Selected Lessons on Reconstruction Including in Fragile Situations

Selected Lessons on Reconstruction including in Fragile Situations

-- for UNICEF Strategy Discussion

Timing/Phasing

Recovery starts immediately but takes time. The recovery time-frames of donors, affected governments and implementers may be defined by politics, bureaucratic rules or media pressure rather than by a sound needs assessment. The time needed for recovery depends on the severity and scale of the disaster, the resilience of the affected community and the scale and depth of the reconstruction effort. It is critical to ensure allowance for contingencies in time budgets.(Cosgrave, p.4; O’Donnell, et al., p.12)

A phased approach to reconstruction programs after natural disasters provides flexibility and avoids locking into inappropriate activities. (Cosgrave, p.14-15)

Experience in Afghanistan shows the importance of prioritizing programmes and promises made in the 'honeymoon period' of emergency response; this can strengthen UNICEF's acceptance and its programming sustainability. Delivering on the promises of aid to as broad a population as possible is of critical importance in the often short-lived ‘honeymoon’ period of emergency operations. UNICEF can make a difference, if core programmes are able to touch the lives of all in a significant, tangible way and are visible at the household level. This creates a strong basis for UNICEF acceptance country-wide. These short-term, tangible results need to be positioned consistently within long-term programme structures, to ensure sustainability. (Hingst, 2007, p.10-12)

This short ‘honey moon’ period also offers a unique opportunity to introduce child-focused social policies with the potential for long-term impact on the lives of women and children such as juvenile justice and micro-nutrient fortification, etc. (Hingst, 2007, p.10-12)

It is critical that cluster/sector leadership shifts early to standard setting and policy work to facilitate recovery.(Sida-Wiles, 2005)

Capacity development

Given impact of disaster on already weak national capacities, there will be a strong risk of humanitarian coordination undermining them both due to pressures of short term financial horizons and the ‘just do something’ urgency following a disaster. It is critical that coordination be in the hands of the government as much as possible and when capacity allows. In the context of Haiti, UNICEF will need to find ways to engage government partners – seconding staff to key national institutions has been an important first option that can be built into a wider capacity development strategy as the situation evolves. (multiple sources Tsunami and other)

Pressure for results in the response phase creates a tendency to ignore local capacity, undermining community participation and ownership. Starting the response this way makes it hard to shift strategies in the recovery phase, when these local organizations may be weakened. (Parakrama et al, 2006)

A flow of reconstruction funding out of the local economy through overreliance on national and international contractors can undermine local recovery. Locally sourcing aid delivery, aid supplies, reconstruction labour, and information collection and distribution can have a number of benefits including reducing costs, streamline logistics requirements and giving affected populations decision-making for their own recovery. Communities benefit as well, from the increased support to local livelihoods, greater community ownership of disaster relief and recovery assistance, and increased support for generating and sustaining new market activity. (O’Donnell, et al., p.18)

Similarly, experience in Afghanistan highlighted that where national and governmental structures remain weak or not fully legitimate, there is need of concerted effort to curb expatriate dominance and disruption. There, the suggested response was to prioritize the identification and engagement of local and national emergency and rehabilitation actors,including through the Afghan diaspora. OECD, P.6

In fragile contexts (e.g. Afghanistan)experience suggests the critical role of normal daily activities and functioning local institutions (governmental and civil society), particularly those concerned with the rule of law, in creating a sense of progress, security and routine. Great care is needed in providing institutions and organisations with sufficient resources to rebuild confidence in them while preventing growth of corruption and in identifying local partners which are legitimate and not associated with violence, and engaging with them in a principled way. (OECD, p. 6) This level of intensive partnership has been extremely challenging for UNICEF in the past (UNICEF, 2006).

Decisions as to where to engage, whether at the center or at lower levels, will need to be based on a political analysis of the specific context aimed at locating capacity and will at different institutional levels. This is of crucial importance: in contexts where lack of willingness at the central level is a significant constraint to pro-poor service delivery, donors may be able to find ‘pockets of willingness’ or ‘entry points’ within certain ministries or at lower levels of government. In this way donors can build on existing pro-poor political will and work with lower-level institutions with the aim of integrating initiatives into government processes and structures in the longer term. (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008, p.15)

Slow pace in policy decisions and lack of policy coherence between different parts of government can create serious bottlenecks in recovery: in Pakistan, for example, there were policy differences between the rehabilitation agency and the line ministries, and between the central government and the districts. (Cosgrave, p.7).

