Thaksin Shinawatra 2001-2006Carina ArdleySTUDENT ID: 2087972

A contentious issue surroundingThaksin Shinawatra’s Prime Ministership and his ensuing political and economic influence on Thailand.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s(Figure 1) was the Prime Minister of Thailand between 2001 and 2006 followinghis oust by a military coup. The reforms he introduced during his time in government are notorious for embodying his own selfish motives. Thaksin used his political power to avert the course of justice by carrying out incidences ofelectoral fraud, suppression of information, demoralisinghis political rivalsand unlawful attacks against accused criminals and drug dealers (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005). It may be speculated that hadThaksin held a higher level of resilience towards criticism and acknowledged that his reforms were not always perfect, he may have been portrayed more positively by the media. This in depth study will explore Thaksin Shinawatra’s Prime Ministership and his influence on Thailand’s economic and political systems during and preceding his leadership. The following themes will guide my research:

  1. How did Thaksin draw support from the rural class?
  2. What were Thaksin’s key political reforms and how were they received by the Thais?
  3. The Muslim insurgency in the South and Thaksin’s peace actions.
  4. To what extent did Thaksin improve Thailand’s political and economic situation?
  5. What was the motive for the initial and continued demonstrations by the Red Shirts?
  6. Can Thailand achieve democracy?

How did Thaksin draw support from the rural class?

Thaksin founded the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in 1998 and although not one himself, he centred his campaign and subsequent leadership on populist ideals(U.S. Department of State, 2010; Hewison, 2008). His style of leadership gained the support from the lower class who collectively made up the majority of votes. He graspedBuddhism principlesand he publically revealedhisdisparityfrom other Thai politicians. Thaksin declared that if he was in power he would focus on the peopleand he would support local entrepreneurship by initially giving each Thai Village one million baht (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004). This was reiterated in Thaksin’s 2002 speech at theAsian Political Partiesconference, the government must “... do everything to promote their interests” (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004 pp138). Thaksin was able to win the 2001 election and remain in leadership for the entirety of his first four year term. The ensuing success of the TRT party gave him a false sense of power and control (Hewison, 2008).

In 2001,the Thai capital began to strengthen from the 1997 financial crisis, giving Thailand a more stable financial outlook (for a brief outline of the 1997 financial crisis see Appendix 1). Unemployment reduced by 1.5% and,by 2005,the socioeconomic status of the poor improved,increasing the overall living conditions of over 5.5 million people (Council Foreign Relations, 2010). These triumphs subsequently improved their living conditions (Council Foreign Relations, 2010). Thaksin was renowned for his ‘Robin Hood’ type activities, taking from the rich and giving to the poor, however, his motive was merelyto be the sole benefactor. An example was the reform to provide the rural class with access to the health care system at a cost of thirty baht.

The elite opposed the redistribution of the country’s funds as their wealth and prosperity was largely affected(Fawthrop, 2010). The situation was further aggravatedbyThaksinadopting an independent power base in the North (for map of Thailand see Figure 2) to attain further control of the rural class (Kurlantizick, 2010; Warr, 2010).

The rural people are often distinguished from the upper classes ‘less of a person’ and are given the label of ‘underprivileged’ (Nelson, 2005). It was noted that their existence in the ‘supposed’ democratic nation was purely passive and that they are recognised as ‘followers’ (Nelson, 2005). The government has disregarded the wellbeing of the rural class until Thaksin moved into power.

Thaksin encouraged the lower class to make choices as he saw the potential to strengthen the nation (Thepkannjana, 2010). In his 2006 speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, he made reference to the coexisting relationship between the rich and the poor in the Thai economy and the democracy (Council of Foreign Relations, 2006). Therefore, the rural class’ access to make democratic decisions would in effect improve their socioeconomic position (Thepkannjana, 2010; Ngarm-maen in Nelson, 2005). This was recognised by Thaksin’s successors who chose to continue the policy.

What were Thaksin’s key political reforms and how were they received by the Thais?

