TORTS

Goals

  • Compensate plaintiffs
  • Allocating damages
  • Deter
  • Economic efficiency

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Respondeat superior

  • If an employee commits a tort during the scope of his employment his employer will be liable (jointly with the employee)
  • Applies to all torts
  • Policy
  • Prevent future injuries
  • Assure compensation…spread losses (fairness)
  • Incentive to discipline/supervise
  • Successful suit may deter business for tortuous behavior and give them an incentive for better future behavior
  • Christensen v. Swenson
  • D was driving back from lunch to work and collided with motorcycle causing several injuries. P moved for SJ for VL under RS. Court deemed SJ for D inappropriate because it wasn’t clear if P was within the scope of employment
  • three criteria from Birkner for determining whether employee was within scope of employment

1. conduct must be of the general kind the employee was hired to perform

2. conduct must be within hours and ordinary spatial boundaries of employment

3. conduct must be serving the employer’s interest

  • scope of employment is highly contextual and must be determined by a jury
  • not VL…rides to and from home to work, frolic and detour
  • you can also sue an employer for negligence in hiring…not VL

Apparent Agency

  1. Represented by purported principle
  2. Reliance on the representation by a third party
  3. A change in position by the third party in reliance on the representation
  • Policy
  • Spread losses to deep pockets, forces company to monitor hiring
  • Roesslar v. Novak
  • P suing hospital for injury caused by independently contracted doctor argued to be portrayed as apparent agent. Court deemed SJ for D because consideration of L’s status as an AA is for the jury.

Independent Contractors

  • Generally you cannot sue an employer for the tort of an IC
  • Policy
  • Doesn’t make sense to go after the company because they have less control and understanding of the work of the independent contractor
  • Consumer expectations are different
  • Insurance/Business Management
  • Fairness
  • You want to be able to hire an independent contractor to have a job done more adequately, without concerns of liability
  • Both parties benefit
  • Seems fair to spread risks to those actually doing the work
  • Exceptions
  • Employer’s own liability
  • Non-delegable duty
  • Inherently dangerous activities

-vicarious liability

-respondeat superior…employee/employer

-apparent agency…independent contractor

NEGLIGENCE

DUTY

  • Misfeasance (an affirmative act which harms or endangers P) v. nonfeasance (a mere passive failure to act)
  • Commission makes it easier to find duty, for an omission you have to prove an affirmative duty
  • Matter of law for the judge to decide

Affirmative obligations to act

  • Special relationships
  • Special relationship requires a situation open to the publicOR when one has custody of another who is deprived of normal opportunities of self-protection (custodial relationship)
  • Good Samaritan rule for physicians to stop and assist at accidents
  • Harper v. Herman
  • D, as a social host, does not assume a special relationship creating a duty to protect when he allowed an inexperienced diver on his boat
  • Examples of special relationshipsR3
  • Common carriers with its passengers; an innkeeper with its guests; a business or other possessor of land that holds its premises open to the public with those who are lawfully on the premises; an employer with its employees; a school with its students; a landlord with its tenants; Doctor/patient; Employer/employee
  • D involved in injury or creation of risk (negligent or non-negligent)…D has a duty of reasonable care to prevent or minimize harm R2 § 314
  • Policy: you have a duty because you are putting someone in a position which they would not have otherwise been in
  • D and victim as co-venturers
  • D has no general duty to rescue
  • Policy: deter inept rescue; remoteness (no clear causal element); impracticality (limits?); autonomy
  • However, once D voluntarily begins to rend assistance (even if she was under no legal obligation to do so) she must proceed with REASONABLE CARE. D must take all reasonable efforts to keep P safe and cannot discontinue her aid to D or leave her in a worse position then when D began to render assistance. R2 § 324
  • Policy: may prevent good rescue; causes person being rescued to rely on you
  • Farewell v. Keating
  • Court held that D failed to exercise reasonable care after voluntarily coming to the aid of Farwell and that his negligence was the proximate cause of F’s death. D knew or should have knew of his peril, and had an affirmative duty to come to Farwell’s aid.
  • Also, special relationship because they were co-venturers
  • Dissent
  • no authority is cited for close relationships establishing legal duties except policy saying it would be good for humanity
  • Duty to control others
  • Such a duty may arise either because of a special relationship between D and P, or a special relationship between D and the third person
  • Third person must be known and must be known to benefit from being informed in order for D to have a duty to him
  • This type of duty cannot rest on foreseeability alone
  • Tarasoff v. Regents of Univeristy of California
  • Court held that because of special relationship between defendant psychotherapist and patient, who told them of his intent to kill P, Ds had a duty to warn P of patient’s intentions (which were later carried out) if a reasonable person would have done so. Ds did not, however, have a duty to P to confine the patient, because of a state statute granting doctors immunity with respect to this kind of decision.
  • Concurring and Dissenting
  • dissents that a only therapists who predicted and failed to warn that can be held liable
  • Dissent
  • Policy against: inherent value of confidentiality; difficult to predict; burden of warning the third party (reasonableness); treatment may be deterred by lower disclosure; unnecessary warnings; overcommitting people