Public vs. Private

Perspectives on public vs. private channels in reconstruction are politicized. Beyond the short-term, state capacity, regulation, and a large degree of state provision are necessary to get universal access to key services. (O’Donnel, 2008)

In general in recovery but especially in fragile situations, non-state providers make a significant contribution to basic service provision. It is critical to engage non-state providers, while also strengthening public institutions. This entails ensuring that they are not disconnected from the public service delivery track and that hand-back mechanisms to ensure the eventual transitionto state actors are incorporated in programme planning and design from the very beginning. (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008, p.16; O’Donnel, 2008)

In terms of how to engage with non-state providers, contracting approaches have been used in Health sector and could be used potentially in Education sector as a way of bringing together capacities of both state and non-state providers for service delivery, while simultaneously introducing an accountability mechanism through performance or output based contracts. Specifically, contracting puts the public sector in the stewardship role, while giving responsibility for delivery of basic services to the private or civil society sector. Advantages of contracting include that it: allows a greater focus on measurable results; increases managerial autonomy; draws on private sector expertise; increases effectiveness and efficiency through competition; allows governments to focus on other roles such as planning, standard setting, financing, and regulation; allows for rapid expansion of services

Disadvantages of contracting include: competition may not exist, especially in low-income countries where there may be no alternative providers; contracts may be difficult to specify and monitor; management costs may wipe out efficiency gains; governments with weak capacity to deliver services may also be weak in a stewardship role. (Pavanello and Darcy, 2008, p.15)

Participation of affected populations

Involvement of affected communities requires building in systematic approaches. This includes approaches to providing information to affected communities about planned activities, available resources and progress. It includes introducing standards for involvement affected communities with partners (and by extension in clusters). It should include contemplating of spaces and processes where issues of adolescent boys and girls are properly discussed and considered (e.g. linked to CFS). It should include participatory techniques built into assessment and monitoring. (Sida, Wiles, 2005)

More recent experience in DRC has pointed to perhaps obvious but critical link between systematic participatory approaches and a window for integrating Gender Equality programming (ref GE in Humanitarian Action Communities of Practice).

DRR

Risk reduction is a valuable and necessary investment in protecting local development gains. However, disaster-risk management is often not adequately addressed before reconstruction starts.

Disaster risk reduction must be done from the start – when awareness is high – but needs to reflect the full range of hazards. The time for introducing a more hazard-aware approach is limited, and this must be done from the start rather than as a later add-on. (Multiple sources) Note that some documentation points to the value in reconstruction projects identifying the failures in damaged systems and designing around those failures to reduce vulnerability– for example, specifically in water and sanitation programmes addressing software issues -- community mobilization regarding waste disposalvia drainage structures which was a main contributing factor to flooding in Haiti after Tropical Storms in 2004 (O’Donnell, et al., p.25) – however, as noted above this should not lead to a single hazard approach to risk reduction.

To ‘build back better’ in the sense of reducing risk, there is a need of more in-depth multidisciplinary vulnerability assessment analysis. This requires a very different approach to assessment with higher local participation and few agencies have the capacity for this approach. (Christoplos, 2006)

In insecure environments, contingency and scenario planning remains imperative to informing programme design and implementation.In Afghanistan in 2002, in spite of the acknowledgement of the uncertainty and insecurity of the environment, UNICEF did not pay enough attention to developing possible future scenarios and planning how the programme would have to adapt to these changed circumstances. Such planning could have informed programme design and implementation as well as aiding in planning mechanisms initiated by local government. Regular discussion of possible scenarios and their impacts on programme implementation and monitoring both at the zonal and national level could have fostered greater attention to emergency preparedness, programme prioritization and the design of flexible programme delivery mechanisms. Scenario-based planning could also be integrated in planning mechanisms initiated with local Government. Planning workshops could have also addressed planning on different scenarios, not by discussing scenarios explicitly, but by encouraging Government to think flexibly about how basic services could continue to be delivered under different circumstances. (Hingst, p.16-17)

Note – lessons on DRR duplicate largely ISDR guidance on DRR so not covered here.

