The Evolution from Conservative Republicanism to
Progressive Democraticism in American Politics
By George Ortega
March 23, 2010
Introduction
In politics, there are cycles and evolutionary progressions. One example of these cycles is the back and forth swing between Democratic and Republican party dominance in U.S. party politics. 1860 saw the election of Abraham Lincoln and the beginning of a Republican era that lasted until 1932. This era was followed by a 48 year Democratic era that began with Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. It was eventually replaced by a Republican era that ran from 1980 until 2008, when it appears to have ended with the election of Barack Obama on the heels of the Democratic Party takeover of Congress in 2006. There are also evolutionary progressions wherein a political ideology, often representing an entire system of government and social organization, becomes so incapable of addressing societal and political challenges that it is completely and irrevocably replaced by a new or competing ideology deemed better suited to meet those challenges. The transitions from small tribal societies in Europe to the feudal system of lords, vassals, and fiefs that thereafter evolved into more centralized monarchies and, in turn, were replaced by representative democracies are examples of these evolutionary ideological progressions.
Based on an analysis of demographic, geographic and public opinion trends during the last several decades, John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira concluded in their 2002 book The Emerging Demographic Majority that the Conservative era that began in 1980 with Ronald Reagan would before 2010 be replaced by a new Progressive era that the authors predicted would last several decades. While Judis and Teixeira predicted merely the evidence and timing for the next cyclical swing in American political ideology and policies, two major historical events that occurred four and six years after the publishing of their findings presage a far more substantial shift that seems likelier to manifest the characteristics of a political evolutionary progression than a political cycle.
The first of these events was the international release of former vice president Al Gore’s Oscar winning documentary on global warming, An Inconvenient Truth. Although the climate crisis had received its first major thrust into public consciousness in 1988 when James Hansen, head of NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Studies, appeared before Congress to warn them of the rapidly growing threat to human civilization that was looming as a result of dangerously high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, it was not until Gore’s film premiered in 2006 that an American public that had become ecologically complacent since Reagan began dismantling the nation’s environmental protection regulations suddenly reawoke with an informed sense of urgency regarding the threats posed by our warming climate.
The huge and likely insurmountable problem for the Republican Party is that their Conservative political and economic ideology, distrustful of science and government intervention, and wedded to defending the big business interests that will by absolute necessity bow to unprecedented levels of government constraints and regulations, was not designed to address a crisis as needful of a strong and sustained central command as demanded by our climate crisis. This problem, however, extends far beyond the principles and policies of Conservative ideology. Equally challenging for the Republican Party will be the Conservative mindset that has been burned into the Republican brain over the last century, and threatens to render both Conservative politicians and their constituencies psychologically incapable of abandoning their cherished political beliefs, even when continuing to maintain those beliefs amounts to political suicide. The third, and probably most influential, factor irrevocably destroying any chance the Republican Party of today might ever have of regaining influence in American politics is that the political demands posed by the climate crisis will continue, and very likely grow in scope and urgency, through the remaining nine decades of the twenty-first century. Neither Conservative ideology nor Conservative psychology, locked into a trust of the past that necessitates an accompanying contempt for change, possesses the basic values and principles by which to successfully address those decades-long demands. Thus, similarly to how our presumably Progressive Founding Fathers were compelled to craft a system of government fundamentally and profoundly different from that of the British Monarchy, politicians today must craft a new government/business relationship fundamentally and profoundly different from that reflected by the free market-dominated status quo, while the intellectual elite of a Conservative ideology now destined for extinction must eventually craft a new political and economic ideology fundamentally and profoundly different from the Conservatism of the last century. This transformation will be neither easy nor swift.
In fact, on its own, the decades long demands that climate change will impose on our American government, and the fact that they can be met only by massive government control and regulation over the private sector, bodes a sure and relatively quick death to Republican Conservatism. However, that human civilization-scale survival challenge is not the only monumental, and, indeed, historical, force now bearing down on Conservative ideology and forbidding any future prospect for the political resurgence of the Republican Party, as we know it. The 2008 global economic meltdown poses a threat to the Republican Party that is also independently in the process of denying a future to the foundation of Conservative economic ideology, and in the process of ultimately rendering inconsequential a Republican Party so irrationally intransigent as to continue defending the insidiously destructive Conservative sans-regulatory principles and policies at the heart of that meltdown.
