CSO/VSO
Handout 1
Maritime Security Training Provider
Why we do what we do:
On September 11, 2001 the world fundamentally changed. The Unites States was attacked by an enemy with no border and no uniform. As New York City and the rest of America recovered, many questions were asked and very few were actually answered. As time went on, we realized there were three underlying failures that led to the largest attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor: a lack of preparation, a lack of communication, and, perhaps most importantly, a lack of imagination. Nineteenth century Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, said it best in his magnum opus On War: “War is a chameleon.” Time has proved him wise.
In todays fast-paced, globalized world the nature of security is constantly changing and so are the threats. Transnational crime, international pirating, and terrorism are but a small fraction of what we are likely to see in the future. International Maritime Security Network, LLC. (IMSN) provides the training, experience, and imagination to hedge against both symmetric and asymmetric threats that modern adversaries pose to federal, state, local and private entities.
What IMSN offers:
IMSN offers six certified and established training courses for crews and/or security professionals. All IMSN courses are written with input from both mariners and security professionals and integrate theory with practical exercises.
All courses are fully vetted and certified by either the United States Coast Guard, Det Norske Veritas (DNV) or Maine Maritime Academy. Courses are built around, and comply with, IMO regulations (SOLAS and ISPS Code) and US regulations (33 CFR).
Courses Offered
· CSO/VSO- Company Security Officer/Vessel Security Officer (UMC & MARAD Certified)
· FSO- Facilities Security Officer
· CSO/VSO/FSO- Company, Vessel, and Facilities Officers combined course
· FBTSO- Fast Boat Tactical Security Operator
· MSLEP- Maritime Security for Military, First Responders and Law Enforcement (MARAD Certified)
· MS-UIED-S&R- Maritime Security Underwater improvised Explosive Devise Search and Recovery
· APDC- Anti-Piracy Defense Course (MMA Certified)
In addition to training, the hard security division at IMSN can run force-on-force drills to test existing security measures for ships and facilities. IMSN also offers plan auditing services to ensure that clients’ security programs remains in compliance at all times.
IMSN works with its clients closely and takes great pride in understanding the dynamics and peculiarities of each entity’s security concerns and unique capabilities. A plan for one is not a plan for all. IMSN understands this completely and will help prepare clients for unforeseen events and develop strategic contingency plans to mitigate damage to their interests.
Lastly, IMSN provides the only full spectrum, multi-layered anti-piracy defense system with the Triton Shield Anti-Piracy System (APS). IMSN operates the Triton Shield within the principles of force continuum to ensure that operators exhaust every non-lethal option available to keep crews safe before hard security teams directly engage attackers.
Handout 2
CSO / VSO Course—Competencies to be Achieved
Scope
This course is intended to provide the knowledge required for personnel to conduct the duties of both Company and Vessel Security Officer in accordance with the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 as amended, the IMO ISPS Code, and relevant U.S. Coast Guard regulations.
Learning Objectives
Those who successfully complete this course should be able to undertake the duties and responsibilities as Company Security Officer, as defined in 33 C.F.R. § 104.215(c) (See also, ISPS Code A/12.2), which include, but are not limited to:
Ø Advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the vessel, using appropriate security assessments and other relevant information;
Ø Ensuring that vessel security assessments are carried out;
Ø Ensuring the development, the submission for approval, and thereafter the implementation and maintenance of the Vessel Security Plan;
Ø Ensuring that the Vessel security Plan is modified, as appropriate, to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual vessel;
Ø Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities;
Ø Arranging for the initial and subsequent verifications of the vessel by the Administration or the recognized security organization;
Ø Ensuring that deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance are promptly addressed and dealt with;
Ø Enhancing security awareness and vigilance;
Ø Ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the vessel;
Ø Ensuring effective communication and cooperation between the Vessel Security Officer and the relevant Facility Security Officers;
Ø Ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;
Ø Ensuring that, if sister-ship or fleet security plans are used, the plan for each vessel reflects the vessel-specific information accurately; and
Ø Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a particular vessel or group of vessels are implemented and maintained.
