THE M4 CORRIDOR AROUND NEWPORT

PUBLIC LOCAL INQUIRY

PROOF OF EVIDENCE

of

IAN CONNOR MEREDITH

on behalf of the

CARDIFF, BARRY AND NEWPORT PORT SECURITY AUTHORITY


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Table of Contents

1. Personal Information 1

2. Scope of evidence 1

3. Port Security: Outline of the Regulatory Regime 2

4. The Scheme 4

5. Engagement between the Welsh Government and the PSA 5

6. Port Security in practice 7

7. Security impacts of the Scheme 9

8. Mitigation 16

9. Conclusions 18

10. Statement of truth 19

Appendices

Appendix 1 Directive 2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on enhancing port security

Appendix 2 Port Security Regulations 2009 SI 2009/2048

Appendix 3 Port Security (Ports of Cardiff, Barry and Newport) Designation Order 2013

Appendix 4 Minutes of meeting with M4 CAN team representatives 12.9.2016

Appendix 5 Correspondence between the PSA and the M4 CAN team

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1.  Personal Information

1.1  My name is Ian Connor Meredith. I am the Port Security Officer (PSO) for the ports of Cardiff, Barry and Newport and Chair of the Cardiff, Barry and Newport Port Security Authority (the PSA). I am also Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) for the port facilities of Cardiff, Barry and Newport and a director of ABP Security Limited (Co. Reg. No. 08866705) (ABPsec).

1.2  I am an ex-Royal Navy Engineer. After leaving the Service in 1990, I worked in various roles within the security industry including the aviation and commercial sectors. In 2013 I obtained a Diploma in Security Management from The Security Institute, which is the UK’s principal professional body for security professionals, of which I became a member (MSyl) in 2015 after 12 years in the security industry. In 2016 I became a Technical Member of the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health, which is the professional body for people responsible for health and safety in the workplace.

1.3  I have worked at the Port of Newport (the Port) since 2007 when I became PFSO for the ports of Cardiff, Barry and Newport.

1.4  I was appointed by the PSA as the PSO and Chair of the PSA on 20 January 2013. My appointment was approved and confirmed by the Secretary of State for Transport.

1.5  On 8 April 2014 I became a director of ABPsec, which had been incorporated on 29 January 2014. ABPsec is an independent company responsible for security measures at the ports belonging to Associated British Ports (ABP). ABPsec is a member of the PSA.

1.6  As Chair and PSO of the PSA I am responsible for its efficient operation and the performance of its statutory functions, which are explained below. With my fellow members of the PSA I am personally accountable for such performance and, potentially, criminally liable in the event of non-compliance. My PFSO role is distinct from this. The relationship between PFSOs and the PSO is explained in section 3 of my evidence.

2.  Scope of evidence

2.1  My evidence is given on behalf of the PSA. It describes the impacts of the proposals for the M4 Corridor around Newport (the Scheme) as they affect the PSA and the functions for which the PSA, its members and I, as PSO, are responsible. I accordingly identify the Scheme’s effects on port security both during and after construction.

2.2  The element of the Scheme with which my evidence is concerned is the length of the proposed new motorway that is within the Port, comprising the motorway bridge across the River Usk and the associated roads within the Port estate, in particular the link road described in the application as Docks Way Link, from the western end of the bridge to the proposed Docks Way Junction with the A48 Southern Distributor Road.

2.3  I should emphasise that the PSA interest is not concerned with the development of the Port, its commercial operations or any development that may affect those things. The PSA’s function is purely to preserve the security of the Port in whatever the prevailing conditions may be. My evidence accordingly addresses the merits of the Scheme only insofar as relevant to that security interest.

2.4  As part of identifying the impacts, or potential impacts, of the Scheme in the Port, I have provided examples of practical steps that need to be taken to preserve the continued security of the working Port both throughout the construction period and during operation and maintenance of the motorway thereafter.

2.5  References to Appendices are references to appendices to this Proof of Evidence.

3.  Port Security: Outline of the Regulatory Regime

3.1  Security in all transport modes has been of particular concern to successive governments since the 9/11 attacks in the USA. As a result, suites of security measures have been put in place. In the case of UK ports, these include International Maritime Organisation (IMO) requirements and EU regulation which, with other security requirements for domestic shipping, form part of the National Maritime Security Programme (NMSP). (The NMSP brings together the UK and international regimes to provide a comprehensive security regime for UK ships and ports.) The measures that are relevant to my evidence are:

3.1.1  the Port Security Directive 2005[1] (the 2005 Directive) on enhancing port security, concerned with preventing terrorist attacks on ports; and

3.1.2  the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code adopted by the IMO to protect ships and port facilities in the context of the ship/port interface.

3.2  In the UK the 2005 Directive was implemented by way of the Port Security Regulations 2009[2] (the 2009 Regulations). These provide for the Secretary of State to designate port security authorities for defined areas (regulation 5). The PSA was designated by the Port Security (Ports of Cardiff, Barry and Newport) Designation Order 2013 (the 2013 Designation Order).[3]

3.3  The required members of the PSA are the security officers prescribed by regulation 6. The only security officers in the ports of Cardiff, Barry and Newport who come within regulation 6 are the PFSOs (functions explained in paragraph 3.9 ) for the various facilities within those ports. They represent ABPsec, Sims Metal Management, Liberty Steel, Valero, Inver Energy, Prax Petroleum Ltd, European Metal Recycling (EMR) and Navigator Terminal (formerly Vopak). The membership of the PSA is subject to approval by the Secretary of State.

