods & Models, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (ISBN 0-521-63394-x).
· Hinich, Melvin and Michael Munger (1997). Analytical Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (ISBN 0-521-56567-7).
· Shepsle, Kenneth (2010), Analyzing Politics, 2nd Edition, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company Press. (ISBN 978-0393935073).
· Ordeshook, Peter (1992). A Political Theory Primer, New York: Routledge Press. (ISBN 0-415-90241-x).
Detailed Weekly Schedule
0. Introduction to the Course (January 4)
What are you hoping to learn from the course?
What are game theory, formal theory and formal modelling?
Why and when are these approaches useful?
Key concepts
-rationality
-preferences and preference orderings
-strategy and strategic action
-models and levels of abstraction
Readings:
· Rogowski, R. “Review: Rationalist Theories of Politics: a Midterm Report” World Politics, Vol. 30, No.2: 296-323
1. Introduction to Formal Theory (January 18)
What is game theory?
What differentiates between the different types of game theory?
When should we use these approaches?
Moving from reality to model (what is relevant?)
The process of making assumptions/simplifications
Some basic mathematical concepts (review)
Key concepts
-rationality
-preferences and preference orderings
-transitivity
-completeness
Readings:
· Morton, chapters 1-3
· Shepsle, chapters 1-3
· Wildavsky, Aaron, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” APSR, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1987.
· Munck, Gerardo, “Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns” World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 2. 2001.
· Rogowski, R. “Review: Rationalist Theories of Politics: a Midterm Report” World Politics, Vol. 30, No.2: 296-323 (in case you did not read for week 0)
2. Basics I: Normal/Strategic Form games (January 25)
What is a normal form game?
Constructing and understanding some standard games
-Prisoner’s Dilemma
-Battle of the Sexes
-Chicken
Key concepts
Perfect information
Strategic action
Nash equilibrium
Best response functions
Dominated actions
Symmetric equilibria
Readings:
· Ordeshook, Chapters 1 and 3
· Dixit, Avinash, Susan Skeath and Daid Reily, Games of Strategy, 3rd Edition, Chapter 4 “Simultaneous Move games with Pure Strategies,” New York, NY: Norton Publishers, 2009 (will distribute).
· TBD
Assignment: #1 (problem set)
3. Basics II: Extensive Form games (February1 and February 8)
What is an extensive form game?
Constructing and understanding extensive form games
-relationship between normal and extensive form games
-when to use extensive versus normal form games
-war or peace
-veto or override?
Key concepts
Backward induction
Information sets
(in)complete information
pay-offs
Readings:
· Ordeshook, Chapter 2
· Shepsle, chapter 6
· Conley, Rich and Amie Kreppel, “Towards a Typology of Vetoes and Overrides,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2001.
Assignment #2 (problem set)
Assignment #3 (paper 1)
4. Basics III: Spatial Models (February 15 and February 22)
What is a spatial model?
Why use a spatial model?
One-dimensional versus two-dimensional models
Constructing a spatial model (get a compass!)
Key Concepts:
Single peaked preferences
Euclidean preferences
indifference
Status quo
Win-set
Indifference curves
Readings:
· Hinich and Munger, Chapters 1-3
· Shepsle, chapter 5
· Kreppel, Amie, “Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament: Past, Present and Future” European Union Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2000
Assignment #4 (problem set)
Assignment #5 (paper 2)
5. Basics IV: Voting models/games and collective action (March 1 and March 15)
Blacks Median Voting theorem
Rational individuals and irrational outcomes
Majority cycling
Impact of methods of voting (plurality, run off, approval etc.)
Key Concepts:
Condorcet winner
Arrow’s paradox
Agenda setting/agenda setter
Voter’s paradox
Readings:
· Hinich and Munger, chapters 5 and 7
· Shepsle, chapter 4
· Shepsle, K and B. Weingast “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice” Public Choice, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1981), pp. 503-519.
Assignment #6 (problem set)
Assignment #7 (paper 3)
6. Moving beyond the basics I: Normal/Strategic Form games (March 22)
Mixed strategies
Maximizing strategies
Strictly competitive games
Cooperation
Key concepts:
Zero-sum game
Minimax
Readings:
· Ordeshook, Chapter 4
· Morton, chapters 4-5
· Shepsle, chapters 8-10
· TBD
Assignment: #8 (Problem set)
7. Moving beyond the basics II: Extensive Form games (March 29)
Incomplete information
Iterated/repeated games
Simultaneous moves
Key concepts:
Sub-game perfect equilibria
Information sets
Bayesian updating
Readings:
· Ordeshook, Chapter 5
· Morton, Chapter 6
· Ordeshook, P and T. Schwartz, “Agendas and the control of Political Outcomes” APSR, Vol. 81, No. 1, 1987.
Assignment #9 (Problem set)
8. Moving beyond the basics III: Spatial Models (April 5)
Determining stable outcomes
Models with collective actors
Thinking about multi-dimensionality
Non-Euclidean preferences
Coalitions
Key concepts:
The core
The yolk
Pareto optimality
Readings:
· Ordeshook, chapter 6
· Selections from Tsebelis, G. Veto Players
· Tsebelis, George and Tatiana Rizova “Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Post-Communist Countries” CPS, 2007 vol. 40: 1155.
· Segal, Jeffrey “Separation of Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts” APSR, 1997, Vol 91, No.1: 28-44.
· Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast, “Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions” LSQ, 1994, Vol. 19, No. 2:149-179.
Assignment: #11 (paper 5)
9. Moving beyond the basics IV: Voting models/games and collective action (April 12)
Voting outcomes when actors are strategic
Behavior among groups (trends or probability)
Applications and examples
Key concepts:
Strategic voting
Non-separability
Probabilistic behavior
Readings:
· Hinich and Munger, chapters 8-9
· Shepsle, chapter 7
· Riker, William,“The Paradox of Voting and Congressional rules for Voting on Amendments,” APSR, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1958.
Assignment: #12 (Problem set)
10. Conclusions (April 19)
Understanding when and how to use formal theory
Costs and benefits of the formal approach
Formal modeling as a method to develop/test alternative explanations
Thinking about applying formal methods in non-formal research
Readings:
· Morton, chapters 8-9
· Johnson, James “Is Talk Really Cheap?” APSR, 1993, Vol. 87, No. 1: 74-86
· McCubbins, M. and M. Thies “Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory” Leviathan, Fall 1996.
· Additional readings TBA
Assignment: #13 (paper 6- final essay)
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