1.1.Background to the Study

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1.Background to the Study

The study examines the Africa role conceptionsbyNigeria’s political leadershipfrom 1985 to 2007. The perception that states are like humans who occupy specific roles in a social group is a global one with a long history. By the national role approach which has been popularized by Holsti (1967, 1970, and 1987), Wish (1980), Walker (1990), and Krotz (2001), a state is equated with an individual who cannot live in isolation and has a particular set of roles to perform in the human community: from the family group, to the school, religious organization, peer group, market, workplace, and so forth. Borrowed from Social Psychology,which recognizes the mutuality of “role” and “man” in every social group that provides a platform for the full expression of man’s potentials and social self (Backman and Second, 1968), the behaviouralist approach in the field of Political Science and International Relations contextualizes the world system as an international community or a social group, and states as members or individuals of such community with separate or similar roles either apportioned or self imposed which they identify with the intent of playing. Hence, from the global bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), continental systems such as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), regional organizations including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to bilateral arrangements, every component in the global system has a set of roles to play, and these distinguish each one of them. Interestingly however, each body may be dysfunctional until the states that make them up play organic roles in the system.

However, political realism, which stresses the primary role of national interest in every role a nation plays or does not play in international politics, argues that national roles are galvanized by well articulated national interests. This perspective holds that identified roles are directly connected to identified interests and that when roles become incompatible with such interests, the state changes the roles. However, it is not always the case for other actors or components of the international system. International organizations to which states belong have specific interests and roles to give life to the interests which its members must play. This does not foreclose the fact that states opt out of organizations that can no longer accommodate their interests rather than play a role not coterminous with their nation’s interests. Spain left the League of Nations in the 1930s, and so did Germany. Despite the place of national interests in identifying national roles, it is the latter that defines the external behaviour or attitude of the state, and makes its reactions or dispositions to world issues predictable (Isaak, 1975). The state would even have a specific image or earn aparticular label for itself by which other nations would know it (Eulau, 1963). For instance, the United States and Britainbecause of their role in global democratization andgood governance,and fight to secure the world from terrorism, are referred to as “world policemen”.Thus, the life which the national role approach gives to states more than national interest makes it more attractive and scientific in the study of a state’s foreign policy (Adigbuo, 2007).

The African context of role conception and assumption has not been different. However, it is a relatively new outlook for African foreign policies except for Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia, which from independence, against the backgrounds of their colonial experience and aspirations for the future,assumed some definite roles in the continent and the world. Ghana,under Kwame Nkrumah,took the lead in the movement for a radical unification of independent African statesin which all the nations would surrender their sovereignty to a supranational authority (King, 1996). Ghana spearheaded this when Nkrumah declared that Ghana was under the authority of the African sovereign, a position that other states in the erstwhile Casablanca group identified with. Ghana’s Pan-Africanist posture and roles allowed for the first conference on the African soil of the movement to be hosted in Accra. Egypt’s anti-colonial behaviour from the era of the nationalization of the Suez Canal under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and its roles in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (a group of states with specific objective to depart from the ideological feud between Soviet Union and the United States during the period referred to as the Cold War, and specific role to reconcile the two divides and judge ideology-related issues based on merits) (Adeyemo, 2002), made Egypt an early comer in global and African politics. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was one of the foremost African leaders to carve a niche for his country as a continental leader with his anti-western but Pan-Africanist rhetorics and advocacy. These activist roles towards African harmony of Ethiopia under him were part of what culminated in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and earned for Ethiopiafrom that time to date the headquarters of the continental body.

Role conception and assumption by Nigeriahas been a function of the perceptions of the founding fathers from the eve of independence, and a product of certain geographical factors. The nationalists including Nnamdi Azikiwe, Herbert Macaulay, Obafemi Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Aminu Kano, Ahmadu Bello, and Tafawa Balewa, to mention a few, viewed Nigeria as a nation naturally created to fill the roles of leadership in Africa and the world.Their foreign policy outlooks which had characterized their basis for independence movement in the first place were premised on the historical factors of the making of Nigeria itself. This factor was the merger of the great nations and empires of the Western Sudan and the Forest Region of the pre-colonial era, including Kanem Bornu, Benin, Oyo, Nupe, Kano, Kororofa, Sakwatto, Itsekiri, and Ijaw (Ikime, 1985).Other factors included the civility, maturity, and political wisdom in struggling for and earning independence. This was considered to have served as a model for other nations under colonial rule. Other factors that informed the role conceptions by the founding fathers includedNigeria’s huge population; its wealth; and its rich cultural heritage. The perceptions of the past have been strengthened by the increasing population making Nigeria the most populous black nation in the world, and its oil fortunes which place it as one of the rich countries of the world in revenue (Onyearu, 2008).The first instinct of Nigeria has therefore been to occupy the centre of African affairs: use its resources, influence, and power to reach great bargains and further its interests, assume leadership positions and become the voice of the continent, and assist needy nations of the entire black world (King, 1996). These three-prong roles have underlined the foreign policy towards Africa and earned for Nigeria the international label of having an Afrocentric attitude.

