AL-QAEDA QUARTERLY
milITARY pressure CONSTRAINS centralLY-DIRECTED NETWORK BUT threatS to WEST AND TARGET SELECTION EVOLVE
9 March 2010
CONTENTS
ITEM PAGE
Executive Summary 2
Introduction: coherent al-Qaeda network remains 3
Threat to Western interests constrained but evolving 3
Pressures on centre affect ability to project violence 4
Insurgency inhibited in Pakistan; tempo maintained in Afghanistan 5
Regional franchises provide limited resilience 7
Developing threat from affiliated jihadist groups 9
Business threat mainly collateral, but with exceptions 10
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Al-Qaeda Quarterly No 8 – 9 March 2010 Page 11 of 11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
· Links to al-Qaeda continue to be evident in the most credible jihadist plots affecting the West. Sustained military pressure on the group’s leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan has inhibited but not destroyed their ability to coordinate an international militant network.
· Al-Qaeda remains determined to mount attacks on commercial aircraft and the wider aviation industry. Shipping (especially in the Gulf of Aden) and the Saudi and Algerian oil industries also face ongoing threats. The US Government has said that it expects another significant attack (not necessarily against aircraft) within the next 3-6 months. Several European Governments have made similar warnings, backed up in some cases by increased terrorist threat levels. This is consistent with signs of increased jihadist plotting in the West in recent months.
· Sustained military pressure on al-Qaeda’s leaders and main bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan must have at least temporarily inhibited their ability to coordinate complex international operations. A significant threat remains but will be directly affected by military, political and development progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
· There has been a downturn in major urban attacks by affiliated insurgent groups in Pakistan and India, suggesting that military pressure on the Af-Pak safe havens has constrained their ability to project violence into the main regional population centres. A threat of further major attacks nonetheless remains.
· Semi-autonomous al-Qaeda franchises in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and Iraq – as well as affiliated organisations in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa – provide a degree of resilience but are facing military and security pressures of their own. Links to the centre are evident in the majority of their most effective terrorist operations.
· A number of affiliated jihadist groups are also showing signs of enhanced international terrorist ambition. Al-Shabab in Somalia and the Pakistan/Kashmir-based Lashkar-e-Tayba have networks of their own, although their operational capability remains unproven. These are supported and indirectly helped by - but not entirely dependent upon - al-Qaeda central and will therefore be somewhat less affected by developments in Afghanistan.
· Al-Qaeda faces a challenge in overcoming its reputation for inflicting Muslim civilian casualties. This means there are significant incentives to avoid targeting customer-facing businesses with largely Muslim staff and clientele, even if they are owned by or related to major Western companies. The threat to businesses thus remains primarily collateral. However, targeting criteria are complex and specific industries and national groups are frequently singled out.
introduction: coherent AL-QAEDa network remains
Links to al-Qaeda continue to be evident in the most credible jihadist plots affecting the West. Sustained military pressure on the group’s leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan has inhibited but not destroyed their ability to coordinate an international militant network. Al-Qaeda remains a threat to Western (and Chinese) interests despite the poor success rate of its operations beyond the main centres of insurgency.
Semi-autonomous franchises in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and Iraq – as well as numerous affiliated organisations – provide some resilience but are facing security challenges of their own. Ongoing military campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan will therefore be crucial in shaping the long-term threat from al-Qaeda. The group’s leaders recognise this and have continued to make Afghanistan the main priority for recruits and funding. This dilutes the short-term threat to the West and Western interests abroad. However, it also helps to sustain an international network of jihadists connected by a shared ideology and strategy and a coherent command and control structure.
THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS CONSTRAINED BUT EVOLVING
The failed Christmas Day bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 by the Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was a tactical failure offset by a degree of strategic effect. Whilst failing to bring down the aircraft, it generated the most extensive media coverage of al-Qaeda seen in the West for many months. The decision to attack on Christmas Day, over the US mainland, suggests that it was intended to have precisely this impact.