Before exploring in detail exactly how and why climate change and the 2008 global recession, both on their own and as a tandem force, unequivocally spell doom for a Republican Party politically and psychologically unable to abandon its Conservative ideas, we will explore the demographic, geographic and public opinion trends that forebode this fate for Conservative Republicanism. We will conclude with an examination of the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling on Citizens United v. FEC, which threatens to delay this evolutionary shift, and an exploration of what Conservative principles may live on to influence whatever new party emerges to challenge the Progressive Democraticism destined to rule for at least the next three decades, and probably well into the unforeseeable future.
The Democratic-Trending Demography
In 2002, Judis and Teixeira observed strong and growing demographic, geographic and public opinion trends that during the next several decades seem destined to result in larger local, state and national Democratic Party gains, and corresponding gains in Progressive ideals, policies, and programs. The strong demographic shift toward progressives they observed includes almost all of the major demographic groups that are growing fastest. These groups include professionals, women, minorities, and the white working class. Seven years later, in 2009, Teixeira updated his earlier results in a 51-page report for the Center for American Progress titled “New Progressive America; Twenty Years of Demographic, Geographic, and Attitudinal Changes Across the Country Herald a New Progressive Majority.” This new analysis reaffirmed Judis and Teixeira’s 2002 conclusions, and provided additional data describing an increased pace in America’s shift toward progressive ideology. His paper also added young voters as perhaps the most telling and influential demographic group presaging a new Democratic era.
During the 1950s college educated highly skilled professionals such as doctors, lawyers and teachers were the most dependable demographic group for the Republican Party. This group, which in the fifties comprised only 7 percent of the workforce, has by 2009 grown to 17 percent.[1] They have the highest turnout rate of any group, and by 2000 they comprised about 21 percent of voters nationwide.[2] The problem for Republicans is that while this group overwhelmingly supported Eisenhower and Nixon, and strongly supported Ford and Reagan, they supported Gore over Bush in 2000 by 52 percent to 44 percent, Kerry over Bush in 2004 by 55 to 44 percent, and Obama over McCain in 2008 by 58 to 40 percent.[3]
Decades ago women also overwhelmingly supported Republicans over Democrats. For example in 1956, women voted for Eisenhower by 63-37 percent (while men supported him by 56-43 percent).[4] By the 1980s that trend had reversed, and in 2008, women voted for Obama by 56 to 43 percent (while men supported him by 49 to 48 percent).[5] Moreover, while in 1970, single women comprised only 38 percent of all women, they now make up 47 percent of all adult women,[6] and their growth rate is double that of married women.[7] The problem for Republicans is that in 2008 single women voted for Obama over McCain by 70 to 29 percent.
Minorities will also present a growing problem for the Republican Party. While in 1960 almost one third of Blacks voted for Nixon, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the National Voting Rights Act of 1965 represented major transformative events, and by 1964 fully 94 percent of Blacks voted for Johnson.[8] The level of Democratic support among Blacks has remained very high with 95 percent voting for Obama in 2008.[9] This trend is further amplified by the growth of Blacks as a percentage of all voters. In 1960, Blacks comprised fewer than 6 percent of the electorate.[10] By 2008, their numbers had more than doubled to 13 percent.[11] A similar and even stronger trend is seen with Hispanic voters. While as many as 47 percent of Hispanics voted for Reagan in 1984,[12] in 2008, 67 percent of Hispanics voted for Obama.[13] Moreover, while in 1992, Hispanics comprised only 3.7 percent of the voting electorate,[14] in 2008 that number had risen to 9 percent.
The strong and growing minority trend toward Democrats, and the huge problem it creates for the Republican party, is most clearly seen by contrasting the past and current African-American, Hispanic and Asian voting populations with population projections for the coming decades. In 1988, minorities comprised 15 percent of the national electorate.[15] By 2008, that number had grown to 26 percent.[16] As the minority share of the total population grows from roughly one third in 2008[17] to a projected 54 percent in 2050[18] we can expect much greater minority influence within the national electorate during the next several decades.