Policy bases for invoking no duty

  • Ruinous liability
  • Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.
  • Failure of CE Elec. Led to NYC blackout. P fell in common area of building where landlord paid for electricity. Court held that while limiting recovery to customers in this instance can hardly be said to confer immunity from negligence on Con Edison, permitting recovery to those in P’s circumstances would, in our view, violate the court’s responsibility to define an orbit of duty that places controllable limits on liability
  • Policy: limitations to direct, contractual, or seemingly so, liability; avoiding ruinous liability
  • Far reaching social implication and ill-equipped judiciary
  • Reynolds v. Hicks
  • Court held that social hosts have no duty to third parties injured by intoxicated minors leaving their events because social hosts are not as capable of handling the responsibilities of monitoring their guests’ alcohol consumption as are their commercial and quasi-commercial counterparts.
  • Policy: judiciary is ill-equipped to impose social host liability; social hosts have no profit motive to control guests; changes the way we socialize
  • Dram shop acts
  • most states have enacted dram shop acts that impose liability on commercial enterprises for harm resulting from intoxication when they serve a person to the point of intoxication or serve an intoxicated person

The duty of landowners and occupiers

  • Generally concerns the circumstances of the land
  • Rules may differ from duties that apply to activities on the land
  • Duty and breach get conflated entirely
  • What is the status of the plaintiff on the land, and what is the reasonable care owed that plaintiff?
  • Legal trends
  • Despite some cases, like Heins, many Js retain traditional categories
  • Heins v. Webster County
  • elimination of distinction between licensees and invitees by requiring a standard of reasonable care for all lawful visitors…still retain trespasser distinction
  • change of law applied prospectively
  • dissenters argue the removal of these distinctions socializes private property, and that more trials will go to jury because determination of reasonable level of care will have to be considered
  • however, homeowners insurances makes this elevation of licensees less burdensome
  • Even more have abolished some or all of the categories
  • Most commonly eliminated distinction is between invitee and licensee
  • Most Js define scope of duties based on status of entrant
  • Key points
  • Liability based on condition of land/property is generally imposed on possessor of the land
  • Rather than the owner
  • This is because possessor is best situated to control condition of land
  • Exceptions exist if owner is in better position (i.e. LL)
  • Limited duties generally apply only to injuries to someone who comes on the property…if conditions of or action on your land cause injury to those outside your property
  • Ordinary principles generally apply
  • OR sometimes SL principles apply
  • Rationales for limiting duty to those who enter your land as compared to those off your land:
  • Individualism concerns
  • Notion of sanctity and privacy of home
  • Right to use your home as you choose
  • Traditional categories
  • Trepasser
  • Enters or remains on land w/o possessor’s consent or permission
  • Licensee
  • Has permission to enter premises, but is not invitee
  • Until you say leave your property…licensee assumes permission
  • You may be liable for sales solicitor until you tell him to leave
  • Invitee
  • On premises with possessor’s permission AND
  • Land is open to the public OR
  • Business reasons that concern possessor
  • Some Js required material benefit to possessor
  • Duties Owed to Trespassers
  • General rule
  • No duty of reasonable care regarding conditions of or activities on premises
  • Often, duty to refrain from intentional, willful, and wanton conduct
  • Exceptions
  • Discovered trespasser
  • When possessor knows that T is on property, there is a duty to refrain from intentional, willful, wanton injury
  • Some courts:
  • Duty to use reasonable care, particularly where risk is from activity on, as opposed to conditions of, premises
