S. Yountchi

Turkey’s Military

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  1. Introduction

On February 19, 2001, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stormed out of a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) after President Ahmet Necdet Sezer accused him of obstructing investigations in an anti-corruption campaign led by Interior Minster Sadettin Tantan. Moreover, Ecevit told the press that, “a serious crisis had arisen” and that “Sezer will have a responsibility in the economic troubles that this incident might cause.”[1] Three days later, when the Central Bank had lost a quarter of its foreign exchange reserves trying to prop up the lira, the currency was allowed to float freely, giving way to a depreciation of the Turkish Lira by 40%. On March 2, after refusing to the take the blame for this crisis, Ecevit appointed Kemal Dervis, an economist who had worked for the World Bank for 23 years as Economic Minister. Dervis, whom many started to give him the nick-name, “Mustafa Kemal Dervis” in hope that he would “save Turkey” in the same regard as its founder “Mustafa Kemal Ataturk”, announced the “National Program for Adoption to the Acquis (NPAA) on March 19th. This plan, was established as a blueprint for reforms consisting of “targets” rather than concrete policy proposals. The coincide with the Copenhagen Criteria, which must be implemented before Turkey can begin accession talks with the European Union.[2] The underlying theme of the reform package announced by Dervis is a reduction in the role of the state in the economy.

The reforms also call for a reduction in the political autonomy, power, and influence of the Military. The reforms, calling for civilian control of the Military, “confronts the generals with the prospect of losing dominance of civilian affairs and their much less publicized but no less influential role in the country’s economy.”[3] Thus far, the nature of civil-military relations has created a legacy that reinforces and maintains a strong degree both direct and indirect influence over policy-makers and civil-society. However, in addition to the Military’s political autonomy, its independence in pursuing its economic interests also plays out in this powerful influence. Thus, if the current reform environment presents a direct threat to the Military’s security interests and political autonomy, are the Military’s financial interests and economic autonomy also subject to such threat? How will the Military’s influence over civil society be affected in light of these threats? Moreover, how will its economic interests play out in its influence over the greater society in light of the dynamics of its civil-military relations?

I argue that the growth of the independent economic power of the military is an important element characterizing the Turkish Military’s behavior, and assists it in retaining its institutional autonomy as well as both its direct and indirect influence in Turkish policy making. Moreover, in pursuing its economic interests, the Military is developing a stronger influence over the greater society, in order to maintain its influence and prestige. The Turkish Military, a state entity with ties to a private company, is attempting the fill in the gap between the public and private sphere, linking the two. However, in the end the Military is using its economic interests to influence civil society rather than linking the state and society.

These changing dynamics of the Military becomes obvious through an examination of the case of OYAK, the Military’s “Armed Forces Pension Fund”, which is growing into one of the largest holding companies in Turkey. It not only illustrates just how important it is that the Military preserve their financial ties, economic power, and autonomy, but also how this commercial endeavor allows it to influence civil society.

First, in order to examine the significance the Military’s economic interests, I provide a brief literature review of the current discussion regarding civil-military relations in Turkey, particularly during the latest economic crisis. The necessary socio-economic and theoretical discussion of Turkey’s military and civil society is then presented in order to better understand the dynamics of civil-military relations in Turkey. I then turn to the current situation in Turkey regarding the current political and economic reforms and criteria which the state is aiming to meet. Specifically, I will expand on the Military’s support and opposition of different aspects of the reform program. Finally, I present the case of OYAK, and show that while the Military is taking a “back seat” to the operation of OYAK, it still maintains the ability to influence the private commercial sector, and interact with the state on behalf of civil society. It is this position of being involved in the private sector, yet still being influential over the state, that allows it to maintain its economic autonomy and influence over civil society. Through this discussion, I hope to provide a better understanding of the importance of the Military’s economic interests to the changing dynamics of civil-military relations in Turkey and its relationship with the civil society.

Literature Review: The Source of Debate

Most of the literature concerning Turkey’s civil-military relations focuses on the Military’s political autonomy and the way that the Military’s security interests play out in its political influence in policy making.[4] It appears though that in the literature and academic research concerning the reforms being undertaken after the 2000/20001 crisis, that there is a literature gap concerning the financial interests and economic autonomy of the Turkish Military. Most of the literature comes from reports and opinion pieces in both the foreign and domestic press. However, even before the recent economic crisis and reform criteria, discussion on the economic interests of the Military in Turkey was lacking in comparison to the literature regarding the Military’s political interests.

What we do see though, is an indirect reference to the significance of economic autonomy and economic mechanisms to the Turkish Military’s power and influence. For instance, in Umit Sakallioglu’s discussion of the political autonomy of the military, she notes that since 1983 the military has used legal/constitutional, historical/cultural, and structural reasons and budgetary mechanisms to retain its privileged position in issuing demands, policy suggestions, and warnings on political matters.[5] Although she alludes to the use of economic mechanisms to preserve power as part of a direct or indirect influence, it does indicate some significance.

