The British Expiditionary Force
To November 1914
In this period we see the BEF retreat. The BEF’s initial engagement just north of Mons on August 23rd. was cut short by the call to fall back from the Senior French Commander – effectively the allied Commander - Marshal Joseph Joffre. [The position of Allied Supreme Commander – Generalissime wasn’t enacted until the Spring of 1918.]
The BEF was deployed to the immediate left of the 5th French Army commanded by General Charles Lanrezac and at this time the BEF was commanded by Field Marshal Sir John French.
The personalities of the senior commanders on the allied side [France, Britain and Russia] were to have a profound influence on the conduct of the war. When hostilities began Sir John French was the most senior British Officer at the time – in normal circumstances he would not have been chosen as Commander in Chief [CinC], and indeed he had resigned due to the accumulation over many years of scandals associated with his private life and his actions in the army,. However, in the absence of a similarly high placed officer on the Army List [ a list, in order of seniority, of all army officers] – French was requested in late July 1914 to accept the position of CinC. French was controversial at home and was not well liked by his French allies, due in no small part to his own dislike of the French plus his inability to speak French and having to conform with their battle plans. Whilst he had full autonomy – something the Commander of the BEF retained until early 1918 – it was always the case that the French had overall say on the conduct of the war, and by extension the strategic and tactical value of the BEF.
Sir John French’s antipathy towards the French in general, and General Lanrezac in particular– meant that French had to liaise with and cooperate with Lanrezac’s battle plans. This was not a good situation for either party or the early conduct of the war.
It is against this backdrop we see the BEF engage in some of the most desperate and bitter fighting of the war. In addition we see the BEF’s original compliment of enlisted career soldiers, bolstered by reservists [men who have just finished their allotted period of duty ie experienced soldiers] and territorial [volunteer part-time soldiers] battalions whittled away by the severity of fighting - either killed, wounded or captured. These were the Old Contemptible’s, a reference to the Kaiser’s dismissal of the BEF as a “contemptible little army”; it was also widely recognised as the most professional army placed in the field at this time – they punched well above their weight.
Over time the BEF received an influx of men as forces serving overseas in the British Empire were rushed home to replace the haemorrhaging losses. In addition we see the arrival of the first troops from the Dominion’s as men and material arrived from the Indian Army who were to play a major role in early 1915.
This is also the time when we see the first fatality of one of the men mentioned on our war memorials.
September to December 1914
During this time the BEF fought against the German 1st and 2nd armies under the most difficult circumstances – always outnumbered by at least 2 to 1 but often as much as 6 to 1.
This was a period of mobile warfare before the familiar 14/18 “trench-lock” solidified the opposing armies into a fighting line that stretched 475 miles from Switzerland to the English Channel.
The BEF was located on the extreme left of the Franco British lines, France fielded 5 armies and by the end of August the British fielded 3 Army Corps [just over 10% of the total allied force]. In time a sixth French Army was cobbled together and placed on the left of the BEF but that occurred towards the end of this period.
Our first casualty: Lieutenant Colonel Walter Frederick Kerr – nephew of the then Marquess Lothian, who is commemorated on the Crailing War Memorial, he was killed on October 31st 1914. He served as the senior staff officer for his Regiment – the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders which traditionally raised their volunteers from the Highland areas of Inverness-shire.
Lt. Col. Kerr was 47 and married to his cousin Lady Helen Victoria Lillian Kerr daughter of the 9thMarques of Lothian, which explains his name being on one of our memorials – even though he and his wife and two children had their home elsewhere – at Breamore near Salisbury, Hampshire; this was a common situation for senior career officers in the forces then as now. It is not unusual, especially with aristocratic families, where a name is commemorated in the principle area the family have influence and possibly where they lived and perhaps elsewhere where the family may have had property or estates – for instance Lt. Col. Kerr’s death is also commemorated in St. David’s RC Church, Dalkieth.
Lt. Col. Kerr and the men of his Battalion were in the First Division of 1 Corps of the BEF under command of General Sir Douglas Haig. Since their arrival at Le Harve on August 8th 1914 they had marched nearly 30 miles from their railhead in N. France to the front at Mons in S. Belgium. Here they deployed to the right of General Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien commander of 11Corps [2nd Corps]. Haig had only a limited engagement with the enemy whilst Smith-Dorrien bore the brunt of the action engaging the advancing German 1st army.
