Tues. 20 Sept. 2011

GUARDIAN

Ø  Damned if we do impose sanctions on Syria. And damned if we don't……………………………………………………...1

NYTIMES

Ø  U.S. Is Quietly Getting Ready for Syria Without Assad….…4

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

Ø  Why Russia is blocking international action against Syria….8

JAZEERA ENG.

Ø  The Assads versus YouTube ……………………………....12

JERUSALEM POST

Ø  All eyes on Hezbollah …………………………………..…16

INDEPENDENT

Ø  Fisk: Why the Middle East will never be the same again.…20

Ø  A tale of two gulfs: the rise and fall of oil prospecting….…23

YEDIOTH AHRONOTH

Ø  'Obama is the best thing Israel has going for it'…………....26

DIGITAL JOURNAL

Ø  Thousands of 'Nazca Lines' discovered in MidEast deserts..29

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Damned if we do impose sanctions on Syria. And damned if we don't

Foreign companies are enriching Assad's brutal regime – but even the Syrian people are divided on the issue of sanctions

George Monbiot,

Guardian,

Monday 19 Sept. 2011,

I would rather not be writing this column. To argue against the course of action I'm discussing is to tolerate collusion with a murderous regime. To argue in favour is to risk promoting wider human suffering. The moral lines are tangled and the progressive response is confused: perhaps it is unsurprising that this issue has attracted little public discussion. Should we or should we not support wider economic sanctions on Syria?

I felt obliged to tackle this question when I discovered last week that Shell, the most valuable firm listed on the London Stock Exchange, is directly connected to the economic interests of Bashar al-Assad's government. It has a 21% share in the Al Furat Petroleum Company, 50% of which is owned by the state. Ghassan Ibrahim, CEO of the Global Arab Network and a prominent opponent of the regime, tells me that the government permits foreign companies a share of its booty only if they can offer expertise it does not otherwise possess. As much of the wealth produced by Syrian state companies goes into the pockets of the elite, it seems clear that if Shell were not useful to the regime, it would no longer be there.

Shell says: "We condemn any violence and the human rights abuse it represents and we have deep concern over the loss of life … we comply with all applicable international sanctions." But, though complying with current sanctions, it is enriching a government that is violently repressing peaceful protest. The regime has killed some 2,600 Syrian people since March. Its interrogators have tortured and mutilated its prisoners, cutting off genitals and gouging out eyes.

The likely outcome of Shell's investment is that Assad has more money to spend on soldiers, weapons and prison cells. The argument for forcing Shell and other investors to leave and for finding further means of starving the government of money is a strong one.

But no one with an interest in human rights can be unaware of what happened when western nations applied sanctions to Syria's neighbour, Iraq. No one who has seen it can forget the CBS interview in 1996 with Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton's secretary of state. The interviewer pointed out that half a million children had died in Iraq as a result of sanctions. "We think the price is worth it," Albright replied. The sanctions on Iraq could scarcely have been better designed to cause mass mortality. But even measures that are narrower in scope and applied more humanely will add economic distress to the suffering of Syria's people. Sanctions broad enough to hurt the government's ability to deploy troops will also be broad enough to hurt the people they are meant to protect.

And if not sanctions, then what? So far the only alternatives on offer are vacuous condemnation and demands from the likes of Nick Clegg that "it's time for Assad to go", which, in terms of efficacy, is like being mauled by a giant sock.

So far the European Union has imposed travel bans on members of the regime and frozen some of their assets. The impact is likely to be limited, not least because Assad and his close associates are said to have stashed far greater sums beyond the reach of the EU (and beyond the reach of any kind of scrutiny or accountability) in Swiss banks. It wasn't until May that European governments decided to impose an arms embargo on Syria, which tells us more than is comfortable about their priorities. But better late than never.

More recently, Europe banned the import of Syrian oil. Because the EU imported over 90% of Syria's oil, because oil provides 25% of state revenue and because the state has a monopoly on its sale, this would have stung – had Italy not insisted that the ban be delayed until mid-November. This gives the government time to find new customers. An investment ban, which would reduce the value of assets that enrich the political elite, could hit the government much harder.

The obvious means of resolving this question is to ask the Syrian people what they want. But there is no clear consensus. Of the three opponents of the Assad regime I've consulted, two are in favour of wide-ranging sanctions, one is against. Chris Doyle, director of the Council for Arab-British Understanding, who has spoken to a much larger number of dissidents, tells me that "Syrians are hugely divided on this issue". Almost everyone in the protest movement supports sanctions aimed specifically at members of the regime and their businesses, but they are split over wider measures, such as the EU's oil embargo.

Ghassan Ibrahim told me that opponents of the government recognise that "freedom is very expensive and you have to pay the price. Let's pay it once and for good." He argues that sanctions are likely to be more effective than they were in Iraq, as the regime's resources are smaller. Even today it can scarcely afford to sustain its army. The government's oil revenues provide few benefits for the people.

Samir Seifan, a prominent economist who sought to reform the regime, argues in favour of a wider embargo, including sanctions on investments in the oil and gas sector. This would, he concedes, hurt people because of its impact on industry, farming, transport and electricity, but it also restricts "army movements which are using a huge amount of oil products". Others have argued, Doyle says, that as well as hurting the people more than the regime, sanctions would give Assad an excuse to blame the Americans and Europeans for the economic crisis he has caused.

So I posted the question on Comment is free, in the hope that Guardian readers would help to resolve it. There was a big response. It provided no clear answers, but it helped to clarify some of the issues.