Gerassimos Karabelias demonstrates a similar economic reference in his study on the evolution of civil-military relations in Turkey from 1980-1995. He argues that there are certain elements that characterize the Military’s behavior and assist it in retaining its institutional autonomy as well as its superiority over politicians. Among these, is the growth of the independent economic power of the Military.[6]

Although not apparent in abundant literature, the issue of the “pure economic motivations” of the Turkish Military is one that can be debated. For example, in Gareth Jenkins recent study on “The Turkish Military and Politics” he argues “the military’s influence on policy is neither uniform nor total. It only attempts to exert influences in areas with, by its own definition, a security dimension. For example, it has shown little interest in economic policy.”[7] I disagree with Jenkins, and argue that while the Military in Turkey is concerned with protecting its political autonomy, and has intervened in economic issues when it relates to matters of national security, the Military also has an economic agenda. In order to preserve its role as the protector of Kemalism, the military is equally concerned with protecting its economic power.

Karabelias also mentions in his discussion of civil-military relations that that the Military’s economic activities have assisted not only in the increasing the degree of the political and financial autonomy of the officer corps from the civilian government , but also in developing closer, direct ties between the military establishment and leading industrialists in Turkey.[8] Therefore, a closer look at the Military’s economic interests is significant to understanding these dynamics especially in the current economic climate following the crisis.

Although there is a literature gap regarding the role of the Turkish Military in the private sector, new research regarding military business interests in other parts of the world is starting to come onto the stage.[9] Some of the recent observations regarding the interaction of the Military and private business interests in Indonesia and Latin America helps to explain the importance of the Turkish Military’s business and economic interests to its civil-military relations.

According to Peter Lock’s discussion on the changing economic role of the Military, he states that due to the changes in the international economic environment, the parameters of potential military roles in the economy are being forced to change. It is only closed economies that the military can still enter regular businesses, while in more open economies, the choices are limited to joint ventures with domestic or foreign enterprises.[10] Although his statement is based on his study of the effects of globalization on Indonesia and Latin American military regimes, it is definitely applicable in the case of Turkey. For not only is it the reforms of the Turkish Government that are provoking such changes in the economic environment, but economic reforms stipulated by international organizations such as the European Union, International Monetary Fund, or World Bank in both Turkey and the international economy, that are playing out in the changing role of the Military. It is then a combination of its relationship with society and the dynamics of both the international and economic environment, that allows the Turkish Military to pursue its economic interests and autonomy. These dynamics become clear examine the Military vis-à-vis the political-economic environment following the 2000/2001 economic crisis.

Finally, Taha Parla’s 1998 case-study of OYAK provides us with the appropriate academic approach to the case study as I will discuss later in this paper.[11] However, his study ended in 1998, and there have been significant changes in both the company and the economy since then. Parla concludes from the study that the Turkish Military together with OYAK, blurs of the boundary between the private and public spheres.[12] Yet, considering the recent crisis and movement towards reform, will the military continue to blur this boundary, or will the Military simply increase its influence over both the state and civil society? Clearly, a closer look at the economic interests of Turkey’s Military is necessary to fill this gap in the discourse regarding civil-military relations in Turkey.

  1. Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

In a generic sense, civil-military relations encompasses the whole array of interactions and relationships between the Military and different segments of society in which they co-exist and operate.[13] In Turkey, the Military’s interests and influence is not only rooted in its relationship with the political elite, but rooted in its relationship with the Turkish society. Therefore, in order to better understand the dynamics of civil-military relations in Turkey, it is important to underline some of the important theoretical and historical characteristics of the Military’s relationship with the greater civil society. I will first discuss these dynamics in the theoretical context of state-civil society relations in Turkey followed by a look at how this relationship plays out in the public perception of the Military.