The Thai military contributed toThaksin’s power base as they enforcedthe agendas of the TRT party. These agendas related to the preventative actions of drug abuse, suppression of coordinated crime and illegal financial activity (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005 pp226). In 2003, the integrity of the Bangkok police was questioned Thaksin’sfamily and friends were promoted into senior positions. An example was the ascendency of Paisarn Thangjaitong from Lieutenant General of the Police Department to the Assistant General of the Crime Suppression Division (Appendix 2 highlights Thaksin’s relationship to officials in the police department; McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005). In effect key military personnel acted as his political pawns.

Thaksin chose his cabinet members from those he knew would support and agree with his reforms. Subsequently, he was unable to see the full implications of his reforms due to the absence of critical debate (Kurlantzick, 2003). Thaksin was equipped to carry out these reforms successfully to weaken his political rivals and to cease power brokers from drug and human trafficking activitieswith the support of his loyal friends in the Police Department. In Thaksin’s 2002 speech, he argued that “governments... enacted laws to sustain their own power rather than to empower the people who put them into office (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004 pp138).” This further strengthens the notion that he was conscious of the fact that he was manipulating the government.

At the top of the hierarchy, Thaksin aimed to decentralise decision making to restructure the support of the coalitions and to ultimately increase his power and his influence through policy making (Mutebi, 2004). Currently, there exists a greater number of decentralised organisations in Thailand than any other nation in South East Asia (Kurlantzick, 2003). The decentralisation of administration has the ability to decrease the level of corruption as the authority of subject matters in government by one person would disperse across to a number of people (Mutebi, 2004). The advantages include the depth of knowledge as there would exist specialists, the increased accountability of each person to their superior and there would be a greater number of people positioned at the lower levels with greater responsibility (Mutebi, 2004). Thus, with further pawns to move at his will, the more time he has to create and to oversee reforms to benefit himself. In reality, the 1997 constitution known as the ‘people’s constitution’ would still have overturned the power to the Thai people(Kurlantzick, 2003).

Under the public facade, Thaksin utilised the police and the narcotic suppression officers to carry out the success of his reforms. If they could not meet his orders they were demoted (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005). His power and authority gave him the confidence to promise he would eradicate all drugs in a manner of months. The first phase began in February of 2003 with the methamphetamine trade and the remainder by December of that year (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005).

The government supplied sixty thousand names of drug trafficking suspects who were later interviewed by police (Kurlantzick, 2003). Following the suspects release some were murdered by motor cycle riding gunmen (Kurlantzick, 2003). Thaksin’s involvement in these callous acts demonstrated his undeniable belief that he was untouchable, particularly following his declaration that “in this war, drug dealers must die!” (Kurlantzick, 2003 pp288).

By 2002 Thaksin’s enemies grew, he accused the media of publicising him negatively and of conspiring against him (Kurlantzick, 2003). The magazine, the ‘Far Eastern Economic Review,’ was one of many publications whom Thaksin called in rank to implement a counter attack such as the sacking of two reporters(Farrelly, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2003). Ammar Siamwalla, a respected political commentator warned Thais that TRT may increase national debt and business type practices which caused the 1997 financial crisis (Kurlantzick, 2003). The self-censorship of political commentary and the bureaucratic people who dared to criticise Thaksin personally or his reforms such as the governor of the Bank of Thailand and the head of the stock exchange were demoted or removed (Kurlantzick, 2003). A positive and populistimage of Thaksin was for the most part promoted by the media with few who stated otherwise (Kurlantzick, 2003). In power, Thaksin’s business experience used in policy making and his authoritarian style enabled him to be in the political world.

Thaksin’s abuse of power and self serving behaviourcompromisedThailand’saffiliationwith International countries. The two thousand two hundred deaths, whichwere a result of Thaksin’s anti drugs campaigns, were one of many that tainted Thailand’s International image (Kurlantzick, 2003). The money invested into training of the Thai police and other law enforcement agencies by International investors was in peril (Kurlantzick, 2003). The United States invested in the building of infrastructure during the Vietnam War but since the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks, the positive relationship has been compromised (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004; Kurlantzick, 2003). The Thai-Muslim connections with the Middle East, meant that the Thai government needed to be vigilant as to make a wrong step would further jeopardise their relationship.