Those who successfully complete this course should also be able to undertake the duties and responsibilities as Vessel Security Officer, as defined in 33 C.F.R. § 104.210(c) (See also, ISPS Code A/11.2), which include, but are not limited to:
Ø Undertaking regular security inspections of the vessel to ensure that appropriate security measures are being maintained;
Ø Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the Vessel Security Plan, including any amendments to the plan;
Ø Co-ordinate the security aspects of the handling of vessel’s stores and bunkers with vessel and relevant facility personnel;
Ø Proposing modifications to the Vessels Security Plan to the CSO;
Ø Reporting to the CSO any deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verification of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;
Ø Enhancing security awareness and vigilance aboard the vessel;
Ø Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to vessel personnel, as appropriate;
Ø Reporting and recording of all security incidents;
Ø Co-ordinate implementation of the Vessel Security Plan with the CSO and the relevant Facility Security Officers;
Ø Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and maintained; and
Ø Ensure consistency between security responsibility requirements and the proper treatment of vessel personnel affected by those requirements.
Handout 3
Suspicious Activities
Any activity which may result in a transportation security incident
--U.S. Coast Guard
The following is a list of some possible examples of suspicious activities that the CSO/VSO/FSO should review with applicable personnel each time the MARSEC Level is raised:
● Unknown persons photographing facilities/vessels
● Unknown persons attempting to gain access to facilities/vessels
● Suspicious individuals establishing businesses or roadside food stands either adjacent to or in proximity of facilities/vessels
● Unknown persons loitering in the vicinity for extended periods of time
● Vehicles with persons in them loitering and perhaps taking photographs or creating diagrams of facilities/vessels
● Small boats with persons on board loitering and perhaps taking photographs or creating diagrams of facilities/vessels
● Suspicious general aviation aircraft operating in proximity to facilities/vessels
● Any bomb threats to the facility or vessel
● Unknown persons attempting to gain information about facilities/vessels by walking up to personnel or their families and engaging them in a conversation
● Suspicious vendors attempting to sell merchandise
● Theft of facility vehicles, vehicle passes, personnel identification, or personnel uniforms
● Theft of standard operating procedures documents
● Unknown or suspicious workmen trying to gain access to facilities/vessels to repair, replace, service, or install equipment
● Suspicious emails on Internet, public affairs attempting to obtain information regarding the facility, personnel, or standard operating procedures
● Suspicious package drop offs/attempted drop offs
● Anti-American sentiment being expressed by employees or vendors
● Anti-American pamphlets or flyers distributed to employees or placed on windshields in parking lots
● Repeated or suspicious out-of-ordinary phone calls
● Recreational boaters posing as mariners in distress to attract assistance from other vessels
● Fishing/hunting in locations not typically used for such activity
● Unattended vessels
● Unusual boat characteristics
● Any aggressive actions or suspicious activity
● Filming/recording/note taking activities
● Lights flashing between boats and shore at night
● Operating /transmitting in an area not typically transited
● Vessels anchored in an area not typically used as an anchorage area
● Unusual transfer of personnel or items while transiting
● Unattended vehicles in unusual locations
● Unusual vehicle characteristics
● Unusual night operations
● Missing, damaged fencing, lighting, etc.
● Unusually large cash payments for vessel services, such as fuel charters
● Fixtures attached to structures
● Frequent trips between facilities buildings / vessels
● Observed security changes or lack of usual security practices
● Inconsistent schedules (outside normal operating hours)
● Vessel operating at night without running lights
● Sophisticated radio or scanner devices; electronics that are inconsistent with facilities/vessels design or intended purpose
● Vessels that make drastic course changes away from other vessels, particularly those marked as law enforcement
● Vessels that ride low in the water, or display false load lines
● Suspicious cargo
● Irregularities in cargo manifests, especially related to hazardous cargoes
● Deficiencies in cargo containment
● Improper segregation of cargoes / stores
● Unusual transfer of cargo while underway
Handout 4
Al-Qaeda and the connections to MS – 13
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WASHINGTON – As London recovers from the latest deadly al-Qaida attack that killed at least 50, top U.S. government officials are contemplating what they consider to be an inevitable and much bigger assault on America – one likely to kill millions, destroy the economy and fundamentally alter the course of history, reports Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin.
