1.1 Basic Concepts

1. Wellman

1.1 Basic concepts

States (never explicitly defined; pp. 11, 14): coercive organizations that control [attempt to control?] behavior in in a geographical through legislative, executive, and judicial operations. [cf. my preferred definition: a rule-of-law-based coercive organization that, for a given territory, effectively rules all individuals in it, is not effectively ruled by any other person or organization (so that is the ultimate or supreme ruler), and claims a monopoly on the use of force.]

Statism (p. 6): Some [non-consensual, p. 11] states can be morally justified [are morally permissible].

Anarchism (p. 6): Negation of statism. [Note that “anarchism” is sometimes (e.g., here) used to mean the denial of the justness or permissibility of non-consensual states and sometimes (see notes on Simmons, below) to mean the denial of the political authority of states.]

Justice: infringes no rights (p. ?). Justice in this sense is compatible with being impermissible (because impersonally wrong and injustice in this sense is compatible with being permissible (when the infringement is made permissible by an overriding justification).

Legitimacy of a state relative to those in its territory (defined in different ways by different authors; not defined in the book, but defined as follows in e-mail): The moral liberty-right of the states to enforce its directive on those people (i.e., to coerce them with threats and to impose the threatened actions) = the justice of enforcing it directives. (Different but related concept: the permissibility of enforcing its directives.]

1.2 Defense of statism

Crucial benefits (definition): avoiding a “bloody mess”, a “horrible life”, or a “horribly perilous environment” (pp. 10-11); social stability, p. 17; “secure peace and protect basic moral rights (p. 45)

P1: A state is [pro tanto? conclusively?] justified, if (and only if?) (1) it supplies crucial benefits that could not be supplied in the absence of a state and (2) it does not impose unreasonable net costs on those it coerces. (p. 5)

P2: Some non-consensual states satisfy the above conditions.

C: Some non-consensual states are justified.

P1* (more careful version, p. 19): A state is [pro tanto? conclusively?] justified in coercing a given person if and only if (1) the coercion to that person (overall, as opposed to a particular case?) supplies crucial benefits to others that could not be supplied in the absence of this coercion, and (2) the coercion to that person does not impose unreasonable net costs on her.

P2*: Some non-consensual states satisfy the above conditions for all (most?) of those it coerces.

C: Some non-consensual states are justified.

Here justified = morally justified = morally permissible (p. 30). A slightly different claim would be about justice (infringing no rights).

In support of the P1 claim that a well-functioning state supplies crucial benefits (p. 10):

(1) Without an authoritative legislative body (that establishes practical rules), there will be conflicts among people want to respect people’s rights but who disagree on what morality requires.

(2) Without an effective executive body (that enforces the rules), those with some inclination to infringe people’s rights will not be sufficiently deterred from doing so, and this will significantly reduce everyone’s incentives to engage in productive projects.

(3) Without an effective judicial body, private adjudication will lead to more perceived injustice (over-punishment and under-punishment), and thus to more retaliation and bloody conflict.

1.3 Defense of duty to obey the law

P1: An agent has a pro tanto (pp. 53, 87) duty to obey the just laws of a legitimate state governing the territory that she is in (even if not a citizen) if and only if (1) the social practice [“communal project”, social “coordination” project] of obeying the just laws of this state supplies crucial benefits to those in its territory that could not be supplied in the absence of this social practice, and (2) complying with this practice does not impose unreasonable net costs [more than her fair share?] on the agent. (p. 32)

P2: The social practice of obeying the just laws of a legitimate state governing the territory that one satisfies by above conditions.

C: An agent has a pro tanto duty to obey the just laws of a legitimate state governing the territory that she is in (even if not a citizen).

Note that the crucial benefits can be supplied without the agent’s obedience, but they cannot be supplied without the social practice of obedience. There is a move here to an indirect, or rule-based, assessment (like that of rule-utilitarianism).

There is no (pro tanto? p. 77, 79 “no general duty”) duty to obey the laws (even if just) of illegitimate states or the unjust laws of legitimate states. (p. 74).

Wellman endorses limited political anarchism: There are potentially weighty reasons to resist unjust laws of legitimate states and to resist illegitimate states. (p. 74)

The duty to obey just laws of legitimate states is not absolute (morally conclusive). It is permissible breach that duty when there are overriding moral considerations.

2. Simmons

Morally Justified = morally permissible P. 148

Legitimacy relative some individual: moral/political authority over that individual, i.e., that the entity can create a moral obligation for the individual to do something simply by issuing a directive that she do so. p. 148 [In n. 66, p. 180, Simmons notes that “legitimacy” is sometimes used in the sense of “a right to rule”. This is sometimes (e.g., by Wellman in this book) understood as the permissibility of issuing and enforcing directive. Sometimes it is understood as political authority (the moral power to create moral obligations by issuing directives). And sometimes it is understood as requiring both.]

Philosophical Anarchism: There is no (general) pro tanto obligation to obey even just laws of just states. (p. 101)

Political Anarchism: It is morally permissible, or perhaps obligatory, to resist/overthrow (most? all?) non-consensual states. P. 191. (Simmons describes it as the position of being committed to overthrowing such states, but I think that my version better captures what he wants.)

Argument in defense of philosophical anarchism:

P1: An agent in the territory of a given state has a pro tanto obligation to obey its laws only if the agent has consented to acquiring this obligation. (n. 10, p. 120, 148).