  • Rationale
  • Misfeasance v. nonfeasance decision
  • Frequent trespasser
  • E.g., person who regularly cuts across your lawn
  • Some Js
  • Duty to warn of hidden dangers
  • Duty of reasonable care to avoid harm through activities
  • Other Js
  • Also duty of reasonable care for conditions or premises
  • Rationale
  • Begins to look like tacit permission, merges in licensee
  • Child trespasser
  • R2 § 339, liability if:
  • Possessor knows or should know children are likely to trespass
  • Possessor knows or should know that condition poses unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury
  • Children do not discover the condition or realize the risk of condition
  • Utility of maintaining condition and burden of eliminating it are slight compared with risk AND
  • Possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to protect children
  • Rationale
  • Trespassing children are FOS, whether or not enticed; traditional rationale… “attractive nuisance”
  • Duties owed to licensees
  • Sometimes its hard to distinguish Ls from Ts
  • E.g. if possessor does not stop people from taking a shortcut, may lead to jury question regarding status
  • Permission may be implied from
  • Possessor’s conduct
  • Or from condition of property
  • Licensee is expected to accept premises as possessor maintains them
  • May be entitled to be warned of know conditions
  • No duty
  • To inspect premises
  • To discover dangerous condition
  • Or to make premises safe for the visit
  • Carter v. Kinney
  • P slipped on ice on D’s driveway. Court held that Ds had no duty to protect P, a social guest, from unknown conditions because he was a licensee. Social guests are classified as licenseesbecause there is a common understanding that the guest is to take premises at the possessor uses them and does not expect preparations regarding his safety, etc.
  • Some Js
  • May be duty
  • To warn of known hidden dangers
  • Or duty to make safe known dangers
  • Some courts impose duty of care regarding activities on, as opposed to conditions of, land
  • Operating machinery
  • Backing up a car, etc.
  • Duties owed to invitees
  • Possessors owe an affirmative duty of care:
  • includes:
  • to discover dangers
  • to protect against dangers of which possessor is or should be aware
  • Landlord liable to tenant if:
  • Hidden danger that LL but tenant is not aware of
  • Premises leased for public use
  • Under LL’s control…i.e., common area
  • Negligent repair by landlord
  • Liability likely if landlord promised to make repairs and did not or did so negligently
  • Policy
  • Tenant financially unavailable
  • Lease makes improvements not so beneficial
  • Landlord assumes obligation
  • there is a movement to extend landlord liability to reasonable care
  • policy: LL can pass on costs to tenants through higher rents
  • LLs’ sometimes liability sometimes extends outside their premises
  • LL may also be liable for protection of tenants from criminal activity
  • Policy: provide incentive to maintain premises (because LL will not be criminally liable)

Immunity…NO DUTY

  • Charitable (funds not intended for tort claims), intrafamily, governmental
  • Spousal immunity
  • Abolished
  • Parental immunity
  • Abolished

Intrafamily duties

  • Broadbent v. Broadbent
  • Court held that a parent is not immune from their tort based solely on their relationship with their child.
  • Installed a “reasonable parent test,” in which a parent’s conduct is judged by whether that parent’s conduct comported with that of a reasonable and prudent parent in a similar situation
  • Policy for:
  • Disturbs domestic tranquility more if not liable
  • Disruption has already occurred
  • Fraud and collusion possible in all suits
  • Recovery from insurance could actually ease financial burden
  • It is really rare that child will predecease parents
  • Thus it is rare for parents to benefit off of the harm they caused
  • However, undercutting of parental authority is one major concern
  • Approaches
  • Complete abrogation…Broadbent
  • Protection under parental activities
  • Duty to the world …no PI
  • Duty to the child…PI
  • Total PI
  • Mother generally owes no duty to unborn child

