Opublikowane: Sunzi bingfa ji qi xiandai jiazhi [Sztuka wojny Sunzi i jej wartość współczesna], pod red. Huang Pumina i innych, Junshi Kexueyuan, Beijing 1999, str. 409-416.

The 4th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art of War

Beijing, October 19-21, 1998

Krzysztof Gawlikowski

Institute of Political Studies,

Polish Academy of Sciences

Warsaw, Polna 18/20, Poland

STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN A DREAM OF RED MANSIONS

AND THE CHINESE MILITARY CULTURE

It is well known that such battle epics like The Tales of the Three Kongdoms (Sanguo yanyi) or Water Margins (Shui hu zhuan) contain plenty of strategic concepts. A Dream of Red Mansions (Hong lou meng) by Cao Xueqin, where a peaceful life of an aristocratic family is presented, had not beenyet analyzed from this perspective. When we read carefully this romance it is easy, however, to realise that strategic principles are often quoted and practiced there. We may find there, for instance, several Sun Zi’s concepts. We read there: „[at first] guard yourself as a shy maiden, [then] advance as a swift hare” (shou ru chu nü, chu ru tuo tu). It is an abbreviated quotation from Chapter 11 of his treatise: „at first be as a shy maiden, and the enemy will give you an opening, then be as a swift hare” - shi ru chu nü, di ren kai hu, hou ru tuo tu). Then another principle is quoted: „advance when he is not prepared” (chu qi bu bei) that constitutes an abbreviated and slightly modified passage from Chapter 1: „attack where he is unprepared, advance when he does not expect you” - gong qi wu bei, chu qi bu yi)[1]. As Tong Yubin points out, various modified forms of the last principle appeared alredy in the sources earlier than the romance[2].

Cao Xueqin does not suggest that heroines of the romance know Sun Zi and most probably he himself borrowed such concepts from later works, not the ancient treatise itself. It is, however, significant that the romance indicates as a source of these principles „the art of employing troops”, suggesting that the girls who discuss their plans know about an existence of such an art and about its applicability to social interrelations.

At one occasion Ping’er exclamates: „it is like an egg dashing itself against a rock” (jidan wang shitou shang peng)[3], that alludes to a metaphor of „fullness” (shi) and „emptiness” (xu) in the Chapter 5 of Sun Zi[4]. One may find as well in the romance the famous Wu Qi’s principle, although it appears again in a modified form: „ten thousand men are no match for one person ready to risk his life” (yi ren pin ming, wan fu mo dang)[5]. In Wu Zi (ch. 6), it is formulated as: „one person ready to sacrifice his life is enough to terrorize a thousand men” (yi ren shou ming, zu ju qian fu)[6].The first obviously derives from the second, however, as Tong Yubin indicates, the proverbial form quoted in the romance originates from Xu Wenchang’s work Biographies of Heroes (Ying lie zhuan) of the Ming period[7]. In Chapter 6 of the romance an important principle appears formulated in Han Fei Zi, that concern struggle among superiors and inferiors: „when the ruler loses an inch, his subordinates gain a yard”[8]. That is a small loss of a strong party could constitute a great gain for a much weaker one. In the romance this idea is merely mentioned and expressed as „a hair of your body is thicker than our waist”[9].

The strategic concepts contained in the romance and applied there to everyday social relations are predominantly based on proverbs or sayings (chengyu) in which this ancient Chinese wisdom had been coined. We may find in this text innumerable „strategic proverbs” used as an explanation of the pattern of action already followed or intended to be adopted. For instance, several such proverbs are quoted in Chapter 16: „point at the mulberry only to curse the locust” (zhi sang ma huai); „kill with a borrowed knife” (jie dao sha ren); „sitting on a hill to watch tigers fight” (zou shan guan hu dou); „borrow wind to fan the fire” (yin feng chu huo); „watch people drawn from a dry bank” (zhan gan an er); „don’t rescue the oil bottle that’s been knocked over” (tui daole you ping er bu fu)[10]. The first and the second belong to the thirty-six stratagems (respectively as 26th and 3rd)[11]. In this chapter such tricks are mentioned with some contempt, but many of them appear in the romance again without any moral disapproval. See, for instance Chaper 69 where the proverb on the „borrowed knife” and „sitting on a hill” are quoted[12], or Chapter 59 on „pointing the mulberry”[13]. One can find two other proverbs of the thirty-six in Chapter 55: „conceal a dagger in a smile” (xiao li zang dao) and „to catch bandits, one must nab their leader first” (qin zei bi xian qin wang)[14]. They are enumerated respectively as no. 10th and 18th in the famous book The Thirty Six Stratagems, although the second appears there in an abbreviated form (to catch bandits, nab their leader first - qin zei qin wang)[15]. We know, however, that it was used in the extended and the abbreviate form, and an intermediate form (as qin zei xian qin wang) circulated as well[16].