According to captured al-Qaida leaders and documents, the plan is called the "American Hiroshima" and involves the multiple detonations of nuclear weapons already smuggled into the U.S. over the Mexican border with the help of the MS-13 street gang and other organized crime groups.
Al-Qaida has obtained at least 40 nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union – including suitcase nukes, nuclear mines, artillery shells and even some missile warheads. In addition, documents captured in Afghanistan show al-Qaida had plans to assemble its own nuclear weapons with fissile material it purchased on the black market.
In addition to detonating its own nuclear weapons already planted in the U.S., military sources also say there is evidence to suggest al-Qaida is paying former Russian Special Forces Spetznaz to assist the terrorist group in locating nuclear weapons formerly concealed inside the U.S. by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Osama bin Laden's group is also paying nuclear scientists from Russia and Pakistan to maintain its existing nuclear arsenal and assemble additional weapons with the materials it has invested hundreds of millions in procuring over a period of 10 years.
The plans for the devastating nuclear attack on the U.S. have been under development for more than a decade. It is designed as a final deadly blow of defeat to the U.S., which is seen by al-Qaida and its allies as "the Great Satan."
At least half the nuclear weapons in the al-Qaida arsenal were obtained for cash from the Chechen terrorist allies.
But the most disturbing news is that high level U.S. officials now believe at least some of those weapons have been smuggled into the U.S. for use in the near future in major cities as part of this "American Hiroshima" plan, according to an upcoming book, "The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Coming Apocalypse," by Paul L. Williams, a former FBI consultant.
According to Williams, former CIA Director George Tenet informed President Bush one month after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that at least two suitcase nukes had reached al-Qaida operatives in the U.S.
"Each suitcase weighed between 50 and 80 kilograms (approximately 110 to 176 pounds) and contained enough fissionable plutonium and uranium to produce an explosive yield in excess of two kilotons," wrote Williams. "One suitcase bore the serial number 9999 and the Russian manufacturing date of 1988. The design of the weapons, Tenet told the president, is simple. The plutonium and uranium are kept in separate compartments that are linked to a triggering mechanism that can be activated by a clock or a call from the cell phone."
According to the author, the news sent Bush "through the roof," prompting him to order his national security team to give nuclear terrorism priority over every other threat to America.
However, it is worth noting that Bush failed to translate this policy into securing the U.S.-Mexico border through which the nuclear weapons and al-Qaida operatives are believed to have passed with the help of the MS-13 smugglers. He did, however, order the building of underground bunkers away from major metropolitan areas for use by federal government managers following an attack.
Bin Laden, according to Williams, has nearly unlimited funds to spend on his nuclear terrorism plan because he has remained in control of the Afghanistan-produced heroin industry. Poppy production has greatly increased even while U.S. troops are occupying the country, he writes. Al-Qaida has developed close relations with the Albanian Mafia, which assists in the smuggling and sale of heroin throughout Europe and the U.S.
Some of that money is used to pay off the notorious MS-13 street gang between $30,000 and $50,000 for each sleeper agent smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico. The sleepers are also provided with phony identification, most often bogus matricula consular ID cards indistinguishable from Mexico's official ID, now accepted in the U.S. to open bank accounts and obtain driver's licenses.
The Bush administration's unwillingness to secure the U.S.-Mexico border has puzzled and dismayed a growing number of activists and ordinary citizens who see it as the No. 1 security threat to the nation. The Minuteman organization is planning a major mobilization of thousands of Americans this fall designed to shut down the entire 2,000-mile border as it did in April with a 23-mile stretch in Arizona.