Governmental Entities

  • Bottom line: you cant sue the government UNLESS they say you can
  • Riss v. City of New York
  • D has no duty to provide police protection to any particular member of the public. If such duty were recognized, and enforced by the courts, this would “inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits”
  • Types of governmental activity
  • Services (private sector)
  • NO GI
  • Service (public sector)
  • NO GI
  • Protection of the public
  • GI
  • Concerns
  • Allocation of resources
  • Predictability
  • Unlimited liability
  • More pressures on police to respond if people know that they can make claims without much of a predication for the likeliness of injury
  • This can be constrained…just because you can be sued doesn’t mean the suit will be successful
  • Institutional roles
  • Judiciary does not have the oversight of the legislature to make claims as how gov’t resources should be properly delineated
  • Separation of powers issue commonly comes up here
  • Courts do not have the expertise that the police have in the allocation of resources
  • Limitations on GI
  • Public undertaking activity to help as requested by police
  • Creation of risk
  • Promise….Direct contact, promise, reliance on that promise
  • If police are there and witness the harm, then they have a duty to act
  • 911 call
  • special relationships exist only when the police create them
  • this goes back to the fact that the police essentially give you permission to sue them
  • there must be an affirmative act on the part of the government…commission or special relationship
  • Federal Tort Claims Act (1946)
  • You can sue the federal government or its employees in the scope of employment for tort claims that would be okay against civilians
  • Exceptions:
  • You can’t get punitive damages
  • You can’t sue if the employee is following statute/regulations
  • You can’t sue for many intentional torts
  • You can’t sue for discretionary functions of government
  • This is where many issues occur…what is a discretionary function is a debatable point
  • Discretionary Function Exception
  • Was there a choice?
  • Statute or regulation imposing choice
  • If choice, discretionary function?
  • Political, social, economic, etc.
  • Policy laden?
  • You can’t sue when the decision made is fraught with policy considerations
  • You can’t sue when it is a discretionary function
  • You can sue when the decision made is not fraught with policy nor discretion
  • 4 rationales for providing governmental immunity
  • court is not well-versed in governmental decision-making
  • separation of powers
  • limited funds
  • we do not want to chill the decision making of the executive branch

Duties to avoid emotional harm

  • negligently inflicted emotional distress
  • tort law tends to privilege physical harm
  • you can recover for parasitic emotional distress
  • situations in which there is preliminary physical harm
  • tough areas
  • no physical harm
  • physical harm comes after
  • bystanders

Direct Victims

  • Approaches
  • Physical impact rule
  • Zone of danger
  • R2 § 436
  • P can usually recover when he fears for his own safety
  • Falzone v. Busch
  • D’s husband was struck by a car in front of her. Court held that where negligence causes fright from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury or sickness, the injured person may recover if such bodily injury or sickness would be regarded as proper elements of damage had they occurred as a consequence of direct physical injury rather than fright. Of course, where fright does not cause substantial bodily injury or sickness, it is to be regarded as too lacking in seriousness and too speculative to warrant the imposition of liability. This was a change in law: discarding the physical impact standard.
  • Policy
  • Medical evidence suggests relationship between emotional disturbance and physical injury
  • Fraud may come up in all tort cases
  • Difficultly of proving causal connection should not bar P’s recovery
  • Expansion of “judicial machinery” in reaction to the impending flood of litigation
  • However, overdeterring remains a pertinent issue
  • Concerns victims P is on notice about
  • Extension of impact rule
  • Near miss
  • Still linked to physical harm…stemming from emotional distress
  • Premised on the traditional neg. concept that by unreasonably endangering P’s physical safety D has breached a duty owed to him for which he should recover all damages sustained including those occasioned by witnessing the suffering of an immediate family member who is also injured by D’s conduct
  • Gammon
  • More traditional notion of tort law for emotional distress
  • Treats ED like physical harm
  • Doesn’t privilege physical harm like the zone of danger does
  • Negligent mishandling of corpses; negligent transmission of telegraphs
  • Physical impact rule eroding
  • However, in these cases recovery, most courts require that some physical symptoms manifest for recovery to be allowed
  • Limits fraudulent claims
  • Exceptions
  • Telegraph company negligently sending death notice
  • Negligent mishandling of corpses
  • Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine Inc.
  • Court held that previous requisites connecting physical injury as a cause or result for an emotional distress claim to be successful are arbitrary and should not bar recovery
  • tort principle of foreseeability provides adequate protection against unduly burdensome liability claims for emotional distress
  • D is bound to foresee physic harm only when such harm reasonably could be expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive person (especially vulnerable victim)
  • High probability of SEVERE emotional distress for family of recently deceased when coming across a severed leg
  • The “at-risk plaintiff”
  • May P recover for the purely emotional harm of being distressed by this increased likelihood of illness, assuming that there are no symptoms of the illness itself
  • Some courts require D to prove that actual exposure occurred more probably than not
  • Some court require that possibly of contracting illness is probable than not

Indirect Victims