Proverbs and sayings (chengyu) constitute an exceptionally important part of Chinese culture and transmit enormous amount of intellectual heritage. An analysis of the strategic contents of the romance confirms this opinion: these appear to be a main vehicle for the dissemination of „strategic wisdom” among its heroes. Perhaps this concerns Chinese culture in general. As Cheng Xi points out, the proverbs originating from Confucian and Buddhist canonical books, that teach noble moral principles, were, even in the past, much less popular than these originating from historical works and anecdotes, as well as from other sources[17]. One may suppose that one of the reasons of their bookish nature was their edifying character, whereas these of less noble sources, often related to strategic art and requirements of everyday life, became much more popular. Thus we find at least one thousand five hundred „military sayings” (junshi chengyu)[18], and even much more belonging to a broader category of „strategic sayings”[19].

Notwithstanding their significance, the strategic content of the romance is not restricted to them. We also find there innumerable descriptions of actual actions of various heroes and heroines in line with strategic principles. For instance, When Jia Rui initiated undesirable advances towards Feng Jie, she did not simply reject them, as a Western girl will do, but apparently gladly accepted them in order to arrange a severe punishment for the boy. When he arrived to the appointed room, he was closed in by servants, spent there an entire frizzing night, then was punished by his grandfather, and in the result of these sufferings eventually died (Chapter 12). One may notice, that according to Sun Wu’s principles of „arranging situations” and „subduing the enemy without fighting” she moved no finger but the boy received the horrifying punishment. She organized even a much more complicated intrigue to punish her husband and put an end to his love affairs, with an involvement of numerous persons, of the court procedures, and by indirect means „killed” his concubine, provoking her suicide (Chapters 68-9). Jin Gui for a similar purpose initiated another complicated intrigue with a composition of a precise plan in advance (Chapter 80). As one could notice, not only women apply this type of action, that involves deception and intrigues, but also men. For instance Jia Rong helps Jia Lian to take Er Jie as his concubine hoping to obtain in this way a possibility of establishing with her his own secret love affairs (Chapter 65). The social relations within the house are often described in quasi-military terms and once Bao Chan even states openly: „You know how it is in our family - everybody appears to agree when speaking, but hides inward disagreement” (zamen jiali dou shi yan he yi bu he)[20]. Thus apparent observation of Confucian norms and maintenance of „family harmony” covered hidden conflicts and struggle with the recourse to deception, tricks and complicated stratagems, that sometimes resulted even in deaths of the „enemy”, although these means were used to members of the same family and to the friends.

The official Confucian ideology accepted the use of „immoral principles” of the strategic art towards the enemies of the state, as the imperial approval of the Martial Classics of Seven Books (Wujing qi shu) demonstrates, although the noble means, based on Confucian virtues were certainly preferred. In everyday life recourse to such principles towards the „strangers” was commonly tolerated. Within the family and towards the friends it was certainly condemned, but widely applied, as innumerable Chinese romances and short stories illustrate this. Even Mao Zedong in his conversation with Edgar Snow described the family relations of his childhood as struggle between his father and other family members, including himself, and referred to strategic principles of an „indirect attack” and an „open rebellion”[21].

Thus the romance illustrates in the most unequivocal way the nature of social relations in traditional China: the widespread use of the strategic art of struggle that allowed achieving one’s own aims without apparent breaking the Confucian norms of harmony. Hence the teaching of strategy constitutes another side of the „Confucian coin”, being in fact a part of one entity, that only foreign bookish scholars or idealistic Chinese thinkers could regard as two separate, or even contradictory, currents of thought. Whereas the Confucian classics have been studied and propagated, the art of strategy had been learned predominantly by other means: by sayings, historical anecdotes, stories, theater and romances, not by reading military treatises themselves. Therefore we deal in the romance, as well as in Chinese culture in general, with an indirect influence of Sun Zi’s concepts already incorporated into the traditional mentality and in „cultural norms”. It appears that Cao Xueqin, as numerous other Chinese, considered social life as a combination of co-operation and struggle to which principles of war and tricks can and should be applied. One should not, however, underestimate the favorable impact of the Confucian ideology and tradition. They have been much more efficient in imposing the norms of maintaining harmony in social relations in China and in East Asia, than Christianity in the West. They prevented evolution of individualism, democracy and the rule of law, but taught instead obedience, social discipline, cooperation, self-control, and self-cultivation, that granted to the East Asian nations much „warmer” atmosphere of human relations. To a certain extent this Confucian heritage undoubtedly contributed to their contemporary economic successes. We should not, however, overestimate this aspect of Chinese civilization and pay due attention to another side: the hidden or even open conflicts usually resolved with the recourse to the art of strategy.