The white working class, or those without a college degree, comprise a relatively large demographic group representing about 39 percent of the total electorate in 2008.[19] Between the years of F.D.R.’s New Deal in 1932 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this group voted heavily Democratic. In the 1960s, they shifted dramatically toward the Republicans, and only began returning to the Democrats during the 1990s. Nonetheless, they are still predominantly Republican, and voted for McCain over Obama in 2008 by an 18 point margin.[20] The good news for Democrats is that this group is steadily becoming a smaller segment of the overall electorate. Since 1988, it has been declining at a rate of about three quarters of a percentage point each year, and is down 15 points over the last twenty years.[21] The decline in white working class voters is expected to continue as the current upgrading in education progresses, and the group will likely lose an additional six points by 2020.
As noted, Judis and Teixeira’s 2002 analysis neglected to include the influence of young voters, however, Teixeira’s 2009 update found this group to be trending strongly Democratic and an increasingly decisive influence in future elections. Born between 1978 and 2000, and referred to by Teixeira as the “Millennial Generation,” this demographic group gave Kerry only a 9-point advantage in 2004. Four years later, however, the group voted for Obama by 66 to 32, or a margin of 34 points.[22]
Equally importantly, while Millennials comprised only 20 percent of the total electorate in 2008, their turnout between 2004 and 2008 increased by over four percentage points; a turnout increase rate four times the national average. More bad news for Republicans is that the voting age members of this Millennial group is increasing by about 4.5 million each year, and by 2020, voting age Millennials will make up almost 40 percent of the electorate.[23] And this 40 percent Democratic Millinnial electorate will be further amplified by the attrition of older voters who tended to vote Republican as strongly as Millennials now vote Democratic.
The strong and growing trend of Millennials toward the Democratic Party most clearly describes the end of the Reagan Conservative Republican Era because whereas there is substantial overlap in similar trends of the other demographic groups, Millennials are comprised of all non-age-related demographic groups combined. That Millennials who in 2008 voted for Obama over McCain by a two-to-one margin will comprise 40 percent of the electorate by 2020 singularly bodes disaster for the Republican Party. When we, as we will in subsequent sections, factor in that of all groups Millennials will be most effected by the threat of climate change and very strongly effected by whatever Progressive remedies to the 2008 global recession are required, we see even more clearly why today’s Republican Party is truly on its last legs.
The Democratic-Trending Geography
Professionals, women, minorities, the white working class, and Millennials are all trending steadily Democratic. But demographics are not the only way to describe the problems Republicans and their Conservative ideology face during the coming decades. The geography of the Country is also trending steadily Democratic and Progressive. Judis and Teixeira see a new political geography defined by metropolitan regions within states rather than by states. They coined the term “ideopolises” to label these new Democratic geographic strongholds, and describe them as postindustrial metropolises that specialize more in the production of ideas and services rather than in assembly-line manufacturing.[24]
While in 1992, 1996 and 2000, Democrats dominated states in the Northeast, upper Midwest and Pacific Northwest, winning 267 of the 270 electoral votes needed for victory with these ideopolises, they are now extending their reach into Republican territory in the South and Southwest. Judis and Teixeira predicted in 2002 that by 2008 Democrats could rely on these ideopolises to win 332 electoral votes, or 148 electoral votes more than they would need to win the White House. By winning 365 electoral votes in 2008, Obama actually surpassed this prediction by 33 votes. Such is the extent of the electoral lock the Democrats seem poised to command during the coming decades.
In his 2009 update, Teixeira used a more traditional geographical analysis and found similar evidence for a strong and lasting Democratic majority. He noted that the fastest growing and largest metropolitan areas were almost all strongly trending Democratic. Republican gains, on the other hand, were limited to stable or declining rural areas.[25] Furthermore, these trends are expected to continue and intensify during the next several decades. For example, as the U.S. population gains about 100 million by 2037, the bulk of this growth will take place in those large Democratic-trending metropolitan areas.
