Institutionally Induced Autonomy: the Case of Andalusia

Institutionally Induced Autonomy: The Case of Andalusia

Angustias Hombrado Martos

University of Kent at Canterbury (England)

UNEDUniversity at Madrid (Spain)

Prepared for the Northern PSA Postgraduate Conference

Edinburgh, 6th June 2008

Self-government institutions were established in Andalusiaback in the early 1980s,according to the harsh rules laid down bythe 1978 Spanish Constitution in its Article 151. Astrong socio-political mobilization enabled to overcome the difficulties of the constitutional procedure; consequently, the “surprising and brilliant conquest of the Statute and full self-government”[1] became a major landmark in the region’s political life (Acosta 2002: 106)[2]. At state-wide level,moreover,the approval of the Andalusian Statute of Autonomy (its regional constitutional law)representsthe first unequivocal expression of how decentralization dynamics in Spain have responded to a principle of “multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence” (Lecours 2004; Moreno, 1994). If we agree with L. Moreno that the quest for autonomy in Andalusia hasirreversibly influencedthe construction of the Autonomous Communities System (Moreno 1997: 108), it comes as a surprise how little scholarly attention has been paid to this region[3], in contrast to the burgeoning literature focused on the so-called “historical nationalities”-namely Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia.

From an empirical point of view, therefore, Andalusia stands out as an interesting under-researched case whose study can significantly improve our understanding of political decentralization in Spain. By making Andalusiathe core of this paper, I want to point up the convenience of widening the traditional analytical focus on well-known examples of national minorities, to include other territorial communitiesthat are allegedly part of the national majority[4]. This is, in my opinion, the only way to properly address the issue of how the initial asymmetrical institutional designhas affected the development and performance of the Spanish political system as a whole.

From a theoretical point of view, on the other hand, the study of Andalusiawill contribute to the literature on the causes of regional autonomy, by challenging the general validity of approaches based on cultural and economic factors. Provided that Andalusia’s autonomy quest is better explained as the articulation of “catching-up” dynamics in order to gain a similar status and degree of autonomy as those achieved by Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, this analysisadvocates for a political-institutional explanation of regional autonomy. In that respect, historically non-assertive regions or those regions that have previously posed a low level of assertiveness, are more likely to demand self-government and to play“catching-up” dynamics when exposed to an asymmetrical constitutional design. That is to say, their autonomy claim is institutionally induced by the constitutional design and the political dynamics of the system.

In order to address the question about the driving forces behind the demands forself-government,this paper presents an explorative single case study and, it undertakes three main tasks: First and very briefly, I will define various socio-structural hypotheses derived from the literature on variation in regional assertiveness, together with the new alternative political-institutional hypothesis here proposed.Second, the constitutional framework and political process carried out in Andalusia to get its Statute of Autonomy approved will be described. Finally, those hypotheses will be tested against the evidence offered by the case of Andalusia.

If “regional assertiveness”occurs when a change in the territorial distribution of powers is demanded in favour of the regional level of government (Van Houten 2001), why, when and how does this claim take place? Most of the literature on the causes of regional assertiveness explicitly recognises –or implicitly assumes– a “structural approach” (Jenne 2004; López Aranguren, 1981). Accordingly, it is the existence of particular socio-economic and cultural features that distinguish a region from the rest of the country what is thought to account for the claim for self-government. More explicitly, various structural hypotheses have been derived from this general argument. First, a “cultural distinctiveness hypothesis” will argue that ethnic and cultural distinctions between a region and the rest of the state are a necessary -and even sufficient- condition for regional mobilisation and demands for autonomy (Connor 1994; Horowitz 1985).On the other hand, some authors have also recognised the importance of the level of economic development of the region, relative to the country as a whole. And this has resulted intwo alternative economic hypotheses:

-In accordance with what I have elsewhere called the “over-development hypothesis” (Hombrado 2005: 13), regions that are economically better off are likely to be more assertive (Gourevitch 1979; Harvie 1994).

-On the other, the “under-development hypothesis”, based on the internal colonialism model,will assert that regional assertiveness comes as a response to internal colonisation and economic deprivation; in other words, economically disadvantaged regions are more likely to rebel against their state and to support devolution (Hechter 1985; Rokkan and Urwin 1983).

Apart from these three structural arguments, the hypothesis I want to put forward theoretically draws on “actor-centred institutionalism”[5], and some recent works on regional identity and politics, that accurately appreciate the impact of both, the contingent decisions of political actors and the institutional context.In this vein, for example, A. Lecours has suggested that it is the form of the Spanish state throughout history, more than cultural markers themselves, that constitutes the “key variable in shaping regional-cultural identification in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and other areas” (2001: 210). In his statistical analysis of the most assertive regions in six Western European countries, P. Van Houten concludes that there are the features of the party system and the conditions of electoral competition that better account for the level of regional assertiveness (2001: 3).As far as minority mobilisation in ex-Yugoslavia is concerned, E. Jenne stresses that regional political elites have tended to opportunistically decide to radicalise or moderate their autonomy claims, taking into account their internal electoral strength and whether or not a powerful external actor supports their position (2004: 732).