P2: Very few agents in the territory of a given state have consented to acquiring a pro tanto obligation to obey the laws of that state. (. P. 118, n. 10, p. 120)

C: Very few agents in the territory of a given state have a pro tanto obligation to obey its laws.

Simmons defends P1 mainly by arguing against the main alternatives (summarized below).

Associative theories (non-voluntary occupation of duty-laden social roles or “identity”):

- Non-voluntarist “contract” version: People grow (non-transactionally) into networks of expectation and commitment to obey the law.

o Objection: Social roles and identities, and expectations, are local. Hence, there is no general duty to obey the law.

- Identity version: People’s identities (who they are) are defined in part by being duty-bound members of a particular political community.

o Objection: Why should identification with a duty-bound role ground moral duties?

- Normative independence version: Local practices are morally authoritative (i.e., general moral duties).

o Objections: Does a local practice of slavery generate duties to respect the slave-owners legal rights?

Transactional theories (based on certain kinds of interactions) that are not based on actual consent (e.g., reciprocation theories):

- Hypothetical consent version: One has obligation to comply with those rules that one would hypothetically consent to under specified idealized conditions.

o Objection: Hypothetical consent is not really transactional. It’s really a natural duty theory based on the features that would elicit the hypothetical consent.

o Hypothetical consent does not generate duties.

- Reciprocation version: Receipt or acceptance of benefits generates a moral duty to reciprocate

o Fair share version: Those who benefit (or freely accept benefits) from the cooperative sacrifices of others, made in support of a mutually beneficial scheme, have a moral obligation to bear their fair share of the burdens assigned with that scheme.

§ Objection: The principle is sound only if the benefits are freely accepted, and this is seldom the case for the benefits provided by states (usually no choice to avoid).

o Gratitude version: We have a moral duty to make appropriate returns for benefits provided by others.

§ Objections: (1) It is morally desirable to make appropriate returns, but it is not morally obligatory. (2) If there is an obligation, it is owed only to specific benefactors with specific motives. (3) The appropriate returns need not be obedience to the law.

Natural duty theories (a duty that all agents have)

- Consequentialist versions:

o Act (“direct”) consequentialism: agents have an impersonal duty to adequately promote morally good consequences.

§ Objection: Violating the law is often a way of promoting good consequences.

o Generalized consequentialism: Agents have an impersonal duty to that which “if everyone did it” would adequately promote morally good consequences:

§ Objection: Implausible appeal to “everyone doing the same thing”

o Rule consequentialism: Agents have an impersonal duty to comply with those rules that, if generally followed, would adequately promote morally good consequences:

§ Objection: Implausible appeal to rule-following.

- Necessity versions (really, I think, a form of satisficing consequentialism [avoiding a disaster; e.g., protecting life and limb against violence])

o Objections: (1) Why does someone’s need of protection generate a duty for someone to provide that protection? (2) Is a legal system necessary for avoiding the relevant social disaster? (3) Why does it generate a duty to obey the law?

- Respect version (skipped)

- Natural duty of justice version (my reconstruction):

o Ethical version (Kant?): Everyone has certain basic rights and thus everyone owes everyone else certain basic duties. In addition, everyone owes everyone else a duty to do her fair share of promoting justice (i.e., ensuring that people’s rights are not infringed).

§ Objection: How does this generate a duty to obey the law?

o Political version (Rawls): Everyone in a given society owes everyone else in that society a (pro tanto) duty to comply with, and support, those institutions (laws) that are reasonably just and to “do one’s part (fair share) to promote the existence of more just institutions.

§ This generates a duty to obey the law, only if the institution of which it is part is just.

§ Sometimes just institutions are better supported/promoted by disobeying certain laws (to heighten awareness of certain injustices).

§ Disobeying the law sometimes has no effect on the functioning of reasonably just institutions.

§ Why is there a duty to obey and support the just laws of one’s society but not of other societies?

o Waldron’s version: skipped.

o Wellman (natural duty of mutual aid): Treated separately below.

Wellman’s theory (repeated from section on Wellman, not from Simmons):

P2: The social practice of obeying the just laws of a legitimate state governing the territory that one satisfies by above conditions.

C: An agent has a pro tanto duty to obey the just laws of a legitimate state governing the territory that she is in (even if not a citizen).

Objections to P1:

(1) Wellman’s Samaritan duty seems to be a curious hybrid of two kinds of duty. His examples are of perfect/interpersonal duties of (easy) rescue (duties of mutual aid, Samaritan duties) to deal with emergencies directly presented to the agent, but his principle is of imperfect/impersonal (limited, e.g., by “surplus” good or fair share limitation) duties of charity (mutual assistance, beneficence) to alleviate (typically, ongoing) suffering or meet needs. Only the former allows that the duty is to obey local laws and that the duty is owed to fellow citizens, but only the latter can include a fair share requirement. [See pp. 183-88] Let’s discuss! Note that here aid ≠ assistance.]

(2) Obedience to the local law is only a means to providing the good of security. If the our actual circumstances permit us to effectively promote morally mandated ends (such as need satisfaction, security, or even local security) without adopting the usual (or locally prescribed) means of doing so, then we are permit to do so. (p. 188).

Objections to P2:

(1) Unusual valuers (with significant net costs from the legal order) may not stand to benefit from state stability and thus have no duty to obey the law.

(2) The net costs of an act of obedience are often significant.