Other key issues

With many groups rushing to provide aid, it is imperative to develop systems to track efforts. Transparency is the only way to ensure that citizen groups can participate in the monitoring of aid activities. It will help reduce corruption in implementation. It can identify which sectors are overfunded compared to needs, and which are chronically underfunded. It can help maintain a sense of urgency over project implementation. (Kharas, 2010)

Communication for development plays a critical role in creating the space for programming in highly insecure contexts and should be part of programme planning from the outset. (Hingst, 2006)

Construction

There will be pressure to define UNICEF role in construction early. In the tsunami, UNICEF committed early to work in construction at a time when UNICEF lacked a construction offer and contracting capacity. It was not adequately recognized within the organization that both technical and “software” experts are needed when planning a construction programme. Risks are high if decision makers believe that construction can be planned and handled in the same manner as other programme activities. Although the timing for construction itself is fixed, construction is best planned from a longer-term development perspective. It is not advisable to rush construction programmes in situations that are complex and where local resources are limited. The connection between aspirations and ability to deliver is important: it is better to promise less until success is assured; it is easier to expand a programme than to reduce commitments later. In-house oversight capacity and implementation partners’ capacity are key considerations in making commitments about the number and timing of outputs.

If UNICEF engages in construction, a number of key challenges need to be addressed:

• It is critical to ensure that construction does not take away from UNICEF’s more strategic programming focus. The Tsunami experience highlighted the need for CO structure to include a separate construction management unit as opposed to placing construction under the education section. (Schwartz, 2008)

• Timeframes and targets for implementation must be realistic and targets require proper assessment. In the Tsunami response targets were set high and early -- by end of year 2, only 10 of 346 schools were built in Indonesia and only 2 of 35 schools were built in Sri Lanka.

• In engaging partners such as UNOPS,UNICEF COs need to increase internal contracting knowledge to better understand what to expect and demand when establishing a clear business relationship.(Schwartz, 2008)

• In implementation large-scale school construction programmes, managing expectations is critical; this requires attention to communications with donors, partners and communities. (Hermoso, 2008, p.6)

• Construction requires explicit NCD objectives, strategy and corresponding resources. Roles and responsibilities of government ministries, the Country Office and the implementing partner/s need to be clearly defined and understood to assure coordination. To the extent possible government officials should be not only updated by also involved in analysing construction progress and implementation solutions. In the tsunami, opportunities were missed, in seeing planning as more as part of a process of managing-for-results with the government, at both central and regional levels. A more comprehensive set of progress and performance indicators could have been set with governments at the outset. This might have provided a framework for ongoing planning, feedback and joint decisions on implementation and strengthened capacity building. Co-ordination committees, comprised of government and major construction players, can be highly effective capacity-building mechanisms. This model is likely to be most successful when the focus is on harmonising efforts towards producing specific outputs such as standard designs, a detailed construction strategy, etc. (Schwartz, p.16)

• In construction programmes in recovery, it is critical that programme design addresses sustainable maintenance of infrastructure, to protect investments in WASH and education, and progress made in post-tsunami recovery. For UNICEF, planning for sustainability includes anticipating needs after agencies and donors exit, especially where local ownership is lacking and/or capacities remain limited. (Lesson from Tsunami) (UNICEF, 2009, p.22, 29)

• Semi-permanent schools are vital stop-gaps to keep education going in parallel with longer-term construction, in the transitional period before large constructions were ready. Semi-permanent construction also helped manage community expectations and provided information useful for the planning of permanent construction. (Hermoso, 2008, p.6, Schwartz p.16)

Bibliography

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Cosgrave, J. (2008) “Responding to earthquakes 2008:Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations.” ALNAP, Provention Consortium.

Christoplos, Ian. “Links Between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response.” 2006. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). p.72

Grunewald, Francois. (2005) “Joint Unicef-DFID Evaluation of Unicef Preparedness and Early Response to the Darfur Emergency.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.56

Hingst, Gepke and Gilgan, Megan. “EMOPS Debriefing Notes Series, Fostering an Enabling Environment For Programming in Insecure Contexts -- Lessons Learned from Afghanistan.” 2007. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.10-12

Hermoso, Rafael. (2008) “Lessons Learned / reporting mission to Banda Aceh and Nias, 27 Jan. 2008 – 3 Feb. 2008.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.7

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(OECD) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001) AID RESPONSES TO AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS. DAC Senior Level Meeting, 12-13 December 2001”.

Schwartz, Anne. (2008) “Lessons Learned: UNICEF Construction Programmes in Indonesia, Maldives and Madagascar.” United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). p.51, p.58
UNICEF (2009) "Children and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami - Evaluation of UNICEF's Response in Indonesia (2004-2008) Synthesis Report" p.56

UNICEF (2009) "Children and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami - Evaluation of UNICEF's Response in Sri Lanka (2004-2008) Synthesis Report" p.29.

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