Venezuela: Honing a Jungle Warfare Capability

Venezuela: Honing a Jungle Warfare Capability

[Teaser:]A new school for Venezuelan soldierscould meanenhanced combat capacity vis-à-vis Colombia.

Summary

The announcement of a new jungle operations school in Venezuela signals a step toward achieving sufficientmilitary capacity -- at least in terms of ground combat -- to challenge neighboring rival Colombia. The challenge for Venezuela is that it is so far behind in its military evolution that it will take years for the school to have a positive effect on overall readiness.
Analysis

The VenezuelanMinistry of Defense has opened the Armed Forces Special Jungle Operations School, according to Jan. 12 media reports. The school will be[we say it’s been opened already. has it not? if not, when will it be?]established at Yapacana National Park in Amazonas, Venezuela’s southern-most state. The announcement comes at a time of heightened tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, and the school represents a step towardthe Venezuelan armyhaving the capability to go up against fight against the more seasoned and better equipped Colombian military.
The announcement also came just a day after the U.S. Department of Defense, in a public statement, made it clear that the United States does not consider a war between Colombia and Venezuela very likely, despite the <link nid="145616">increasing militarization of the border and tense rhetoric</link> that has resultedfrom closer militarycooperation between the United States and Colombia. STRATFOR also believes that the chances of a shooting war between Colombia and Venezuela are slim.
For one thing, Colombia has a much more capable military. Colombia has been engaged in an all-out war against domestic insurgents for a decade and is very adeptat conducting ground operations in mountainous, jungle terrain. Not only does Colombia have an indigenous military that far surpasses that of the Venezuela, it also has the added benefit of a close alliance with the United States, the world’s military superpower, and has the authorization to station as many as 800 U.S. troops on Colombian soil.
While Colombia’s military has fought insurgents in the jungle, the Venezuelan military had been embroiled in domestic political affairs (coups, military dictatorshipsand the like). Indeed, its involvement in political and economic matters over the last century has been an incentive for political leaders to weaken the institution and try to keep its attention focused on <link nid="145535">new equipment purchases</link> and potential external threats. As a result, the Venezuelan military has had little international experience, and it is unlikely that it would be able to conduct a major campaign across its western border even in the best of circumstances.

Further constraining the Venezuelan military are the terrain limitations.There are few access points between Venezuela and Colombia that are not mountainous and blanketed in jungle, limiting the potential for major conventional clashes. Should Venezuela seek to challenge Colombia to an open fight, it would likely find itself thoroughly trounced. Hence, the aggressive rhetoric out of Caracasis likely meant to rouse domestic support, not frighten Bogota.
This is not to say that there is no possibility at all of armed conflict. There are any number of scenariosthat could result in a skirmish of some sort, including something as simple as a miscommunication between units stationed on the border, or one unit taking some kind of action -- such as moving into disputedlittoral territories near the mouth of LakeMaracaibo -- that provokes a nationalistic response from the other side.
In such a scenario, Colombia’s far superior training in jungle and mountain warfare would put Venezuela at a severe disadvantage, making the announcement of a jungle warfare school a significant step up for Venezuela. Should the school manage to achieve its training goals, Venezuela would be closer to actually challenging Colombia. However, developing an entirely new fighting doctrine is extremely difficult, and it would be some time before the effects could be felt throughout the Venezuelan armed forces -- and that’s assuming the effort gets off the ground at all. Venezuela has very few international partners (with the possible exception of Cuba) with the kind of experience needed to introduce these skills to Venezuelan soldiers, and the country may be forced to start building the school from scratch. And, finally, there is no better training than actual warfare, and Colombia will continue to have the upper hand in combat experience.
However, in the off chance that the effort to build such a school is serious and successful at improving the capabilities of Venezuelan troops vis-à-vis Colombian troops, it would increase the likelihood of a fair fight between the two regional rivals.
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