Grounding in the aforementioned works, I will argue that political actors -not socio-structural factors- play the key role in explaining political outcomes. Yet, this argument should also be qualified in the sense that all political decisions -institution-building decisions included- are never made in an institutional vacuum. On the contrary, there is always an institutional context that defines the constellations of actors involved, provides for incentives and restrictions to decision choices and, determines the most basic rules of the decision-making process. Therefore, strategic interactions among political elites are fundamentally influenced by the wider institutional framework. Bearing this in mind, my political-institutional hypothesis reads as follows: asymmetrical devolution is likely to trigger the multiplication of autonomy claims that, once combined with the particular conditions of electoral competition, will eventually set in motion self-government claims ininitially less-empowered regions.

Moving from the theoretical dimension to the empirical focus of the paper, it is worth mentioning that the territorial distribution of political power has been unanimously considered one of the most contentious issues within the Spanish democratic transition (Aja 2003; Blanco Valdés 2005; Caciagli 1984; Guibernau 1995). If the Spanish Constitution was to emerge as the product of a “compromise” and “consensus”[6]among the main political forces, it would have to be achieved in spite of the entrenched conflict between centralists advocating for the unity of the State and those others political actors pressing for the recognition of minority nations and for varying degrees of decentralisation. As a result, the constitutional writing will noticeably show a lack of imprecision, allowing for different and sometimes contradictory readings[7].

Not surprisingly, the Fathers of the Constitution could only agree to defer the final territorial structure of the State,and to set forth various alternative paths for the elaboration of statutes of autonomy. Instead, the very decision to accede to devolution was handed over to the very territorial entities that were to benefit from self-government, in accordance with a “principle of voluntariness” (so-called principio dispositivo). This is what P. Cruz Villalón has labelled “de-constitutionalisation of the form of the State” (1981: 53).

Articles 151 and 143 of the Constitution establish two basic paths for self-government, with an essential difference in terms of competencies: in the first case –so-called “fast-track autonomy”– the highest level of competencies could be achieved from the very beginning, whereas autonomous communities to be formed according to the second one –“slow-track autonomy”– would have to wait a five year period before they could claim for the specific powerslisted in the Article 149 of the Constitution. From a procedural point of view, Article 151 required a formal initiative for self-government to be adopted by three-fourths of municipalities, representing at least the majority of the electoral census in each province. This initiative had also to be approved by absolute majority in a referendum taking place within six months after the first agreement in favour of the self-government initiativewas upheld by a local authority within the region. And a second referendum would be also necessary to ratify the drafted statute afterwards. According to article 143, by contrast, the firstreferendum for the self-government initiative was not required.

To complicate the scenario further, a special provision was made to allow “those territories that had held in the past a referendum on a statue of autonomy with affirmative result”[8] to “opt in” to the widest range of powers without fulfilling any self-government initiative procedure. In an intricate attempt to solve the long-lasting national problem (Guibernau 1995: 239), this circumlocution used to refer to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia was expected to satisfy their demand of differentiated treatment. As we have already seen, other regions were not absolutely excluded from the same status, but their access to this higher degree of self-government was made much more difficult(Solózabal 1996: 249).Extremely difficult, indeed, that it was thought to be unviable in practice and to work only as a “formal alibi” for the extremely favourable treatment the historical nationalities were to receive (Blanco Valdés 2005:56;Meilán Gil 1988).

Against this background, political forces in Andalusia almost unanimously agreed that Andalusiadid not want -and would not accept- to be treated as something less than the historic nationalities; consequently, in the first meeting held by the Andalusian pre-autonomous government on the 4th of December 1978, the so-called “Antequera Accord” was approved. According to it, the pursuit for Andalusian self-government would be undertaken on equal terms to those defined for Catalonia and the Basque Country, that is to say, followingthe fast-track procedure. At the same time, the “Antequera Accord” was used as an official appeal to all local and provincial councils to adhere to the regional self-government initiative. In response to this request, and only after two months, all eight county councils together with 95% of local councils had formally endorsed the self-government initiative for Andalusia[9].