The Muslim insurgency in the South and Thaksin’s peace actions

The Malay-Muslim conflict was not perceived well by Southern Thai residents. The insurgency began at the end of the 18th Century when the military seized their territory under Thai rule (Bajoria and Zissis, 2008; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004). Since 1932 Thailand has alternated its constitutional government with that of the military and the bureaucratic elite (Kurlantzick, 2003). As a result, the nation gained greater experience in democratic practicesthan any other South East Asian region (Kurlantzick, 2003). By the mid 1970’s the quarrel between the Muslims and the Thai government declined (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004). The Muslims chose to attend Thai-Islamic schools and then continue to institutions in the Middle East to not be subject to cultural uniformity and for a better quality of life (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004).

Thaksin believed the true reason for the conflict in the Muslim community was the incidence of drugs, poverty and teenage bloodshed (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004). In reality, hisinaction was the pivotal role for the escalation (Bajoria and Zissis, 2008; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004). This was particularly evident with thefull responsibilitytransferred to the army to resolve the insurgency. The authority given to the police and the military enabled their violent behaviour includingthe military physically detaining demonstrators and the use of violence to restore order (Bajoria and Zissis, 2008). It was common practice for Muslims to be tortured by the military until they confessed to crimes that they may or may not have committed (Bajoria and Zissis, 2008; National Human Rights Commission, 2004 in Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004). Thaksin ordered Chaturon Chaisaeng, the Deputy Prime Minister at the time, to assess the conflict in the South and Chaturon recommended the police to back off, “police must stop torturing, abducting and murdering people,” and then the balance may be restored (BP, 8/4/04 in Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004pp238).

The army in the South were unable to improve the situation as revised reforms at the top of the hierarchy were required to make any meaningful progress (International Crisis Group, 2008;Nelson, 2005). There were many military personnel working in the South, however, funds invested into the region were scarce and thus were one of the poorest regions in Thailand (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004). Due to the pressure to support and to produce reforms inflicted by the army,Thaksin vindicated publically that it was indeed the military who were conspiring to assassinate him (Zissis, 2006). Thaksin’s ill-treatment of the Muslim population and his poor management of the revolts lost him the support of the local residents.

To what extent did Thaksin improve Thailand’s political and economic situation?

Thaksin’s period of leadership was the ‘golden age’ for Thai telecommunications as he implemented tax reforms that were advantageous to the telecom industry (Crispin, 2010; Jha, 2008). His lucrative telecommunications business prior to his involvementin the government gave him a degree of affluence in the community which was furtherincreased by the purchase of iTV(Kurlantzick, 2003). Following histakeover of iTV, twenty three journalists who were critical of TRT were laid off,strengthening the notion thatThaksin believed he was above the law (Kurlantzick, 2003).

During Thaksin’s reign, he strategically merged with other parties to fortify his 2005 campaign (Uwanno, 2009; Nelson, 2005; for 2005 electoral resultssee Appendix 3). There was much speculation as the media accused the government of purchasing twenty six Morpho luggage scanner (CTX 9800) machines and the subsequent involvement in the demotion of Auditor General Jariwan Maitaka (Nelson, 2005). Due to the suspicious circumstances of Maitaka’s demotion, the Senate implemented the National Counter Corruption Commission to track Thaksin’s movements casting further doubt of his ability to rule with the country’s needs above his own (Nelson, 2005).

In 2006,Thaksin sold his Shin Corp shares, gaining his family and friends a collective 1.9 billion American dollars (BBC News, 2010; Pan, 2006). The urban Thais were infuriated by the transaction as he was able to offset the payable tax and he sold his asset to Temasek Holdings, an overseas Singapore company (BBC News, 2010; Pan, 2006). The deal became the deciding factor for his oust in September of that year.