Against these backgrounds, this study examines African role conceptions and assumption by Nigeria. It attempts to identify the role conceptions, actors in the politics of role conceptions, and how Nigeriaperformed these roles from 1985 to 2007. The period encompasses five political dispensations (three military regimes and two civilian administrations). However, one of the civilian administrations, the Shonekan Interim National Government (August-November 1993) has been left out because of its very brief tenure, and inactivity in the foreign policy arena.

For Nigeria, national role conceptions vary over time and across borders. Each regime comes up with its own rhetoric of “unique roles” Nigeria would occupy in Africa. This does not foreclose the fact that such regime always seems to end up having role conception or role assumption problems. The seeming vagueness of the conception or vagueness of strategies of realization of Nigeria’s African roles, or the rehash of old conceptions, rather demonstrate any or a combination of these six role conception strands in the development of Nigeria’s African policy: vaguely or unclearly conceived roles; absence of role conceptions; assumption of national roles not conceived; clearly conceived roles that are partially or never filled; lack of a dynamic role conception, and clearly conceived roles that were also effectively occupied. Specifically, the study seeks to identify the lacuna and establish which of the six observable scenarios underlined Nigeria’s African policy from 1985 to 2007. The concept of Nigeria’s African policy can be viewed as a systematic approach to building and preserving a desirable balance between Nigeria’s dispositions and Africa’s conditions (Bukarambe, 1990). a. Since independence in 1960 Nigeria’s efforts have been geared towards engendering an enduring peace, security, unity, brotherhood and brotherliness towards Africa and the entire black race (King, 1996; Oluwaniyi, 2006), and lately good governance, poverty reduction, diseases control and development in the region, with the Africa-centrepiece underlining its foreign policy.

The research interrogates policy makers’ role conceptions, why and how such roles were conceived, how each leadership has implemented their own African policy against the background of their role conceptions, and the specific problems with role conceptions that each has faced. To these ends, the study also examines the politics of conception of national roles in the foreign policy making of Nigeria. The study attempts to underline the utility of National Role Conceptions (NRCs) as a more promising analytical tool in the study of foreign policy (Adigbuo, 2007), than commonly used International Relations (IR) instruments such as Political Realism (including National Interest), Liberal-idealism, Marxism, and lately Constructivism.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

An important area in foreign policy analysis, which, however, seems neglected in Nigeria’s foreign policy (NFP) is national role conception (NRC). In Nigeria, role conception has not been clear in part because it is prone to different interpretations by various governments, political institutions and influential individuals and groups.More critically is that the role conceptions have often been outlandish and vague as far as strategies or instruments of policy were concerned. In terms of the politics of role conceptions and foreign policy making, the Nigerian leadership has exhibited a high degree of dictatorship, making foreign policy a class, clique, and secret thing between the President or Head of State and his chosen small cabinet. Other agents of foreign policymaking, including other ministries, the parliament, judiciary, media, research groups, think-tanks, academic community, and pressure/interest groups are sidelined, while a very small informal or semi-formal political group (the group within the group) conceives external roles of the country, takes decisions, and formulates policies. Thus, foreign policy making is often shrouded in secrecy and clique clannishness. This has impacted on the problem of definition of Nigeria’s African rolesin its policy towardsAfrica. The politicization, secrecy andresultant confusion create a problem of clarityculminating in the unpopularity of role conceptions as a term in Nigerian foreign policy analysis, because it is often difficult for analysts to underline or identify Nigeria’s conceived roles. These have constituted major lacuna in Nigeria’s foreign policy analysis. It is this major gap that this study has attempted to fill: to identify these roles, critique them, and examine how they are conceived and eventually assumed by Nigeria in Africa.