These results are especially relevant, if several actions carried out by the UCD - party in power at the central government- are taken into consideration: First, instructions were sent by the National Secretariat of the Party to press UCD town- councillors to vote against the self-government initiative. Second, the National Executive Committee -met on the 15th January 1980- agreed on some “Conclusions and Guidelines” concerning the Government’s decentralization policy, calling for the “rationalization of the process of autonomy”[10]. This way, the Government formally revealed its intention to close the path of Article 151 after the Statute of Galicia had been approved; as a result, the process of devolution in the remaining of the country had to be channelled through Article 143. Third, the National Executive Committee -met again on the 16th January 1980- made a decision to recommend abstention to all party’s voters, in case the Andalusian referendum would finally take place[11].

These decisions came too late, because Andalusia had already complied with the requirements to pursue the self-government initiative referendum and, even the President of the Government -Adolfo Suárez- had decided the date for that popular consultation. The Socialist Party -PSOE-, Communist Party and Party for Andalusia[12], strongly campaigned for participation and the “yes” vote, whereas UCD was divided between those supporting the referendum and those others recommending abstention. During the electoral campaign, advertising in national TV channels was forbidden, some restrictions were also established for newspaper advertising[13] and, the expenses for the institutional campaign were reduced[14]. Due to some delays in the delivery of the ballot papers, some soldiers in compulsory military service were unable to exercise their voting right; and some problems happened in the vote counting, too.

Circumstances surrounding the referendum have been described as painful and discriminatory for the Andalusian people (Clavero 1983) and, partly because of itandalusian consciousness was strengthened. In this sense, the perception of being discriminated found clear translation into the referendum results: The turnout was over 65% and, 86’93% of votes favoured the self-government initiative. Precisely because Andalusia was able to carry out the whole path traced in Article 151, this “significantly added democratic legitimacy to its autonomy quest over all other autonomous communities – the so-called historical nationalities included” (Acosta 2002: 107)[15].

How successful are the various hypotheses in explaining these political results? In accordance with the “under-development hypothesis it can be argued that,at the outset of the democratic transition Spain offered a broad gap between the most prosperous and the poorest territories. Within this context, Andalusiawas described as a backward region, overtly dependent on agriculture and tourism and with a weak industrial sector (Murillo 1981: 138). From the 1950s onwards, the region had permanently been the origin of emigration movements; in 1979 the unemployment rate was 5 points higher than the national average[16] and, the average family income in the region represented only 78% of the national one. Reinforcing these statistical data, the widespread opinion in the region was that,it had suffered from the government’s economic policy in previous decades that had favoured the development of other regions at the expense of Andalusia (Clavero 1983; Jimenez et all 1977). The way was paved, therefore, for regional politicians to exploit resentment and comparative grievance arguments.

As for the cultural distinctiveness hypothesis, Andalusia does not have its own regional language, but rather some phonetics and dialect features that differentiate the way Andalusians talk the Castilian language from the standard Castilian pronunciation. Accordingly, the linguistic element cannot rigorously be held as expression of the Andalusian distinctiveness; yet, some other more subjective elements of cultural specificity have been recognised in the case of Andalusia, in terms of its distinctive lifestyle and folklore (Lecours 2001, 211). On the other hand, and in spite of an increase in the sense of Andalusian distinctiveness, at the time when the referendum took place, Andalusians mostly held the perception of being primarily Spanish and secondly Andalusians (Jimenez et al 1977).

Regarding the political-institutional hypothesis, the mainstream literature on Spanish decentralization agrees that the granting of special autonomy to the historical nationalities –that is to say, establishing a process of asymmetrical devolution-had a powerful demonstration effect on the rest of the country and, it resulted in a process of inter-regional competition and territorial emulation (Blanco 2005; Lecours 2004; Moreno 1997). Not out of irony, the process of decentralization has been described as the “fable of the hare and the tortoise” (Corcuera 1994). But, why was Andalusia the only among the “non-historic nationalities” that pursued autonomy through Article 151? A first glance to political party interests and interactions reveals that the PSOE was the main political force in Andalucia, whereas the central government was ruled by the UCD. Whereas the PSOE read autonomy for Andalucia as opening the door tothe government of the region, UCD inevitably interpreted the same event as the lost in territorial power.

When assessing both economic hypotheses together, the fact that economic difference can work in both directions seems to minimise its conclusiveness and explanatory power. Being one of the most economically developed parts of the country could activate the claim for self-government in the case of Catalonia that found itself “politically subjected to an anachronistic and backward state, Castile, that held political power” (Guibernau 1995: 241). At the same time, being one of the most economically under-developed parts of the country could also activate the claim for self-government in Andalusia. Provided that most regions could easily find socio-economic indicators –such as GDP per capita or unemployment rate- to argue that they stand in a better or worse economic position that the average country, it seems that most regions could rely on this argument as the rationale behind their claim for a higher level of autonomy. That is to say, if economic difference could explain all cases, it would end up explaining none of them.