In response to the political conflict surrounding incidences of corruption,the Council for Democratic Reform staged a coup endorsed by the King,against the government in September of 2006(Uwanno, 2009; Modi, 2007; Pan, 2006). Two years later, Thaksin was found guilty of an “abuse of power and conflict of interest” (Jha, 2008). Thenumerous findings of corruption, which were previously speculated by the public,strengthens the notion that he again with the support of his cabinet for selfish reasons.

In Thaksin’s speech to the Council of Foreign Relations (2010) in September of 2006, he estimated that there were twelve million tourists travelling to Thailand annually. He perceived the opening of the Suvarnabhumi airport on the 28th of the month would potentially increase (Figure 3) in the number of tourists between 2004 and 2006 (Council of Foreign Relations, 2010). The Suvarnabhumi airport was a forty year development project at a cost of three billion American dollars (Thai Websites, 2010). The Tourism Authority of Thailand (Thai Websites, 2010) predicted that the Red Shirt riots earlier this year,obstructed up to two million tourists from visiting Thailand. The loss of income to hotels, international and domestic flights, shopping centres, markets and businesses, especially those who were forced to close business during the violent attacks by the Red Shirts, will have an ongoing economic impact (Ebeling, 2010).

Since Thaksin’s oust, thelocation of funds is a growing concern as Thailand’s annual expenditure of 15% in contrast to the gross revenue of 8% is considerably more (Saelee, 2010b). To combat this deficit determining how to bridge the gap between the public debt and the national gross domestic product is integral to its success (Salee, 2010b). Financial analysts foresee an economic crisis may result if the balance of the two is not taken seriously (Saelee, 2010b).

What was the motive for the initial and continued demonstrations by the Red Shirts

The Red Shirts, an alleged terrorist group(Figure 5) were formed to seek justice for Thaksin who was ousted from his Prime Ministership in 2006. The Red Shirts derived their inspiration to overturn Thaksin’s oust from the Yellow Shirts who overthrew the 2008 government with non violent demonstrations (Warr, 2010). The Red Shirts quest to reinstate Thaksin was however, unsuccessful. Their venture required a large number of Thais to be drawn to the demonstrations and to have the police and the army personnel onside. Their demonstrations were similar to the Yellow Shirts as they were disruptive to the residents where the protests were held, however, their actions sometimesturned violent (Warr, 2010). The Red Shirts consisted predominately of the rural class, including the elderly, women, children, young men and the Black Shirts.

The Black Shirts (Figure 6) comprised of professional killers who were most likely ex-military or police officers (Warr, 2010). Their presence was known to the government to create havoc in a bid to discredit them (Warr, 2010). The young men involved were looking for physical conflict armed with homemade weapons, sling shots, rocks, and bombs. The violent demonstrations led to eighty nine deaths, ofwhich women and children made up the majority (CBC News, 2010; Warr, 2010). On April 10th, 2010 Red Shirt demonstrations became violent and an unidentified sniper fatally shot a nurse who attempted to assist a Red Shirt bleeding out from a bullet wound (Warr, 2010). These events lead to the murder ofMajor General Khattiya Sawandipol, who had sided with the Red Shirts, by the government (Warr, 2010).

Red shirt protesters were of the belief that Thaksin was a true representation for their people as he personally gave them cash and during his reign the economy remained stable. Since his oust there has been the 2008 global financial crisis and the living conditions of the poor has disintegrated. This gave the Red Shirts further ammunition to rebel against the Abhisit Vejjajiva government. The ignorance of the Red Shirtdemonstrations when Thaksin has since been found guilty of corruption and being investigated for acts of terrorism, seems absurd! The charges of terrorism are due to his involvement in the Red Shirts demonstrations and are being headed by the Paris based Police of International Intelligence (Jha, 2008). If he is found guilty, he will be executed by the Thai military (Jha, 2010; Tancharoen, 2010).