One may notice that the wide use of Confucian and strategic principles in wars not only diminished their number and destructive impact, but also constitute one of the main factor of China’s survival. Whereas in the West we face the chain of civilizations that develop and eventually collapse in wars, one after another, and a pluralistic multi-state system, in East Asia we find the continuous development of one civilization and one empire that embraced all neighboring states. The division was an exceptional and temporary event, whereas in the West a political and cultural unity constituted an exception. In the West we notice an uncontrollable drive for conquest, booty and predominance achieved with arms, whereas in China aggression and taking booty were condemned as „barbarous”, and predominance was achieved with political rather than military means. In the result China - as the only great ancient state - survived until our days. She suffered wars, of course, numerous foreign invasions, and sometimes even herself invaded her neighbors, but this happened rarely and in a much smaller scale than the conquests of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Chingiz Khan, or Napoleon, that preceded modern colonial conquests and horrors of the two world wars. The Chinese concepts that „achieving victory is easy, to preserve its fruits, is difficult”, that the greatest art consists in „subduing enemy without fighting at all”, and that the state that wages innumerable victorious wars is destined to perish[22], were unknown to the West. Clausewitz, in line with its tradition, had written that merely idealistic and naive persons could imagine that there are some ingenious means to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed and recommended the maximum use of force[23]. In China an opposite, Sun Zi’s concept predominated that recommended exactly the way rejected by Clausewitz. Only recently the West learned to appreciate peace, peaceful co-existence, avoidance of bloodshed, and recognized aggression, conquests and mass killing as crimes. This is one of the reasons why the West initiated to study Sun Zi.

Thus one could conclude the Confucian glorification of harmony and strategic wisdom of achieving political goals contributed significantly to the very survival of China. Of course, there were also other currents of thought and it is extremely interesting how these have been reflected in A Dream of Red Mansions. In addition to these two interrelated main currents: Confucianism and the strategic art as „social praxiology”, we can distinguish in the romance some elements of Buddhism and of religious-and-poetic Taoism. However they are much less „operative”, that is their impact on human relations and actions is much less significant. There are, of course, several personages deeply influenced by them, as well as numerous descriptions of various religious rituals or artistic activity that may be inspired by Taoist ideals, but their real impact on social relations can rarely be detected. It seems that Buddhism and Taoism predominantly shaped the image of „self” and the inner spiritual world of some exceptionally sensitive persons (as Bao Yu and his grandmother). Hence these two secondary currents appear to be important but in a different way than Confucianism and the art of strategy. It deserves to be mentioned that the „operational” stratum of Taoism as a theory of action had been absorbed by the School of Strategists (bing jia) and in this respect it is difficult to separate them.

Therefore when we analyze everyday culture of late imperial China and realistic descriptions of life, we find the reality significantly different from the traditional textbooks of Chinese philosophy. First of all we detect merely these four currents (considering, of course, the yin-yang theory a part of official Confucianism). Moreover an anthropological analysis indicates that each of these principal currents of Chinese thought predominates, or manifests itself, in different spheres and social context. Confucian norms, for instance, determined mainly interrelations between elder and younger generations, in particular parents (or grandparents) and children. On the other hand, the strategic principles are applied mostly to the interrelations between „equals”, belonging more or less to the same “age class” (although elders could also be involved or became an object of an „indirect attack” with their use). Buddhist and Taoist ideas, in the Dream of Red Mansions, concern predominantly individuals and their spiritual life, their internal harmony and relations to the mysterious forces of Nature or to the spirits in the religious sense.

Some remarks concerning the two principal currents of Chinese culture could be added. We should acknowledge, as indicated above, an organic link between Confucianism and strategic thought: tricks were required because the Confucian ideals of social harmony predominated and did not allow an open outbreak of conflicts. Thus conflicts of interests or intentions required particular means that were not harmful to maintenance of harmony, and the Strategists provided them. Hence their concepts could evolve, be elaborated and popularized under the shadow of Confucianism. On the other hand, without such means of resolving inevitable conflicts, Confucianism itself could not survive and predominate in such a scale as in traditional China. In other societies, in particular in the West, the elements of strategic concepts could, of course, be born, but social and cultural conditions necessary for their development were missing, since there was no social need for indirect ways of attack. The Western societies appreciated and glorified conflicts and open struggle, instead condemning them as in China[24]. An open aggressiveness (or at least the drive to aggressive competition), together with sexual virility became there essential characteristics of a „true man”, an ideal macho, whereas a cooperative orientation in social relations, avoidance of conflicts and recourse to intrigues and maneuvers were considered „feminine”[25]. Therefore the Confucian and Strategic currents of Chinese thought are not merely interrelated but interdependent and complementary as yang and yin, with which they usually were identified. This is also illustrated by a complementary nature of Wen and Wu embodying these two intellectual and social traditions.