The operation was executed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and exhibited methodological similarities to an operation four months earlier against Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayef. This was also planned by AQAP and was similarly effective in bypassing airport screening. These incidents, and subsequent statements of intent by AQAP, point to a sustained effort to exploit the aviation industry’s specific vulnerabilities.
AQAP claims to be refining its methods before trying another suicide bomb attack, with the detonation method appearing to be the main sticking-point. The al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabab group in Somalia has also recently targeted aviation and has particularly strong links to AQAP. Indian authorities have expressed concern over a possible jihadist threat to domestic airlines. Man-portable missiles continue to proliferate internationally, whilst the 2007 attack on Glasgow airport shows that terminals are also viewed as iconic targets.
The aviation industry remains a particular jihadist preoccupation but there are also ongoing threats to transport and energy infrastructure. AQAP has indicated that it is leading renewed efforts to attack civil and military shipping in the Gulf of Aden, possibly using improvised mines. There are also concerns among several intelligence agencies regarding a possible jihadist threat to shipping in the Straits of Malacca. Meanwhile, there has been at least one arrest this year of suspected al-Qaeda operatives conducting hostile reconnaissance against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, whilst oil industry contractors have been consistently targeted by al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQM), in Algeria.
Targeting criteria are not always straightforward. For example, AQAP claims to have selected the route through Amsterdam for the Christmas Day attack in part to punish the Dutch for the controversial Fitna film. It is partly because of these complexities in target selection, and the influence of sometimes convoluted scriptural interpretation, that tactical-level prediction of operations is consistently difficult. Nonetheless, an understanding of al-Qaeda’s strategic objectives, and the capabilities and constraints of its international networks, does enable us to identify trends in targeting and areas of particular vulnerability for business and Western interests more broadly.
PRESSURES ON CENTRE REDUCE ABILITY TO PROJECT VIOLENCE
In our previous Quarterly we discussed two main categories of jihadist recruit in the West: those who have trained in al-Qaeda camps, learning to make bombs, use weapons and communicate covertly with operatives further up the chain of command; and those who are inspired to carry out attacks but lack proper training and have weak or non-existent links to the centre. Abdulmutallab is an archetypal example of the former category, having been radicalised and recruited as a student in London (establishing contact with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Imam Anwar al-Awlaki) before receiving practical training with AQAP in Yemen.
His operation seems to have benefited from the input of senior jihadist commanders, with his known movements indicating that he was in Yemen around the time of the August attack on Prince Muhammad bin Nayef in Jeddah. An AQAP video recorded at that time purported to show a group of suicide bombers being prepared to mount attacks. Abdulmutallab has since alleged that English-speaking Western converts were trained alongside him, a claim that US intelligence is apparently taking seriously.
A 14 December message from al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri contained unusual references, which we judged at the time to be a possible activation message. It is thus noteworthy that Abdulmutallab’s final air tickets were purchased two days later. AQAP has close links to al-Qaeda central through its leader, Abu Sayyaf al-Shihri, who trained in Afghanistan in 2000-1 and was detained in Guantanamo Bay for six years before going through a Saudi rehabilitation programme, only to re-join al-Qaeda in Yemen. Al-Shihri’s deputies also have long-standing links to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda central and it is therefore reasonable to surmise that the centre will have had at least some input into the operations against both Northwest 253 and Prince Muhammad.
These links between al-Qaeda central and a young, Western/African recruit show that the movement remains capable of coordinating operations on an international scale. Despite its obvious shortcomings, the attack on Northwest 253 was notably more sophisticated than most recent plots in the West, which have generally been poorly executed (such as the Glasgow Airport and London car bomb attacks of June 2007) or foiled at various stages of preparation.
The strength of the al-Qaeda network broadly correlates to its members’ proximity to the central leadership. This proximity can in part be measured geographically but also functions through the internet and personal connections. For example, Abdulmutallab was linked to the centre via AQAP, despite having never visited Afghanistan. This meant that his operation benefited from a level of logistical and technical support unavailable to the typical lone radical.