To the east on Haig’s right Lanrezac’s 5th French Army started to fall back as the French defence buckled as a result of the aggressive German sweep into N. France from Belgium. To understand the tactics used at this time it was considered vitally important to “hold the line”; if a gap occurred it could be exploited and the attacking army could push through and attack the defending army from the rear, a situation known as a “break-through” or if gaps occurred between armies or Corps on the same side the enemy could break through here, this was known as “turning a flank” – both are equally bad and can become a “no win situation”. So to avoid this the French forces, when ordered to retreat, fell back maintaining a cohesive line. So when Lanrezac started to fall back he asked Sir John French’s BEF to comply. French’s bungling autocratic style failed to produce the quick response needed – eventually he instructed his Corps Commanders to “sort it out themselves”.
Haig of 1 Corps was more than happy to oblige and removed his men with alacrity – something which was to raise doubts about his fighting spirit. Smith-Dorrien and his 11Coprs, in contrast, was heavily engaged in fighting the German 1st army and only just managed to extricate his forces, retreat and prevent his whole Corps being mopped up by the advancing Germans. Inevitably gaps did occur within and between BEF’s Corps but because of the speed of retreat the Germans were unable to exploit them.
As the BEF retreated southward 1 and 11Corp became separated by the massive natural barrier the Forest of Mormal; 1Corp to the east and 11 Corp to the west. The German 1st Army maintain sporadic contact with Smith Dorrien’s 11 Corp and nibbled away at the rear guard as they tried to escape.
It fell to one of the least known or acknowledged branches of the Army to maintain communication, command and control during this crisis – a retreat of 200 miles in 21 days, on foot.
The Motorcycle Dispatch Riders were the only means through which Generals could maintain contact with the disparate elements of a fragmenting Army in full retreat. Whilst most of the weapons, and elements of the battlefield, uniform and equipment would be familiar to the armed services of today – the means of communication available to a commander then were almost medieval relying on semaphore, written or verbal messages committed to memory by “runners” – men who’s job it was to run, or gallop, between command head-quarters and the front line. It was the appalling lack of efficient communications, more than any other, which was to lead to such slaughter on a scale never seen before.
Radio did exist but a typical field radio would require at least one horse drawn cart to carry it from place to place. They were huge, heavy, had very limited range and were extremely fragile; they served very little use at the outbreak of hostilities.
Telephony was far more reliable but lines laid by combatants were vulnerable to being broken by artillery fire or simply ripped up and broken by the passage of thousands of steel shod men and horses. During this phase all combatants relied on the fixed lines of the civilian telephone service with predictable delays and chaos caused by the overwhelming demands made of exchanges.
However, the rapid enlistment at home of volunteers with motorcycles, and their deployment as Motorcycle Dispatch Riders meant that links between units of the retreating Army could be maintained; such were the means that Kerr – as his Battalion’s main Staff Officer – maintained some kind of link with his men – ensuring they were fed and supplied and that their officers had orders to control their movement throughout this critical period.
At the start of hostilities there were a handful of motorcycle dispatch riders; this rose rapidly with over 2,000 volunteers by the end of August and remained in the thousands throughout the war with manufacturers producing tens of thousands of machines per year.
Towards the end of September the situation had reversed. Smith-Dorrien and his 11 Corps were in a state of near collapse after 21days of harried forced marching –they managed to form a cohesive force – although out-numbered in men at arms [many men had “lost” their weapons to save weight in the retreat], out-gunned in artillery Smith-Dorrien turned his force,in defiance of Sir John French’s demands,and checked von Kluck’s 1st Army’s advance at Le Cateau in a brilliant but desperately fought savage battle. It succeeded and enabled the Franco-British forces to halt the retreat, bring the German forces to a shuddering halt and to start the process of pushing them back.
The state of the men in Smith-Dorrien and Haig’s forces at this time was pitiable; many men had thrown their boots away. These were new boots which had not been broken in; soles of thick leather [at least 1cm thick] and studded with steel tacks to aid grip they caused men’s feet to swell, blister and eventually turn into a bloody pulp – they were marching for up to 16 hours a day every day for 21 days to avoid being caught by the advancing Germans. Instead of boots men wrapped their feet in rags. Back-packs with spare clothes, ammunition, rations and bedding weighing between 65 and 70lbs, were left at the roadside. Rifles laid down at rest stops were left as the men resumed their march; many were collected by horse drawn carts of the transport units. Men and horses had to be fed and watered and many went without both for days at a time. The logistics of an army in retreat are chaotic; communication is essential but almost impossible. French and his senior staff officers were trying to control what remained of 200,000 men with no access to accurate information; even if a dispatch rider managed to make contact with a given unit it may take up to 1 hour for that information to pass between head quarters and local command. The fluid conditions of a mobile front line and fragmented forces frequently meant communications were redundant or nonsensical.