Indeed, Nigeria’s African policy has suffered conceptual problem from independence. Political leaders and elite who make the policies have been more driven by class, group, and personal interests than national concerns in the formulation of policies. They also sometimes lack the intellectual and technical finesse to conceptualize policy and articulate national roles that can help translate rhetoric to action, and subject national roles to their petty perceptions and narrow interpretations (Gambari, 1986). Such have led to a number of deficiencies in role conception- vague, static or non-dynamic, clear but unrealistic (bogus), clear but lacking in will, absence of conception, and clear conception with the will to assume them. By and large, there is a problem with clarity of Nigeria’s African policy, which is rooted at the role conception stage. Universally, NRCs have three basic assumptions namely, that role conceptions are the culmination of the perceptions of leaders, interpretations of the leaders, and the expectations of the general public (local and international) (Adigbuo, 2005; Wish, 1980). However, the politics of role conception in Nigeria is such that the first two assumptions have been strengthened at the expense of the third which emphasizes the crucial place of citizens and other groups which Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann, and Hermann (2001) have referred to as decision units in the policy process (2001). This was particularly so during the post Second Republic period, when the army with its command structure and professional “secret” style of operations, took over the business of foreign affairs. The civilian administration that succeeded it from 1999 was incidentally led by another army General who had retired after serving as a military Head of State in the past. The study thus carefully selected the period of 1985-2007 because it presents a classic reference point in the role conception problem.

The study attempts a fact-value dichotomy, by a scientific inquisition through the interrogation of the many outlandish political statements of the political leaders, and critically evaluating the assertions of the leaders and policymakers and juxtaposing their pronouncements with their actions in Africa, and in the process identifying and documenting Nigeria’s official roles in Africa.

1.3. Research Questions

Against the background of the problem, the study has attempted to answer the following questions:

1. What are the national role conceptions in Nigeria’s African policy?
2. Who conceives national roles and how are they conceived and assumed?
3. Are there differences between the role conceptions and role performance of each administration?
4. What accounts for these differences?

1.4.Research Propositions

The study has made some propositions to act as guide in the course of the research. The degree of probability of the propositions is tested in the course of the research and analysis. These propositions are:

1. National roles are not clearly defined in Nigeria’s African policy from 1985-2007.
2. Foreign policy making process is not controlled by a small and informal group.
3. There is no significant difference between the role conception and role performance of each leadership.
4. Differences that mayoccur between role conception and assumption arenotnecessarily informed by domestic factors.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

Against the background of the problematique and research questions, the overall objective of the study is the interrogation of the historical development of Nigeria’s African policy against the background of role conceptions of the policymakers, investigating the underpinnings of politics in the role conceptions and examining how the leadership and diplomacy styles and preferences of four different policy regimes rubbed on policy initiative, making and implementation concerning Africa from 1985-2007. Specifically, the objectives are to:

1. Investigatethe national role conceptions in Nigeria’s African policy
2. Identify the political undercurrents in both the conception and assumption of Nigeria’s roles in Africa
3. Comparatively examine the conception of national roles and performance of the roles by the successive leaderships in Nigeria from 1985 to 2007.
4. Account for the differences in the roles of each political regime.

1.6. Scope of the Study

The study covers the period 1985-2007. This was a significant era in Nigeria’s foreign policy. This period included three military regimes (Ibrahim Babangida, 1985-1993; Sani Abacha, 1993-1998; Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1998-1999); and the civilian administration of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007). The administration of Ernest Shonekan is omitted because of its very brief tenure. The period was eventful and critical for Nigeria’s foreign policy in general and its African policy in particular. The period allows for an inquiry into whether Nigeria had clearly defined or identifiable role conceptions in its formulation and implementation of African policy. The study identifies the common thread running through successive regimes’ role conceptions and foreign policy implementation, and establishes the differences in policies.

The period chosen enhances a more critical approach to the understanding of the politics of and variations in foreign policy making in Nigeria because of the governance types it understudies and the understanding of different regime behaviours this offers. The period also allows for a flow in the investigation of any continuity and change in Nigeria’s role conceptions and African policy. These become important because of the variants of leadership and their different agenda as far as foreign and African policy was concerned. For instance, the twilight of the Babangida regime posed a lot of credibility crises for Nigeria in international politics, the Abacha period undermined its leadership in Africa, the Abubakar era sought reintegration of Nigeria in global politics, and Obasanjo’s dispensation saw Nigeria struggling - to outdo South Africa, Egypt and Ghana- and recovering its leadership and respectable position in Africa.