The Theoretical Context of Turkish Civil-Military Relations

When discussing the issue of civil society in the Middle East, Turkey is listed among the few examples where “…civil society has developed with remarkable rapidity, emphasizing yet again that the chronology of political change is dramatically telescoped in the late twentieth century”.[14] However, as Ersin Kalaycioglu’s study of “Civic Culture in ‘Secular’ Turkey” reveals, a “fragmented civil society” is actually present. For instance, in Turkey, “the overall rate of membership in voluntary associations seems to be quite low, hovering around 7% of the population for all associations….”[15] Thus, only a small minority of the population is taking part in this civil society. These associations are not only lacking in numbers, but lack in its strength to act as the “buffer” between the people and the state. Therefore, it would seem obvious that civil society in Turkey must further develop in order to meet its democratic ideals. But to what extent can the Turkish Republic afford a stronger and more widespread civil society? Can the state pursue a strong political structure while allowing more voluntary associations, or more “civic mindedness” of the population to grow and gain influence in the state? In Norton’s discussion of civil society in the Middle East, he notes Sadowski’s observation that societies in the Middle East are so powerful that they can overpower the state.[16] Similarly, Nilufer Gole argues that “civil society is thus expected to be a force of resistance and opposition to political state power. However, it is precisely this over politicization of civil society that hinders democratization.”[17] A government that has too much central power though, loses its democratic ideals. Yet, in order for the state and civil society to interact with one another, must it be a zero-sum game? Is there not an ideal “balance” of control between the two spheres? These are the questions which Turkey’s Military are struggling to answer as it is torn between its fight to maintain its influence over civil-society, advocating a strong civil-society as stipulated by the European Union. Therefore, in order to better understand these questions, we must look towards a broader concept of the dynamics of state-society relations.

In The Collapse of the Weimer Republic, a response to Robert D. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, Sheri Berman argues that “not only did participation in civil society organizations fail to contribute to republican virtue, but it in fact subverted it”.[18] Her argument here is specifically targeted at Robert D. Putnam’s study of “Italy’s regional experiment”. As he discusses how the differing social context and history of the northern and southern regions of Italy shape the performance of institutions, he concludes, “Toqueville was right: Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society”.[19] She points out that Putnam fails to see the consequence of strong participation in volunteer associations as weakening necessary political parties and political structure. Berman supports her argument by attributing strong associations to corroding the necessary political parties and political structure needed for a state to survive, such as in Germany. Furthermore, in terms of the importance of having specifically “horizontal structured associations”, Berman notes that these will not have a positive effect unless you have the strong institutions.[20]

Although the argument stems from observations made about two Western states, Italy and Germany, it does bear relevance to the discussion of civil society and the state in Turkey, and the Military’s concern for maintaining its influence.. In Binnaz Toprak’s study, he agrees with Régis Debray that civil society can pose a threat to “the free expression of individuality”.[21] Civil society can pose this threat because “as the state recedes…the stage may not be left to the free individual, but is likely to be dominated by religious authorities, ethnic clans, the mafia, the mass media and financial "feudalities."[22] Thus, while a move towards decentralization in Turkey can open the door towards an increase in the quality of civil society, not having enough influence over civil-society, may do more harm than good. As Berman argues, this is the consequence of having too strong of a civil society, as the case in Germany. Therefore, it is obvious that a certain balance in the strength of the state and the strength of voluntary associations, is necessary in order for Turkey to further develop its democracy.

In order achieve this “balance” in state power and the strength of civil society, some argue that the state should be allowed to further develop a framework for civil society. Although, this may seem contrary to the concept of “voluntary associations,” some sort of framework may help to keep civil society “vigorous” without taking too much power from the political structure. Furthermore, many would argue that the state is already too strong, and this power plays out in the obstacles faced by Islamic or ethnic groups trying to form associations in Turkey. However, the state needs to have a role in the formation of civil society so that civil society can be defined as a separate domain from the state but nevertheless function under its universal rules.[23]

To achieve this balance and help develop civil society, the state can take a role in helping to develop other important elements of civil society. For instance, the state can help to develop a thriving economy and private commercial interests in order to increase the development of civil society. Although, [24]Putnam demphasizes the importance of economics to defining civil society as “…civic norms and networks are not simply froth on the waves of economic progress”.[25] However, Putnam does observe that civic engagements contributes to economic prosperity and are in turn reinforced by that prosperity.[26] Montesqiuieu makes a similar argument in that cities, as a result of expanding trade and commerce, will become civilized. As new forms of wealth is generated and becomes mobilized, increased accountabilitry will civilize “the barbarians”.[27] Likewise, Khaldun and Serif Mardin discuss how the notions of civil society play out in the economic or commercial dynamics of the state. Khaldoun’s commercial observations focus on the impact of excessive taxation and how this can lead to the demise of the dynasty.[28] He does argue though that “[c]ivilization and its well-being as business prosperity depend on productivity and people’s efforts in all directions in their own interest and profit.”[29] Therefore, the individual’s economic interest will play out in their participation in society. Likewise, Mardin also argues that commercial activity contribute to the core of civil society, as civil society emerges from the city, the center of commerce. Mardin discusses how the development of the merchants and commerce gave way for the development of city government in Western urban history. However, it is the notion that “…political rights and obligations stemmed from property” that is important to note here.[30] Rather than having a single ruler to dictate commercial dynamics, these capitalist interests played out in the civic participation or self-government of the individual, giving rise to civil society’s "political legitimation".[31]