Many men and horses slept as they walked; those who fell by the wayside – and many did – were either captured by the Germans or helped by local residents to hide as the German front line engulfed them. They were hidden like this until the allies pushed north a few weeks later when they rejoined the BEF only to be arrested and threatened with the charge of desertion.
Fortunately for the allies, the engagement at Le Cateau caused the German 1st and 2nd armies to become separated – a gap had occurred which the allies could exploit, they could break through or turn the enemies flank.
However, at this crucial moment Sir John French’s instinct was to cut and run for the channel ports – he wanted to protect himself and the BEF’s escape route [French has been described as a “poltroon” – a coward - by the eminent military historian Max Hastings]. Alarmed by the behaviour of the CinC the Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and his Secretary of State for War Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener, the 1st Earl Kitchener were required to rush across the channel to stiffen the resolve of Sir John French.Making sure he would comply with the pleading Marshal Joseph Joffre to join with the French in what was to become known as the Battle of the Marne; which caused the Germans to retreat over the ground they had gained. They retreated to the heights over the river Aisne which provided ideal defensive positions – they were not to be moved from them until 1918.
Realising that the way to Paris, and victory, still lay open the Germans redirected their efforts and marched their 1st and 2nd Armies onto the flat, low lying lands of Flanders in N.W. France and S.W. Belgium.
The remnants of the Belgian Army and some men from the British Royal Naval Division dashed south and west to secure the coast of Flanders [The Royal Naval Division was the brainchild of Winston Churchill who was 1st Lord of the Admiralty, who together with Sir John French, thought it might be possible to launch an offensive from Antwerp that would attack the Germans from the rear – the Division was made up from reservist Royal Marines and Royal Naval personnel, this “Boys Own” venture failed to materialise. They eventually fled to the Netherlands, and were interned in neutral Holland for the duration of the war; but some fought on with the rump of the Belgian Army]. The allied forces and the Germans pushed west – the Germans trying to reach Paris and the allies trying to head them off and secure the vital strategic channel ports – this phase of the war was dubbed “ the race to the sea”. The BEF and the French 6th Army dashed west and joined the Belgian forces and prevented a German break through and their attempt to finish the war. The Belgians opened the sluice gates in the sea defences and large tracts of coastal Flanders became impassable which helped to halt the Germans.
In their dash for the sea in late September early October the BEF encircled the ancient city of Ypre in the Flanders area if Southern Belgium and created a thin line that held back the overwhelming forces of Germany’s 1st Army – this was early October. The original BEF of two Corps had been reduced to half of its original size; a third Corps arrived in late August early September but they too had experienced the attrition of modern war; so the number of men the BEF could field at this time was roughly the same as the original BEF force sent to France in August, about 160,000 men.
The BEF forces facing the Germans in Flanders were out-numbered by at least 2:1 in men at arms and 10:1 in artillery. Men who went into battle did so with their ammunition rationed; the artillery was rationed to 10 shells a day per gun. They needed unlimited supplies of small arms ammunition and at least 100 shells per artillery piece per day [field guns – the British 18 pounder could sustain high fire rates of up to25 shells per minute]. Some men were issued bullets which wouldn’t fit their rifles – a slight error in manufacture meant the calibre of the bullet was too great to fit in to the breach of their gun – only a very small error was enough to do this. The Minister for Armaments at this time was Lloyd George.
When the men reached the front around the perimeter of Ypre, desperate battles took place to seize the “high” ground – “high” is a relative term in this flat landscape, we are looking at a rise in the ground which may be about 20 to 30m above the surrounding landscape. It was enough to give a tactical advantage to whoever held it – they had commanding views over the lower lying areas, could see developing attacks and also see how accurate their artillery shelling was; battle winning advantages. The race to the sea had solidified the opposing forces into a continuous line from Switzerland to the ChannelCoast. The men dug defensive trenches to protect themselves from shell-blast and bullet and the incredibly complex and increasingly sophisticated variations in trench design started at this point; trench warfare had arrived.
In October the weather was breaking, it had been a long hot summer and the autumn rains were moving in. Flanders is only just above sea-level; the soil, whilst fertile, lies over a thick belt of blue clay and water can not drain through it. To avoid the area flooding the area is criss-crossed with complex drainage systems and canals. These became casualties of the passing armies – exploding artillery shells destroyed the drainage system and ground-water accumulated. When the men of all the combatants tried to dig defensive trenches they filled with water which was just beneath the surface. A man would consider himself lucky to be able to lie in a trench two foot deep and remain dry – more often he had to lie and fight in a scrape barely a few inches deep and have to lie in cloying mud.