The most widespread objection to the sanctions was that the governments imposing them are selective in their concerns and lacking in moral credentials. This is true on both counts. This column is discussing sanctions on Syria only because they are being imposed there, rather than on Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, which are also run by violently repressive regimes. Far from restraining them, the UK and other European nations continue to supply them with a hideous array of weapons. Though both the UK and the US committed the crime of aggression in Iraq, there is no prospect of sanctions against them. This is the justice of the powerful.

But these concerns, while valid, do nothing to resolve the question. You could just as well argue that because the grisly Russian and Chinese governments oppose further sanctions, they must be a good idea. The brutality of Assad's government is not altered by the nature of the states that oppose him, or by the incoherence and self-interest of their foreign policy. We must make our own moral judgments.

The division on this question among Syrians, the difficulty in predicting the outcome of measures that might help and will harm, a repulsion from collaboration pitched against a fear of aggravation, lead me to an unusual place for a polemicist. There is no right answer.

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U.S. Is Quietly Getting Ready for Syria Without Assad

Helene Cooper,

NYTIMES,

19 Sept. 2011,

WASHINGTON — Increasingly convinced that President Bashar al-Assad of Syria will not be able to remain in power, the Obama administration has begun to make plans for American policy in the region after he exits.

In coordination with Turkey, the United States has been exploring how to deal with the possibility of a civil war among Syria’s Alawite, Druse, Christian and Sunni sects, a conflict that could quickly ignite other tensions in an already volatile region.

While other countries have withdrawn their ambassadors from Damascus, Obama administration officials say they are leaving in place the American ambassador, Robert S. Ford, despite the risks, so he can maintain contact with opposition leaders and the leaders of the country’s myriad sects and religious groups.

Officials at the State Department have also been pressing Syria’s opposition leaders to unite as they work to bring down the Assad government, and to build a new government.

The Obama administration is determined to avoid a repeat of the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq. Though the United States did not stint in its effort to oust Saddam Hussein, many foreign policy experts now say that the undertaking came at the expense of detailed planning about how to manage Iraq’s warring factions after his removal.

Syria is sure to be discussed when President Obama meets Tuesday with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on the periphery of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York, administration officials say. A senior administration official said the abandonment of Mr. Assad by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and European nations would increase his isolation, particularly as his military became more exhausted by the lengthening crackdown.

Another Obama administration official said that with 90 percent of Syria’s oil exports going to Europe, shutting the European market to Damascus could have a crippling effect on the Syrian economy and could put additional pressure on Mr. Assad’s government.

“Back in the 1990s, if Syria wanted credit and trade and loans that they couldn’t get from the United States, they went to the Europeans,” said Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Obama administration official. Now, Mr. Takeyh said, Europe has joined the United States in imposing sanctions on Syrian exports, including its critical oil sector.

Aside from Iran, he said, Syria has few allies to turn to. “The Chinese recognize their economic development is more contingent on their relationship with us and Europe than on whether Assad or Qaddafi survives,” he said, referring to the deposed Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.

Eight months ago, the thought of Syria without a member of the Assad family at the helm seemed about as far-fetched as the thought of Egypt without Hosni Mubarak or Libya without Colonel Qaddafi.

But intelligence officials and diplomats in the Middle East, Europe and the United States increasingly believe that Mr. Assad may not be able to beat back the gathering storm at the gates of Damascus.

Mr. Obama’s call last month for Mr. Assad to step down came after months of internal debate, which included lengthy discussions about whether a Syria without Mr. Assad would lead to the kind of bloody civil war that consumed Iraq after the fall of Mr. Hussein.

The shift moved the administration from discussing whether to call for Mr. Assad’s ouster to discussing how to help bring it about, and what to do after that.

“There’s a real consensus that he’s beyond the pale and over the edge,” the senior Obama administration official said. “Intelligence services say he’s not coming back.”

To be sure, Mr. Assad may yet prove as immovable as his father, Hafez al-Assad, was before him. Many foreign policy analysts say that the longer Mr. Assad remains in power, the more violent the country will become. And that violence, they say, could unintentionally serve Mr. Assad’s interests by allowing him to use it to justify a continuing crackdown.

Many factors may make his exit more difficult than the departures of Mr. Mubarak in Egypt and President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. For one thing, both the United States and Europe have become more distracted in recent weeks by their economic crises.

Furthermore, while Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and even Yemen all imploded, those eruptions were largely internal, with their most significant ramifications limited to the examples they set in the Arab world. A collapse in Syria, on the other hand, could lead to an external explosion that would affect Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and even Iraq, foreign policy experts say, particularly if it dissolves into an Iraq-style civil war.

“The Sunnis are increasingly arming, and the situation is polarizing,” said Vali Nasr, a former Obama administration official in the State Department and the author of “The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future.”

“Iran and Hezbollah are backing the regime,” Mr. Nasr said. “There’s a lot of awareness across the regime that this is going to be pretty ugly.”

That awareness is fueling the desire to plan for a post-Assad era, Obama administration officials say. “Nobody wants another Iraq,” one administration official said on Saturday, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

At the same time, the administration does not want to look as if the United States is trying to orchestrate the outcome in Syria, for fear that the image of American intervention might do the Syrian opposition more harm than good. In particular, administration officials say that they do not want to give the Iranian government — which has huge interests in the Syrian government and is Mr. Assad’s biggest supporter — an excuse to intervene.

But one administration official pointed to the remarkable call earlier this month by Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for Mr. Assad to ease up on his crackdown as a sign that even Iran’s leaders are worried about the Syrian president’s prospects.