This increasingly Democratic-favorable geography is also apparent through a state-by-state analysis. Democrats are making strong gains in all of the recent battleground states -- Pennsylvania, Michigan, Colorado, Nevada, Ohio, Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, Missouri and Indiana. A dramatic shift in these states toward Democrats over the last 24 years is revealed by the results of the last seven elections, as shown in the table below.
Recent Battleground States Trending Democratic
State and its electoral votes / Mondale 1984 / Dukakis 1988 / Clinton 1992 / Clinton1996 / Gore 2000 / Kerry 2004 / Obama 2008 / 24 year Dem. gain
Florida 27 / -31 / -22 / - 2 / + 6 / - 0 / - 5 / + 3 / 34
Pennsylvania 21 / - 7 / - 2 / + 9 / + 9 / + 5 / + 4 / +10 / 17
Ohio 20 / -19 / -11 / + 2 / + 6 / - 4 / - 2 / + 5 / 24
Michigan 17 / -19 / - 8 / + 7 / +13 / + 5 / + 3 / +16 / 35
Missouri 11 / -20 / - 4 / +10 / + 6 / - 3 / - 7 / - 0 / 20
North Carolina 15 / -24 / -16 / - 1 / - 5 / -13 / -12 / + 0 / 24
Virginia 13 / -25 / -20 / - 4 / - 2 / - 8 / - 8 / + 6 / 31
Indiana 11 / -24 / -20 / - 6 / - 6 / -16 / -21 / + 1 / 25
Colorado 9 / -28 / - 8 / + 4 / - 1 / - 9 / - 5 / + 9 / 37
Nevada 5 / -34 / -21 / + 3 / + 1 / - 4 / - 3 / +12 / 46
A look at how the most solid Republican states in 1984 have also shifted dramatically Democratic reveals the comprehensive and relentless nature of an American political realignment that foretells an ultimate end of the Conservative-dominated Republican Party.
Party Trend of the Most Solid Republican States in 1984
State and its electoral votes / Mondale 1984 / Clinton 1996 / Obama 2008 / 24 year Dem. gainAlabama 9 / -22 / -18 / -22 / 0
Arizona 8 / -33 / + 2 / - 8 / 22
Oklahoma 8 / -38 / - 8 / -31 / 9
Kansas 6 / -33 / -18 / -15 / 18
Nebraska 5 / -41 / -19 / -15 / 26
Utah 5 / -50 / -21 / -28 / 22
Idaho 4 / -45 / -19 / -25 / 20
Alaska 3 / -37 / -18 / -22 / 15
North Dakota 3 / -31 / - 7 / - 9 / 22
Wyoming 3 / -42 / -13 / -33 / 9
The Democratic-Trending Attitudes
The changing American demography and huge geographic Democratic gains in recent battleground and traditional Republican states reveal the shift in political power from Republicans to Democrats. These trends, however, do not occur outside of a public attitudes context that drives voters toward either Democrats or Republicans on major political issues. It is the nature and extent of these Democratic-leaning public attitudes among the general electorate, and especially among the demographic and geographic groups most strongly trending Democratic, that explain the current political realignment and signal a coming evolutionary transition rather than a Progressive-Conservative cycle.
Judis and Teixeira’s 2002 analysis found that the culture war issues like gay rights, race, abortion and gun control that played a pivotal role in the Conservative era beginning in 1980 had lost much of their steam by 2000. By 2009, Teixeira’s updated analysis reported strong evidence that the Country now has a new agenda, and that it’s major concerns like active government, health care, clean energy, diplomacy-based national security, and education are Progressive issues that pull the electorate toward Democratic policies and candidates.
Teixeira cites the rise in Millennial Generation voters, and single and non-religious adults, with their more tolerant attitudes, and the decline in the white working class as the main reasons for what appears destined to be a steadily growing shift in those public attitudes.[26] One example of this powerful and growing Progressive shift is that 58 percent of Millennials approve of gay marriage while 60 percent of older Americans disapprove.[27] In the coming decades, simple cohort replacement will account for much of this historic evolution from Conservative to Progressive ideology and government.