3.4  A PSA must appoint a PSO (regulation 12). The appointment is subject to approval by the Secretary of State.

3.5  The Secretary of State must carry out a port security assessment for each designated port (regulation 3A). This forms the basis from which each PSA must develop, maintain and update the port security plan (PSP) for each port for which it has been designated. The PSP must integrate the port facility security plans (PFSPs) for every port facility within the port. It sets out the port’s security arrangements, specifying security measures and identifying those responsible for each measure. Details of the matters which the PSA and the PSP must take into account are in Schedules 3 and 4 to the 2009 Regulations.

3.6  Under regulation 16 a PSP is subject to approval by the Secretary of State, who must also approve any amendment of a PSP.

3.7  The PSA must satisfy itself that its PSP is implemented and those identified in a PSP as being responsible for implementing a measure in the PSP must implement that measure (regulation 17). Under regulation 13 the PSO must be the point of contact for security-related issues and is responsible for co-ordinating the PFSOs and their implementation of the PSP.

3.8  The 2009 Regulations include a monitoring system (regulation 22) under which implementation of PSPs is monitored by transport security inspectors. These are inspectors specifically authorised by the Secretary of State to carry out security inspection functions. The regulations also contain provisions governing enforcement (Part 6 – regulations 26–39). These include provision for enforcement notices, with non-compliance being a criminal offence.

3.9  In addition to the function of the PSO, who has the overall responsibility for security of the port, each operating facility in a port has its own PFSO. The PFSOs are responsible for maintaining and implementing the appropriate security measures for each facility’s operations under a PFSP. The PFSPs are concerned mainly with the ship-to-shore interface and (like the PSPs) are subject to approval by the Secretary of State.

3.10  All port security assessments, PSPs and PFSPs are classified as officially - sensitive and cannot be disclosed.

3.11  If the Secretary of State gives notice of the security level that is to apply at a port or part of a port, the PSA must ensure that the measures required for that level, which are in the PSP, are implemented (regulation 20). This contemplates periods of heightened alert. A notice will either state the required time for compliance or must be given effect within 24 hours. Further, the PFSOs and PSOs are required to follow any Port Facility Security Instructions (PFSIs) received from the Secretary of State. Both directed security levels and PFSIs are classified as officially - sensitive.

3.12  The PSA holds at least two meetings in a year. It is responsible for the review of the PSP and the port security assessment. The review takes place at each meeting and within 30 days of (i) a major operational change in the port; (ii) a major structural change in the port; (iii) major security incident at the port; (iv) any written request of the Secretary of State; and (v) not more than 5 years after the assessment or the plan was last approved.

3.13  The above outlines the regulatory framework. A description of what this produces on the ground is set out in section 6.

3.14  The functions described above have not been devolved. Ultimate responsibility for port security and its regulation rests with the Secretary of State for Transport.

4.  The Scheme

4.1  So far as affecting the Port, the Scheme would comprise the construction of a bridge carrying a section of the M4 motorway over the Port. The bridge would pass over the operational port at a height of about 25.5 metres on viaduct, directly over the engineering workshops and the Junction Cut, where vessels pass between the North and South Docks, then descending over the operational port to a new Docks Way motorway junction with Docks Way at ground level. A connecting road, the Docks Way Link Road, would run across the port estate from the new junction to the A48 Southern Distributor Road. Supports for the bridge and other permanent infrastructure associated with both the bridge and the associated junction and link road would be located within the designated port boundary as prescribed by the 2013 Designation Order as the area for which the PSA is responsible. The construction of the Scheme would involve the temporary possession of parts of the operational port for construction compounds and worksites and use of roads within the Port. It is also proposed to move the location of the current west security gate temporarily to a different location.

4.2  During construction the Scheme would necessitate (among other things):

·  Access to and egress from the Port for the project team, including contractors and work on the construction site and those delivering materials to the construction site;

·  use of arterial roads within the Port for construction traffic;

·  construction activities within the Port, including fabrication of significant elements of the bridge structure, and the provision of welfare facilities, parking and similar facilities;

·  pursuant to the Supplementary Scheme, temporary closure of the navigable waters of the River Usk during the placing of the sections of the bridge decks.

Details have yet to be ascertained, in particular the extent of the area of the river where the navigation might be temporarily closed.

4.3  Permanent requirements would include:

·  compulsory acquisition of affected land and/or airspace;

·  acquisition of rights over Port land for the purposes of maintenance, renewal and access.

Details of both these have yet to be ascertained.

4.4  After construction the bridge and roads will pass over or through the port estate.

5.  Engagement between the Welsh Government and the PSA

5.1  There was no contact with the PSA at the pre-application stage. The PSA was not, accordingly, consulted on the Scheme prior to submission of the applications.

5.2  There has been just one meeting between the PSA and Costain Vinci JV (CVJV) (the contractor appointed by the Welsh Government under an ECI contract to progress the development of the Scheme). It took place on 12 September 2016. I attended the meeting as PSO representing the PSA, and was accompanied by the PFSO from Liberty Steel, a member of the PSA. In summary the meeting discussed the following principal issues:

·  In response to the request (Matthew Jones’ letter responding to PSA’s objection) to provide a copy of the PSP, I explained that the PSP is a security classified document with the classification of “OFFICIAL – SENSITIVE” which could only be released with the consent and on the instruction of the Secretary of State.

·  CVJV asked if CVJV could become a member of the PSA. (In later correspondence the same request was made in relation to the Welsh Government.)