Such links became clear at the trial of members of a disrupted cell which planned to attack the New York subway on the eighth anniversary of 9/11 (a plot described by US authorities as one of the most serious since then). The cell’s ringleader, Najibullah Zazi, received training at an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan and retained direct connections to the central leadership. In contrast, a Jordanian-born radical arrested in September suspected of planning to bomb a prominent building in Dallas, and an alleged jihadist cell disrupted in North Carolina in July, do not appear to have been directly linked to al-Qaeda central and were foiled before developing into serious threats.
This generally poor operational tradecraft reflects the scarcity of recruits with both the necessary training and robust links to the core al-Qaeda network. Radicalised loners and misfits continue to form the bulk of the movement’s support base, although their relative isolation makes such individuals difficult to detect and therefore a significant threat. The killing of 13 soldiers by a radicalised US Army Major in Texas in November last year provides an example of their potential destructiveness. Nonetheless, a degree of practical training and some level of contact with al-Qaeda central still tend to be pre-requisites for the most credible plots in the West.
The US Government has said that it expects another significant attack (not necessarily against aircraft) within the next 3-6 months. Several European Governments have made similar warnings, backed up in some cases by increases in terrorist threat levels. These concerns are consistent with an apparent increase in jihadist plotting in the West in recent months, reflected in the Northwest 253 attack and the sharp upturn in arrests in the US.
INSURGENCY INHIBITED in pakistan; MAINTAINED in afghanistan
The US has increased the frequency of its Predator drone attacks into the Pakistani Tribal Agency of North Waziristan this year, inflicting a number of high-level Taliban casualties. This could suggest that it has new and more reliable sources of intelligence there. However, it also appears significant that the increased focus on North Waziristan was preceded by a major al-Qaeda-led attack on a CIA team based in Afghanistan’s Khost Province on 31 December, an operation that is thought to have robbed US intelligence of several of its most experienced al-Qaeda experts.
The perpetrator of that attack, who was mistakenly thought to have been “turned”, had been used as a source of information on Zawahiri and other senior al-Qaeda leaders, probably helping to direct the drone campaign against them in late 2009. The subsequent shift of the campaign’s focus this year could therefore imply that the US has effectively lost sight of the senior al-Qaeda leaders. Nonetheless, sustained pressure on their Taliban hosts is almost certainly curtailing al-Qaeda’s mobility and training capacity in North Waziristan (although serious questions remain about the broader strategic effectiveness of the drone campaign - see our separate paper on this issue).
The Pakistani Army has meanwhile maintained pressure against Taliban/al-Qaeda strongholds in neighbouring South Waziristan, as well as several other Tribal Agencies and parts of North West Frontier Province to the north. There have also been several arrests of senior Taliban figures in Karachi, where they have previously been able to hide with minimal interference from the authorities. Collectively, these developments point to a degree of increased cooperation with the US by the Pakistani Government, and specifically the Inter-Services Intelligence agency. This is probably driven in part by the wave of Taliban attacks against Pakistani military and intelligence targets last year and, if sustained, has the potential to alter the long-term prospects for the Taliban and al-Qaeda dramatically for the worse.
Nonetheless, a steady tempo of complex insurgent operations has been maintained in Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan. The NATO offensive in the South of Afghanistan has prompted two major attacks affecting hotels and commercial areas in Kabul, whilst several provincial capitals have been similarly targeted. Meanwhile, a suicide bomb attack against the Pakistani Federal Investigations Agency in Lahore on 7 March was this year’s first significant strike against the Pakistani Government outside the north-west. This shows that the insurgents remain a significant threat in the major cities despite the pressures discussed above.
Karachi has also seen a sharp upturn in violence in early 2010, a cause for concern given both its relative stability in the past and its economic importance. However, militant-linked attacks have so far been primarily against Shia religious and civilian targets, suggesting that the violence is driven by sectarian priorities.